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ABBREVIATIONS IN FOOTNOTES. 
In the footnotes of this work the abbreviation op-cit. 
is used to refer to a book and the abbreviation loc. cit. to 
an article in a periodical, or an essay in a collection of 
essays where the full title of the book, article, or essay 
has been cited in an earlier footnote. Where more than 
one book, article, or essay by the same author is referred 
to during the course of the work a shortened title is used 
after the first reference, to make clear to which work the 
particular footnote refers. 
1 
INTRODUCTORY. 
Writing in 1935 Professor R. A. Humphreys observed that the 
activities of mercantile groups in England during the American 
Revolutionary period had not been explored and that there was 
a need to know more about the relations between trade and 
1 
politics and the formation of policy. Later scholars, notably 
Dr. Lucy Sutherland who has explored the relationship between 
mercantile groups and the first Rockingham administration and 
2 
the part played by the City and East India Company in politics 
and Professor Sosin who has assessed the mercantile influence 3 
on British colonial policy between 1763 and 1775 have begun 
to supply the need to which professor Humphreys drew attention. 
This thesis attempts a further contribution in this field, 
investigating the relations between the Duke of Newcastle, 
4 
the Marquis of Rockingham and mercantile classes in London 
and the provinces during the years 1761-1768 with particular 
reference to American affairs. By doing this it is hoped to 
1. "British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution" by 
R. A. Humphreys, History, Vol. XIX, London, 1934-35, pp. 46,48. 
By 1760 merchants were specialising in different branches 
of trade and thus it becomes possible to distinguish 
American merchants. 
2. See particularly "Edmund Burke and the First Rockingham 
Ministry" by L. S. Sutherland English Historical Review. Vol. 
XLVIV, London, 1932, pp"46-72. "The City of London and the 
Devonshire-Pitt Administration 1756-1757" by L. S. Sutherland, 
Raleigh Lecture in History, 1960 Proceeds s of the British 
Academy, Oxford 1961, pp. 147-193; The City of London and he 
Opposition to Government 11168-17'14 by L. S. Sutherland, The 
Creighton Lecture in History 1958s London 1959; The East 
India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics by L. S. Su erland, 
Oxford 1952. 
3. Agents and Merchants by Jack M. Sosin, Lincoln (Nebraska) 1965" 
4. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (ed. VJ. Little, H. W. 
Fowler, J. Coulson, Oxford 1933.. Vol. l, p. 1235) defines a 
2 
gain an overall picture for a limited period of the relations 
between the merchants and one political group both when they 
were in and out of office. Beginning with the fall of Pitt 
from office in October 1761 and ending with the death of 
Newcastle in November 1768 this work attempts to trace the 
relationship of Pitt's partner, Newcastle, and his political 
heir Rockingham, with the merchants, particularly those trading 
to America, and to assess the effect that mercantile opinion 
the 
and commercial considerations had upon/party which came to be 
called the Rockingham Whigs and also upon the American policy 
of this party. In particular from the point where the 
5 
'monied interest' supported the Duke of Newcastle, and the 
"lcont merchant as : - 
"(a one who buys and sells commodities for profit; 
orig(inally) gen(eral) but early restricted to 
wholesale traders, esp(ecilly) those trading with 
foreign countries. 
(b) a shopkeeper. 
In the eighteenth century the term merchant was confined 
to a wholesale trader and it is in this sense that the term 
is used in this work. These traders dealt in a wide variety 
of goods although they could specialise in one or a few 
varieties. 
In his major historical works Sir Lewis Namier defines 
merchants as widely as possible, comprehending within the 
classification anyone connected with trade including bankers, 
and manufacturers but excluding country gentlemen who owned businesses and ran them as a "side-line". or subsidiary interest. Gerritt P"Judd, however, in attempting a detailed 
classification of the composition of the House of Commons defines merchants as narrowly as possible and places in 
other categories anybody who was not a businessman "trading 
within England as well as with Europe and continental America" See The Structure of Politics at the Accession 
of George III by Sir Lewis Namier, 2nd edn. London 1957, p. 49 and Members of Parliament 1734-1832 by Gerritt P. Judd, IV, New Haven U. S. A. 1965 p. 89 et assim. By the use of the term mercantile classes I hope to make it quite clear that the definition of the word merchant for the purpose of this thesis is as broad as possible, and 
3 
commercial interest William Pitt this thesis endeavours to 
trace the emergence of the American merchants as a separate 
group in politics at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis, the 
cementing of the alliance of this group with the Rockingham 
Whigs, and the gradual loss of the support of the 'monied interest' 
with the entry of the party into opposition and the death of 
Newcastle in 1768. In the process it is hoped to do something 
to dispel the notion that Rockingham himself was a mere 
nonentity and that Burke was the real driving force behind the 
Rockingham Whigs, for Rockingham's ability in political affairs 
and his assiduity and political conscientiousness are often 
apparent in his dealings with the mercantile classes. In 1766 
in A Short Account of a Late Short Administration Burke stated 
that the first Rockingham administration 
"was the first which proposed and encouraged publick 
meetings and free consultations of merchants from all 
parts of the kingdom; by which means the truest lijfhts 
have been received; great benefits have been already 
derived to manufactures and commerce, and the most exten- 
sive prospects are opened for further improvement. " 6 
4 cont means, as in Namier s definition, a man whose main 
method of getting his living was by wholesale trade of some kind. 
5. Dr. Sutherland has drawn a distinction between the merchants 
of London who were primarily interested in trade but who 
were also interested in financing the government, and the 'momied interest' who-were chiefly interested in government finance. See "The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration 1756-1757" Raleigh Lecture in History 1960, loc. cit. pp. 148,164,166" 
6-The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Loncddn 1815, Vol. II, p. 4,. 
-- -- -i 
4 
and in his Speech on His Arrival at Bristol 1774 he said 
"I have ever had my house open, and my poor services 
ready, for traders and manufacturers of every 
de nominat ion. " 
and that 
"Commerce.... has ever been a very particular and a very 
favourite object of my study, in its principles, and 
in its details. " 7 
It is thus interesting to investigate the relations 
between the merchants and the party which claimed to represent 
them, especially in the years 1'161-1768 for 1763 is generally 
accepted as the climax of the first British Empire, essentially 
a mercantile empire, and the years 1763-1768 saw the beginnings 
of the contest which was to bring this empire crashing in ruins.! 
Contemporaries and histoaians of the period have 
acknowledged that this was a period of rising mercantile 
representation in the House of Commons. Thus as well as 
noting the effect of the mercantile alliance on the Rockingham 
Whigs it is interesting to note the influence and effect of 
the alliance with the Rockingham Whigs on the careers of the 
merchants concerned, and to assess what they hoped to gain 
and did gain through alliance with the Rockingham Whigs. 
All the political groups of the era had their following 
of merchant members of Parliament, but there were other 
merchants outside Parliament with whom Newcastle and 
Rockingham discussed political affairs especially when the 
7. Ibid. Vol. III, p. 8. 
8" See "The Stamp Act in British Politics" by W. T. Laprade, 
American Historical Review Vol. XXXV, No. 4, New York 1930 
P. 735. Members of Parliament 1734-1832 by Gerritt P. Judd, 
IV, New Haven, U. S. A. 1955, p. 89, et passim. 
5 
issue was of a politico-economic nature. At times, if not 
always intentionally, Newcastle and Rockingham called on expert 
opinion on matters of trade about which they desired more 
information. Sometimes, indeed, mercantile experts seem to 
have formed their advice upon Rockingham and Newcastle,. The 
9 
Stamp Act Crisis is an admirable example of both circumstances. 
Contact upon matters of trade with the Rockingham Whigs 
often seem to have led to a merchant embarking upon a political 
career, if he had not already done so. In many cases the 
merchants concerned were drawn under the political wing of the 
Newcastle-Rockingham group, but in others the merchants 
concerned stayed outside politics, sometimes they were only 
consulted once, but sometimes they became advisers to the 
Rockingham Whigs on one particular aspect of trade. 
See y Barlow Trecotn1cx anct ozner Associates or Lord. 
Rockingham during the Stamp Act Crisis 1765-66 unpublished 
M. A. thesis in Sheffield University Library 1957, especially 
the introduction, conclusion and section on Trecothick. 
Also my "Barlow Trecothick" in Bulletin of the British 
Association for American Studies New eries Nos-1 and 2. 
Nottingham, 1958-1959, pp. 36-49 No. 1) 29-39 (No-2). 
i 
t 
I 
6 
THE RI 
0 
ATION IN THE HOUSE OF 
After the general election of 1754 contemporaries noted 
that in the new Parliament there would be a greater number of 
10 
merchants than ever before. Mr. John B. Owen lists forty. -one 
merchants who were in Parliament in 1741 and states that at 
least eighteen of these ranged themselves behind the opposition 
11 
leaders. As'nearly half of the merchants according to Owen's 
classification were willing to oppose the government there is 
some justification for concluding that Rockingham and Newcastle 
had a mercantile following even when out of office and that 
merchants were not always prepared to support administration 
for economic gain. 
Sir Lewis Namier states that fifty merchants were elected 
to Parliament in the 1761 general election and thirty-seven of 
12 
these had extensive business dealings with the government. 
Although Namier does not list the names of the fifty men that 
he classifies as merchants, the names of at least thirty can 
be discovered from the pages immediately following this state- 
ment and from the appropriate pages in his England in the Age 
13 
of the American Revolution. It is not clear whether Namier's 
and Owen's classifications agree and neither appear to agree 
14 
with Judd, so it is impossible to'draw any definite conclusions 
10. See Laprade loc. cit. p. 735 quoting Public Advertiser, 8 May 
1754. 
11. The Rise of the Pelham's by John B. Owen, London, 1957 p. 59. 
12. Nam er off. cit. pp. 48-49* 
13. Ibid. pp. 49-58. See also England in the Age of the American 
Revolution, by Sir Lewis Namier, 2nd edn", London 1961, 
p. 241 et seg. 
14. op. cit-"'ap ssim. 
7 
on the proportionate rise in the number of merchants in the 
House of Commons between 1741 and 1761 due to the difficulty in 
obtaining a common classification. Judd, however, provides the 
15 
following analysis of M. P's with commercial interests 
Bankers 
Manufacturers 
Nabobs 
India Interest 
West Indies Merchants 
West Indies Interest 
Merchantb 
Total 
Names appearing in more than 
one classification 
Net Total 
1754 1761 1768 
13 13 10 
- 1 2 
4 5 15 
9 10 8 
4 4 3 
16 20 19 
24 23 29 
70 76 86 
2 2 1 
68 74 85 
These figures, although they differ substantially from those 
quoted by Owen and Namier do show a progressive rise in 
commercial representation during the period covered by this 
16 
thesis, and if the Nabobs and manufacturers are disregarded 
an approximAtionto Namier' s figures for 1761 is reached. 
Judd assigns an many merchants as possible to other groups 
thus leaving in his 'merchant' category those engaged in what 
17 
he describes as "miscellaneous business pursuits". He states 
that it is difficult to differentiate between merchants and 
bankers in the early years of the eighteenth century but 
tentatively concludes that banking was emerging as an entirely 
18 
separate profession by 1750" A nabob Judd defines as It a British 
citizen who had lived in the Orient usually but not always in 
19 
the East India Company's service and mainly for profit... *" 
10. uff. citi. p. tty. 
16. For the year 1741 when Owen quotes 41 Judd' s total is 68.1 17., Judd M. Sit. p. 59.18. Ibid. P. 61.19. Ibid. p. 64. 
L 
His definition of members in the India interest, which includes 
East India Company Directors, large shareholders and shipowners 
20 
has more of a commercial flavour. Judd also states that his 
"members in the West India Interest" were mainly absentee owners 
21 
of Caribbean estates. 
According to the definition of merchant accepted for use 
it is perhaps not technically correct to include in Judd's 
classification bankers, manufacturers and nabobs as members of 
the mercantile classes and it is the rise (300 per cent between 
1761 and 1'168) in the number of Nabobs sitting that mainly 
account for the rise in commercial members during these years. 
However it can be seen that there was a rise in the number of 
merchants between 11161 and 1768, slighter than it looks at (first 
sight but still significant. 
This expansion in mercantile representation corresponds 
with the growth of trade that was going on at this time. Professor 
Werner Schlote notes that before 1776 British foreign trade 
increased slowly and that there was considerable fluctuation due 
to wars. After the War of American Independence Professor 
Schlote contends that this rate. of increase was much greater. 
He argues that it is the 'rate of expansion' of trade that is 
really important, defining this as the growth of overseas trade 
in relation to the size of the population, for, Professor Schlote 
contends, there is a genuine growth only if such growth is 
greater than the population. He prints the statistics in the 
table overleaf comparing growth in the literal sense with the 
20" Ibid. . b5. P 21. Ibid. p. 6?. 
9 
.r 
rate-of expansion. Some correlation between this rate of 
expansion and the slight increase in mercantile representation 
can be noticed. 
Tables of Annual Average Percentage Increase in the 'Rate of 
Growth' and the 'Rate of expansion' of volume of British 
Overseas Trade. 22 
(a) Rate of Growth 
Imports. Exports. Re-exports. Turnover. 
V00-3370 1.2 1.2 1.2 
1? 80-1800 5.5 6.1 - 5.8 
(b) Rate of Expansion. 
Imports. Exports. Re-exports. Turnover. 
1700-]7'ro 
1? &sO-1800 
0.7 
2.6 
0.7 
3.2 
- 0. 
- 3. 
7 
0 
In an era of heightened interest in scientific and indus- 
trial matters which acted as a prelude to the rapid increase of 
industrialisation which was to take place at the end of the 
eighteenth century and in an era when the first British Empire, 
essentially a mercantile empire, was coming to its climax, 
the 
rise in mercantile representation is scarcely surprising. 
But 
the increase of representation, as will be seen, cannot be 
disassociated from 
the increasing contact between the Newcastle 
See -%-- . Ll"U-n zne iiuu, s hv L11G . Laiv .+ 
by Werner Schlote, transltd by W. a. Henderson and W. H. Chalonsr" 
oxford 1952, PP. 41-42. 
ýý 
10 
and Rockingham Whigs and the mercantile classes. 
Through entering Parliament merchants often hoped to gain 
government contracts, and through long service in the House, 
social advancement for their families, although there were 
some exceptions to this as some merchants were genuinely 
interested and more active in the political stiheres than was 
necessary for their own social and economic advancement, for 
men are often motivated by other principles and ideals than 
those which concern their own pockets, they were generally far 
more interested in becoming landed gentry than in a political 
23 
career. 
As a result the association of Newcastle and Rockingham 
with a merchant was often short-lived and contact with particular 
merchants lasted for only a certain political period, and when 
another political crisis emerged and different political and 
economic factors were involved Newcastle and Rockingham might 
be found to be associated with an entirely different commercial 
group. Rockingham and Newcastle came into contact with merchants 
because they desired help in the political sphere. The merchants 
for the most part demanded help in the economic sphere. So a 
politico-economic alliance led to the advantage of both parties, 
both had something to give and both hoped to gain something. 
Thus the bulk of the merchants turned to the Rockingham Whigs 
when in opposition only when they despaired of the administration, 
23. See Namier, Structure of Politics pp. 46-51; England in the 
Age of the American Revolution PP. 5-6; George III and the 
Politicians by R. Pares, Oxford 1953, pp"15-16,193. 
1 
- -- - -- -1- -- J 
11 
because opposition leaders had few rewards to bestow. Some 
merchants, however, who were motivated by principle, adhered 
consistently to the alliance with the Rockingham Whigs. 
12 
THE MERCANTILE ASSOCIATES OF ROCKIIdGH M, NEVVCASTLE AND BURKE. 
If it is possible to gain some idea of the extent of the 
increase of mercantile representation from Judd's figures, then 
it would seem possible to gain some idea of the mercantile 
contacts of Rockingham, Newcastle and Burke, Rockingham's 
secretary, by making a comparison between the men who appear in 
Judd's list as members of the commercial classes and the corres- 
pondents of Rockingham, Newcastle and Burke. 
Table I. 24 
Newcastle's Mercantile Corres ondents. 
(Members of Parliament only) 
1761-68. 
Bankers 14 
Manufacturers - 
Nab ob s4 
India Interest 5 
West India Merchants 3 
West India Interest 7 
Merchants 18 
Total 51 
Table II. 
Rocki ham's Mercantile Correa ondents. 
(Members of Parliament only 
Bankers 
Manufacturers 
Nabobs 
India Interest 
West India Merchants 
West India Interest 
Merchants 
Total 
1761-68. 
3 
2 
1 
3 
3 
12 
13 
Table III. 
Burke's Mercantile Correspondents. 
lembers of Parliament only)- 
1761-68. 
Bankers - Manufacturers - Nab ob s1 
India Interest 1 
West India Merchants - 
West India Interest - 
Merchants - 
Total 2 
Although these tables have obvious limitations as some 
letters are obviously missing and others may not be about 
commercial matters some worthwhile conclusion still seems to 
emerge. 
Firstly, if the totals in these tables are compared with 
the total numbers of the mercantile members in Parliament as 
25 
shown in the tables above it may be seen that Newcastle, Rocking- 
ham and Burke must have corresponded with a large proportion 
of the mercantile members relative to the size of their party. 
Newcastle obviously corresponded with far more of the mercantile 
classes than either Rockingham or Burke. This, no doubt, was 
because he was in power for so long, was closely connected with 
matters of government finance and with matters of patronage.; 
Secondly, a deficiency in manufacturers may be noted in 
all three tables. This must be correlated with the small 
24. These tables are compiled from a comparison of M. P's listed 
as members of the mercantile classes with in Table I the 
index of correspondents in Catalogue of Additions to the 
Manuscripts in the British Museum 1882-1887 London, 1889, in 
Table Ilnthe index of correspondents in Guide to the Manu- 
scripts Collection in the Sheffield City LibrariestSheffieldp 
1956, pp-87-96,, in Table III the alphabetical 1st of 
correspondents in A Checklist of the Correspondence of 
Edmund Burke by T. W. Copeland and M. S. Smith,, Cambridge 1955. 
_ 
2 5' See above pp. 6-1. 
14 
number of manufacturers in Parliament during this period under 26 
consideration. It is not true to say, however, that this proves 
that Newcastle, Rockingham and Burke were not interested in 
industry. 
Thirdly, among the correspondents of Newcastle the 
predominance of bankers and merchants is obvious. Newcastle 
was closely connected with bankers and merchants through the 
raising of government loans and contracts. 
Rockingham seems to have corresponded with few bankers. 
This is probably due to the fact that he was not really concerned 
with government finance as he was in opposition for a great 
part of his political career. The fact that Burke's correspon- 
dents are fewer than Rockingham' s points to the fact that 
Rockingham was leader of the party and it was therefore with him 
that the mercantile classes corresponded rather than with Burke. 
There appears to be little difference either between the type 
of merchant who corresponded with Burke as compared with 
Rockingham or the business with which the correspondence was 
concerned. 
Unfofbtunately Judd has no classification of American 
merchants, so it is impossible to tell how strong tb V were in 
support of Rockingham and Burke but very few West India merchants 
supported Newcastle, Rockingham or Burke. As the North American 
and West Indian mercantile groups were often opposed this may 
well be due to the fact that these politicians were often in 
alliance with the American merchants. 
2F). See above p. 
15 
At this point it seems fitting to discuss the differences 
in character between the mercantile following of Newcastle and 
that of Rockingham. Whereas Newcastle was interested in secur- 
ing and maintaining the allegiance of the trading and mercantile 
classes in general, as a statesman who was in office for the 
greater part of his political career, and as the statesman who 
was responsible for government finance during the Seven years 
War, he was particularly interested in maintaining the support 
of the greater merchants who in many cases held government 
contracts and who were the government financiers. On the other 
hand Rockingham was only in office for two short periods during 
his political career and neither of these periods was long 
enough for him to build up systematic contact with a group of 
government financiers, nor were the measures of Economical 
Reform, (especially Clerk's Act) during the second Rockingham 
administration conduc/ive to winning the support of the 
27 
mercantile classes. These measures must have seemed to have 
struck at the heart of the eighteenth century financial system 
and been anathema to the government financiers, for in the past 
the merchant in Parliament, who financed the government, had 
28 
very often held lucrative contracts. Government financiers were 
7. For these measures see The Second Rockingham Administration 
by Derek Wall (unpublished M. A. thesis in Sheffield 
University Library 1956) p"175 et seg. See also Shelburne 
and Reform by John Norris, London, 1963, pp"226-228 where 
it is stated that Clerk's Act demoralised existing contractors 
and encouraged new competitors and Wilkes Wyvill and Reform 
by Ian R" Christie, London, 1962 p. 152 where it is stated 
that Clerk's Act affected only about 20 merchants, most of 
whom preferred to keep their seats andxsign their contracts. 
28. See Namier Structure of Politics pp. 48-58. 
16 
mainly interested in seeking rewards for their political services 
and neither of these measures would encourage them to seek these 
rewards from the Rockingham Whigs. Moreover, in opposition 
before 1765, the "Wildurans" group led by Rockingham were interested 
in using their mercantile supporters as a pressure group to 
29 
assist opposition tactics. During the first Rockingham adminis- 
tration, R9ckingham and his colleagues were again more interested 
in using the merchants as a pressure group to secure the repeal 
30 
of the Stamp Act and the passing of related commercial measures. 
The reward of the merchants was to be in the results of the 
legislation itself. 
The same situation persisted after 1766 when Rockingham 
went out of office. Again he was pre-occupied in using the 
merchants as a pressure group to embarrass the government. His 
use of the petitions of the merchants who traded to America 
31 
especially in 17,10 and 1775 is typical of these tactics. As in 
1765 and 1766 the reward of the merchants was to be the removal 
of the present government, Rockingham's accession to power and 
what he considered to be a more enlightened commercial p1licy. 
If one accepts the division of the mercantile classes 
32 
adopted by Mr-David Reid, Newcastle's interest in the merchants 
embraced all three categories, but he was especially interested 
D. See below pp. - 30. See below P. 323 etsece 
31. See below p"4 - 
32. For this classification of mercantile opinion see "An Analysis 
of British Parliamentary Opinion on American Affairs at the 
Close of the War of Independence" by D. S. Reid, Journal of 
Modern History, Vol"XIX, No. 3, Chicago 1946, pp. 212-214. 
17 
in the first, the greater merchants, who generally sat in 
Parliament and whose aims were government contracts or social 
advancement. Rockingham, however, was more concerned with the 
other two categories, firstly the smaller merchants in Parlia- 
ment whose interests were mainly local, and secondly the great 
mass of the merchants, often less wealthy, outside Parliament 
who often co-operated with each other to petition Parliament 
for the sake of trade. 
PART I. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
"t 
18 
CHAPTER I. 
AMERICAN TRADE AND MERCANTILE PRESSURE. 
The use of mercantile pressure to secure the repeal of the 
Stamp'Act by 
1 
the first Rockingham admimistration is generally 
acknowrledgedv but most modern authorities make only passing 
reference to the economic slump in Britain during the period 
2 
of the Stamp Act Crisis. Indeed there is still a lingering 
impression that the Rockingham administration exaggerated 
3 
mercantile distress for their own political ends. Yet this was 
the only occasion during the Revolutionary period when English 
merchants were successful in co-operating with and putting 
pressure on an administration to secure the nullification of 
legislation considered detrimental to their commerce with the 
American colonies. Never again were the merchants so vociferous. 
Never was mercantile agitation so highly organised. 
It is interesting to examine Britain's commerce with 
the American colonies during the Revolutionary period in the 
light of these circumstances considering whether they can be 
partly explained by changes in the relative values and importance 
of the trade or whether it was purely as Burke claimed, that 
the merchants received more consideration from the Rockingham 
4 
administration than from any o'ther These issues also raise 
I. See for instance The Stamp Act Crisis, Prologue to Revolution 
by H. G. and H. M. Morgan, Chapel Hill, 1953, pp" 2b4,271-272; 
British Politics and the American Revolution by C. R. Ritcheson, 
No*nAN 195, pp. 46-49,60; "Edmund Burke and the First R ck i ham Mini st it bvL . Sutherland, loc. cit. pp. 36-72. 2. C" Mor an 
, 
off. cit. pý. 26 -25. Ritcheson - if. p. 47. 30 Cf. Morgan 
, off. cit0 pp. 254,259,271,272,280-281; Ori ins of the American Revolution by J. S. Miller, Boston 194p. 155 
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the questions of economic factors as a contributary reason for 
the ineffective opposition of the Rockingham Whigs after 1? 66 
and the effect economic circumstances had on the relations 
between the American merchants and the Rockingham Whigs. 
Five ports in the eighteenth century were chiefly ehgaged 
in trade with the American colonies. These were London, Bristol, 
Liverpool, Whitehaven and Glasgow. In or near these ports were 
warehouses where merchandise was collected and later shipped 
to America. 
Textiles, especially woollen goods, were important in this 
trade and by the time of the War of Independence there was a 
growing tendency for this export trade in cloth to concentrate 
on London. By 1777 London shipped out more woollen goods than 
all the other ports in England combined. Besides this many 
other English and continental goods passed through London, 
besides those goods that were made in the neighbourhood of 
the capital itself. Glasgow specialised in importing rum , sugar 
and-tobacco and in exporting Scottish goods. Whitehaven, the 
least of the five ports, exported cheaper and inferior quality 
goods of the same nature that London supplied. Liverpool was 
the outlet for Lancashire cloths, Staffordshire pottery and 
-metal goods from Sheffield and Birmingham, and Bristol exported 
pottery, nails, salt, cheese and the products of the west of 
5 
England woollen industry. 
G. "A Short A ccount of a Late Short Administration by Edmund 
Burke in Works Vol.. II, p. 4. 
5" See It The Import Trade of Colonial Virginia" by C. B. Coulter 
(, 1nr) in William and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, Vol. II, No. 3, 
Williamsburgh Va, 1945, pp-296-298. For a general account of 
20 
Under the old colonial system the value of colonies was 
measured on a commercial standard. Up to the middle of the 
eighteenth century the ideal colony was regarded as that which 
furnished goods that Great Britain could not produce herself. 
The West Indies and the south continental colonies conformed 
more closely with this pattern than the middle and New England 
6 
colonies. Although the latter were a valuable link in the 
trade with the former and their production of foodstuffs and 
carrying trade was valuable to the West Indies and south contin- 
ental colonies, they exported little to the mother country 
except mast timber for the navy and they could supply little 
that Great Britain had to buy from abroad. Thus the West Indies 
and south continental colonies were considered to be of much It 
greater value than the middle and New England colonies. 
By the time of the Peace of Paris 1't63, however, circuim- 
stances were altering a little. England was ceasing to be a 
regular exporter of wheat and the industrialist, becoming of 
greater importance, emphasized the view that the colonies should 
furnish a market for the mother country's manufactured goods. 
The West Indies with its slowly increasing population could 
not offer so large a market for British manufactures as the 
mainland colonies which were rapidly expanding. Moreover the 
(contd)the value of colonial trade see "A Quantitive Approach 
to the study of the effects of British Imperial Policy upon 
Colonial Welfare, Some Preliminary Findings" by R. P. Thomas, 
in The Journal of Economic History Vol.. XXV, Nerr York, 19b5, 
p. 615 et seg. 
6" For an estimation of the value of the west Indies as colonies 
and their trade with other colonies see Capitalise and Slavery by E. W1lliams, London 1964, pp. 51-57,108. 7. See England and America - Rivals in the American Revolution 4 
__ 
by C. H. Van Tyne, Cambridge 19271p. -55. 
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textile industry was among the first to develop and the North 
American colonies were especially valuable as a market for this 
industry, for continental Europe could supply itself with woollen 
goods and there was only a small market in the tropical West 
Indies. Finally the landed classes because they owned land and 
sheep were interested in the woollen industry, and the Peace of 
Paris, when Britain kept Canada and returned Guadeloupe to the 
French was a triumph for the industrialist and landed gent&eman 
8 
rather than the merchant. 
The changing attitude of the industrialists and landed 
interest towards the North American mainland colonies was, 
however, bound to be reflected by the merchants. They had to 
sell the goods to the North American market and it was the 
British export trade that was most affected by British political 
measures and American resistance. The merchants no doubt 
hoped to make significant profit from the new development in 
the American trade, but before the trade really had time to 
mature it was adversely affected by the measures that led up to 
the War of American Independence, for less than two years after 
the definitive peace treaty of 1763 was signed George Grenvillh'S 
American Stamp Act was passed in 1765. 
The trade of Great Britain with the North American mainland 
See British Colonial Policy 1Y54-1766 by 0. L. Beer, New York, 
1907, pp. 134-140 where Beer states that up to 1750 colonies 
were not really considered important as markets, but it is 
interesting to note that Joshua Gee in his The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered London 1'129, p. 21 
was considering the colonies valuable as markets. See also The Mississi p4 Valley in British Politics by C. W. Alvord, 
Cleveland U. S. A. 1917, Vol. 1, p. 45 et seg. 
22 
colonies during the period of the American Revolution was thus 
altering in characteristics and importance and because the trade 
had not been of a constant volume for a number of years it was 
impossible for the merchants to assess the precise effect of 
British political measures for they found it difficult to quote 
figures for a normal year. This became obvious from\he evidence 
the merchants trading to America gave before the Stamp Act 
9 
Committee. In trying to assess the precise importance of the 
trade with the North American colonies the changing nature of 
the trade if not invalidating all statistics does therefore 
mean that they should be treated with reservation, and one 
cannot gain any picture of how great the trade would have been 
between 1760 and 1780 without the interruption of the War of 
Independence by comparing trading figures with those of the two 
previous decades. 
During the Seven Years War exports to America were main- 
tained at an artificially high level because of the capture of 
French possessions and markets especially in the West Indies, 
10 
and becuse of shipments to British forces overseas. At the 
end of the war the American market was the only expanding market 
for British merchants and the Stamp Act came into operation 
before trade had time to adjust itself properly to the new 
9. Sheffi&ld City Library, Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, 
Rockingham Papers (hereinafter abbreviated to Wlii) R27 
'Minutes of the evidence before the Stamp Act Coimnittee' 
particularly the evidence of Barlow Trecothick pp. 21,28. 
I am grateful to the Earl Fitzwilliam and the Trustees of the Wentworth Woodhouse Settled Estates for allowing me to use these documents. The evidence is part-printed in English Historical Documents Vol. IX, American Colonial 
Documents to 17'16 ed. M. Jensen, London 1955, pp. 686-691. 
23 
peace-time conditions and during the temporary recession at the 
11 
end of the war. This made its effect doubly hard. Indeed the 
reason why the effects of the Stamp Act seem to have been felt 
by the merchants more than any other American measure taken by 
the British government appears to have been the peculiar nature 
of economic forces in operation at the time. There were no 
alternative markets open for the goods that should have been 
sent to America, trade had not yet fully adjusted itself to 
peace, and to find the American market almost completely cut 
off was a disastrous situation for the merchant. There was no 
alleviating factor at all whereas in the succeeding crises 
there were always compensating factors. Moreover, to make 
things worse, British merchants had taken advantage of the 
recent peace to increase their sales in America by one-third 
12 
between 1763 and 1765, and the most uncompromisingly solid 
opposition that the Americans ever presented to an Act of 
13 
Parliament was to the Stamp Act. 
There is a difference of opinion over the precise effects 
of the Stamp Act. Professor Ashton has cited figures of 
exports from Great Britiain to America that show that there 
was a steady but slight decline from 1764 to 1766 and 
10. Economic Fluctuations in Engian1 i'(UU-. L UU oy 1.5. Asnton, 
London, 1960, p. 60. 
11. Ibld" pp. 61,165. 
12. An Historical and Chronological Deduction of the origins 
of Commerce by jfý"Anderson, London 1787, Vol. I, pp" 55-56,78- 
13. The British Empire before the American Revolution by L. H. 
Gipson, Vol. X, New York 1961, p. 365. 
24 
Schlesinger has put forward the argument that 'the adoption 
of non-importation agreements added no new difficulty to the 
situation already existing' for trade with America had steadily 
been declining since 1764 due to the restrictive commercial 
measures of the British government, and London merchants were 
noting a decline in the trade with America as early as July 
14 
1765. Indeed much the same as in England there seems to have 
been a temporary recession in the American colonies at the end 
15 
of the Seven Years War, but none of the witnesses, American or 
English, before the Stamp Act Committee appear to have hoticed 
this and when looking for specific causes for the decline in 
trade with the American colonies it was far easier for them to 
point to restrictions imposed by the British government. It 
thus seems fair to conclude that the protest of the Americans 
over the Stamp Act was the culmination of a series of factors, 
that alarmed British merchants because it caused a decline in 
trade to America, the origin of which, if it lay in the slump 
occurring at the end of the Seven Years War, was greatly 
aggravated by the restrictive commercial legiälation of the 16 
British government. Morgan supports this conclusion. 
Professor Clark gives an illuminating account drawn from 
contemporary newspapers and periodicals of the effects of the 
14. Ashton 22. cit. p. 154; The Colonial Merchants and the America 
Revolution by A. M. Schlesinger, New York, 1957 pp. 50-81. 
15. See Jensen of . cit. p. 659. This seems to be borne out by the 
situation in the iron industry. See Iron and Steel in the 
Industrial Revolution by T. S. Ashton, Manchester 1951, p. 132. 
16. Morgan 22. cit. p. 264. 
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Stamp Act on British trade. She states that before December 
1765 the value of countermanded American orders was £700,000 
and existing debts were not being paid. All other orders were 
conditional upon the repeal of the Stamp Act. In the circum- 
stances very few British merchants ordered goods from the 
manufacturers and the manufacturers consequently were as hard 
hit as the merchants. Tt was not possible to develop alterna- 
tive rjtrkets immediately for each market had its own peculiar- 
ities and goods suitable for the colonies were not useful 
elsewhere. Professor Clark states that unemployment as a 
result of this was reported from'every town in England where 
British labourers had supplied American demands'., This situation 
was worsened by the high price of bread. Moreover although 
America continued to send some goods to England while boycotting 
English goods American goods soon became scarce in England 
because ships could not afford to sail repeatedly to the 
17 
colonies in ballast. If the American resolution not to import 
was not entirely responsible for the decline in trade it at 
least served to focus discontent upon it. 
As far as contemporary evidence goes the fullest source 
of information is the evidence given before the Stamp Act 
Committee. It cannot be denied that many of the witnesses 
appearing before the Committee were chosen by the Ministry and 
were 'ministerial witnesses' but it isAsignificant fact that 
. See Britt 
Clark, New 
yNi. iaiVll utiu yilc li[RCrican Kevojution by D. M. 
ven 1930, pp. 36-39; Morgan op. it. pp. 2 265. 
26 1! 
Grenville and his allies had equal opportunity to nominate 
witnesses and they could not produce one witness who was an 
American merchant and who could prove that the Stamp Act was 
not affecting trade. 
That they tried is shown by the evidence given by Richard 
Oswald. Oswald stated that he was a merchant who traded with 
the American colonies until 1753 and thought that they could 
pay the Stamp Ditties. He had still owing to him considerable 
cmount& of money from the colonies. Under cross-questioning 
from the ministerial benches 9swald seems to have broken down. 
He admitted ignorance of the situation in America and made 
the 
mistake of saying that he would stand a better chance of 
recovering his debts if the Act was repealed. When asked 
'Do'you from your own knowledge know the present state of any 18 
one colony and their ability to pay the taxl'., he replied 
'No'. 
It seems highly improbable that Rockingham and his colleagues 
would put forward a witness who gave evidence of this nature 
and one is led to the conclusion that Oswald was a witness 
put forward by Grenville, that this was the best he could do 
in getting mercantile evidence and therefore the evidence 
girren by the merchants who were 'ministerial witnesses' would 
19 
be reasonably authentic. 
18. B. M. Add. Mss. 33030 ff195-8 Minutes of the Evidence given 
before the Stamp Act Committee'. 
19. For Oswald as a witness of Grenville's see The Committee of 
the Whole House to Consider the American Papers by B. R. 
Smith, Unpublished thesis in Sheffield University Library 
1956, pp. 2-3. Oswald was later important in the peace 
negotiations at the end of the War of Independence. See 
The Second Rockingham Administration by D. Wall, Ulipublished 
thesis in Sheffield University Library, 1956, p. 271 et sea. 
27 
As far as ministerial witnesses were concerned the 
ministry produced five London and ten provincial manufacturers 
and merchants, together with Benjamin Franklin and seven other 
20 
witnesses who had recently been in America, and the Journals 
of the House of Commons suggest that there were many other 
21 
witnesses ready should they have been required. Barlow 
22 
Trecothick, the leader of the London rAerchants, estimated the 
value of the export trade of Great Britain with the American 
colonies at £3,000,000 per annum, and the debt owing to London, 
Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester merchants at the 
time of his examination at £4,450,000" 
23 
He pointed specifically 
to the Stamp Act as a cause of the debt. The provincial 
manufacturers provided evidence of unemployment and large 
stocks in hand particularly in the textile industry, including 
one estimate of thirty per cent employment in the neighbourhood 
24 
of Leeds. 
The Committee found it difficult to obtain evidence from 
merchants as to what proportion of their trade American business 
19. (contd) It is nowhere stated that the evidence Trecothick 
and his fellow witnesses presented was not prepared to a 
certain extent by the Ministry. Cf" Smith p. cit. pp. 25-34. 
20. See Smith 2 p. cit. pp. 36-37 et Qassi 
21. Journals of the House of Commons Vol. XXX, 1765-1766, Londom 
1766, pP" 513-602. 
22. For Trecothick see my "Barlow Trecothick" loc. cit. No. l, pp. 
36-49.. No. 2, pp. 29-39. 
03. B. M. Add. Iss. 33030 f105. Cf. Jensen 
. 
2p. cit. p. 688. The evidence 
in the Newcastle Papers (B. M. Add. LZss" 33030) may be checked 
against that in wY. w. M" R27. 
24. B. M. Add"Mss. 33030 ff100,105,140,141. Cf.?. fassschusettF% 
Historical Society Collect jQnsVll Series Vol. IX, "The 
Commerce of Rhode Island 1726-1800" Vol. 191726-1774, Boston 
1914, p. 140 Henry Cruger Jr. to Henry Cruger Sr-14 Pebr2ry 
1766. 
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was or how important American commerce was in a particular area, 
Only Obadiah Dawson of Leeds and Robert Hamilton of Manchester 
were able to produce statements of the amount of their trade 
with America and only Hamilton was able to give an eatimateof 
the amount of a particular area's American trade. Dawson 
estimated that half his trade was American and Hamilton that one 
third of his goods were exported to 'America including Africa'. 
He also stated that one third of Manchesters textile production 
25 
was for the- export market. William Reeve of Bristol revw1ed 
that the value of exports from Bristol was £59ggc4per annum 
and the value of his personal trade there was £100,000 per 
annum. William Halliday of Liverpool quoted the value of 
26 
Liverpool's trade with America at £240,000 per annum, but 
neither produced figures of the proportion of total trade 
these figures represented. 
This evidence suggests that if a town, merchant or 
manufacturer was engaged in trading with or manufacturing for 
the American colonies it represented a considerable proportion 
of that trade. The fact that it was possible to form a 
committee of 'Merchants trading to America' meant that commerce 
27 " 
was specialized. Where the slump caused by the Stamp Act was 
felt it would be felt severely and there is a clear indication 
that there was a real and serious depression in the American 
25. Ibid. ffl56-158,41" This evidence is part printed in Jensen oP. cit. pp. 689-690. 26. B. M. Add. Mss 33030 ff146-7; w. W. M. R27 pp22,58,71. part 2 ppl-3 8. 27. See nay "Barlow Trecothick" loc. cam, No. l, p. 44. 
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trade at the time of the Stamp Act for there were merchants and 
manufacturers from many of the industrial areas in England 
28 
present at the Stamp Act Committee and most of the witnesses 
were willing to blame the Stamp Act for the slump even if they 
were not correct in doing so. 
With the repeal of the Stamp Act trade to the North 
American mainland colonies seems to have recovered its normal 
course until the passing of the Townshend Acts in 1767. The 
effect of the Townshend Revenue Acts on the trade with American 
was neither so immediate, nor so severe, as that of the Stamp 
Acb. The pressure on British merchants at the time of the 
Stamp Act had been unconscious at first. Economies because of 
Grenville's earlier commercial legislation had diminished the 
volume of British commerce to America before the trade boycott 
had become formal: the change at the time of the Stamp Act 
Crisis was from unconscious pressure on trade to a formal 
boycott; the Stamp Act had been the culmination of a series of 
measures that had been detrimental to the commerce of the mother 
29 
country with the colonies. 
After the passing of the Townshend Acts, however, it took 
some time for the colonial non-importation schemes to become 
30 
organised and anything like unanimous. There was, however, a 
28. Cf. -Smith ff-. Sit- pp. 85,278. 
29. See The Causes of the War of Independence by C" H. Van Tyne, 
London 1922, p. 164. Cf. TheAmerican Correspondence of a 
Bristol Merchant 1763-l7't6 Letters of Richard Ch ion, ed. 
a. H. Guttrudge, Berkeley 1 34,, pp. 9- 0, Richard Champion to 
Caleb and John Lloyd, 15 February 1766. Cf. Clark op. cit. p. 4?. i 
30. See Van Tyne op. cit. pp. 255-266. Cf. Miller a- 
. 
Sit- pp. 269-281, 
Schlesinger op. cit. pp. 108-155. 
30 
substantial fall in imports from Britain into New England, New 
York and Pennsylvania between 1768 and 1769. The most outstanding 
example being in New York where in 1768 ißaports from Ehgland 
totalled £482,930 but in 11169 only £74,918. In the southern 
colonies where similar non-importation agreements were entered 
into by the planters mainly to bring pressure to bear on their 
creditors it appears that imports from England actually increased 
31 
from 1769-17W. Schlesinger confirms this saying that in the 
commercial provinces imports from England decVeased by two thirds 
but in the plantation provinces they actually increased. In all, 
exports for the colonies fell from £2,157,218 in 1768 to 
32 
Z1#336. 
#122 in 1769. 
Due to the time lag in the commencement of the non-importation 
agreements, and the lack of unanimity about them the effect of 
the Townshend Duties was not felt so severely by British indust- 
rialists and merchants. It was not until the spring of 1768, 
when debts were not being paid again and orders were again being 
made Conditional on the repeal of the Duties that British 
merchants again began to feel concern over the American trade. 
An increase in foreign and domestic markets, however, offset 
the effect of this on British industry and in 1770 the Russo- 
Turkish War created an unusual demand for British goods in 
Russia; 
31. Jensen M. it. PP-392-393., 
32. Schlesinger öff. cit. pp. 182; Van Tyne 22--cit., -pp-262-265. 
31 
i 
"Merchants were more inclined to place orders, regardless 
of non-importation agreements. Speculators demanded 
wares for immediate exportation and conservative traders 
expecting parliament to grant their petitions for repeal 
wished to have goods on hand to fill the conditional 
orders. Certainly the weight of business depression 
fell less heavily upon the manufacturers than the 
merchants-" 33 
There was, however, some hardship and goods were left on 
the merchants hands. It took non-importation to move the 
British merchants but there was no unanimity about their 
campaign. Political conditions in 1769 and 17'(0 were totally 
different from those in existence at the time of the repeal 
of the Stamp Act. In the economic field there were alleviating 
factors in 1709 and 17'l0 that were absent in the Stamp Act 
Crisis. Thus the merchants campaign was unsuccessful. By 1'1't0 
moreover, some merchants were for the first time beginning to 
consider whether the resistance of the Americans to taxation 
on constitutional grounds was justified, and in many cases they 
were prepared to secrifice their co=nerce with the American 
mainland colonies to the supremacy of Parliament over the 
colonies for they could see the repeal of the Townshend Duties 
would not end the trouble in this direction. Mercantile opinion 
34 
had been split. Moreover in the period 1768-1770 it was the 
merchants who suffered most, industrialists were affected 
little, consequently it was a much smaller section of the 
33. Clark - op" cit. pp. 53,5b" Cf. Schlesinger ý. cif. pp. 237-239. 
Cf. "Boston Merchants and the Non-Importation Movement 1769" 
by C. M. Andrews in. Publications of the Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts Vol. XIX, Transactions 1916717 Boston 1918, 
pp. 241-242.: 
34" Clark op. cit. pp. 56,58,6ii. Cf. Guttridge o. cit. p. 21. Champildn 'to Caleb and John Lloyd 16 July' 7"7 . Barlow 
32 
population, purely the American merchants who were interested 
35 
in securing the removal of the Townshend Duties. 
Thus the relative value of the corrnerce with the North 
American mainland colonies was altering once again in the face 
of new markets abroad and changing political and economic factors. 
Following the partial repeal of the Towrnshend Duties by 
Lord North in 1?? O trade with the American colonies seems to 
have recovered something like its normal value although the 
British Credit Crisis of 13'Y2 seems to have had a temporary 
adverse effect. ) It was not until the formation of 
the Associa- 
tion in December 1'(14 that any serious recession was noticed 
36 
in American trade. 
The end of the Russo-Turkish War, however, coincided with 
the formation of the Association and trade -with Iurope, 
especially along routes which the Russo-Turkish War had blocked 
offset the effects pf the Association. Moreover there were now 
more troops in America to furnish contracts and the merchants 
who were still mercantilist at heart were questioning even more 
the motives of the Americans. Thus in 1775 the mercantile 
pressure that could be brought to bear on the government was 
again divided, the true value of the American trade was not 
34. contit- Trecothick when pleading for the repeal of the 
Townshend Duties before the House of Commons in 17'l0 had to 
admit that there was full employment and no slump in trade. 
See "The Trumbull Papers" Massachusetts Historical Society 
Collections 6th Series, Vol. IX, Boston 1885, pp. 430-431. W. $. 
Johnson to J"Trumbull 14 April 1770. 
35. Clark or. cit. p. 64. 
36. Ibid. pp. 63--1 2. Cf. "The British Credit Crisis of 1772 and the American Colonies" by R. L. Sheridan in Journal of Economic History Vol. XX, 1960, pp" 161-172. 
33 
37 
apparent, the effects of non-importation were again being offset. 
Burke, in his speech on American conciliation stated that 
the value of the export trade from England to North America 
and the West Indies was £4,791,734 in 1772. He observed that 
the trade had multiplied twelve times since 1704 and went on 
to say that the 'colony trade' had now grown from a twelfth 
part of the whole trade of the country to a third and this 
trade was the fount that had nourished every part into its 
38 
present magnitude. ' In an effort to refute Burke's contentions 
Josiah Tucker stated that from 1763-1772 the total value of 
the trade to Holland and Germany was £30,294,126,11,3 
39 
, while that to the thirteen colonies was £20,061,023,3,8. 
The point that Tucker makes is very valid. In an era of rapid 
trade expansion the interruption of one outlet was not so 
noticeable when other export markets were developed. By 1774 
the peculiar circumstances that had applied to America at the 
end of the Seven Years War had ceased to exist and the reduction 
of the American market no longer appeared as a substantial 
threat to the bulk of manufacturers and merchants. 
The changing value and importance of the American market 
immediately before the outbreak of the War of Independence is 
admirably exemplified in letters that Richard Champion wrote 
to his American correspondents. On 13 March 17'(5 he wrote 
311. Clark opw alt- pp"'(b-t$u. 
38. Burke Works Vol. III, pp. 39-40. 
39. See A Letter to Edmund Burke E 
the City of Bristol and Agent 
oslah Tuc1er, Gloucester I 
Member of Parliament for 
the Colony of New York 
, P" 27. 
34 
from Bristol 
"The resolution of the Congress to shut up the ports of 
America was indisputedly entered into, with a view to 
bring the Mother Country into terms, by throwing such a damp upon its trade, as to raise a clamour in the people 
against the Governors. It has not had the effect nor will 
it to the degree that might have been expected. Several 
causes occur to prevent it. A principal one I have 
mentioned ý the prejudices of the people have not been 
removed by the payment for the tea destroyed at Boston. 
The manufactories of the Kingdom have. not been affected 
in any degree to excite a clamour by the non-importation 
agreement. The trade of Yorkshire, Manchester, Norwich 
and the clothing counties near this continues very brisk, 
even Birmingham is not greatly affected. The coarse 
woollen and heavy iron manufactories indeed severely feel, 
but not sufficiently, to throw a great weight into the 
opposite scale. This is evident from the Petitions to 
Parliament which were in general languid and without 
spirit, and with some difficulty procured, nay in Yorkshire 
Birmingham and Nottingham counter-petitions were procured. 
It is true that of the two latter places were insignifi- 
cant, but the Yorkshire one had many respectable names. 
It is still more evident from the behaviour of the 
merchants and traders who though treated in the most 
contemptuous manner by the Ministers, have never resented it with any degree of warmth. " 40 
In the August of the same year Champion wrote again confir- 
ming that the situation was the same but in 1775 the greatly 
increased trade to Russia, Poland and Spain (where the Spanish 
41 
flota was fitting out) had also compensated for the decline 
42 
in trade with the American colonies. In the same year there 
was also a notable recovery of trade with the East Indies 
and there was an increase in shipment of goods to places from 
which smuggling to the American mainland colonies was possible. 
40. Guttridge o- cit. p. 51. Champion to Messrs Willing and ý_ - 
Morris at Philadelphia, 13 March 1775" 
41. For the flota fitting out see below p. 
42. Guttridge off. cit. p. 60. Champion to Messrs Willing and 
Morris 26 August 1775. 
35 
Thus in spite of a decline of over 90% in exports from England 
43 
to America between 17'lyand 1775 the effect was not so severe 
as at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis, although agitation 
for repeal of the Coercive Acts was stronger than any agitation 
had been since 1766. Lexington, and the American drift 
towards independence tended to lead towards a hardening of 
opinion. It seems that the merchants feared American indepen- 
dence more than temporary economic loss. 
During the war British merchants found it very difficult 
to collect debts in America and some went bankrupt. Others 
were forced to diversify their business and adjust themselves 
to new situations and to seek compensation for American losses 
in various ways. Some merchants turned to foreign markets 
(especially in Russia, Germany and the Baltic) with considable 
success. Others made fortunes in war contracts and speculations. 
There was increased trade to such places as Canada and Flobida 
44 
and the needs of the British Army had to be supplied. The 
argument that the loss of trade caused nothing but bitterness 
in England and a desire to prosecute the war, appears to have 
a certain amount of validity and may partly account for the lack 
45 
of mercantile agitation after 1766 in spite of severe losses. 
43. This figure can be calculated from Jensen op. cit. pp. 392-393 
In 1774 the total exports to the thirteen colonies were 
£2,590,337 and in 1775 they were £196,112" 
44. Ashton ! ýR. cit. p. 161 quoting The Rise of the Port of Liverpool 
by C. N. Parkinson, Liverpool 1952, pp. 124-125. Obadiah Dawson 
who had given evidence before the Stamp Act Coimnittee 
appears to have been one merchant who had diversified his 
markets. See Smith op. cit. p. 209. 
45. Clark M. cit. pp. 93-119 assim. 
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In The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith stated that 
"Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of have 
very fortunately occurred to hinder Great Britain from 
feeling, so sensibly as it was generally expected she 
would, the total exclusion which has now taken place for 
more than a year (from the first of December 1774) from 
a very important branch of the colony trade, that of the 
twelve associated provinces of North America. " 
Smith enumerated these five events as follows. Firstly, that 
the American colonies, in preparation for the non-importation 
agreement, had drained the British market of all commodities 
of use to them. Secondly, he contended that 
"The extraordinary demand of the 61$}i1 flota (coming to 
the Weet Indies) has, this year, drained Germany and the 
north of many commodities, linen in particular, which 
used to come into competition, even in the British market 
with the manufactures of Great Britain. " 
Thirdly, Smith stated that the end of hostilities between 
Russia and Turkey had led to a sudden increased demand from 
Turkey and that fourthly and fifthly there were increased 
demands from the north of Europe and Poland. He concluded 
"These events are all, except the fourth, in their nature 
transitory and accidental, and the exclusion from so 
important a branch of the colony trade, if unfortunately 
it should continue much longer, may still occasion some 
degree of distress. This distress, however, as it will 
come on gradually, will be felt much less severely than 
if it had come on all at once, and in the meantime the 
industry and capital may find a new employment and 
direction, so as to prevent this distress, from ever 
rising to any considerable height. " 46 
The year 1778 appears to have been the worst year for the 
American trade. By this year it was stated 733 vessels had 
Nations by Adam Smith ed. Edwin Cannan. London 1904, Vol. II, 
PP- 107-8" 
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been taken by the Americans of which forty-seven had been released 
and 127 re-taken. The merchants valued the remaining 559 at 
£2,600,000 and Macpherson notes that losses in salvage, interest 
on value of cargoes, and losses of markets on the retaken ships 
must have been condiderable. Moreover, insurance had risen from 
22 to 5 per cent for ships travelling with convoy and 15 per 
cent without convoy, if insurance could be secured at all in 
47 
such circumstances. Moreover there were 675 bankruptcies in 
1778, eighty three occurring in November alone. In comparison, 
48 
in 1774 there were only 360 bankruptcies. 
Bic this time it would seem that the palliative effect of 
compensating and alleviating factors had been offset and the war 
was having its effect on American commerce. However, the size 
of the co=erce with America was not sufficient for a major 
crisis to occur, and again it was the merchants who suffered 
more than the manufacturers. It was more difficult for a 
merchant having concentrated his energies almost entirely upon 
one market to make new contacts and to find a new market for the 
sale of his goods than for an industrialist who had merely to 
divert his goods from one channel to another. Indeed, if a 
merchant concentrated on the American market he seems to have 
concentrated solely on that market and he was bound to go 
bankrupt unless he could find new openings for his trade. 
It may be concluded that trade with the North American 
47. Annals of Commerce, Manufacturers, Fisheries and Navigation 
by D" Macpherson, London 1805, Vol. III, p. 617. Cf. Anderson 
op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 223. 
48. Macpherson 
, 
off. cit. Vol. IV, pp" 720= d 21. 
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mainland colonies was an irp-ýrtant but specialised branch of 
British commerce. A slump could have serious effects particu- 
larly on merchants who specialised in the trade and who could 
find no other market for their goods. The only time, however, 
that a slump was felt in its true magnitude was during the 
Stamp Act Crisis because at this time there was no compensating 
factor to offset the decline in the American trade, and the 
slump was more apparent because the trade had been growing very 
rapidly before it. 
At the end of the Seven Years War, moreover, in a period 
of general recession the effect of a slump in a branch of trade 
which had been expanding rapidly would be particularly notice- 
able, and the restrictive legislation of the British government 
enabled the merchants to point to this as they considered it 
to be the cause of the recession. This was particularly the 
case with the Stamp Act., 
After 1766 merchants and industrialists who were connected 
with the American trade were more prepared for a slump and in 
future crises the cries of individual merchants were unavailing. 
Moreover, if the Stamp Act was passed for economic reasons, 
later legislation concerned with an American revenue was passed 
for political and constitutional reasons or at least conditioned 
by political and economic circumstances. It was thus not so 
49 
likely to provoke response in the economic field. 
See line Commercial Policy of England towards the American 
Colonies by G. -136-1 , Columbia C llege St di in HjStory, ýs and Publc, Laws Vol" IIl, Nevr York, 1993, p. 4.4. 
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Economic factors were therefore partly responsible for 
the success of mercantile pressure in 1766 and its failure 
afterwards. Moreover the clamorous protests during the Stamp 
Act Crisis were consistent with the severity of the trade 
depression at that time, and later protests were less forceful 
because the trade to the colonies was becoming of secondary 
importance. The recovery of the trade after the repeal of the 
Stamp Act and the pattern of American trade after 1766 points to 
the effectiveness of repeal and shows that neither Chatham, 
Grafton nor North had to deal with a crisis in American trade 
as great as that which the first Rockingham administration 
faced. Statistics show that in later crises the decline in 
trade by value was far more severe but the crises did not occur 
at a time of general slump and mercantile protest was not so 
50 
vociferous. 
The decline in mercantile discontent can be regarded as 
a reason for the powerlessness of the Rockingham Whigs. With 
stronger mercantile support the party might have remained 
more coherent and able to secure conciliates measures for 
the American colonies. 
In view of the information presented in this section it 
50. See English Overseas Trade Statistics 697-1808 by E. B. 
Schumpeter, Oxford 1960, pp"17-18. The picture of British 
trade as a whole that has been drawn seems to have been 
faithfully reflected in the trade of Glasgow alone. See 
"Scottish Opinion and the American Revolution" by Delpby 
I. Fagerstrom in-William. and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, ' Vol. 
XI, No. 2, Williamsburg Va, April 1954, especially pp. 263-264. 
40 
is thus possible to look at the commercial measures of the 
Rockingham administration from a new standpoint. The facts 
here presented throw much light on both the relations of the 
Rockinghamites with the merchants and the relations between 
the American merchants and the ministries in power after 1766. 
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APPENDIX - PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES. 
The evidence presented in the foregoing chapter as to the 
general pattern of the development of trade is supported by 
evidence presented in specialised studies of particular 
industries. 
Professor Ashton has noticed that the iron industry was 
very propserous during the Seven Years War, that there was a 
slump coming in July 1763 and bad trade for a long period 
afterwards. He states that the chief single factor contributing 
to this was the bad relations with the American colonies. 
Although, Professor Ashton notes, little iron in its unfinished 
state was exported to the American colonies large quantities of 
ironwear, especially nails, were. With the onset of political 
troubles this trade was cut off but he contends there was a 
1 
compensating demand for ordnance after 17'15. 
lair. G. VW Daniels has noted that the cotton industry's 
recovery from the European slump, particularly serious in that 
industry at the close of the Seven Years War was delayed more 
than anything else by the trouble with the American colonies. 
Mr. Daniels contends that the cotton trade was so important 
that over the American Revolutionary period it was carried on 
regardless of prohibitions, the effect of this being rather to 
check expansion and increase uncertainty rather than to decrease 
the volume of trade. 
He also points out that in times of crisis as in 1765-1766 
I. Ashton o2. cit. pp. 131-132" Uhl, A )t! TY 
U ;A IF3 
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2 
Parliament was bombarded with petitions. This evidence is supported 
in a further work on Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade 
3 
edited by Professor Arthur Redford and can be illustrated by 
reference to the statistics for the export of cotton checks and 
4 
linen checks 1753-80, published by A. P. Wadsworth and J. de la Mann. 
There is unfortunately no modern study of the woollen 
industry which deals, in detail with the fluctuations in trade 
during the American Revolutionary period but Heaton suggests 
that after 1770 the controversy with the colonies had a deleterious 
5 
effect on the Yorkshire woollen industry and Lipson states that 
6 
the American War ruined the Norwich Woollen industry. The 
7 
evidence presented before the Stamp Act Committee and additional 
information contained in Bischoff s' Comprehensive History of the 
8 
Woollen and Worsted Manufactures and in Sir John Clapham's 
9 
The Woollen and Worsted Industries shows that the pattern found 
in other industries was repeated in the woollen industry. 
2. The Early English Cotton Ind'istry with Some Unpublished Letters 
of Samuel Crompton by G. W. Daniels, Manchester, 1920, pp" 86-87. 
3. Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade 1794-1858 by Students 
in the Honours School of History in the University of Manchester 
Arthur Redford, Manchester 1934, pp. 3-4. 
4. The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire 1600-1780 by A. P. 
Wadsworth and J. de a Dann, Manchester 1931, p. 167. 
5. The Yorkshire Woollen and Worsted Industries from the Earliest 
Times up to the Industrial Revolution by H"Heaton, Oxford 1965, 
pp-276-277. 
6. The History of the Woollen and Worsted Industries by E"Lipson, 
London 1921, p. 249. 
7. See above pp-27-28 and below pp. 380 - 384. 
8. London 1842, pp. 172-273. 
9. London 1920, pp. 2ýt2+rtý. 
.ý 
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CHAPTER II. 
1 
NEWCASTLE, ROCKINGHAM AND THE DISSENTERS. 
During the course of this work as the relations between 
Newcastle and Rockingham and the mercantile classes are exam- 
2 
fined recurrent reference will be made to the dissenters, partly 
because a considerable number of the merchants to be considered 
were dissenters, and partly because Newcastle at least was at 
times concerned with conciliating the dissenting interest which 
he considered something separate from the trading interest 
3 
though closely associated with it. 
From its earliest days, because they were prepared to 
advocate a degree of religious toleration, the Whigs had become 
the party of religious dissent. The Old 'Whigs under Newcastle 
in the middle of the eighteenth century, descended from 
I. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary a "Dissenter" is 
defined as ' one who separates himself from any specified 
church especially from the communion of the Established 
Church of England" and a "Nonconformist" as "originally one 
who, while adhering to the doctrine of the Church of England 
refused to conform to its discipline and practice - later a 
member of a religious body which is separated from the 
Church of England; in modern use usually a Protestant 
Dissenter". This classification is used in modified form 
in Protestant Nonconformity and some Social and Economic 
Questions by F. D. Bebb (Unpublished Ph. D" thesis in Sheffield 
University Library, 1933, introductory page) where the term 
"Dissenter" is used to embrace Presbyterians, Baptists of 
various sorts, Independents and Congregationalists, and 
"Nonconformists" is used to include all sorts of Protestant 
dissenters, Methodists amongst them. For the purpose of this 
chapter the latter definition is used as being the most 
convenient. o4sd. ý,: -. - 2. For instance see b ]owa p. 3.. 5 %,. ' 3. See below p48-49et assim. 4. See The Later Stuarts by G. N. Clark, Oxford 1934, p-97. - 
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Walpole's Whig party, were perhaps the true heirs of this 
original Whig party mote than any of the other splinter groups 
in existence at the end of the reign of George II. Thus they 
believed they were the true inheritors of dissenting support 
5 
and real guardians of the dissenters' interests. 
At this point it seems appropriate to turn aside for a 
moment to consider the position of dissenters in the third 
quarter of the eighteenth century. During this period the 
position of the dissenters remained practically static. The 
Toleration Act of 1689 was never seriously challenged after the 
repeal of the Schism and Occasional Conformity Acts in 1718. 
Thus Trinitarians who were willing to assent to thirty-five 
of the Thirty-nine articles were allowed to preach and teach 
freely. The condition that a licence was to be obtained was 
seldom enforced and finally abolished in 17'19. This made 
possible the formation of Unitarian churches in the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century. These were definite but modest 
advances for the dissenters. The decision that fines could not 
be exacted from conscientious dissenters who refused office 
rather than take the necessary oaths, was another advance, but 
on the other hand Hardwicke `s Act of 11153 obliged all nonconfor- 
mists except Quakers to marry in the parish church. Dissenters 
were thus more comfortable during the period but this ease 
depended upon the continuance of mild administration of the law. 
See English Dissent under the Early Hanoverlans by D"Goomer, 
London 1946, p. 92. See also English Whiggism and the American 
Revolution by G. H. Guttridge, Berkeley Cä Porn a, 1942, 
Pp. 3 and b.: 
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1 
The Episcopal Bench remained firm against the dissenters and 
legal, political and economic privilege remained the prerogative 
of the Establishment, and the Church!. $* privilege on the whole 
was supported by public opinion. There was very little popular 
6 
pressure in Parliament on behalf of the dissenters. 
Professor Ashton has noticed the close association between 
trade and industry and dissent and has stated concisely the 
various explanations that have been offered for this connection. 
Firstly, Ashton states that 
and 
"It has been suggested that those who sought out new 
forms of worship would also naturally strike out new 
paths in secular fields" 
"that there was an intimate connection between the tenets 
peculiar to J onconfornity and the rules of conduct that 
lead to success in business. " 
Ashton also notes that it has been argued that the exclusion 
of the dissenters from university education and public office 
"forced many to seek an outlet for their abilities in 
industry and trade. " 
He believes that each of these factors was influential, but 
he places more weight on the argument that the close alliance 
between dissent and trade and industry was due to the tact 
that the dissenters for the most part were the better educated 
7 
section of the middle classes. This would appear to have been 
6. See The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman by Caroline Robbins, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1959, pp. 223-224. and The Protestant 
Dissenting Deputies by B. L. Manning, Cambridge 1952, pp. 1-7. 
For a general survey see "Dissent and Toleration" by J"Steven 
Watson in Silver Renaissance ed. by Alex Maý, London 1961, 
pp. 1-18. 
7. See The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830 by T. S"Ashton, London 
1948, pp. 18-19. See also "The Industrialists" by Michael 
Flinn in Silver Renaissance p. 75. 
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particularly true in the scientific, technological, commercial 
and practical spheres. 
This theme has been developed by Professor Armytage who 
states 
"It was the superior education, rather than their 
. exclusion from Oxford and Cambridge 
(though the two were 
of course interconnected) which animated them to become 
the architects of the industrial state. " 8 
It should, however, be noticed that the Dissenting Academies 
at which the nonconformists beceived this "superior education" 
was especially adapted to educate men in subjects that were 
9 
useful for a commercial, industrial or scientific career, 
probably because there was little use in training nonconfor- 
mists in the more convential eighteenth century studies when 
the normal road to advancement was barred to them. 
Because of the close association between trade, industry 
and dissent it Nvas thus natural enough that the politicians 
who were the particular representatives of the dissenters 
should have a particular concern with commerce. Even if from 
1756 and 1757 Pitt had succeeded in securing the loyalty of 
the commercial classes especially in the City of London and 
10 
to some extent in maintaining this loyalty, this should not be 
confused with the loyalty of the dissenters in general, and 
8. See Civic Universities, Aspects of a British Tradition by 
VI. H. G. Armytage, London 1955, p. 153. 
9. Ibid. p. 128 et seq p. 153 et sea. See also English Education 
under the Test Acta. beine the Riatnrv of the Nnrrnnfn»`; +_ 
16 et sue. See also 'Steven Watson loc. ct. p. 11. 
10-See-below p"80 and also "The City of London and the 
Devonshire-Pitt Administration 1756-7" by L. S"Sutherland, 
pp. 150,158-159 et passim. 
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there must have been many merchants among the dissenters who % 
still paid allegiance to Newcastle and the Old Whigs. 
Yet in 1756 Newcastle promoted Thomas Secker to the 
Archbishopric of Canterbury. Seeker was known to be less 
tolerant than his immediate predecessors and on this occasion 
Newcastle found it necessary to gain reassurance for the 
11 
Dissenters. On 1 April 1756 Newcastle wrote to John White 
"I sent early to him(Secker) with relation to his 
conduct towards the Dissenters. He has explained 
himself wholely to my satisfaction and what I am 
persuaded will be theirs. He has assured me that he 
is well with Dr. Avery and Dr. Chandler. I shall speak 
to both of them upon the new archbishop's subject and 
I shall talk to Dr. Lawrence and to some who are of a 
different party among the Dissenters; and you may assure 
them all that I will answer for the new archbishop as 
relates to them. " 12 
Part of Seeker's unpopularity was due to his advocacy of the 
establishment of a colonial episcopate. It was his opinion 
on this matter that had partly served to prejudice the 
English Dissenters against him, for there was a close bond 
between the colonial and the English dissenters and Newcastle 
13 
reassured the English dissenters on this matter especially. 
11. See Mitre and Sceptre 1689-1775 by Carl Bridenbaugh, New 
York, 1962, p. 109. Professor Norman Sykes makes it quite 
clear that Newcastle was chiefly responsible for this 
promotion. See "The Duke of Newcastle as Ecclesiastical 
Minister" in English Historical Review. Vol. LVII, 1942, p. 68. 
For Secker's activities in the American Colonies see 
Origincof the American Revolution 1759-1766 by Bernhard 
Knollenberg, New York 1961, pp. 76-78. 
12. B. M. Add. Mss"32879 f5 Newcastle to John White 1 April 1758 
quoted Sykes loc. cit. p. 
68. Avery, Chandler and Lawrence 
were leading dissenting ministers, Avery and Chandler 
being prominent members of the Dissenting Deputies. See 
Manning 9P. cit. pp. 29-30 see also below p. 49 
13. See Bridenbaugh 92. cit. p. 109; also B. M. Add. Mss. 32879 f74 
John White to Newcastle 3 April 1758; ibid. f75 Newcastle 
to White 1 April 1758 quoted Sykes loc. cit. p. 69. 
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Secker, however, seems to have learned political wisdom by 
1758. 
After his appointment he seems to have worked to preserve 
good relations with the Engish dissenters without abandoning 
his personal opinions. As Archbishop of Canterbury he endea- 
voured to prosecute the scheme for establishing an episcopate 
in the colonies which led him to being misunderstood there, 
while at the 
14 
" in England. 
same time working to conciliate the dissenters 
This episode shows that at times Newcastle considered 
maintaining the allegiance of the dissenters as something 
quite separate from maintaining the allegiance of the mercan- 
tile classes. Another example of this fact is in a paper of 
Newcastle's in the Rockingham papers, headed "Measures" and 
dated 2 July 1765 in which after stating how it is essential 
for the new administration to secure the loyalty of the bench 
of bishops he writes 
"I would also propose that the King's ministers should 
send for Dr. Erle, Dr. Langford, Dr. Gibbon, Dr Stennet 
and Mr. Toller, the most eminent dissenting Ministers, 
in and about London; and acquaint them that it is His 
Majesty's Intention to give the Royal Protection to 
the Protestant Dissenters, His Loyal Subjects, and 
particularly to continue His Royal Bounty to the 
13. kcontd. ) See also The Anglian Episcopate and the American 
Colonies by A. L. Cross, New York 1902, pp. 187-189 et pass See also The Church of England and the American EIsco a Church by H. G. G. Harklots, London 1966, p. 85 et sec. 14. Sykes loc. cit. p. 69. See also From Sheldon To- Secker, 
Aspects of English Church History bbO-1? 68. by N. Sykes, 
Cambridge 1939, p-216; Cross op. cit. pp. 248-249. See also A Review of the Life and Character of Archbishop Secker 
by Beilby Porteus, New York 1773, esp. pp. XXXV et se q, 
and p. XLI. -' 
,' 
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Dissenting Ministers in and about London, and that they 
should for the future, have the disposition of it. This 
would greatly secure the Dissenters in the Country who 
take their part from the behaviour of the Dissenters 
in and about London, their correspondents. " 15 
Newcastle's particular courtesy to the dissenters 
especially the dissenting ministers at other times is also 
16 
to be noted. It is probable that believing that the dissenters 
throughout the country took their cue from the London 
Dissenters Newcastle always showed particular civility to 
the London dissenting ministers. 
The reason for Newcastle's attitude towards the dissenters 
was probably the fact that if all merchants were not dissenters 
and not all dissenters were merchants , and although many 
important dissenters could be conciliated by a favourable 
commercial policy and by professing an interest in trade there 
was a large number outside this circle who had to be considered. 
Many dissenters could vote even if they were proscribed from 
public office by the conscientious tenacity by which they 
clung to the tenets of their religion. Thus there could be 
no better way of concilitting them than by showing respect 
for their particualr privileges that this penalised minority 
zealously guarded. Amongst these privileges was the Royal 
Bounty. The normal reward for political wrvices was contracts 
for merchants, public office and social advancement for others. 
15. W. W. M. Rl-45b "Measures" 6 July 1765. B. M. Add. Mss. 32967 
f180 "Measures" 1 July 1765 and below P. 298 " For the dissenting ministers mentioned see A History of the 
Dissenters from the Revolution in 1688 to the year 1808 
by D. Bogue and J" Bennett, Vol. I , London 1312, ass m. 
The bounty referred to is the grant secured by Walpole in 
50 
Contracts were open to dissenting merchants but public office 
and social advancement were barred to their non-mercantile 
co-religionists. Respect for their religious privileges was 
an alternative method of conciliation. It can also be con- 
eluded that the less conscientious dissenters who secrificed 
their religion and found the way into Parliament and in&) a 
political career would look with favour when consideration 
was shown to their more conscientious brethren. 
Newcastle, during the period with which this this is 
concerned, was more concerned with "government finance" than 
18 
"trade" in general. It was not until the onset of the Stamp 
Act Crisis in 176b that trade really became a primary concern 
and then Rockingham was at the head of the party. Thus it 
can be said that Newcastle's attitude to the dissenters was 
a reflection of his attitude to the mercantile classes. He 
was concerned with the dissenters in general in much the same 
way as he was concerned with "trade". Because his particular 
concern was with the greater merchants who were useful as 
government financiers, he was most interested in the most 
wealthy dissenters many of whom had sacrificed their religious 
beliefs for-political office. His attempts. to mai0ain the 
allegiance of -the general mass of the dissenters after his 
15. contc1 1? 23 of £1000 per annum for the widows of dissenting 
ministers. See The Whig Supremacy by Basil V illiams, 
Oxford 1939, p. 68. 
16. See below P. 65 also Steven Watson loc. cit. p. 7. 
17. Perhaps the best example of a dissenting family who held 
Government contracts is the Hanbury Family. For this see 
Namier' s Structure of Politics p-52. See also B. R. Smith 
2. cit. pp" 130-137,288-290" 
im" 18. See below p" 86 et pass 
1 
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fall from power in 1762 as well as his attempt to maintain the 
loyalty of his financiers are to be noted, but he still to 
some extent believed that the position of the dissenters was 
the same as at the beginning of his political career when the 
jaws discriminating against them were enforced far more rigidly. 
Ur. Anthony Lincoln has pointed out that it is possible 
to divide English society in the eighteenth century into a 
number of interests. These he defines as landed, commercial, 
monied, dissenting and labouring. Each of these interests, 
Nr. Lincoln claims were distinguishable as a social and 
political entity and he states it was one of the aims of 
political parties to conciliate these interests in order to 
20 
increase their own political power. Newcastle seems to have 
accepted a division of society on these lines and this makes 
it clearer why he was concerned to conciliate the dissenting 
interest. as something separate from the trading interest yet 
connected with it. In this way the various interests became 
"a cross-section of public opinion influencing party politics 
21 
obliquely and indirectly"" 
Perhaps the best example of this attitude of Newcastle 
is shown at the meeting of the Bankers that followed the 
resignation of Pitt in October 1761. At this meeting the 
opposition to the resignation of Pitt gras led by either 
Joseph or John Freame, Quaker banking partners of James 
19. See below ßp" 176,184 et passim. 
20. Some Political and Social Ideas of English Dissent 1763- 
1880 by Anthony Lincoln, Cambridge 1938, pp. 12-13. 
21. Ibid" p"12. 
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Barclay. Newcastle appears to have been less alarmed by the 
fact that there was opposition on this occasion than by the 
fact that this opposition was led by a Quaker, and the 
Quakers were one of the most powerful sections of the dissent- 
22 
ing interest connected with trade. 
As noticed in the introduction Rockingham's relations 
with the financial and commercial classes were somewhat 
different to those of Newcastle, his predecessor, because of 
a combination of factors. This change in relationship is 
paralleled by a change in relationship between the party 
and the dissenters. As this was considerably affected by a 
change in the characteristics of dissent which was beginning 
to occur it is not inappropriate here to turn aside to notice 
the chief characteristics of dissent in the third quarter 
of the eighteenth century. 
During this time there was a slight decrease in the 
number of congregations of dissenters but the relative 
decline in dissent was greater, due to the total increase 
in the population and the fact that the average size of the 
congregation was smaller. 
Geographically, dissent was increasing west of a line 
drawn from Wiltshire due north to Northumberland with a 
noticeable increase in Lancashire, while south of a line 
drawn between London and Bristol but excluding Wiltshire 
" For this incident ano tine vreames see aelovvr p. 85 " See 
also B. M. Add. Mss. 32929 f113 Memorandum 8 October 1761. 
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there was almost uninterrupted decrease. It should be noted 
how the areas of increase corresponded with the new industrial 
areas. This can be particularly easily observed in the case 
of Wiltshire where the woollen industry was expanding at the 
24 
time. 
As well as a decrease in the number of dissenters a 
decline is also apparent in the social and economic influence 
of dissent. Artisans, tradesmen and labourers were increasing 
their majority among the number of dissenters, and this fact 
corresponds to the geographical areas where dissent was 
increasing. Moreover, dissent had lost much of its fervour 
and uncompromising character, although it had gained somewhat 
in "respectability". As it lost its fervour those merchants 
whp aspired to rise in the social scale became less reluctant 
23. See Bebb op. cit. p. 18. See also Robbins 22. cit. pp. 230-231. 
In accordance with the definitions stated in note 1 to this 
section these figures do not include the Methodists. The 
existence of the Methodists as a separate nonconformist body 
can be cyan from 1784 when Wesley set up the Legal Hundred 
by a Deed of Declaration lodged in the Court of Chancery. 
This document which was to provide for the continuance of 
Methodism after Wesley's death gave Methodism a legal 
existence and constitution. See Methodism by R. E. Davies, 
London 1963, p. 100; Cf. Manning 22 . cit. p. 21. 24. For the expansion of the woollen industry in Wiltshire at 
this time see The History of the Woollen and Worsted 
Industries by E"Lipson, London 1921j. pp. 233-234,252-254 
where it is made clear that about, 1750 the woollen industry in Wiltshire, which was part of the West Country woollen industry was flourishing and expanding and it was only 
after 1770 with the stern resistance to machinery and the 
relatively greater advantages of the West Riding that the industry began to decline in importance relatively. See 
also Bischoff, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 150. 
5t. 
to cast their religious beliefs aside when they became an 
25 
obstacle in such matters as entering Parliament. 
Thus at a time when trade and industry were rapidly to 
become more important, dissent, the force that had previously 
connected the merchants and manufacturers with the Whig party 
was becoming weaker among those manufacturers and merchants 
who were of the most political importance. It is true that 
Methodism, which was to become a form of nonconformity, was 
rapidly growing in importance during this period but the vast 
majority of Methodists were always drawn more from the labour- 
classes rather than from the more wealthy merchants and 
26 
manufacturers. Moreover a change in the ideas of dissent 
accompanied Its changed circumstances. Until the death of 
George II, partly because of their close association with the 
Whig party, the dissenters had usually found it possible to 
support the government in power rather than the opposition 
group, for it had usually been a section of the Whig party 
that was sympathetic to their ideals. After 1760, however, t 
the sect ions of the Whig party that were sympathetic towards 
them were for the most part out of power. Thus the dissenters 
fell back into opposition and by 1770 Mr. Lincoln contends 
27 
they were in the van of opposition. In the 1760's and early 
1770's the dissenters were ready to accept doctrines of the 
25. See Be-bb op. cit. p. ots. cr. Namier structure or roiizics 
p. 47. Robbins p. cit. p. 223. Steven Watson loc. cit. p. 6. 
26. ee Lincoln 2p. cit. p" 13. See also England 
'in I= by 
lie Halevy, Vol. l, of A History of the E lish People in 
the Nineteenth Century 2nd Edn. London 1960, t p-419- 
27. Lincoln p. cit. pp. 19-26.. 
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"rights of man" and the "sovereignity of the people". It 
should be remembered that Pain's "Rights of Plan" was origin- 
ally written as a, refutation of Burke's Reflections on the 
29 
Revolution in France. That the dissenters were ready to 
accept the doctrines therein propounded is indicative of the 
extent to which they were moving out of sympathy with that 
section of the Whig party to which Burke belonged. Even if 
this movement was accelerated in the years after Rockingham's 
death there can be no doubt that it was going on during his 
" lifetime. Gradually in the years after 1765 the dissenters 
entered the forefront of that section of the population who 
30 
demanded radical reform., and slowly their demands became too 
radical for the Rockingham Whigs and gradually the essentially 
conservative nature of those reforms which the Rockingham 31 
Whigs were prepared to accept ceased to satisfy the dissenters. 
4 00 
29. 
30. 
31. 
Ibid. p26" It must be remembered that in accoraance wiLn 
the definition given in note 1 to this chapter the term 
dissenters does not here include Wesleyan. 
Paine's work was first published in London 1791 and Burke' s 
in London in 1790. 
Lincoln 22. cit. pp. 28-40" 
There were for example many dissenters who supported the 
Refom Movement in 1779-1780 and an interesting commentary 
on their views as against the views of the Rockingham Whigs 
can be gained by studying the relationship of the Rockingham 
Whigs with the Nyvill's Yorkshire Reform Movement at this 
time. See George III, Lord North and the People 1779-1780 
by Herbert Butterfield, Cambridge 1950, pp-198 et pas i. 
Christie op. cit. pp. 75-103" See also The Associätion, H 
al 
-Reform Movement in Sheffield" by G. P. Jones in Transactions 
of the Hunter Archaeological Society Vol. IV, Sheffield, 
1929-30, pp-57-68 and "The Yorkshire Association 1780-844, 
a Stuxy - in Political Organisation" by I. R. Christie in 
,. - The Historical Journal Vo1. III, Canlbridge 1960, pp. 147-153. 
Nonconformist opinion on the American Revolution Nvas 
divided. The dissenters had strong political and social ties 
with the American colonies and they were for the most part 
sympathetic towards the American Revolution. There was a 
difference, however, in being sympathetic towards the American 
colonies and supporting the American Revolution. When the 
Revolutionary war broke out two schools of thought among the 
nonconformists were apparent, firstly the school at the head 
of which was Dr. Richard Price who thought the Americans were 
fighting a just war and secondly the other school of thought 
led by John Wesley, who were strongly anti-American. Moreover 
Wesley's publications and preaching appears to have 
influenced 
a large number of nonconformists besides the Methodists 
32 
against the American cause. Yet as far as the nonconformists 
were concerned the American policy of the Rockingham Whigs 
fell between two stools. Any sympathy towards the American 
colonists would fail to satisfy those who followed Wesley's 
point of view, and as Rockingham's ideas on American were 
essentially conservative they could secure no support from 
the more radical dissenters until the leaders of the Rockingham 
party became ready to accept American independence. 
Their opinions, however, did find favour with that section 
of nonconformist chi iürity that desired the connection with 
the American colonies restored to the-state that it was 
66. 
32. See Nonconformity and Social and Economic Life 1660- 
- E. D. Bebb, London 1933, pp. 84-85 and his Protestant 
Nonconformity (Unpublished Ph. D. thefts) pp. 139-145. 
ýT 
before Grenville's American Stamp Act. This section was 
essentially the mercantile section. Thus what was really 
happening was that there had been a change in the ar-oent of 
the policy of the Rockingham Whigs. Until 1765, when Newcastle 
was at the head of the party, the professed sympathy of the 
party for trade was more a result of the connection with 
dissent than a cause of this connection. After 1765, under the 
influence of Rockingham and Burke, the connection with the 
dissenters was much more because the party set out to repre- 
sent trade. The situation had been reversed, and these cir- 
cumstances cannot be considered in isolation from the growth 
in importance of trade and industry, and the change and 
decline of dissent as a force in politics. Thus, in the 
period from the beginning of the first Rockingham administra- 
tion up to the death of Rockingham in 1782 one finds that the 
tendency to treat the "dissenting interest" as something 
which was worthy of separate consideration is far less marked. 
Burke, for instance, always took great pains to represent the 
33 
Rockingham Whigs as the party which stood for trade, and 
he very seldom speaks directly of the dissenting interest and 
the need for dissenting support, but much more generally 
about religious toleration as a principle of the party. 
'Burke made it clear that this toleration was to be extended 
to Catholics as well as dissenters and this was hardly likely 
34 
to endear him to the dissenters. Indeed, as Burke became 
33. See above pp. 3-4. 
34. See for instance Burke' s Speech on Relief of Protestant 
Dissenters (1773) printed in Works Vol. Y, p. 22 et seg. 
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the political prophet of the Rockingham Whigs the whole 
accent of the policy of the Rockingham party changed. 
Newcastle had always been a practical politician; he had always 
been concerned with conciliating men and with the realities 
of everyday politics. Perhaps his particular attention to the 
dissenters was a legacy from Sir Robert Walpole under whom he 
35 
had served his political apprenticeship. 
The changing attitude of the Rockingham Whigs to the 
dissenters is again exemplified by Sir George Savile's support 
of the dissenters in 1772 when they endeavoured to gain greater 
social liberty and a relaxation of the terms by which univer- 
sity graduates had to subscribe to the Thirty7nine Articles. 
Savile took up the dissenters' cause with enthusiasm possibly 
because of his unitarian leanings, but Rockingham and Burke 
seem to have made no attempt to use what might have been a 
first class opportunity to rally the dissenters to their 
36 
banner. The leadersoBf the Rockingham Whigs were far more 
concerned with the abstract principle of "toleration" .. ' '.. ' 
37 
than maintaining the loyalty of the dissenters. The years 
35. The Rockingham Whigs naintained contact with the extreme 
dissenters through John Lee who was to be Solicitor-General 
in the second Rockingham administration. Lee was a friend 
of Priestley who introduced him to Burke and who worshipped 
at the Unitarian Chapel in London. It was possibly through 
him that Savile came in contact with the Unitarians. See 
Robbins op. cit. pp. 329-330. 
36. For this incident see The Reign of George III by J'. Steven 
Watson, Oxford 1960, p. 156. See also The History of England; fron the Accession-of King George III to the Conclusion 
of the Peace of Paris in 1783 by J. Adolphus, London 1802, 
Vol. II, p. 43 See also Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham 
and his Contem oraries by the Earl of Albemarle, London 1852, Vo1. I , pp. 223 . 
37. See for instance The Correspondence of Edmund Burke Vol. IV, 
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in opposition and the death of Newcastle was altering the 
characteristics of the Rockingham Whigs. Moreover, there was 
now little point in conciliating interests and in opposition 
it was more difficult because they could give no rewards to 
interests that were loyal to them. 
This statement is not, however, valid for all the leaders 
of the party. One, at least, was alive to the value of dissent- 
ing support for on 26 April 1772 the duke of -Richmond wrote 
to Rockingham 
"The subject of this letter is to inform your Lordship 
that I have had many applications f rbm the Dissenters 
in Sussex and in London desiring rr7 assistance in the 
support of their Bill to release their ministers from 
subscribing to the Thirty}nine Articles. As I think 
the Bill a just one, founded on reason, good policy 
and the true principles of Whiggism and toleration I 
have promised to support it. I conclude you have had 
like applications, and an persuaded that your giving 
it a warm support will greatly recommend you to that 
weighty body of men, the Dissenters, who all over 
England are very powerful, and who stick pretty much 
togehher. I confirm I wish you the more to be well 
with them, as their religious principles and our 
political ones are so very similar, and most probably 
will make us generally act together. 
I wvish, therefore, you would see some of their 
leading men, and write to as many Lords as you possibly 
can to attend for I understand the scheme of the Ministry 
is to thrown it (the Bill) out in the House of Lords by 
the Bishops. Now the more of your friends appear in 
the List of the minority the better. " 38 
If this letter shows that Richmond at least was in favour 
37. (contd. ) July 1778- June 1782 ed. John A. Woods, Cambridge 1963,1 
p. 83, et seq Edmund Burke to John Erskine 12 June 1779. 
38. w. tit. M. Ri-1403 Richmond to Rockingham 26 April 1772 part 
printed A Lbe/marle 2]2. cit. Vo1. II, pp. 224-225. Cf. Sir Francis 
Dashwood, an Eighteenth Century Independent by Betty Kemp 
London 1967,, p. 143. 
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of conciliating the "dissenting interest" it also shows to 
what extent the Rockingham Whigs connection with the dissent- 
ers had been weakened. They no longer considered it their 
natural duty to support the interest of the dissenters. 
Rockingham's correspondence shows no effort tö rally his 
colleagues and Richmond's plea for regaining the support of 
the dissenters seems to have gone unheard. 
Perhaps this was partly due to Burke who was far more a 
philosopher than a practical politician and thus was concerned 
more with abstract ideas and principles. Toleration to him 
was the important thing and as he came to the fore this same 
tendency became marked among Rockingham and his friends. 
Rockingham and Burke thus became more concerned in the 
shee*tat of, and adherence to, abstract principles. 
It can safely be seid that had Newcastle been living he 
would not have failed to capitalise on such principles, for 
he would have seen that far more benefit accrued to a party 
in opposition, in using the enunciation of such a principle 
as toleration to conciliate a group like the dissenting 
interest, than in merely declaiming and defending the principle 
in Parliament. Indeed, with the death of Newcastle, the 
Rockingham Whigs were deprived of their great organiser, for 
it was his persistence in holding the party together and his 
attention to detail that above all things could have brought 
the party back to office in a short space of time if anything 
coula: 
09. See below p. 
6f 
In spite of these factors the former connection of the 
party with dissent and the connection with individual dissenters 
was still influential particularly in the last years of 
Newcastle's life. Shortly after Burke became Rockingham's 
secretary in 1765, Rockingham appointed Joseph Harrison as 
his assistant. He must have known that Harrison was a former 
40 
Quaker and that it was Harrison who endorsed the letter signed 
"Amor Patriae" that Rockingham received during the Stamp Act 
Crisis with the words "N. B. The author is a Quaker; Mr. Thomas 
Crowley in Gracechurch Street". In this letter Crowley 
suggested an imperial Parliament as a solution to Britain's 
41 
difficulties with the colonies. This view does not seem to 
owe anything in particular to Crowley's religious beliefs 
42 
although other Quakers were adopting a similar point of view. 
Harrison is more likely to have endorsed the latter to the 
effect that Crowley was a Quaker because Rockingham was in 
43 
contact with other Quakers at this time. 
One cannot point to the importance of dissent as a 
significant force from the political point of view among the 
Rockingham mercantile associates at the time of the Stamp Act 
Crisis, but as is to be expected, a number of them were 
O. For Harrison see my Barlow Trecothick e 
41. For this document see YW. ti's. M. R65. For Cr 
Barlow Trecothick etc pp"193-212. 
42. Ibid. p. 205. 
43. Ibid. assim. 
pp"100-128. 
y see my 
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dissenters because of the connection between trade and dissent. 
The closely knit nature of the dissenting community especially 
the Quakers, must however have been helpful to Rockingham. 
The best example of this is the way in which Benjamin 
Franklin and Dr. John Fothergill worked together with a nu3aber 
of Quaker merchants (especially Daniel Mildred, Capel Hanbury 
and Richard Barclay) whom they knew well, probably through 
44 
their common religious beliefs. Had it not been for closely- 
knit religious communities such as this Rockingham must have 
found the organisation of the campaign for the repeal of the 
Stamp Act considerably more difficult and because his party 
had engaged in dealings with the dissent interest prior to 
this time, Rockingham and his colleagues must have gained a 
certain amount of "know-how" which enabled them to deal with 
the dissenting merchants far more easily than they would 
have done. 
Anothe point worth noting here is that during the early 
months of the first Rockingham ministry, the Archbishop of 
York sent Rockingham two documents concerned with the estab- 
lishment of an episcopacy in North America, both in Canada 
and the thirteen colonies. These documents, nova among the 
45 
Rockingham Papers, discussed the arguments for and against 
44 For this see my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 171-192 et passim 
where tt is made quite clear that Franklin still 
had 
close contact with the Quakers at this time. 
45. The Papers are at W. W. N. R65 entitled "Thoughts upon the 
Ecclesiastical EstablishMent in Canada, 11 April 1765" 
and "Thoughts on the present state of the Church of 
England in America June 1764". The covering letter. is 
W. W. M. Rl-497 Archbishop of York to Rockingham 30 
September 1765" For this issue see also Bridenbaugh 
._ QP_ý . _' 254 met sec . 
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the setting up of an episcopacy, and although noting that 
there were weighty arguments against an episcopacy in both 
areas, generally concluded that in both cases bishops were 
more desirable than no bishops, but the documents presented 
a much stronger case for an episcopacy for the thirteen 
colonies than for Canada. There can be little doubt that 
establishment of a scheme of episcopacy in either of the two 
areas would have won favour with the Bench of Bishops and 
Newcastle advised Rockingham to secure the support of the 
46 
Bishops as well as the dissenters. It is true that in his 
covering letter of 30 September 1765 the Archbishop of York 
had stated that 
"It seems too disturbed a season in our colonies to 
enter into such a plan at present. " 47 
but in the period after March 1766 when further and more 
extensive reforms for the American colonies were contemplated, 
the introduction of such a plan might not have been considered 
inappropriate. 
There were, however, more subtle pressures at work. 
During the campaign for the repeal of the Stamp Act, Rockingham 
was in close contact with Dennys de Berdt. He was not only a 
colonial agent but also the leading colonial dissenter in 
London. Shortly after the formation of the Rockingham ministry 
pe: Bardt had explained the religious origins of the American 
colonies to Lord Dartmouth, the new president of the Board of 
46. See labbve 
47. VI. W. M. R1-49't Archbishop of York to Rockingham 30 September 
1765. 
i 
6 4., 
Trade. Prior to this in 1'150 Dennys de Berdt had been appointed 
a member of the special committee of six set up by the 
Dissenting Deputies to 
"keep a watchful Eye.... over the design to introduce 
Bishops to America, to endeavour to prevent all encroach- 
ments on the religious rights of the people there. " 48 
During the Rockingham administration Dr. William Samuel Johnson 
who was working with Archbishop Seeker to secure the appoint- 
ment of a colonial bishop wrote to a correspondent 
"I do know the dissenters plume themselves upom their 
weight they have with the ministry and their zeal and 
venom against episcopacy. " 
Seeker reported to Johnson that he sought to send out a 
colonial bishop but this 
"could not be done when you and we were on fire with 
the Stamp Act-" 49 
Thus the most likely reason why Rockingham took no measures 
to set up an episcppacy in America after the repeal of the 
Stamp Act was the fear of annoying the dissenters both at 
home and in the colonies. There can be little doubt that 
he realised the importance of dissenting opinion both at 
home and in Aierica. 
In the campaign for the passing of the Free Ports Act 
and the contnercial legislation related to it, the part' 
played by the dissenters was precisely the same as the part 
they played during the campaign for the repeal of the Stamp 
48. Bridenbaugh off. cit. pp. 97 , 245. For De Berdt's part during the Stamp Act Crisis see below pp qtBridenbaugh quotes 
here the 'Minutes of the Dissenting Deputies'. 
49. Bridenbaugh 
, 
off. cit. pp" 268-269 quoting unpublished William 
Samuel Johnson Papers. 
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Act. Individual dissenters were important but they were not 
treated as a separate "interest" which had to be conciliated. 
One of the leading figures in the campaign was the Quaker 
merchant Abraham Rawlinson and his contacts with other 
50 
Quakers again seem to have been valuable. 
The next time that the dissenters became prominent in 
the affairs of the Rockingham Whigs was during the election 
campaign of 1768. Here the connection was mainly with the 
Duke of Newcastle and thus it is hardly surprising that some- 
thing of the old tendency to treat them as a separate interest 
becomes apparent again. Abraham Rawlinson, the Quaker merchant 
51 
who had led the agitation for the Free Ports Act in 1766 
had in May 1767 pressed Burke to stand as Parliamentary 
52 
candidate for Lancaster. Prior to this Rawlinson had written 
to Burke in March 1767 and Burke had endorsed his letter 
53 
"The narrow notions of a merchantL' This 'suggests that to 
Burke, Rawlinson was important as a 
member of the dissenting community. 
Rawlinson approached Burke to stand 
a commercial representative that he 
Rawlinson's particular religious co: 
54 
insignificant. 
merchant and not as a 
When in May 1767 
For Lancaster, it was as 
sought Burke and 
znections were again 
50. For Rawlinson see my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 252-255. 
See below pp. 443-447. 
51. For Rawlinson and the Free Ports Act see below pp"427-449 
52. For this see belo* Dp. 528-530. 
53. W. W. I . Bk 1-b9 Rawlinson to Burke 23 March 1767. See below 
pp. 445-447. 
54. See below pp. -52530. 
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Newcastle might have regarded this situation in a different 
light, however, for during the 1768 election campaign when 
Lord John Cavendish stood for Lancaster as Parliamentary 
candidate, the existence of the dissenters as a separate 
interest became more apparent. It does not seem to be any 
coincidence that it was the Duke of Newcastle, the old leader 
of the party, who rallied the interest rather than the new 
leader, the Marquis of Rockingham. In September 1767 the Duke 
of Portland was pressing Newcastle to use his influence with 
John Cookson, a dissenting London lineft draper, who possessed 
considerable interest with the dissenters of Lancashire and 
55 
Westmoreland. In November 1767, John West reported to 
Newcastle that the Quakers (most likely because of Rawlinson(s 
56. 
influence) were solidly behind Cavendish. 
In this election Newcastle treated the dissenters (in 
places as diverse as Sussex, Gloucestershire and London) as a 57 
separate interest who had to be conciliated. After an election 
meeting in Sussex he wrote to his old ally John White express- 
ing his pleasure at having met 
58 
ing Ministers in Sussex. 
the approbation of the dissent- 
55" See B. M. Add. Beiss. 32985 ff3-4 Portland to Newcastle 2 
September 1767. For Cookson and his influence among the 
dissenters see below p. 535. 
56. See B. M. Add. Mss. 32987 fl West to Newcastle 16 November 1767 
and above p. 65. 
57. See below pp"534-536. 
58. See B. M. Add. Mss" 32984 f330 Newcastle to John White 25 
August 1767; see below pp"534-535. 
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Thus right up to the last months of his life Newcastle 
was intent upon preserving the support of the dissenters as 
a separate interest. After his detth the fact that this 
policy became less influential cannot be entirely accounted 
for by a change in the character of dissent and a change in 
the relations between the Rockingham Whigs and the mercantile 
classes. 
Another factor is also important. In the years after 
the Stamp Act Crisis the Rockingham Whigs ceased to be able to 
make trade the main ground of their American policy. Although 
this was always supremely important to them in th(hir dealings 
with the revolting colonists because of the Party's contact 
with commerce, as the conflict with the colonists expanded, 
they ceased to be able to make trade the only ground of their 
plea for a policy of conciliation. During the Stamp Act 
Crisis they were able to do this but the controversy over the 
Townshend Duties forced them to realise that there were for 
Britain other causes at stale in the controversy with the 
colonies, besides the commercial prosperity of British 
merchants. As Other issues came to the fore they found it 
more and more difficult to evolve a policy based on corurer- 
cial considerations, and as these other issues became more 
important the usefulness of the merchants as a pressure 
group declined. Because this association with the merchants 
was closely linked with dissent the connections of the party 
with dissent also became proportionately weaker. 
68 
Rockingham and Burke, however, maintained correspondence 
with individual dissenters as they had done in the past. In 
the 1770's both had extensive correspondence with Richard 
Champion, a Quaker American merchant and Bristol pottery 
maker and politician. Yet reading the correspondence one is 
struck by the small extent to which it was influenced by the 
59 
fact that Champion was a Quaker. Another example is the 
contact that was maintained with Abraham Rawlinson. This 
again does not seem to have been influenced by the fact that 
60 
Rawlinson was a dissenter. On the other hand when Champion 
pressed Burke to stand as parliamentary candidate for Bristol 
in 1774 he added as an after-thpught, having described how 
Burke would receive the support of the trading classes 
"The graver sort among the Dissenters will indisputably 
declare for you. They mention your name with the 
warmest approbation... " 61 
and Richard Burke later acknowledged the value of the Quaker 
62 
support to Edmund, but there does not seem to have been any 
real realisation by Rockingham of the value of the support 
59. For Rockingham 's correspondence with Champion see W. Vr. M. 
Rockingham Papers R1 et passim. The Guide to the 
Manuscript Collections in the Sheffield City Libraries p. 
88 records that 26 letters were written by Rockingham to 
Champion in the years 1775-1782. Copeland and Smith 
2M. cit. pp. 138-147 records at least 156 letters between 
Champion and Edmund Burke during the years 17'14-1788. 
60. See my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 252-255. 
61. See The Correspondence of Edmund Burke Vol. III, 1774-1778 
ed. by G. H. Guttridge, Cambridge 1961, pp-42-48 Richard 
Champion to Burke 1 October 1774. 
62. See ibid. p. 64 Richard Burke (senior) to. R. Shackleton 
11 October 1764. For the strength of the dissenters among the Bristol mercantile classes see The West Couhtry and the American h. 1ainl nri rnl nni pC 17A. A-173with S ecial Reference Reference to the Merchants of Bristol by - (Unpublished Oxford Be Litt. Thesis) 951, p. 93. 
6ý 
, 
of the dissenters or any real effort to cultivate it after 
63 
Newcastle's death. 
Less than a year later when Burke wrote to Rockingham 
concerning the Bristol dissenters and the great trading towns 
lack of response to the Rockingham Whigs' attempt to secure 
petitions for the revival of the American trade he stated 
YThe Dissenters are in general perfectly well disposed. 
The most leading ministers will do as they ought. 
Nine tenths of tthe Quakers will act in the same manner 
as I have been assured by one of the most in influence 
amongst then. The London Quakers have been hurt by 
the contact with the Court and particularly by the 
managements of Your Lordships friend Dr. Fothergill. 
But the rest are of disposition and opinions very 
different-" 64 
It can be seen by this that although Burke still 
recognised the existence of the dissenters as a-separate body 
this body had been divided by now., and some had gohe over 
to sgzpport the ministry. This split in dissenting opinion 
may be related both to the change in the character of dissent, 
which has already been referred to, and also to the general 
lack of effort of the Rockingham Whigs to maintain the 
loyalty of the dissenters as a separate "interest". ý 
63. For Burke and this election in Bristol and the dissenters 
see Edmund Burke' s Connection with Bristol by G. E. WYeare 
Bristol 1894, p. 66. Bristol and Burke by P. T. Underdown, 
(Bristol Branch of the Historical Association) Bristol 
1961, pp. 4-10. "Henry Cruger and Edmund Burke; Colleagues 
and Rivals at the Bristol Election of 1774" by P. T. Underdown, 
in William and Mary Quarterly Vol. XV, Williamsburg Va, 1958 
pp- 14-34* 
64. Guttridge op. cit. p. 208 Burke to Rockingham 14 September 
17'75. It is not clear what activities of Fothergill's 
met with Burke's disapprobation, but it was possibly his 
efforts at conciliation with the Americans the pattern 
of which would definitely have not met with Rockingham's 
approval and also involved 9othergill in contact with the 
7Q 
Thus it may be seen that Newcastle, partly because he was 
much older, was far more aware of the traditional alliance 
between the Whig party and the dissenters, endeavoured to 
conciliate them to a great extent, and was to a greater degree 
more inclined to be sympathetic to their interests. This was 
not due solely to the fact that Newcastle received his 
political training in a different era. In Newcastle's time 
the dissenting interest was different to that in the latter 
part of the eighteenth century, and Newcastle was in office 
for much longer than his successor and during the later years 
of his career he became responsible for, and preoccupied with, 
maintaining the strength of the administration. Also because 
of his responsibility for government finance Newcastle forged 
strong links with the trading and mercantile elements. 
When Rockingham became leader of the party, however, the 
the situation altered radically. The Rockingham Whigs were 
seldom in power and the conciliation of an interest became 
more difficult because there were few rewards to give. As it 
became increasingly obvious that opposition was not a short 
temporary phenomena it became less necessary to conciliate a 
group that were peripheral to politics anyway, and if the 
support of the dissenters was useful it could by no means 
64. cont the ministry. For this incident see my Barlo 
Trecothick etc pp"187-189. See also "Dr. John Fothrg ll, 
Peacemaker" by D" e. Lorner and D. W. Singer in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 98, Philadelphia, ' 
1954, p. 11 et seg. 
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be classed as essential. Moreover the character of dissent 
was changing in such a way that it was becoming less necessary 
to conciliate it. As Methodism became important, nonconformity 
grew less political, more wide-spread, and less clearly defined. 
The nonconformists ceased to be a separate interest whose 
support it was possible to enlist. 
Finally it should be noted that another factor was the 
change in character of the leadership of the Rockingham Whigs. 
Newcastle was essentially a practical politician. His treat- 
ment of the dissenters was in general conformity with his 
political principles. He'believed in conciliating everybody 
and securing the support of everybody possible. Rockingham on 
the other hand, was mainly as "opposition" leader. He was 
concerned with justifying measures which had been taken by 
his party in the past and in which he believed (his constant 
adherence to the Declaratory Act exemplifies this admirably) 
and with maintaining what he considered to be the principles 
of Whig conduct. This tendency was increased. because Burke, 
as a political philosopher, was far more concerned with the 
abstract principles of Whig politics rather that the practical 
application of these principles. Rockingham's treatment of 
the dissenters conforms to this pattern. Thus during the 1780 
election at Bristol, Burke wrote to Portland about the 
dissenters 
;. ,ý 
7R, , 
"The presbytarians are in general Sound, and in our 
Interest. So are the Quakers to about two or three; 
byt the Quakers are not very active, and where interests 
are nearly balanced they are much inclined to caution. 
The Baptists and Ana-baptists were originally disposed 
to Cruger and continue, through the means of one of 
their Ministers.... much his friends, and ill enough 
affected to me. I had most of them the last election 
rather upon the principle of Junction with Cruger than 
for any good liking to our politics. " 65 
No longer did the Rockingham Whigs attempt to conciliate 
an interest closely allied to trade. The dissenters were no 
lomger the natural allies of the party, and Burke ceased to 
consider them an entity but was able to break the interest 
down into its component parts and analyse their opinions. 
Burke Correspondence Vol. IV, ed" J. Woods, p-270 Burke to 
Portland 3 September 1780" 
PART II. 
PEWCASTL '9 ROCKINGHAM AND THE MERCHANTS. 
L761 - 1768. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE FALL OF PITT. 
At a cabinet meeting on 2 October 1761 William Pitt, 
finding that only his brother-in-law, Earl Temple, would 
support his policy of an immediate declaration of war against 
Spain, declared that he would not be held responsible for 
anything that he did not direct and expressed his intention of 
1 
resigning. He formally resigned on 5 October 1761. In this 
way the uneasy partnership, the basis of England's success in 
the Seven Years War, broke up. Pitt, as Secretary of State 
for the Southern Department, had been the architect of victory, 
the inspiring genius and the great orator of the administration 
but Newcastle who was the "greatest electioneer and manipulator 
2 
of personal allegiances" of the eighteenth century had been 
an essential and complimentary partner. 
The resignation of Pitt was the culmination of a series of 
events to which the resignation of Newcastle in May 1762 formed 
only an anti-climax. These events had begun with the accession 
of George III to the throne in October 1760 and continued with 
the promotion of the Earl of Bute to the post of Secretary of 
. L. See Personal ana Party uovernmenti Dy i). A,. Yvinstianiey, Cambridge 1910, pp-75-77. Cf. Steven Watson 2. cit. p. 74. 
For a more detailed account of this meeting see "Pitt's 
Retirement from Office 5 October 1761" by W -Hunt and H. W. 
Temperley (Documents) English Historical Review Vol"XXI, 
London 1906, pp. 119,327, and "George III and his First 
Cabinet" by D. A. Winstanley ibid Vol"XVII, London 1902, pp. 678- 
691. See also B. I. I. Add. Mss" 32929 ffl8-24 et seg " inutes of the Cabinet Meeting 2 October 1761. " At this meeting Pitt, 
Newcastle, Granville, Temple, Devonshire, Bute, Hardwicke, 
Legonier and Mansfield were present. 
2. Steven Watson on. cite pp. 67-68. 
.. _____ _______ 
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State in March 1761. Newcastle had been instrumental in Bute's 
promotion, hoping to find in him an ally against Pitt with 
3 
whom he constantly disagreed. 
In the same month as Bute took office as Secretary of 
State abortive negotiations for peace with France were com- 
menced. With some, especially the commercial classes who had 
suffered at the hands of French privateers, peace was popular 
but most Englishmen wanted a peace that would secure the 
4 
unchallenged supremacy of England. George III, although very 
5 
anxious for peace, seems to have accepted this point of view. 
Pitt, however, made no secret of the terms on which he would 
make peace. Canada, the Islands, harbours and fisheries off 
that country were to be surrendered to England and the fishing 
privileges off the island of Newfoundland which had been 
allowed to Prance by the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 were to be 
given up. England would therefore be completely supreme in 
6 
North America. Newcastle was in favour of the peace terms that 
ý ýi 
Winstanley 
, 
o2. cit. pp. 35-37" On George II s accession, 
Hardwicke had advised Newcastle to resign but he had been 
persuaded to continue in office by the King, other Old Whig 
ministers and City financiers. See The Life and- 
Correspon-dence of Phillip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor 
of Britain by Phillip C. Yorke, Vol. III, Cambridge 1913, 
pp-261-309. 
4. Winstanley op. cit. pp. 42-43. For the merchants desire for 
peace see "Lord Hollands Memoirs" in Life and Letters of 
Lady Sarah Lennox 1745-1826 ed. Countess of Ilchester and 
Lord Staverdale, London 1901, Vol-1.9p. 41. For the lossebof 
the British merchants see The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History 1660-1783 by Captain A. T. Mahan, London 1890, p. 318. 
For the different peace policies see The Peace of Paris 1763 
by Z. E. Rashed, Liverpool 1951, pp-67-69. 
5. Steven Watson M. cit. p. 71. 
6. Winstanley 
. 
2p. 
. 
Sit. pp. 44-4-45. Cf. Yorke o. cit. p. 269. For Pitt' s 
views on the peace see especially Rashed oP. cit. pp. 7,10-11, 
67-69. 
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had been offered by Choiseul on 31 March 1761 by which England 
and France were to remain in possession of the territory that 
they occupied in various parts of the world on certain fixed 
dates whereas Pitt had been more auspicious of Choiseul. Bute 
7 
appears to have been the most anxious of the three to make peace. 
Pitt did not want France to have any share in the North 
American fisheries, principally because he believed he could 
thus deprive the French navy of its nursery and break French 
maritime power but also because of the economic value of the 
fisheries. By depriving France of the fisheries he hoped thus 
to permanently remove any probability of France endangering 
8 
British power in the colonies or at sea. 
By July 1761, Choiseul, increasingly hopeful of an alliance 
with Spain, was raising his terms. Newcastle was still ready 
to make concessions but Bute was throwing in his lot with Pitt 
9 
who was obviously enjoying the most popularity. In the middle 
of August, however, Bute was coming back to the policy of 
peace and was now ready with Newcastle to recognise French 
fishing rights off Newfoundland. This was the critical issue 
and Pitt was unwilling to recognise these rights believing that 
fishing rights off Newfoundland necessitated giving the French 
a naval base there which could easily be a dagger pointed at 
the heart of British North America. Newcastle had been pressing 
Wins an ey oP. cit. pp. 43- as e 22--c-It. pp. 11-M. For 
Newcastle's views see B. M. Add. hiss. 32921 f272v Newcastle to 
Devonshire 2 April 1761. See also Rajhed o ... pp. 71 et seg 
and below pp. 76-77. 
8. Rashed op. cit. pp. 102-104. 
9. V9instanley op. cit. pp. 59-66" See also Rashed op. cit. p. 75 et seg. 
j 
i 
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for peace since early in 1760 and every year he had asserted 
that the funds could not be raised for the forthcoming campaign. 
He believed that peace was absolutely essential for Britain 
because the country could not withstand the increasing cost 
of the war. Moreover he hoped that peace might restore his 
10 
ofd power and ruin Pitt. 
When Bute agreed with Newcastle in August 1761 the balance 
of power in the government had shifted and Newcastle was in 
his strongest position since the negotiations started. At 
the end of August the English negotiators adopted a more 
conciliatory attitude and Pitt suffered a serious rebuff. He 
was outvoted in the cabinet and compelleäfto consent to a 
11 
policy of which he did not approve. 
It was now, however, too late to make peace with France 
for the Family Compact, the existence of which but not the 
12 
precise terms being known to English statesmen, had been 
signed on 13 August 1761. France rejected the more moderate 
Peace terms offered by England and in September 1761 the 
peace negotiations broke down. As early as July 1761 Pitt 
had judged that Spain was going to join in the war on behalf 
of France, and believing that war with Spain was inevitable 
he aba Boned all attempts of conciliating Prance in the 
negotiations and favoured an immediate declaration of war 
13 
against Spain. 
Newcastle believed that England could not support a war 
10. Ibid. pp. 28-30 
11. Ibid pp-95-96. Winstanley op. citpp-67-68 . 12" Bashed oo. cit. pp. 90,96.373--ibid. pp. 90,92. 
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against Spain and Bute joined him in this view. Pitt thus 
stood alone. When he refused to give way Bute and Newcastle 
were faced with the alternative of Pitt's support and a war 
with Spain or Pitt's resignation and the hoped for peace with 
14 
Spain. They chose Pitt's resignation yet Newcastle appears 
to have been the real loser. To a large extent he was now 
left at the mercy of George III and Bute. Apart from the fact 
that he believed that Great Britain could not afford the war 
with Spain three other considerations appear to have influenced 
him. Firstly Newcastle had long worked uneasily with Pitt and 
had often smarted under his tyranny. Secondly he desired to 
retain power in the new reign and thirdly he was siding with 
those members of the commercial classes who believed that this. 
15 
was the most profitable time to call a halt to the war. 
The "Great Commoner" had long been recognised as the 
leader to whom the commercial classes gave their allegiance 
and it is advisable to attempt to analyse and explain his 
mercantile following and to distinguish it from those members 
of the commercial classes who paid allegiance to Newcastle. 
Mr. David Reid has pointed out the divisions in opinion 
among the mercantile classes towards the end of the War of 
American Independence. In Parliament he divides the merchants 
into two broad groups. Firstly there-was a group of "larger 
merchants, financiers and shipowners" who aimed to obtain 
government contracts or social advancement from their wealth 
14. Winstanley ff. cit. pp. 68-74. Rashed opq cit. pp. 100-101. 
Hunt and Temperley loc. cit. p. 119 et seg. y 
15. Winstanley 2p. . 
Sit. p. 77. 
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and connections. Secondly there were a number of smaller 
merchants returned by their locality, who did not seek personal 
advancement and whose interests were mainly local. Mr. Reid 
contrasts these two groups, particularly the first, with the 
merchants outside Parliament who very often worked together, 4`, 
as for example when they petitioned Parliament and he states 
"In fact the larger merchants in Parliament were not 
there as a body representing the commercial interests in 
the nation. They were endeavouring in the main to ee. aure 
contracts and political advancement which was the reward 
of assured support to the administration. " 16 
The division that Mr. Reid is able to distinguish towards 
the close of the War of American Independence seem also to have 
existed on Pitt's resignation in 1761. The development and 
solidification of these divisions can be traced during the. 
Seven Years War and the period immediately preceding it. Dr. 
17 
Sutherland in a recent lecture showed how Henry Pelham endea- 
vouredrto remove the hostility of the ordinary merchants, 
particularly in the City of London, to "the small group of men 
and institutions known to contemporaries as the monied interest" 
18 
(many of whom sat in Parliament) and in so doing how he managed 
to win the allegiance of the leading City merchant Sir John 
19 
Barnard. On Pelham's death, however, Newcastle was not able-to 
16. Reid loc. cit. pp. 212-214- 17. "The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration 1756-57" by L. S. Sutherland loc. 
18" In The Structure of Politics pp. 55-56 Professor Namier 
distinguishes twenty-two-ff-leading City men in close touch 
with the Treasury and deeply engaged in Government finance" Fifteen of these twenty-two had at one time sat in Parliament 
and thirteen were in Parliament in 1761. 19., Sutherland loc. cit. pp. 148-149. See also "The City of London 
_ , Eighteenth Century Politics" by L. S. Sutherland in Essa s Presented to Sir Lewis Namier ed" R" Pares and A. J. P" 
aylor, London 1 56, pp" 2-6 " 
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maintain the position secured by his brother, and the approach 
of the Seven Years War brought the Devonshire-Pitt administration 
20 
into being and gave Pitt his mercantile following. Newcastle 
was discredited through the loss of Minorca and the failure of 
Admiral Byng to relieve it. 
During the public outcry that followed and drove Newcastle 
to resign, the commercial classes began to look to Pitt as their 
saviour. Because of his opposition to the previous administration 21 
Pitt was their obvious champion and his ideas now gained credit. 
It was popular indignation that forced Newcastle to resign, 
forced Pitt upon the crown and also determined the character 
22 
of the administration that was to follow. During this adminis- 
tration Pitt gained popularity with the commercial classes for 
three reasons. Firstly, dogged by ill-health he was peremptorily 
dismissed before he had done anything for which he could be 
criticized, and the dismissal itself was enough to gain 
him 
popularity. Secondly, Fox's attempt to organise a counter- 
propaganda campaign in favour of Newcastle badly misfired and 
this was particularly the case in the City. The virulence of 
the attack on Pitt rallied sympathy to him and caused Fox to 
become disliked there while Pitt's supporters closed their 
ranks and consolidated the popular picture of Pitt they were 
_ seeking 
to advance. Thirdly, the attempt of the administration 
to raise supplies outside the 'monied interest' gave Pitt the 
support of t he commercial classes led by Sir John Barnard as 
20" Sutherland "City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt 
Administration" i c: c3-t: . 149-150. 21. Ibid. p. 151. 
22. Ibid. pp. 152-9. 
23 
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distinct from the support of the 'monied interest'. Dr. Suthea 
land sums this up in these words 
"The financial projects of 1757, unsuccessful though they 
were, played a considerable part in consolidating Pitt's 
popularity in the City, a popularity which was to grow 
steadily through the great coalition ministry and which 
he was never altogether to lose. As time went on this 
popularity was to be enhanced by Pitt's great services 
as a war minister and by the pre-eminence which his 
personality won him. During the few uneasy months of 
the Devonshire. Pitt administration, it was not his 
exploits which won the favour of the rank and file of 
the citizens of London.... Their support of him depended 
on a feeling which they were never altogether to lose 
and which had in it elements of truth - that he was in 
some manner akin to them since he stood with them against 
the big battalions of the political and financial world. " 
24 
If during the pericd of the Devonshire-Pitt administration 
the 'monied interest' did not look to the Duke of Newcastle 
for leadership (and there is no evidence of co-operation 
between them and Newcastle) the stage was still being set for 
the future, for when the great coalition was formed Pitt led 
the commercial classes and Newcastle looked for support from 
25 
the financiers or 'monied interest'. 
During the Seven Years War each of the partners consoli- 
' dated their relative positions. The mercantile classes soon 
realised that Pitt was going to carry on a war for and upon 
trade, and supported him and his war. In his broader conception 
of the war they could see a far greater prospect of lasting 
commercial gain than they could in the narrower 'continental 
view' of the war envisaged by Newcastle and his supporters. 
;:; 0. l DYa. PP" Lb; &-. 
25:. Ibid. p. 171. 
lduct. Pe 
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Many of Pitt' s expeditions were planned with advice of the 
merchants and he treated the merchants courteously and valued 
their advice. The fact that Pitt's chief ally was William 
Beckford, a rich West Indian sugar planter, is significant. 
Even more significant is the fact that Pitt managed to maintain 
Beckford's allegiance while believing that England should 
conquer and keep the foreign West Indian sugar islands because 
the existing islands were becoming exhausted and would soon be 
unable to meet the needs of an expanding North American market. 
Most of the West Indian planters believed this would mean 
economic ruin for them because of the fall in the price of 
26 
sugar on the British market with increased supply. 
Newcastle in a similar manner consolidated his position 
with the 'monied interest' and this is scarcely surprising. 
As First Lord of the Treasury he was responsible for financing 
the war and until the time of his resignation he maintained 
close contact with the financiers. This contact was not 
limited to financial matters for Newcastle was quite willing 
to consult them on other political issues. Sir William Baker, 
for instance, was repeatedly consulted by Newcastle, especially 
during the years 1760-1762 on the peace terms to be made with 
France. Sir George Colebrooke was used to find out the re- 
27 
action in the City on Pitt's resignation. 
26. See Chatham's Colonial Policy, a Study in the Fiscal and 
Economic Implications of the Colonial Policy of the Elder 
Pitt by K. Hotblack, London 1917, pp. 13-19 Namier. England 
in the Age etc pp. 303-304.; 
27. Namier, En land in the Age etc PP-241-242,273-282. B. M. Add. biss. 32 f113 memorandum --8 October 1761. See also Namier, Structure of Politics pp. 53-58. 
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Thus when Pitt resigned, it is true to say, according to 
! r. Reid's analysis that he possessed the loyalty of the 
smaller merchants and the merchants outside Parliament but 
not that of the governemnt financiers. This was because he 
was not interested in government patronage. Newcastle, on 
the other hand, possessed the loyalty of the greater merchants 
who aimed at government contracts or social advancement because 
he took a great deal of care in the skilful manipulation of 
28 
government patronage. It is impor/tant to understand this 
situation because Newcastle's relations with the merchants 
in the future were greatly influenced by the nature of his 
mercantile supporters and it was an important influence on 
the evolution of Rockingham as a political leader. 
. 
28. See above pp. 80-81.1 
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CHAPTER II. 
THE REACTION TO PITT'S RESIGNATION. 
(a) TIT, IM' -TDIATE REACTION. 
When Bute and Newcastle chose Pitt's resignation rather 
than a war with Spain they well knew Pitt's popularity among 
the commercial classes and in the period immediately following 
-his resignation they anxiously watched for a hostile reaction. 
On 4 October 1761 the Duke of Bedford wrote to Newcastle 
1 
imploring him to stand firm in spite of the popularity of Pitt 
and two days later on 6 October 1761 Bute wrote to Newcastle 
"I see no system whatsoever proper for this dangerous 
minute; or that I can in my poor judgement recommend 
to the King. The storm runs high in the City. I hear 
some of them are rash enough to say, they will have 
their minister again. This may subside but a weak 
administration or rather none in the House of Commons 
will not tend to silence it; but of this your Grace-is 
the best Judge-11 2 
Newcastle was particularly perturbed because he was 
responsible for raising government money and if Pitt's 
resignation caused a hostile reaction in London he might have 
difficulty in raising the customary loan in the City. On the 
same day that Bute wrote to him Newcastle had a conference 
with his old friend Bartholomew Burton, the Governor of the 
"ý , Bank 
of England. Burton toltt Newcastle that he would call a 
meeting of the Directors of the Bank and that he did not doubt 
that thgy would support Newcastle as in the past. Burton also 
assured Newcastle that the situation as far as the City was 
1. B. rd. Add. ldss. 32929 f54 Bedford to Newcastle 4 October 1761" 
2. Ibid, f74 Bute to Newcastle 6 October 1761. Bute was perturbed Ft the weakness of the administration in the House of 
-, 'Cormons" 
concerned would improve if anything, with the resignation of 
Pitt, for the 'principal people' would think that the country 
was a good deal nearer peace, and it was only the 'mob' who 
thought or talked otherwise. Burton was supported in his 
opinion by Robert Marsh, the Deputy Governor of the Bank, who 
also said that the resignation of Pitt would help in raising 
money if anything and the only thing that it could adversely 
3 
affect was the attitude of the 'mob' ah the Lord Mayor's show. 
This is presumably because the Lord Mayor's Day was an occasion 
for the display of political feeling. Pitt's hold over the 
less wealthy citizens was demonstrated clearly on this 
4 
occasion. 
Newcastle, however, was still worried about the reception 
of Pitt's resignation in the City. On 8 October he wrote of 
"The different reports of the Disposition of the City upon 
5 
Mr. Pitt's resignation" and reported the conversation of 
several more bankers about loans for the forthcoming year. The 
fact that one of these, Sir George Amyand, assured him that 
there would be very great difficulty in raising the money if 
war broke out with Spain seems to have done little to reassure 
6 
him that Pitt's resignation was for the best. 
6. lbld. ff83-84 Memorandum 6 October 1761. See The Court and, City 
Registry edns, for 1761 and 1762, London, p. 237 in both volumes 
for Burton as Governor and Marsh as Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of England. 
4. See below pp. 103-104. 
5. B. M. Add. , iss. 32929 fill Memorandum 8 October 1761. 6. Ibid. flll Memorandum 8 October 1761. The bankers that 
Newcastle conversed with were Nicholas Magens, Henry Muilman, 
Peter Burrell, Sir George Amyand and Adam Drummond. For 
most of these see Namier Structure of Politics pp. 54-56. 
For Burrell see also Charles Tovmshend by Sir Lewis Namier 
and John Brooke, London, 1964, p. 105. Sir George Amyand. (1720- 1766) was a London merchant trading principally to Hamburg x_. 
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On the same day Sir George Colebrookcreported to Newcastle 
on a meeting of the Bankers, presumably that called by the 
Governor of the Bank of England mentioned to Newcastle on 6 
October. Colebrook told Newcastle that 
"Mr. Frame, a Qua4er and some others were 
upon the subject of Mr. Pitt; (said) that 
a bad peace. No vigorous measures - and 
did not oppose and act with vigour out ( 
accepted anything from the King he would 
and treated like my Lord Bath. " 
very violent 
there would be 
that if 1lir. Pitt 
Df office) but 
be resigned, 
Later in the same memorandum Newcastle noted that Frame had 
It always been a noisy opponent" but he also noted 
6. (contd) and leading partner of the London banIing r Lrm or 
Sir George Amyard, Staples and Mercer. See The Complete 
Baronetage ed. G. E. C. Vol. V, 1707-1800, Exeter 1906 p" 130. 
7. B. b2. Add. Mss" 32929 ff113-4 Memorandum. ,8 October 
1761. The 
reference to William Pulteney, Earl of Bath, is to his taking 
a peerage in 1742 and thus losing all influence. See Williams 
op. cit. p. 226. There is no merchant or--, -banker by the name of 
Frame' in the London Directories of this period but in The 
Universal Director or the Nobleman and Gentlemans' True Guide 
byy' Mr. Mortimer, London 1761, Part III, p"80 Freame, Barclay 
and Freame" are recorded as bankers at "Corner of George Yard, 
Lombard Street" and in A Complete Guide to all Persons who 
have any Trade or Commerce with the City of London and Parts 
Ad acent London 17ý"Freame, Barclay and Freame" are 
recorded as Bankers in Lombard Street. These Freames were 
Quakers. There were Joseph Freame 1701-1766 and John Preame 
1729-1770 of Lombard Street. These two were not father abd 
son as stated in History of Barclays Bank by P. W. Matthews, 
London 1926, p. 34. They appear to have been cousins. For 
this information I am indebted to the Librarian of the 
Society of Friends for consulting Registers of Births, 
Marriages and Deaths of the Quarterly Meeting of London and 
Middlesex. The Freames were in partnership with their 
relative James Barclay ( Joseph Freames sister Sarah appears 
to have married James Barclay). See Matthews op. cit. p. 34. 
The firm later developed and amalgamated with other banks 
to form the present Barclays Bank. See Matthews op. cit. assirn 
See also A Handbook of London Bankers by F. G. Hilton Price, 
London 1890-91, pp"10-12 under Barclay, Bean and Co. This 
work again appears to be inaccurate on the precise relation- 
ship of the Freames. In the absence of any banker by the 
name of Frame and as the Freames were Quakers it is logical 
to conclude that Newcastle's 'Frame' was one of the Freame 
partners. ' 
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"Sir William Baker is of a different opinion. He finds 
nobody uneasy about dir. Pitt's resigning except the noise 
of the Common Council etc. He is much for publishing 
our affairs to Prance, as that will prove, that lyr. Pitt 
not only joined in, but recommended and offered those 
terms. He thinks spirit and Vigour will carry everything through with success; and that peace will be obtained 
now which could hot be procured by Mr. Pitt. 
Sir William Baker's opinion is, to drop the King of Prussia, who he says has given us no assistance. In 
that case, we might keep up our army for the defence of Hanover etc. But this he thinks would remove a difficulty 
into which Mr. Pitt had led us, and therefore it is 
not advisable at present. " 8 
The contrast between the attitude of the 'monied interest' 
who supported Newcastle and the administration in power and 
the less wealthy merchants without political power is thus 
clearly exemplified in October 1761 in the differing attitudes 
of Frame and Baker. 
Until news was received that Pitt had accepted a pension 
and a peerage for his wife the established pattern was thus 
repeating itself, Newcastle receiving support and assurance 
from the ', monied interest' and Pitt from the other mercantile 
classes. Newcastle himself seems to have realised this, 
eventually concluding that nobody was perturbed about Pitt's 
resignation except the "noise of the Common Council" and hoping 
that the negotiations for peace could be successfully completed. 
8. B. M. Add. Mss. 32929 ff 113-114 Memorandum 8 October 1761. 
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On 13 October he wrote to General Yorke 
"You will hear from common report, the effect which this 
whole affair has had in the City. I don't apprehend it 
will have much 'In Parliament provided the persons who 
remain in the administration can have sense enough to 
agree thoroughly and cordially. " 9 
By this time news was spreading that Pitt had accepted 
10 
a pension for himself and a peerage for his wife. On the same 
day as Newcastle wrote the above, two reports were written to 
9. Ibid. f219 Newcastle to General Yorke 13 October 1761. Cf. 
Winstanley 2. cit. pp. 86-89. 
10. Laprade loc. cit. p. 738 states that Pitt' s resignation was 
announced in the morning papers of October 7 e. g. Public 
Advertiser 4 and reports were-immediately circulated 
concerning rewards to him. He cites London Evening Post 
8-10 October which gives evidence of public indignation, 
London Chronicle of even date and Public Ledger of 10 
October 1761. For reaction to Pitt accepting a pension see 
The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham by B. Williams, London 
1915, Vol. II, pp. 118-9. In William Pitt, Earl of Chatham 
by Albert Von Ruville, translated by H. J. Chaytor, London 1907 
Vol. III, p. 14 et sen the author notes the complete revulsion 
of public feeling on the news of Pitt accepting a pension ! 
and a peerage for his wife. His friends were indignant 
that he had humiliated himself to such an extent. Delavel 
said "The man is a fool. If he had gone into the City; 
told them he had a poor wife and children unprovided for, 
and opened a subscription, he would have got £500,000 
instead of £3000 a year. " See Correspondence of William 
Pitt, Earl of Chatham ed. W. S. Taylor and J. Pringle, London 
1838, Vol-II, p. 159. Ruville op. cit. Vol. III, p. 15 blames 
Fox for stirring opposition to Pitt. See also Hotblack 
og. cit. p. 21 who points out the reaction on this occasion is a testimony to Chatham's reputation and states "Another 
statesman might have accepted such favours without remark; 
but the Great Commoner had been tho ht above suspicion. " See also The English Press in Politics 1760-1776 by R. R. Rea, 
Lincoln, Nebraska , , p" " 
a 
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him of hostile reaction to Pitt: The London merchant and 
banker, Samuel Touchet, reported to Newcastle that the London 
Court of Common Council broke up "without any motion being 
made relative to Mr. Pitt or the instruction of their 
11 
representatives. " Also on 13 October one of Newcastle's 
Sussex supporters, John Page, wrote to Newcastle that on the 
previous evening he had attended the annual dinner of a club 
of tradesmen in Chichester and that a toast to Pitt had not 
been well received and that considerable disappointment had 
12 
been expressed at his acceptance of honours., Newcastle now 
believed that he had successfully settled financial affairs 
and prepared to retire temporarily to Claremont. As usual he 
was relying on the 'monied interest' to raise supplies for 
the forthcoming year and wanted to see them on the first day 
13 
of the Parliamentary session. 
11. B. Vii. Add. riss. 32929 f235 Samuel Touchet to Newcastle 13 
October 1761. When Pitt first resigned the London Common 
Council had proposed to address him but learning of his 
voluntary resignation and not of a dismissal they did not 
do so. Pitt's attitude towards the Court also dampened 
enthusiasm for him. See Ruville 
, 
off. cit. Vol.! II, p-11. 
Touchet was one of the 'monied interest'. See Namiexy 
Structure of Politics p"56. 
12. B. M. Add. Mss. 32929 f238 John Page to Newcastle 13 October 1763. 
13. Ibid. f263 Newcastle to Hardwicke 14 October 1761; f273 
memorandum 13 October 1761; ibid f303 "Members to be wrote to to attend the first day of the session and by whom" 16 October 1761: 1 
wi 
7 
4y 
r 
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Just when Newcastle felt secure, however, the tide turned 
against him. On 13 October 1761 Pitt wrote his famous letter 
to Beckford which by 17 October 1761 had appeared in The 
14 
Gazetteer and Public Ledger and was reprinted widely elsewhere. 
In the letter Pitt stated that as the cause and manner of his 
resignation and his acceptance of honours from the King had 
been misrepresented he was obliged to explain his actions. 
He declared that over-ruled in council on the immediate 
declaration of a war against Spain, and not wishing to be head 
responsible for measures that he did not direct he had 
voluntarily resigned and had accepted, unsolicited, certain 
marks of favour from the King. ý.. A 
Concerning this incident Burke commented in the Annual 
Register for 1761 that at first the ministerial cause had been 
better managed than that of Pitt. By printing the news of 
Pitt's resignation, his acceptance of honours, and pacificatory 
news from Spain near each other in the Gazette public fear 
had been allayed and when "the torrent of popular rage" was 
again released in its true direction 
"it was no longer that impetuous and irresistable tide 
which in the year 1757 had born 'down every thing before 
it, it was weakened, divided and ineffective. " 15 
14. For this letter see Taylor and Pringle l 
Pitt to Beckford 15 October 1761. For its printing see 
B. M. Add. MRss" 32929 f333 Hardriicke to Newcastle 17 October 
1761. See also Ruville op. cit. Vol. III, p. 16; Hotblack 
aP" " p" 21" See also London and the Kingdom by R. R. 
Sharpe, London 1895, Vol- III., p-68 and Albemarle 22. cit. Vol. I, pp. 49-50. 
15. The Annual Register Vol. IW, 1761, London 1800, pp. 44-45. 
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In spite of this, Pitt's letter of 15 October and his 
restoration as the popular idol caused Newcastle a great deal 
of concern. He seems to have received his first news of it 
16 
in a letter from Hardwicke on 17 October, but possibly he had 
17 
seen the public papers himself before he recdtved this letter. 
Hardwicke was most indignant about the letter and Newcastle 
18 
noted that Pitt was "still to be hero". On the fal'o*ipg day 
Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke in more detail about Pitt's letter 
commenting on its insolence and stating that Pitt was 
endeavouring to regain his former popularity. He added some- 
what desparingly 
"I think with my Lord Bute that IT. Pitt's letter gives 
us great advantage if we know how to make use of it. " 
19 
In a memorandum on 20 October Newcastle boted the effect 
of Pitt's letter in the City reporting that there had been an 
inflamatory meeting of the Common Council and that it was 
necessary to put a stop to a rumour that Pitt's ideas were 
well-fpunded and that a war with Spain was inevitable. Later 
on the same day or on the following day, however, he commented 
that the meeting of the Common Council had been postponed 
20 
and "Things in the City were shot so bad". 
16. B. ri. Add. M. as. 32929 ff332-33 Hardvricl. e to Newcastle 17 October 
1761. For the publication in the Gazette of Pitt's 
resignation the news of his-pens 
, 
ionand peaceable news 
from Spain at the same time see also Williams, op. cit. Vol. 
II, pp. 116-118. 
17. Thi's "seems more likely. See ibid. f336 Newcastle to Hardwilak4 
17 October 1761.1 ` 
18. Ibid. f333 Hardwicke to. Newcastle 17 October 1761; f336 
Newcastle to Hardivicke 17 October 1761. 
19. Ibid. ff358-, 359 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 October 1761. 
20. Ibid. ff4Ol-402 Memoranda 20-21 October 1761. Bute thought 
that Pitt's letter to Beckford had been provoked originally 
by a meeting of the Common Council on 14 October 1761 in-- 
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Newcastle was also perturbed. at this time because of the 
state of the stock market and the bankruptcy of the London 
21 
merchant, Henry Shiffner, which had just occurred. On the 
same day Newcastle wrote to the Duke of Bedford 
"Mr. Pitt's most extraordinary and unaccountable letter 
has had a most extraordinary and unaccountable effect 
and has brought back to him his mad noisy City friends, 
who were for a time displeased with him. I hear the 
Common Council intend to address, instruct their 
members, compliment ? sir«" Pitt, or something to show they continue their old factious spirit; But I hope 
we shall now despise, and not endeavour to gain them 
by complaisance in our measures. " 22 
and within the next forty-eight hours he wrote three other 
23 
letters in similar vein. 
On 22 October 1761 The Common Council of the City of 
London resolved to present an address of thanks to Pitt for 
his services and to lament his resignation through their 
parliamentary representatives. When the motion was put to the 
vote in the Common Council there were 109 in favour of the 
24 
motion and fifteen against. 
On the same day as the common Council passed its resolution; 
Newcastle wrote to Rockingham sending him an account of the 
20 contd. which there was a majority of 48 to 12 "against r 
message in return of an address to him" See Ibid. f333 
Hardwicke to Newcastle 17 October 1761. 
21. Ibid. f354 Henry Shiffner to Newcastle 17 October 1761; Ibid. 
f401 memorandum 20 October 1761. For Shiffner see Namier 
Structure of Politics pp. 171,419-421,425. England in the,., 
Age etc p. 254, note 4. 
22. B. M. Add. Mss. 32929 ff403-4 Newcastle to Bedford 20 October 
1761. 
23. Ibid. ff406-7 Newcastle to Hardwicke 20 October 1761; Ibid 
f409 Newcastle to White 20 October 1761; Ibid. f427 
Newcastle to Devonshire 21 October 1761. ij 
24. Ibid. f442 Docketed "Common Council 22 October 1761" Of 
the majority there were nine aldermen (Beckford, Glynn, Stepso, Bridgers Masters, Cartwright, Gascoyne, Chaloner and Rawlinson) , ninety-nine commoners and one teller. Of the 
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proceedings and asked him to see York or any other town did not 
follow the example of London. 
York. He concluded 
Newcastle especially suspected 
"I beg your Lordship would be watchful to take measures 
immediately to prevent it; If there should be any such 
design the same as to Hull, or any of the great trading 
towns; but there I don't suspect it. " 25 
Rockingham, who was at Wentworth, replied on 20 October 
reassuring Newcastle and saying 
"by a friend who I have seen, who comes from Wakefield 
I find that the general cry among the merchants and 
considerable persons - is - that a certain great man 
has deserted the service of his country and has given 
a reason for it which only shows the violence of his 
temper and no true patriotic spirit. " 
He concluded 
"The Corporation of York are composed of persons who were 
formerly Tories - and tho' they may now be no longer so, 
yet I fancy they would retain enough of that disposition 
to make it a reason to incite them to follow the example 
of the Common Council of London if they found that my 
friends in York were Lesirous that they should not 
address. It may accidentally happen that the City of 
York will not address Mr. Pitt. If it does your Grace 
will explain it but surely it can not be material what 
they or such a set as the Common Council of London 
can do-" 26 
24 contd minority there were two aldermen (Ladbroke and 
G hry twelve Commoners and one teller. For these 
proceedings see Sharpe 2p. cit. Vol. III, p. 68 and Annual 
Register for 1761, p"301. ß 
25. B. PST. Add. Mss. 32929 ff444-5 Newcastle to Rockingham 22 October 
1761. 
26. B. MI. Add. Mss. 32930 ff158-9 Rockingham to Newcastle 29 October 
1761. The "gentleman from Wakefield" was possibly a member 
of the Milnes family, whom Rockingham knew well and was in 
close contact with at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis. See 
my "Barlow Trecothick etc" pp. 223-233. iý 
It' 
s i: F 
I! 
f, 
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On 14 November Rockingham was forced to inform Newcastle that 
York had followed the example of London and dedided to address 
27 
Pitt. Newcastle had kept Rockingham informed about action 
28 
in October and early November 1761 but the occasion of these 
letters was the first real contact between Rockingham and 
Newcastle since the fall of Pitt, and it thus seems advisable'. 
to assess the precise position of Rockingham at this time. 
The young Marquis of Rockingham was of high birth, and 
perhaps possessed some claim to distinction as the only Marquis 
in the English peerage in 1761. His father, the first Marquis 
of Rockingham, had begun an association with the Duke of 
29 
Newcastle that was to be continued through his son until 
Newcastle's death. The first Marquis, because of his great 
landed property, his connections, and hit position as the 
leading ministerial figure in Yorkshire was able to exercise 
a sort of pre-eminence over the other territorial magnates 
30 
in the c ountg . 
27. B. M. Add. Mss" 32931 f51 Rockingham to Newcastle 14 November 
1761. 
28. See for instance V1. W. M. Rl-199 n. d. but dated in Rockingham 
handlist as 2 October 1761 and ibid R1-206 Newcastle to 
Rockingham n. d. (but dated in handlist as 2 November 1761 
but it cannot be this date as the letter speaks of Newcastle 
meeting Rockingham in London and Rockingham was at Wentworth 
at this time) 
29. "The Rockinghams and Yorkshire Politics 1742-176111 by C. 
Collyer, Publications of the Thoresby Society Vol. XLI, 
Leeds 1954, pp. 352-361. See also "The Yorkshire Election 
of 1734" by C. Collyer Proceedings of the Leeds Ph oso hical 
Society (Litery and Historical Section Vol. VII, Part 1, 
pp. 53-82, Leeds 1952, "The Yorkshire Election of 1741" by 
Collyer, ibid. Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 137-152, Leeds October 
1953. 
30. "The Rockinghams and Yorkshire Politics" lac: cit. p. 352. 
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Rockingham succeeded his father on the latter's death in 
1750 as the head of Yorkshire's greatest political dynasty. He 
had first met Newcastle in Hanover in 1750 while on the Grand 
Tour. The Duke seems to have been impressed and the two seem 
31 
to have struck up a fairly close friendship. 
On 15 September the young Lord Malton wrote to his father 
"The Duke of Newcastle is here, (Hanover) while he stays, 
insists upon my dining and supping every day with him 
after tomnrow he returns-" 
and again on 30 October 
"I must not forget to acquaint your Lordship how extremely 
kind the Duke of Newcastle has been to me and how much 
he expresses love and esteem for Your Lordship and I 
should imagine if you approved of it, it would not be 
amiss that you should let him know of nkr having acquainted 
you of how grateful I was. " 32 
In May 1751 Rockingham took his seat in the House of 
Lords and became assiduous in his attendance especially when 
matters of interest to Yorkshire were being discussed, in 
33 
particular commercial matters. Rockingham set about regaining 
his family's power in Yorkshire, for in the last years of the 
first Marquis's life the initiative in that county seems to 
gone over to the Duke of Newcastle. In 1752 Rockingham secured 
the nomination of Sir George Savile as one of the county members 
against the Newcastle interest., Savile was eventually forced 
to withdraw and Rockingham on this occasion listened to the 
31- 
32- 
33. 
Ibid. p. 361" 
W. W. M. First Marquis's Papers, Letterbook M2 p-548 Lord 
Malton to Rockingham 15 October 1750. 'P. 550 Lord Malton 
to Rockingham 30 Ocftber 1750. ': 
See The Early Career of Lord Rockingham 1730-1765 by G. H. 
Guttridge, University of California Publications in History, 
Vol. 44, Berkeley California, 1952, p. 11. 
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advice of his uncle William Murray, Solicitor General, later 
34 
Earl of Mansfield. Savile's withdrawal conciliated Newcastle 
and Newcastle was pleased when at the end of the year Rockingham 
35 
secured the election of Sir George Armytage as member for York. 
In trying to re-establish the power of the Rockinghams 
over Yorkshire the young Marquis had taken on a formidable 
task, for this was a county of great proprietors where more 
than one man was strong enough to aspire to leadership in the 
county. The county itself was a constituency almost unique 
in the unreformed Parliament, hid- an electorate of 15,000 
which included a strong class of gentry, many freeholders 
unattached to great interests and other independent elements 
36 
of rising importance in the towns and manufacturing districts. 
Thus influence on the aristocracy had to be matched with 
popularity among the other classes and it was this tlua-1 -'' --1 
influence that was to forge Rockingham's position as a national 
leader. In his struggle to regain supremacy in the county 
he learned to deal with the multifarious interests in the 
towns and manufacturing districts, such as the representatives 
of the commercial intereüts in Sheffield and Halifax, as well 
37 
as with the gentry and aristocrats, and the popularity of 
Rockingham's friend Savile was particularly important in the 
34. "The Rockinghams and Yorkshire Politics" a. dit, pp. 361-368. ---'-*- 
Rockingham' father was married to a daughter of Daniels 6th 
Earl of Winchelsea and William Hurray married another daughter. 
35. Ib id. p. 361. 
36. Ibid. pp. 352-353. Lord Holdernesse was Rockingham's greatest 
rival in Yorkshire at first., Rockingham was fortunate that 
he was an ally of Savile who also aspired tb the highest 
honours in the county. See The House of Conons 1754-1790 
by Sir Lewis Namier and J. Brooke, London, 1964-p Vol. 1, pp" 2-10. 37. Ir. pp. 368-369. 
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38 
growth of his support. The experience that Rockingham was 
gaining was to be of infinite service to him, for just as' he 
was now in local politics endeavouring to reconcile the claims 
of commerce and aristocracy, so later during the Stamp Act 
Crisis was he compelled to do the same thing on a national 
basis. 
Rockingham's influence in politics was notably increased 
by the quietening influence he exercised on the popular 
discontents in Yorkshire that heralded the opening of the 
39 
Seven Years War. His position in the county was assured by 
the election of Sir George Savile as County member in January 
1759 and finally clinched in January 1761 when Edwin Lascelles 
who had established great influence among the merchants of 
Leeds and other towns in the manufacturing districts was elected 
40 
as the other county member. Not only was Rockingham's influence 
extending in the county seats but he had always had the disposal 
f the seat in his borough of Malton, and- as well as York 
where Sir George Armytage had been elected in 1760. Rockingham's 
41 
interest extended to Hull, Scarborough and Beverley. Moreover, 
Rockingham's name as an improving landlord and as a patron of 
42 
the turf was making him famous both in the county and beyond. 
Thus by 1760 Rockingham had secured his position in York- 
shire and this was achieved partly by association with inde- 
pendent elements in politics. This gave the Rockingham 
{J V. 
40. 
42. 
39. 
41. 
p. ; 5bv 
pp-375-376. 
p. 370 
pp-370-375. 
P. 369. 
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interest a different flavour from that of the Whigs in his 
father's day and the days of Newcastle's prime, a difference 
that can be seen in a wider sphere in a few years time when 
Rockingham's allies in parliamentary politics were to be men 
like Dowdeswell, a Tory county gentleman, and Trecothick the 
merchant with whom he co-operated during the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Yet, as is well known in spite of all this Rockingham's 
politics were always to remain the politics of aristocratic 
Whiggism. 
It was natural that Newcastle should turn to Rockingham 
to allay the panic on Pitt's fall because Rockingham was 
supreme in Yorkshire politics and because Rockingham had 
inherited co-operation with Newcastle from his father. The 
event showed the limits of Rockingham's power for he was uhäble 
to prevent the Corporation of York presenting an address of 
43 
thanks to Pitt. It also showed that at this time Newcastle 
regarded Rockingham primarily as a local magnate whose support 
it was useful to have. This attitude was natural enough. The 
young Marquis had shown little desire to enter the field of 
national politics and as late as 1760 he had written to 
Newcastle that 
"in the West Riding of Yorkshire we look upon the war 
in North America as merely carried on for the benefit 
of our cloth trade. " 44 
From the immediate reaction to Pitt's resignation it is 
thus possible to draw two conclusions. Firstly it can be 
seen that when Pitt fell the traditional pattern of mercantile 
43, See above p" 93. 44. B. M. Add. Mss. 32913 ff85-86 Rockingham to Newcastle 16 Oo ? $5r 
allegiance repeated itself. Newcastle was supported by the 
'monied interest' and the great merchants who looked to the 
government for their living and advancement. The other 
merchants looked towards their traditional leader Pitt after 
their fears that even the "Great Commoner" was open to 
corruption had been allayed. Secondly the event showed the 
precise position of Rockingham. In October 1761 he was 
regarded as an important local magnate not as a national 
politician. 
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(b) THE ATTEYPTEA ENQUIRY INTO ACCOUNTS j GOVE° +ET1T FINANCE 
AND THE "JAR WITH SPAIN. 
When on 22 October 1761 the Common Council of the City of 
London had resolved to present an address of thanks to William 
Pitt it also resolved 
"to enquire into the application of the supplies for 
some years past, and likewise into the accounts of 
Forage in Germany. " 45 
Newcastle was genuinely alarmed at the idea of an enquiry 
into Treasury Accounts. On 22 October he wrote to Rockingham, 
Devonshire, Bedford, Barrington and Lord Kinnull about the 
matter and the following day he notified Joseph Yorke of the 
proceedings of the Common Council, stating that he considered 
46 
them to be a personal attack upon himself. 
By the time that he wrote to Barrington, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Newcastle was organising his defence for 
he stated 
"1.1r. West dined with our brethren (of the Treasury) this 
day at Martins. I desired my compliments to them, and 
that I hoped that the Pour Lords of the'Treasury would 
second the Four City Members in their motion for the 
enquiry. But I think that it does us honour that the 
first City member and father of the City, Sir Robert 
Ladbroke, was against this impudent measure. " 47 
By demonstrating his willingness to allow an enquiry 
Newcastle hoped to free himself from any suspicion of misuse 
of public funds. He . believed that the King was going to 
45. B. M. Add. Mss. 32929 f442 docketed "Common Council" 22 
October 1761. See above p. 91. 
46. B. M. Add. Mss" 32929 f444 Newcastle to Rockingham 22 October 
1761; ibid. f437 Newcastle to Devonshire 22 October 1761; 
ibid. f440 Newcastle to Bedford 22 October 1761; ibid. f446 
Newcastle to Barrington 22 October 1761; ibid. f448 
Newcastle to aeeeýý-ýfeý e Lord Kinnoull 22 October 1761 add 
ibid. f460 Newcastle to Joseph Yorke 23 October 1761. 
47. Ibid. f446 Newcastle to Barrington 22 October 1761. James 
West and Samuel Martin were Joint Secretaries to the 
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support him and that the supporters of the motion "would not 
' 48 
have fifteen votes in the House of Commons". Nevertheless, 
Newcastle was still alarmed, for Thomas Walpole, whom he was 
using as a contact with the City financiers, told him that the 
Common Councils enquiry 
"will create disturbances and difficulty in our money 
affairs, especially if a rupture with Spain ensues. " 49 
In view of this and because he was alarmed at the support that 
Pitt was regaining among the' cone ercial classes Newcastle 
wrote in the next few days to most of his financial and mercan- 
tile associates to rally their support for his cause and asked 
50 
them to attend the opening of Parliament. From many of these 
51 
men he received a reassuring reply. One merchant, obviously 
bearing the ban ruptcy of Henry Shiffner in mind, wrote 
significantly 
"If I have not appeared at your Levde it has not been 
for want of respect, but it is my opinion that the 
publick and Your Grace may be better served by a closer 
attention to commercial affairs and a regular conduct 
of them, and I wish some of m brethren had followed 
this. " 52 
4'(" I Conti, Treasury. See England in the. Age etc Namier, p. 
313, n. 2, p. 398 n. ll. 
48. B. M. Add. Mss" 32929 f460 Newcastle to Joseph Yorke 23 
October 1761. 
49. Ibid. f468 Memorandum 23 October 1761. 
50" See B. M. Add" Mss" 32930 f3 Ylemoran1um 24 October 1761. 'ýLetter[3 
sent by Mr. Parker to Co by post' in which Newcastle states 
he has written to Rose Fuller, Pierce Acourt, Thomas. 
Ponnereau, Francis Gashry, and Nicholas Linwood. Ibid. 
f36 Memorandum 26 October 1761 "Letters to be wrote' in 
which the names of George AmyaDd, Sir William Baker, Thomas Calcraft, Charles Boon, Frazer Fioneywood, John Thomlinson, 
Sir Samuel Pludyer and Thomas Gore are mentioned. All 
these men were merchants and government financiers. See 
Namier, England in the Age etc, assim. See also NEU`aier, Structure of Politics pp. 53-58. 
51. B. M. Add. Mss. 32930 f31 Sampson Gideon to Newcastle 25 October 
4 
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After 26 October the agitation caused by the Common 
Councils motion to seek an enquiry into government finance 
became of less importance. The ministers resisted the demand 
for an enquiry but had to allow a Commission of Accounts. 
Ministerial policy was decided at a meeting at Newcastle House 
53 
on 27 October and on the same day Newcastle saw Fox, who had 
just been brought into the ministry by Bute to strengthen it. 
Fox supported the strongest measures possible against the 
Common Council and wanted, if possible, to secure the reversal - 54 
of their motion in the Court of Aldermen. 
The Commission of Accounts was not of great importance 
55 
but it continued to worry Newcastle for some time for he was 
in a peculiar position with regard to this enquiry. The 
typical country gentleman was always opposed to wars and 
Continental entanglements because they meant high taxation and 
he would be only too pleased to discover misappropriation of 
public finds. Moreover the merchants and City financiers 
56 
preferred naval and colonial wars to continental wars. This 
general feeling against the continental war probably added to 
the alarm caused by the demand for an enquiry into Accounts. 
It-is also related to the fact that on 23 October 1761 
51. contd 1761; ibid. f266 John Thomlinson to Newcastle 1 
November 1761. 
52. Ibid. f118 George Prescott to Newcastle 27 October 1761. 
Prescott was a London merchant and PSI. P. For Shiffner's 
bankruptcy see hbove p. 91. 
53. B. II. Add-Ilss" 32930 f62 Newcastle to Hardwicke 26 October 1761. 
54. , Ibid. f90 Memorandum 27 October 1761; ibid. f104 Newcastle to 
Hardwicke 'Wednesday night' (26 October 1761). For the 
entry of Fox into the ministry see B. PS. Add" Llss" 32929 ff252-8 
Newcastle to Devonshire 16 October 1761. 
55... B. I. I. Add. Liss. 32930 ff220-230 Newcastle to Devonshire 31 October 1761; See below P177-$et rassim See also Napier, 
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Hardwicke' s draft of the speech for the opening of Parliament 
was rejected by Bute and Grenville as being too pacific. As 
a result Hardwicke thought that Bute and Grenville had changed 
their plans since he had drafted the speech because they were 
aiming to gain the support that was now rallying to Pitt and 
because of the action of the Common Council. Hardwicke feared 
that the ministry, if they pursued this policy would loose 
th@ support of the bulk of the nation who desired peace and 
both he and Newcastle feared that the ministry would never 
57 
succeed in gaining popular support from Pitt. At this time, 
as was generally the case, Newcastle, while being interested 
in gaining the support of the mercantile classes in general, 
was ß9r more interested in the support of the richer merchants 
and government financiers from whom he borrowed money to 
finance the Treasury, especially as he was about to negotiate 
the loan for the forthcoming year. 
By the end of October 1761 Newcastle had become pre-occupied 
with this problem, which had become more difficult because it 
had become obvious that peace was not near, that there was 
a strong likelihood of war with Spain breaking out, and the 
` policy of the ministry had grovin less pacific. Thusk on 27 
October 1761 Newcastle noted in memoranda that Sir Joshua 
Vanneck. was askii Z for the arrangement for the following 
year's loan to be deferred until after the opening of 
bb. (contd. ) England in the Ace etc p. 334 n. 2. 
56. NamierEngland in the Age etc p. 304. 
57. B. M. Add.: Mss" 32929 f470 Hardtiwicke to Newcastle 23 October 
1761; ibid. f472 Newcastle to-Hardwicke 23 October 1761. 
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58 
Parliament. He was also distjfl'bed by the number of bankrupt- 
59 
ties that had recently occurred. On 31 October he wrote to 
Devonshire 
"M4y friends in the City, and particularly our Friend 
Sir Joshua (Vanneck) inform me, that the language, viz, 
'That I was the Minister for Peace etc. that I was now 
the chief person (and consequently the responsible onef 
was the chief discourse, or opinion of the City. That 
the notion was, that there was no settled administration; 
That 1Ir. Grenville doubted much, about accepting the 
lead of the House of Commons; and in short People were 
in such an uncertainty about the union in the adminis- 
tration, that he begg'd I would defer the conclusion 
of our subscription to the King's speech, and the 
addresses were made, that they might see a weight, and 
consistency in the administration. I made sure of this, 
first, to declare to my friends in the City and particu- 
larly to Sir Joshua) that I was not by any means, to be 
looked upon as the directing minister. " . 60 
Newcastle, did however, realise by this time that the warlike 
attitude of the ministry was not entirely caused by the desire 
of Bute and Grenville to gain that popular support which was 
influenced by Pitt's new policy, but was also due to the fact 
that as France had broken off the peace negotiations, it was 
necessary to prosecute the war with vigour in order to bring 
61 
her to terms again as soon as possible. ai desire to 
conciliate and gain the support of both financial and mercantile 
Interests was shown by his visit to the City banquet on the 
58. B. r, I. Add. Liss. 32930 f91 Memorandum 27 October 1761. 
59. Ibid. f91 Memorandum 27 October 1761. Henry Shiffner's 
would seem to be the chief of these bankruptcies. See above 
P"91. Shiffner wrote to Newcastle asking if in his circum- 
stances it was proper for him to attend Parliament on 31 
October. See Lbid%f246 Henry Shiffner to Newcastle 31 
October 1761. 
60. Ibid. f222 Newcastle to Devonshire 31 October 1761. There 
is a draft of this letter in ibid. f203 et EM. 
61. Ibid. f290 Newcastle to Lord Granby 3 November 1761. 
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Lord Mayor's Day 9 October 1761. Although not the chief 
object of popular resentment on this day he did not manage to 
escape unscathed, and it must be concluded that the traditional 
pattern, whereby Newcastle could secure the loyalty of only 
62 
the government financiers was repeating itself. 
When Necrcattle was endeavouring to raise his loan for the 
forthcoming year there was a considerable difference of opinion 
on how the war should be conducted. Newcastle wanted to 
prosecute the continental war with the utmost vigour, thus 
forcing France to terms. He was aware that war with Spain was 
becoming inevitable but thought abandoning the war in Germany 
was fatal as he felt this war enabled Great Britain to preserve 
her American conquests. In this he differed, from a powerful 
section of his supporters including the former Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Legge, who were in favour of abandoning 
the German War. Some merchants and financiers also were 
63 
adherents of this point of view. Newcastle on the other hand 
not only wanted a vigorous prosecution of the continental war 
but also called for additional military operations in America 
or the West Indies (such as an attempted conquest of the 
Mississippi Valley)as these would be damaging to both France 
62. Ibid. f321 Memorandum 5 November 1761; ibid. f333 Memorandum 
6 November 1761; ibid. f378 Newcastle to Sir James Hodges 
9 November 1761. For the occurrence on the Lord Mayor's 
Day see Sharpe 92. cit. Vol. III, pp" 62-70. See also Albermarle 
op. cit. Vol. I, p. 70; Annual Register Vol. for 1761, London 
1800j. p. 237. 
63. For Newcastle's ideas on the war policy see B. M. Add. üss 
32931 f23 Newcastle to Barrington 14 November 1761; ibid. 
f45 Newcastle to unknown 15 November 1761. For the differ- 
ence of opinion among his supporters see Barrington's 
report to Newcastle of the debate in the Commons on 13 November 1761; ibid. f19 for . Legge' s opinion see ibid. f45 Newcastle to unknown 15 November 1761. 
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and Spain and they would have to divert troops from Europe to 
64. 
deal with the attack. He was well aware that the more vigorous- 
ly the war was prosecuted the more justified Pitt's resignaý 
tion would appear, and the greater would be the popular 
demand for his restoration to power, but Newcastle felt 
certain, presumably because of the hostility of the King and 
9 65 
Bute, that Pitt would not be able to return to power. Yet in 
spite of the fact tha" 
to vein the support of 
personal difficulties 
Sir George Colebrooke 
Newcastle was able to 
L. he was adopting a policy not calculated 
the government financiers, and the more 
that he was having with merchants like 
and Merrick Burrell, by 19 November 1761 
report to Rockingham, that he had 
successfully completed the preliminary negotiations for the 
66 
loan for the forthcoming year. Colebrooke who was annoyed over 
the delay in granting a pension promised to his brother sub- 
scribed to the loan but Burrell, who was enraged because 
Newcastle had not supported his candidature in the 1761 election 
67 
a Haslemere did not, and Newcastle added in his letter to 
Rockingham that he doubted whether he would be able to 
negotiate a loan for next year, particularly if the war with 
68 
Spain broke out. 
During the whole period that Newcastle was negotiating the 
loan war with Spain was imminent and` tiwas influencing the 
situation. On 27 November Hardwvicke wrote to Newcastle 
_4rs 
64. Ibid. f48 Newcastle to unknown 15 November 1761. 
65. Ibid. f49 Newcastle to unknown 15 November' lß61. 
66. Ibid. f147 Newcastle to Rockingham 19 November 1761. 
67. Ibid. f11 Memoranda 18 November 1761; ibid f195 Newcastle to 
Hardwicke 21 November 1761. See also B. I. T. Add. 1, -, Tss 
32934 f291 
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"I am heartily sorry that appearances from Spain are 
not so favourable, as I think it will give in the world 
some fresh object of nonsense in favour of Mr. Pitt - 
but surely if a Spanish war is Necessary it may be 
easily shown hove right it may be now tho' not so when 
11r. P. would have had it and I hope that some gains will 
be taken to set that matter in its proper sight if the 
war must happen-" 69 
On 1 December Newcastle noted that in negotiating the 
loan he would be required to give"some assurances with regard 
to a war with Spain" otherwise the subscribers would only 
70 
subscribe conditionally. This does not appear to have been 
the case, however, for on 3 December Newcastle was able to 
announce that he had concluded the negotiations for the loan 
and successfully raised the £12,000, OOO he needed, although, 
as he complained to Devonshire, the rate of interest, which 
taking into account an annual bonus, worked out at four and a 
half per cent for nineteen years, was very high, because the 
financiers were afraid of the stocks tumbling if a war with 
71 
Spain broke out. This, no doubt, had prompted their idea of a 
conditional offer for they suspected that their resources of 
ready money would be limited if the stock prices fell. 
Newcastle's eventual success in negotiating the loan does show 
that the City financiers were remaining loyal to him. Ten of 
the fifteen subscribers to the loan had subscribed to the loan 
72 
for the previous year, yet the fear of the Spanish war prompted 
73 
some withdrawals. 
67. cont&)Newcastle to Hardwicke 'Friday morning' (12 February 
1762). For the subscribers to the loan see B. M. Add. Iiss. 
329$1 f383 Memoranda 3 December 1761. 
68. Ibid. f147 Newcastle to Rockingham 19 November 1761. d' 69" I . f319-320 Hardwicke to Newcastle 27 November 1761, 70. Ibid.. f366 Memorandum 1 December 1761. 
71. I id. f383 Memorandum 3 December 1761; ibid. f388 Newcastle 
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In the midst of his negotiations for the loan for 1762 
Newcastle still found time to look after the interests of the 
dissenters. On 20 November 1761 he vent with the leading 
dissenting ministers to present an address to the King and in 
the middle of December he was helping the dissenters with 
regard to a royal grant to their schools in Pennsylvania. At 
the end of December 1761 Newcastle was endeavouring to fill 
a vacancy on the governing bpaad of Guy's Hospital with a 
74 
candidate acceptable to the dissenters. 
By 10 December Newcastle seems to have ranged to heal 
the breach that existed in the ranks of his supporters over the 
war policy that was to be adopted, for on that day when the 
policy was debated in Parliament he was able to report to the 
Duke of Devonshire that both Legge and Rose Fuller (one of the 
merchants who had,, apparently disagreed) had spoke for the 
German War. Sir William Baker was proving invaluable to 
Newcastle at this time, for he continued 
"IV Friend Sir William Baker (who is a very good judge) 
has been with me. He thinks Mr. Pitt acted a most 
abominable part. That the sun and substance of his 
speech was this; that all, that was done, before he 
came in, and shall be done now, that he is out, Tho' 
they are the very same measures, are wrong; and that he 
flung out the most impudent assertion; that he had 
71. contd to Devonshire 3 December 1761. 
72. Cf. Ibid. f383 Memorandum 3 December 1761 with Namier, 
Structure of Politces p. 55. 
73. Ibid. f427 Memorandum 7 December 1761. 
74. See B. I;!. Add- Piss. 32930 F402 Samuel Chandler to Newcastle 11 
November 1761; B. I,. '. Add. Mss" 32931 fll Memorandum 13 November 
1761; ibid. f62 Memorandum 16 November 1761; ibid. f83 
Memorandum 17 November 1761; ibid. f183 Newcastle to Bedford 
20 November 1761; B. M. Add. I, Iss" 32932 f66 James Chandler to 
Newcastle 8 December 1761; ibid. f72 Memorandum 9 December 
1761; ibid. f310 Dr. Avery to Newcastle 22 December 1761. 
Avery and Chandler were leading dissenting ministers. See 
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never been against continental measures; But that 
Hanover should not be the original cause of them, as it 
had been, before his time, and that he would make the 
heart ache of that man who should do so again. " 75 
Newcastle was not only using Baker to get reports from the 
House of Cozmnons, but her was also using him as a licson with 
76 
City officials and he was seeking, through the merchants, news 
of, the likelihood of war with Spain. On 10 December he had 
been assured by the merchants that their correspondents said 
77 
that Spain had no inclination to go to war with England. 
In spite of these reassuring factors Newcastle gras not 
fully satisfied. He did not feel that he had Bute and Bute's 
supporters behind him in his war policy, and he feared that 
the high interest rate that he had given for the new loan 
would make far too many merchants turn into stock-jobbers. 
As proof of this he noted the rapid fall in the prices of raw 
78 
materials such as wool and cotton. He was also alarmed at the 
financial situation that would result if a war with Spain did 
break out. 
Some of Newcastle's fears were justified. By 25 December 
1761 it was obvious that there was going to be a war with Spain 
79 
and on 2 January 1762 the Cabinet decided to declare war. 
Newcastle was deeply distressed but he could see no alternative 
but fighting Spain. He was also alarmed at Bute and Grenvillh'g 
74. (contd) Bogue and Bennett op. cit. Vol. Iv, p. 404. For Guy' s 
Hospital see English Philanthropy 1660-1960 by David Owen 
London 1965, p"45. 
75-B-1-1-Ada. miss. 32932 ff78-84 Newcastle to Duke of Devonshire 
9-10 December-1761. 
76. Ibid. flOl Memorandum 10 December 1761; ibid. f220 memorandum 
18 December 1761; ibid. f312 Memorandum 23 December 1761; 
B. M. Add. Mss" 39936 f314 Newcastle to Bute 2 April 1762. 
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plan to cut down the subsidy to Frederick the Great and abandon 
the war in Germany, and he feared this was a mistaken policy. 
One of the reasons for the rupture between Newcastle and 
Bute and one of the causes of Newcastle's eventual resignation 
80 
iný May 1762 was the victory of Bute and Grenville' s policy. 
After the outbreak of war Newcastle became preoccupied 
with the state of finances and the attitude of 'the government 
financiers. He was relieved that the new loan had been 
negotiated and settled before the war broke out but it'was 
affected adversely by the new war. By 26 December the loan 
was running at 42 per cent discount and there was a sharp 
slump in the stocks. To offset this Newcastle was anxious 
81 
to encourage the merchants to engage in privateering. p- 29 
December James West irrote to Nevicastle, assessing the situation 
and offered a suggestion that he 'thought might help the 
financial situation. West thought that because of the 
unfavourable circumstances there must be ho further attempt 
to raise money. As a means of alleviating the financial 
crisis he suggested arming 30,000 Moors and shipping them 
77"- B. M. Add" Mss" 32932 f88 Newcastle to Devonshire 9-10 December 
1761; ibid. f142 West to Newcastle 11 December 1761" 
78. Ibid. f149 Newcastle to Devonshire 3.2 December 1761; ibid. 
f302 Memorandum 22 December 1761; ibid. f312 Memorandum 
23 December 1761. - 
79. Ibid. f345 Newcastle to Hardwicke- 25 December 1761. Cf. 
Winstanley off. cit. p. 100., =t 
80. B. M. Add" Liss. 32932 'x'345 ., Newcastle to Hardwicke 25 December 1761. Cf, ibid. f351' NvTewcastie to Hardwicke 25` December 1761. 
Cf. Winstanley 
, ou. ci;, ýPp. 
100-108" 
81. B. M. Add" Mlss" 32932 . 
fý'Newcastle, to Devonshire 26 December 
1761; ibid" f371 Newcastle to Bute 27 December 1761; ibid., 
f377 Newcastle to Barrington 27 December 17614 ibid. f 73 1 
Newcastle to Bute 27 December 1761; ibid. f375 Newcastle to 
Hardwicke 27 December 1761. 
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over to attack Granada thus preoccupying Spain and turning 
her attacks away from Portugal and the main stream of the war, 
82 
thus reassuring the financiers. 
Barrington, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was also 
perturbed by the situation. On 3 January 1762 he wrote 
gloomily to Newcastle 
"Tho' the deposit has been fortunately and successfully 
made the future payments must depend on the cash whzch 
shall be forthcoming at the respective times fixed for 
that purpose. The subscribers, most of whtm: i are in or 
connected with trade, expect returns to enable them to 
, 
be punctual in these payments. The War with Spain must 
occasion disappointment. We must expect bankruptcies 
from the same cause each of which is a diminution of 
general wealth and credit. 
Commerce may eventually find its way into enemy 
lands but is always interrupted at the beginning of 
hostilities. Benefit from prizes will be at least a 
year before it takes effect. All assurance will be 
later from the loan.... If the Dutch join in our 
difficulties will increase. " 83 
In these circumastances Newcastle now began to doubt whether 
it was possible to carry on the War in Germany at such an 
inmiense cost, particularly with Prussia in such a weak state. 
He realised that "both within and without doors" there would 
be a demand for the cessation of the German War, yet he thought 
84 
that to end the war in Germany would be disast#rous. He was 
also alarmed at rumours that were spreading among his mercan- 
tile associates. On 10 January 1762 he wrote to Hardwicke 
"I must conjour Your Lordship to be with us tommorrow, 
not only because the points of the highest consequences 
82. Ibid. f406 West to Newcastle 29 December 
. 
1761. 
83. " B. L Add. Liss. 32933 f50 Barrington to Newcastle 3 January 1762.. 
84. Ibid. f112 Newcastle to Sir Joseph Yorke 8 January 1762; 
ibid. f364 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 January 1762. 
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by which the future conduct of the nation will be 
determined will come before us, but because it is already 
reported in the City, and I had it from good authority 
that P, My Lord Hardwaicke had left the Council. 85 
On 25 January 1762 Newcastle's supporters had to defend his 
position when he was attacked by Beckford in the House of 
Commons. Beckford said that a Spanish War did not involve 
much additional 'expense but that the stocks were falling 
because of the assurances that were given to the City financiers 
that there was no likelihood of a war with Spain when the new 
loan was floated. Newcastle was defended by Grenville and the 
financier Thomas Walpole who stated that Newcastle had given 
no assurances that there was not going to be a war with Spain 
86 
when negotiations for the loan were going on. 
87 
On the following day Joseph Watkins wrote a report of 
the financial situation to Newcastle with suggestions for its 
remedy. This letter is important and worth quoting in detail 
as Newcastle used lilatkinb solution to solve his financial 
difficulties. 
Watkins stated that he had been in the City on 26 January 
1762 when he found that the public credit gras in a "bad way" 
and that unless something was done payment of the loan that 
had recently been negotiated might be endangered. To remedy.. 
this situation Watkins first suggested an end to the war in 
Germany. He continued 
"But if we cannot put an immediate end to this war a 
hint may be dropped that it is intended and that we 
85. Ibid. f179 Newcastle to Hardwicke 10 January 1762. 
86. 'Ibid. ff477-478 West to Newcastle 25 January 1762 "Account 
of what passed in the House of Commons. " 
87. Joseph Watkins was a London merchant. See A Complete Guide 
etc 1757 edn. p. 153.1763 edn. p. 173. 
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shall raise no more money this year, for as it is out 
of doubt we cannot, we may as well declare it. Iy Lord 
Duke, things are very serious and something must be done 
to prevent a total pannick, part with no money that you 
can avoid, leave the navy and victualling Bills for other 
times, don't think of giving a douceur for it will make 
bad worse, a word or two from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer will do more than anything. The sooner this 
is done the better. " 
Newcastle seems to have taken Watkins advice to heart for on 
29 January he wrote a memorandum 
Fall of Stocks. Declaration - no more money to 
be raised. 
To raise money the next year 
within the year and not by 
funding which increases 4e so 
much the National Debt. 
Of opinion that declaration of 
the Treasury that we should 
borrow above 1,200,000 would 
have good effect and that 
1,200,000 of Lottery should be 
given to the presentholders of 
the subscription receipts. 88 
On the same day Newcastle's ideas were confirmed by a 
letter from Legge who stated that he was alarmed at the fall 
in the stocks, and that public confidence was made worse by 
the declaration that the government tigere going to raise 
another f}ß, 000.000" Legge stated that if this rumour was 
89 
stopped it would go a long way to restore public confidence. 
Legge and Barrington, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
discussed Newcastle's ideas which were based on Watkins's 
letter and on 1 February Barrington wrote to Newcastle 
87. contd B. M. Add. Mss" 32934 f26 Joseph Watkins to Newcastle 
26 January 1762. 
88. Ibid. f72 Memorandum 29 January 1762.,, - 
89. Ibid. f74 Legge to Newcastle 29 January 1762. 
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"I have seen Tgtr. Legge and have talked over fully our 
money affairs with him. He is clearly of opinion that 
no inconvenience arising from tying up your hands by 
declaring that no more money will be borrowed, is 
equal in any degree to the dangers to which your 
silence will expose the whole, and therefore he strongly 
advises Your Grace to make your declaration without 
delay. " 90 
On 12 February Newcastle reported to Hardwicke that the 
situation in the City had improved, but he seemed to consider 
the improvement as only temporary. This appears to have been 
91 
due to his adoption of the plan suggested by Watkins. On the 
same day Watkins wrote to Newcastle congratulating him on the 
92 
restoration of public credit, but by 15 February Legge was 
, alarmed again. 
He described the idea of raising all future 
loans within the year as impractivable and implored Newcastle 
not to let the financiers put their trust in it as it would 
93 
create nothing but confusion. The following day 
, 
Newcastle 
was again complaining to Hardwicke about the bad financial 
94 
situation. He was by now finding his position very difficult 
and feeling that Bute was not trusting him 'ras beginning to 
95 
have thoughts of resignation. 
The worst of the financial crisis was over, however, 
had Newcastle realised it. On 26 February he wrote in a 
memorandum that he intended discussing with Bute the state of 
the Bank, and that-there was great reason to hope that the 
908, Ibid. f131 Barrington to Newcastle 1 February 1762" 
91. Ibid. f291 Newcastle to Hardwicke 'Friday i1orning' (12 
February 1762): 
92. Ibid. f309 Joseph Watkins to Newcastle 12 February 1762" J93. Ibid. f351 Legge to Newcastle'15 February 1762. 
94. Ibid. f379 Newcastle to Hardwicke 16 February 1762. 
95. Ibid. f393 Newcastle to Devonshire 17 February 17629 
114 
Bank would advance the money the government needed in the 
96 
summer of 1762 because much money was coming in from Holland. 
He was also bearing the interetts of the merchants in mi3yi, 
for he wrote in the same memorandum that he intended to 
discuss with Lord Mansfield how 
"To reserve a certain proportion out of the Galleons 
and Register ships only, not general captures, to be 
paid into the Bank and laid out in government securities 
to be disposed of after the peace, to make good the 
losses which the British merchants will have sustained 
by captures on board such ships, during the war. The 
manner of adjusting such losses, to be provided for 
in a sunmmry way. " 97 
On 2 March Newcastle 
"Vile think of no 
day; and if it 
Spain, we must 
shall bring it 
wrote confidently to Joseph Yorke 
here 
thing/but peace; our stocks rise every 
had not been for our cursed war with 
now have had peace; and yet I hope we 
about. " 98 
and on 1 April 1762 the Duke of Cumberland congratualted 
Newcastle., informing him that the stock market was healthier 
99 
than it had been during the past two years. 
In the midst of the financial crisis at the end of 1761 
and. in early 1762 Newcastle had still found time to look after 
the private interests of his mercantile adherents and consult 
them when necessary. He had been consulted by George Amyard 
100 
about the government contract he held and he bad used his 
influence with Rose Fuller about a military matter in the West 
Indies 10.1 He was asked to secure the excusal of Capel üanbury'a 
96. B. Y. Add. MMZss. 32935 f112 Memorandum 28 February 1762, 
"Business tomorrow with My Lord Bute. It 
97. Ibid. f112 Memorandum 28 February 1762 "Business tomorrow 
-with My Lord Bute. " (under sub-heading Lord Mansfield) 
98. -Ibid. f145 Newcastle to Joseph Yorke 2 March 1762. 
99. ` B. M, 2. Add. Mss. 32936 f258 Duke of Cumberland to Newcastle 
1 April 1762.1762 
100. 'B. IST. Add. rMss 32934 f37 George Amyafd to Newcastle 27 January 
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102 
brother from merving as sheriff of Monmouthohire, Joseph 
Salvador one of the goüernment financiers, offered any 
assistance he could give if there wan a military expedition 
103 
to Portugal and he was attending to a matter of patronage 
104 
for the Liverpool merchant Sir Ellis Cunliffe. Finally, 
105 
his contact with the dissenters was being continued. 
In the months following the fall of Pitt the established 
pattern was thus repeating itself. Newcastle, no First Lord 
of the Treasury, cultivated the friendship and took care of 
the interest of the City financiers rather than the merchant 
class in general. The latter were profoundly chocked by 
Pitt' s resignation, his acceptance of a peerage for his wife 
and a pension for his son, but when they understood the true 
reason for his actions, they eventually returned to their 
old allegiance to him Newcastle realised that this was 
happening and he seemed to understand the importance of 
mercantile support but he also realised that, as First Lord 
of the Treasury, the support of the City financiers was more 
important. He thus strove to maintain their adherence and 
if to do this it was necessary to cecrifice the support of 
the merchants in general he was willing to do so, if oo: re- 
what reluctantly. At the same time he strove to maintain 
the allegiance of those merchants like Rose puller who were 
101. Ibid. f60 Albe/marle to Newcastle T rcday 2'ong" (28 
January 1762) 
102. B. P. ':. Add. Has. 32933 f265 Memorandum 12 January 1762. 
103. Ibid. f2.54 Joseph Salvador to Newcastle 12 January 1762. 
104. B. M. Add" MIss" 32934, f76 Ellis Cunliffe to I1, cWrcastl© 29 
January 1762. 
105. Ibid. f281. Samuel Chandler to Newcastle 11 February 1762. 
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consistently loyal to him. He looked after their interests 
as he was accustomed to do, , when they consulted him and in 
return expected their help when he called upon them for advice 
and assistance, and he also expected their help in electoral 
matters. 
Thus in these Mouths there was little change in the 
relations between the Old Whigs and the mercantile classes., 
The situation remained static as it had done for most of the 
period of the Seven Years War. There was in fact no profound 
alteration in these relations until after the fall of Newcastle 
in May 1762 and the entry of the party into opposition in 
1763 and 1764. The City financiers naturally supported the 
government in power and when Newcastle fell the loyalty of 
these financiers was tested. They had to choose between their 
allegiance to a political party and th(kir allegiance to 
government finance on which to some extent they depended for 
thier livelihood. 
The period immediately after the fall of Pitt is of great 
interest, showing TTeyrcastle' s preoccupation with the 'monied 
interest' and at the same time his knowledge of the importance 
of mercantile support and his effort to preserve it, if possible. 
Unfortunately, in-many cases the intererst of the merchants 
and the financiers were directly opposed. Rockingham, who 
was mainly in opposition, was fobttunate in that he did not 
have to preserve the support of the financiers, but he inherited 
from Newcastle an appreciation of the value of the support 
of both the 'monied interest' and the merchants. 
CHAPTER III. 
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THE FALL OF IT&7CASTLE. 
It has become clear in the previous chapter that the 
resignation of Pitt had never strengthened Newcastle's power 
in the government as he hoped it would. Indeed it had soon 
become apparent that it was Bute and Grenville who had really 
been strengthened. As early as 23 October 1761 Newcastle 
and Hardwicke had been overruled at a Cabinet meeting on the 
1 
question of the pacific nature of the Address and Newcastle 
in December 1761 was in constant fear that Bute intended to 
2 
abandon the war in Germany. The fact that Newcastle knew 
that Bute would abandon the war in Germany if he possibly 
could must have been doubly embarrassing as his ovrn supporters 
3 
were divided on the matter. 
There were two distinct factors at issue with regard to 
the question of the German war. Firstly there was the 
question of maintaining the subsidy to Britain's ally Frederick 
the Great, and secondly there was the question of the actual 
maintenance of the British army in Germany. with the death 
of the Czarina Elisabeth in January 1762 and the accession of 
Peter III9 the fanatical admirer of F rederigk the Great, 
Frederick could now hope for strong support from Russia, and 
Bute seems to have been willing to continue the subsidy to 
Frederick only on the understanding that he was going to 
attempt a general pacification. When it 170s obvious by April 
1762 that Frederick was not going to attempt this, Bute decided 
1. See B" Ia. Add. r. ýss" 32929 f470 Har3wici; © to T: errcastle 23 October 1Y61; ibid. f472 Newcastle to Hartwicke 23 October 1761. 
See also Namier FEngland in the Age etc p. 302 , at seg Winstanley on. ci . p. ee a ove- p- ; Zo1 
416 
not to pay the subsidy. This was finally decided at a Cabinet 
meeting on 30 April 1762 at which Newcastle, Hardivicke and 
, 
-4 Devonshire found themselves outvoted again. 
The settlement of the subsidy question left Bute free to 
deal with the British army in Germany. Early in April, Bute 
informed Newcastle that he had determined to withdraw the 
British army in Germany. For that reason Newcastle was 
instructed to apply for a vote of one million pounds instead 
5 
of two and superficially it was over this that he resigned. 
The situation was complictaed by the fact that Bute carried 
on a series of what Newcastle considered were underhand dealings 
over this matter. Bute ordered Samuel Martin the Secretary 
of the Treasury to prepare, without consulting Newcastle, an 
account of how much money would be saved by withdrawing the 
army from Germany and not paying the subsidy. This affair 
added to Newcastle's growing suspicions that he was not being 
consulted on matters of the greatest importance and on 26 May 
6 
1762 Newcastle resigned. 
It is thus not clear whether the resignation of Newcastle 
was primarily due to differences with his colleagues on policy 
as it was publicly made out to be, or because of the fact that 
2. Ibid" pp" 96-99. See above p. 109. 
3. See above p. 104. 
4. Winstanley oM. cit. pp. 101-103. Cf. Rashed 2", P" 135. 
5. Namier, England in the e etc pp. 315-319. 
6" Ibid" pp. 316-326. Winstanley gp. cit" pp. 108-109. See also 'American versus Continental Warfare 1739-1763" by Richard 
Pares in English Historical Review, Vol"LI, London, 1936 
pp. 464-465. 
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he was no longer treated with the trust that he was accustomed 
to anddfound himself compard. tively powerless as he made out 7 
to his friends. 
It should also be borne in mind that there was beneath 
all this a far more basic division between Newcastle; and Bute 
and his supporters for Newcastle still believed that the war 
must be ended as soon as possible3and it is interesting to note 
how his affiliation with financiers and merchants on the 
questions at issue affected his decision to resign. 
It must be remembered that Viry was negotiating with the 
English Ministers for peace at this time and Newcastle was in 
8 
close contact with him. On 8 March 1762 Newcastle reported to 
Hardwicke an interview which he had with Viry in which Viry 
reported his conversation with Bute on the previous day. From 
this it appears that it was mainly the settlement of Britain's 
differences with Spain that were preventing the conclusion of 
a successful peace treaty and Newcastle concluded his letter 
by saying 
"For God's sake, My Dear Lord, when things were brought 
so near don't let us lose this great object for a mere 
formality. If my Friend (Viry) is not mistaken Lord 
B. (ute) acts like a man and is determined to conclude 
forthwith. 11 9 
Soon after he had written this, probably the next day, 
Newcastle received the news of Rodney's attack and the capture 
11 
7. See for example B. LI. Add. Mss. 32938 f248 Newcastle to Sir 
Joseph Yorke 14 May 1762; ibid. f50 Newcastle to Rockingham 
4 May 1762. 
8. For the negotiations at this time see Rashed o. cit. pp. 
126-131". 
9. B. M. Add. LIss" 32936 f251 Newcastle to Hardwicke 8 March 1762 
10 
of Martinique. This conquest again raised the question of 
what conquests Britain should retain in 
i 
the West Indies and 
on the American mainland. This had previously been debated on 
11 
the conquest of Guadaloupe. On 2 April 1762 Hardwicke wrote 
to Newcastle with reference to this 
"Your Grace knows what has been debated in pamphlets' 
whether vie should keep Canada or Guadaloupe. It will 
now come to be a more grave question whether you should 
return to France all her sugar colonies or great part 
of Canada. The most material argument for Retaining 
Canada has been the delivery of your northern colonies 
from such bad neighbours and from the danger of French 
encroachments for the future, but some persons have 
thought that could never be securely attain'd without 
conquering Louisiana also, and that for this purpose, 
four parts of Canada might serve as well as the whole. 
The question now may come between Canada, or a great 
part of Canada, and the French sugar colonies except 
St. Domingo. " 12 
Hardwicke continue J.. by stating his opinion on the value 
of both the sugar islands and West Indies, wishing to retain 
the sugar islands because of the valuable trade, and he 
pointed out the arguments were now doubly valid as Martinique 
was conquered. He suggested that Newcastle should consult 
13 
Sir William Baker on the matter. 
Newcastle, startled at what Hardwicke wrote, arranged to 
meet Baker on 3 April 1762. Baker had been Newcastle's 
adviser previously during the Canada and Guadaloupe contro- 
versy and came down strongly for keeping Canada for strategic 
10. Ibid. f270 Newcastle to Cumberland 9 March 1762. 
11. See"Canada v. Guadaloupe, an episode of the Seven Years War" 
by Yl. L. Grant, American Historical Review, Vol. XVI, New York, 
1912, p"735. 
12. B. M. Add. Mss. 32936 ff310-311 Hardwicke to Newcastle 2 April 
1762, quoted Namier, England in the Age etc pp. 279-280. 
The term Santa Domingo is variously applied to either the 
whole or the west half or the east half of (contd) 
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reasons. In 1761 Baker had believed that it was better to 
Cc, vx OL keep Gt ado-loupe because the power of the French would then be 
much reduced on the North American continent and it would be 
much easier tp preserve peace with France and maintain the 
security of our continental North American possessions. Baker 
hoped that in returning Guadeloupe the British government 
might also gain Louisiana in the negotiations, thus completing 
the exclusion of the French from the North American continental 
mainland. He was also impressed by Canada as a potential 
source of power and wealth for Great Britain and desired for 
similar strategic and commercial reasons that the French should 
be excluded from the Newfoundland fisheries. Although he had 
admitted in 1761 that Guadeloupe was valuable, that England 
needed more sugar plantations both for home and for foreign 
consumption he hoped that these could be found in the Neutral 
14 
Islands which he regarded as British "by right". 
Unfortunately there is no written record whether Baker's 
opinions had been modified by the new situation created by 
the conquest of Martinique in 1762, nor do Baker's opinions 
seem to be reported in Newcastle's correspondence at this 
time. In view, however, of the fact that a year previously 
. L. kconza) the isiana or Hispaniola. Here the reference is to 
the west half(the present Haiti) which was the only import- 
ant French sugar colony remaining unconquered in the West 
Indies in April 1762. 
13. B. M. Add. Mss. 32936 ff310-311 Hardwicke to Newcastle 2 April 
1762. 
14. Ibid. f312 Newcastle to " Hardwicke 2 , 
April 1762; B. M. Add. Mss. 
33030 ffl-2 Memorandum in Baker's hand 13 April 1761 quoted Namier England in the Age etc pp. 274-5; See also ibid., pp. 242,266,273-4. ý. / 
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Baker had come down strongly in favour of the North American 
rather than the West Indian mercantile view-point there is 
little reason to suppose that he would have changed his stand 
in 1762. Indeed it is logical to believe that the new conquest 
would only re-inforce his desire to make the whole of continen- 
tal North America British, and Baker's ideas were probably 
influential in forming Newcastle's opinion as they had been 
in the past. 
On 1 April 1762 the day before he rmote about the Canada 
- v. West Indies problem Hardwicke had pressed Newcastle to 
accept the 'interpretation' of the continental war favoured 
by the. monied interest' when he wrote 
"Nothing will do more hurt than have it supposed in the 
nation that the protection and defence of that country 
(Portugal) have been neglected for the sake of carrying 
on the German War. You know very well that I have 
always been for supporting that war as far as it can 
reasonably be done. But the people will, or will be 
taught to, look upon that war as a war that drains us 
of our money, whereas the trade and gold of Portugal does 
in great measure supply us with it. If the war should go 
on and the door continue shut against all commerce with 
Spain, and the Portugal trade be cut off, either by 
Spain possessing herself of that country or the King 
of Portugal being forced to accept of such an offensive 
neutrality as has been talked of, where will this nation 
be able to get any supplies of Treasure at all ? 15 
This idea did not necessarily conflict with the desire 
to keep all of Canada but it may be seen that Newcastle was 
under a variety of pressures at this time. He continued to 
be anxious for peace and his connections with the monied and 
mercantile classes, made him feel that it was urgent. - On 
9 April, 1762 he wrote to Sir Joseph Yorke 
ý. Lwv-wc naraw . cxe to Newcastle 1 April 1762. 
ZM$ 
t ýtvY fiýý, ? "' 
I must repeat to you-that the load of war is so heavy 
upon us, that I don't pass a day without meeting with 
something very disagreeable to myself upon that subject from all quarters.... After an increase of nearly seventy 
millions national debt, by this great, glorious and 
successful war, to continue to carry it on at the rate 
of twenty millions more every year, is more than this 
country can do; I dare say, we shall be repaid in full 
by our Peace, but that is more than I know. " 16 
Newcastle was becoming increasingly aware that as a minister 
he was holding less and less power and was thus less and less 
17 
able to carry out the. policy he wanted to adopt. He was 
anxious to end the war as soon as podsible for he believed 
that the government financiers would not support the Treasury 
much longer. He also seems to have realised the deleterious 
effect that high taxation and the expense of war was having 
upon trade. If, however, it was not possible to end the war 
Newcastle did not believe that the continental war should be 
curtailed. There is no evidence that his belief in a 
continental war was affected by commercial considerations, 
there does not seem to be any correspondence from merchants 
discussing whether or not it was advisable to end the German 
war, and Newcastle's desire to continue it would seem to rely 
mainly on the strategic ground that as it was desired to bring 
France and Spain to terms it was necessary to harrass them in 
in every possible sphere. On the other hand Newcastle never 
seems to have had second thoughts on this policy and it is 
then logical to think that his mercantile friends supported 
16. Ibid. ff449-450 Newcastle to Sir Joseph Yorke 1 April 1762. 
17. See for instance B. Pd. Add. Mss. 32937 f92 Newcastle to 
Devonshire 13 April 1762. 
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him in it. Indeed there is no reason why they should not, for 
the war in Germany was leading to profitable contracts which 
would only end without being replaced by peaceful trade if 
the British army was withdrawn and the subsidy to Frederick the 
Great terminated. These facts are borne out by the loan that 
was negotiated for Portugal in April 1762. When news leaked 
out that a loan was to be negotiated stocks in the City rose, 
18 
and Newcastle was soon appointing merchants to remit the loan. 
Meanwhile the peace negotiations were developing. Viry 
communicated a new dispatch to Bute about 21 April 1762. On 
23 April the Cabinet agreed to return Martinique as the French 
demanded and by 30 April it was also agreed not to insist on 
19 
uuad%loupe or Louisiana. While this policy was being evolved 
Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke 
"I own I had, and have my doubts as to our demanding 
Guadeloupe or Louisiana; We shall have neither; and, I 
hope shall not finally insist upon them. We have once 
lost the Peace, by asking too much and not departing 
from it, soon enough; I hope, that will not be our 
course a second time: If it is, nothing but destruction 
can follow.... Lord Bute.... said little till he insisted 
upon some consideable equivalent for 1 artinico. My own 
private opinion is to ask the four Neutral Islands; and 
finally to take St. Lucia and one of the other three. 
Consider, My Dear Lord, what confusion we shall be in if this negotiation breaks off. You see the King 
of Prussia already treated by M; y Lord President, the 
Duke of Bedford and My Lord Bute, rather as an enemy 
than an ally; and I am afraid, there is scarce any 
exchanges that they will not go into, to avoid what they 
call a continental war. To avoid that we should make up 
with France, if we can, and to avoid other inconveniences 
and even attacks either at home, or in Ireland, for I 
18. Ibid. f192 West to Newcastle 17 April 1762; ibid. f194 
Barrington to Newcastle 17 April 1762. 
19. See' Rashed 
, 
o2,. cit. pp. 141-142. 
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beg your Lordship to observe, that the D. de Choiseul 
owns that Spain has already squinted at Ireland, and 
that will undoubtedly go on, if our negotiations break 
off with France. I hope the reciprocal Flattery-between 
those who govern the two countries will prevent it. I 
own this is my greatest dependence. " ' 20 
Newcastle was thus coming to believe increasingly in 
"peace at any price" and was influenced mainly-by strategic 
considerations, although mercantile considerations must have 
- influenced him-to some extent for the two were inextricably 
entwined. It is also interesting to note that in the reply 
1 21 
Viry sent on 1 May 1762 England claimed the Neutral Islands. 
Perhaps Newcastle had more weight in the Cabinet than he 
I 
believed he had. 
Unfortunately there is not a lot ? . ore to be learned about 
Newcastle's ideas on the war-and the negotiations of peace 
for by 30 April he had become preoccupied with the controversy I 
with Grenville whether £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 should be 
voted, over which he resigned. By 30 April he had guessed how 
Grenville was going to economise to save £1,000,000 for on 
that day he wrote to Devonshire 
"Besides every,. clerk,, who knows anything of the state of 
our finances-must"knowr, that if we have not a second 
million %we-must- " shut up--the exchequer by the end of 
the summer; - and-'-MMr. - Grenville means this only, to force 
you:. to put"fan-immediate end' to -the German-War. " 22 
It is interesting'to, -note, that-in the crisis"at the 
20. B. M. Add. Mss" 32937 ß49 Newcastle to Hardwicke ý 25 April 1762. 
Cf. ibid. f324 -i Newcastle to Devonshire '23 April 1762. On the 23 April the" Cabinet had agreed to demand, Guadeloupe 
or Louisiana as compensation for'L! artinique. See Winstanley 
, 
o2. cit. P. 117-i 
21. Cf. Rashed op. it. 
p. 
142. 
22. B. Vii. Add. Mss. 32937 f453 Newcastle to Devonshire 30 April 1762. 
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beginning of May over this matter during which Newcastle 
decided to resign he kept closely in contact with Rockingham 
informing him of events, primarily one must conclude because 
he wished to be sure of the loyalty of Rockingham and the 
group he led especially in Yorkshire, but it is also a mark 
of the regard in which he held the young Marquis. Since Pitt's 
fall in October 1761 contact with Rockingham had only been 
spasmodic but in May 1762 there was fairly constant correspon- 
23 
dence between the two and among the last of Newcastle's acts 
at the Treasury was securing the appointment of certain 
individuals for Rockingham. Among these was "Mr. Farrar's 
brother". This could well have been significant for Benjamin 
24 
Farrar was to be important during the Stamp Act Crisis. 
During his last weeks in office Newcastle as usual 
maintained contact with representatives of the mercantile 
25 
classes on local and minor matters. From these also he 
received advice and information upon the war and this contact 
was valuable. William Woods, a Customs official, sent 
Newcastle statistics showing the increase of raw sugar imports 
23. See B. M. Add. MMss" 32938 f50 Newcastle to Rockingham 4 May 
1762. Ibid. f123 Rockingham to Newcastle 9 May 1762; ibid. 
f260 Rockingham to Newcastle 14 May 1762; ibid. f281 
Rockingham to Newcastle, -15 May 1762; ibid. f425 Newcastle 
to Rockingham 24 May 1762.1 
24. Ibid. f291 Rockingham to Newcastle-15 May 1762; ibid. f427 
Newcastle - to' Rockingham 24 May 1762. For Farrar see 
Smith M. cit. pp. 221-222. See also below p. 382. 
25. B. M. Add. Mss. 32936 f116 Ellis Cunliffe. to Newcastle 25 
March 1762. B. A2. Add. Mss" 32938 fl6 James Marriott to 
Newcastle 1 May 1762; 'ibid. f93 John Bullock to Newcastle 
20 May 1762: 
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26 
since 1710, Joseph Watkins sent Newcastle his opinion on the 
27 
present state of the war, Sampson Gideon commented on the 
28 
financial situation and Garfield Charles Penfold, a West Indian 
planter, sent a pamphlet to Newcastle reflecting the view- 
29 
point of the planters in the Canada v Guadeloupe controversy. 
Newcastle was also maintaining his contact with the 
dissenters and they very soon expressed their regret at his 
30 31 
resignation as did Sir George Colebrooke. 
Thus during Newcastle's last months in office in 1762 
the established pattern repeated itself. He maintained his 
traditional alliance with the 'monied interest' and his policy 
seems to have been far more affected by deference to their 
opinion than an attempt to curry favour with the merchants 
in general. His desire for peace and his attitude to the 
German war showed this admirably. 
The coming period in opposition was to test the loyalty 
of Newcastle's followers. Newcastle was to see who were his 
Mss-32937 f198 William Woods to Newcastle 17 April 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
1762. 
Ibid. f412 Joseph Watkins to Newcastle 28 April 1762. _cr 
For Watkins see above pp. 111-112. 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32938 f300 Sampson Gideon to Newcastle 16 May 
1762. 
Ibid. f354 Garfield Charles Penfold to Newcastle 20 May 
1762 (docketed received 21 July 1762 and thus not received 
until Newcastle had fallen from power) together with 
pamphlet ibid. ff354-364 Reflections on the true interest 
of Great Britain with respect of the Caribee TRIRndn nnA 
uV aJ L/GLLVO il Vgl. 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32937 f314 Samuel Chandler to Newcastle n. d. (but dated 22 April 1762) B. M. Add. Miss" 32939 fl71 Samuel Chandler to Newcastle 3 June 1762. 
B. M. Add. Mss"32938 f390 Sir George Colebrooke to Newcastle 
21 May 1762.1 
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true allies and discover those who had merely clung to him 
as First Lord of the Treasury. This period was also to forge 
new and different links with the mercantile classes. 
'. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
NE 1CASTIE IN THE WILDERNESS. 
A. THE ATTEITT TO EMARRASS THE DOVER U1EI T FINANCIALLY. 
As soon as he had resigned Newcastle began darefully't. g 
watch the actions of those members of the mercantile and monied 
classes who had been loyal to him while in power. From the 
first he seems to have had some idea that he could embarrass 
the administration by maintaining the loyalty of the 'monied 
classes' to himself personally. On 9 June Hugh Valence Jones, 
Newcastle's secretary while at the Treasury, reported to him 
"Lord Bute) is to have another Lev4e at Whitehall today, 
at which, it is said, pains have been taken to engage 
some of the principal merchants to skew themselves. The 
Boards which were not at the Former will attend this 
Levee. " 1 
After the meeting mentioned above took place Newcastle 
reported to Hardwicke 
"I hear, this day from London that my Lord Bute's Levee 
on We'rsday, was very full; but I don't know of what sort 
of people it was composed. I hear great industry was 
used, to get the considerable people of the City to go 
there, of whom there was scarce any the first da$ t' 2 
He may have been somewhat perturbed and especially anxious to 
find out which merchants attended the second levee, for his 
3 
old friend and ally Rose Fuller had attended Bute's first levee. 
1.13. M. Add. Mss- 32.939 f246 Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle 9 
June 1762. 
2. Ibid. f288 Newcastle to Hardwicke 11 June 1762. 
3. See ibid"f307 Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle 12 June 1762 
sending a list of'Bute's first. lev&e. 
_ ýý 
It is however, to be-noted that Fuller was not a government 
financier. 
The problem of making peace was the chief problem at 
this time and Newcastle was thus anxious to secure any news 
that he could concerning the progress of negotiations. Thus 
when on 15 June Rockingham sent Newcastle news that hopes 
for 
peace were reviving, Newcastle wrote eagerly to Rockingham 
requesting information; but Rockingham was forced to write 
again on the same day and deny the information 
that he had 
4 
sent earlier. 
Newcastle was now coming to the point at which he had 
to decide exactly whit attitude he was going to adopt to the 
new administration. At first, no doubt partly because this 
was the best way to maintain the allegiance of his supporters 
he adopted an attitude of neutrality and on 19 June wrote 
to Hardwicke 
"I am told, and with too much truth that mankind are 
so made, that if they don't see something is to be 
done on one side, they will engage on the other and 
that I shall lose all my friends by not declaring. 
That, to a degree, may be true: But these are friends 
of Interest only, and therefore, that shall never 
force me to a measure improper, and perhaps dangerous 
in itself. Make a declaration of what ? Of opposition 
to what, to right measures, to the necessary support 
of the government, I am sure; nothing shall ever 
induce me, to that, as, I know it would not, the best 
part of my friends, and those whose advice I would 
take. But on the other hand I will enter into no 
engagements, I don't owe it to my Lord Bute, to 
remove his fears and apprehensions, and to make him 
easy in his offensive Administration; but I owe it to 
4. Ibid.. I'i'645-e xoc1 Ingham to Newcastle 15 June 1762; 
, f347 Newcastle to:; Rockingham 15 June 1762; ibid. f34 
Rockingham to Newcastle 15 June 1762. 
ý. 
ý'31ý 
myself, and my country, to do nothing, that should give 
Dishonour to me, or prejudice the other. I will not give 
the lye to all, which I have hitherto done, or to any 
one part of it. This is my full determination and I am 
sure you will approve it. " 
Newcastle also pointed out that once he declared either 
opposition or support for the government that he was bound to 
5 
lose some support. Yet while he adopted this policy of 
"superficial neutrality" Newcastle was willing to embarrass 
Bute, if he could, by maintaining the loyalty of the financiers 
to himself. This policy was not self contradictory. In an 
era when opposition was still tainted with disloyalty the best 
method of returning to power was to prove oneself indispensible. 
No doubt Newcastle hoped to prove that his financial experience 
and contacts were essential to the government. 
Thus when on 17 and 19 June Hugh Valence Jones sent 
Newcastle details of a further levee of Bute`., held on 16 
June 1762, Newcastle was not concerned when he was informed 
that "a considerable number of merchants attended to sol4icet 
some points relating to wharfa e", but was much, tmore 
concerned 
when Jones informed him that three government financiers 
Sampson Gideon, Joseph Salvadore and Samuel Touchet had 
attended, although the latter was supposed to have come"with 
6 
the merchants". 
Following this distressing news of the apparent defection 
5. Ibid. f407 Newcastle to Hardwicke 19 June 1762. 
6. Ibid.. f387 Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle 17 June 1762. 
ibid. f415 Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle 19 June 1762. 
For Gideon Salvadore and Touchet as government financiers 
see Namier, Structure of Politics pp. 55,56. see also Namier and-Brooke Charles Townshend p. 107. 
laa 
of two or possibly three of his City friends, Newcastle wrote 
to Hard. vicke on 20 June, a letter the intention of which Would 
seem was to re-assure himself, and which contains a good analysis 
of his ideas at this time. He wrote 
"I think upon the whole, His Lordship, (Bute) sees the 
difficulties He is engaged in, which will increase 
upon him; and he is too proud, either to own it or to 
ask any assistance upon it. But, if what I hear, is 
true, he must soon be obliged to do both, For I am told 
the run is greater than ever: and that is the general 
opinion, that it is impossible for him to hold it. That 
seem'd particularly to be the notion of my two City 
friends, Mr- Walpole and Sir G. Colebrooke , for both whom 
I answer, tho' the latter was at my Lord Bute's Levee, 
as a Contractor with the Treasury, but had not the honor 
to be spoken to. 
They are nibbling already at borrowing money in the 
City; and give out that they shall want but six millions 
next year. Poor silly men, they don't know, what they 
want, nor, if they did, how to procure it. The only 
persons they have in the City, are Mr. Glover and Mr. 
Salvadore and Mr. Fox's particular friends, proper 
persons to procure money loans for the publick. 
I think it is plain, that the Peace meets with some 
obstruction. My Lord Bute has now found out, that the 
divisions here affect it, and if his want of credit at 
home, should be known, and believed abroad, this will 
affect it more. " 7 
About 21 June Newcastle may have become a little more 
alarmed when he received news that Lord Halifax was to be 
placed at the Head of the Admiralty , and that this was a 8 
popular appointment with the merchants. 
He received more alarming news a few days later, for he 
learned that two Of the greatest of the government financiers, 
Sir Joshua Vanneck and Sir George Colebrooke, had made heavy 
7. B. M. Add. Ilss" 32939 ff421-422 Newcastle to Hardwicke 20 June 176 
8. B. M. Add. Mss. 32940 Barrington to Newcastle 21 June 1762. 
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9 
purchases of government stock. Newcastle also seemed to have 
been annoyed when John Milbanke, a Yorkshire friend of Rock- 
Ingham':., also began to dabble in government stock at this 
10 
time. Newcastle therefore did something to rally his forces. 
11 
He made approaches to Rose Fuller, no doubt testing his 
allegiance, and on 9 July he wrote to John West, his former 
Secretary to the Treasury, asking him to send him information 
as to the financial arrangements of the new ministry, making 
an excuse of the fact that he wanted to know if his calculations 
had been grossly inaccurate. He continued 
"I shall be glad to see you as soon as it is convenient 
to you. In the meantime I wish, you would inform 
, yourself of 
the real sense and inclination of the City 
and particularly whether my old Friends the Bank, the 
the South Sea, Sir G. (eorge) Colebrooke, Sir Joshua 
(Vanneck) and the Walpoles, the Gores and Mellishes, 
Martin, Muilman etc1continues the same as they were. I 
have not the least reason to suspect any change in any 
of them. I wish you would continue to see Sir W(illiam) 
Baker; and tell him how glad I should be to see him 
here in my retirement. " 12 
At the same time, however, or even possibly slightly 
before, Newcastle must have been receiving some reassuring news; 
for on 4 July'Rockingham wrote to Newcastle from Wentworth that 
9. Ibid. f40 "Inteikligence" 23 June 1762.. 
10. W. W. M. R1-258 Milbanke. to Rockingham 23 June 1762. Milbanke 
seems to have acted as a financial agent for Rockingham in 
London. -See ibid. R1-257 draft Rockingham to Milbanke n. d. 11. B. MM. Add. Mss" 32940 f184 Newcastle to Lord Ashburhhsml July 176 
12. Ibid. ff302-303 Newcastle to West 9 July 1762. Bartholomew 
Burton Governor of the, Bank of England, -John Bristol( 
Governor of, the South Sea Company, Sir George Colebrooke, 
Sir Joshua Vanneck., 'Thomas Walpole, John Gore, William 
Mellish, John Martin and Henry Muilman were government 
financiers who had been closely connected with Newcastle 
during his administration. Cf.. -Namier Structure of Politics 
etc p. 55. 
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- 
"By all that I can learn here I find a very general 
discontent and a sensible and considerable merchant of 
this country surprised me by assuring me that he was 
just come from Scotland and even there the Great Ian 
was not popular and no joy. " 13 
and on 10 July Thomas Walpole saw Newcastle and informed him 
that Vanneck's large purchase of government stock was the 
result of instructions received from a servant of Choiseul and 
14 
was not made- c. Dn_hiß-. own initiative. Newcastle probably 
concluded, fairly justly, that it was the same sort of instruc- 
tion that had proipted Colebrooke's similar action. He was 
however, forced to conclude from this, that peace had nearly 
15 
been concluded and on the 15 July 1762 was able to write 
reassuringly to the Duke of Devonshire 
"I have very good account from the City; Everything there 
is as Your Grace left it.... I have my home full every 
day, this day I expect nay Friend Sir W7(illia)m Baker. " 16 
Newcastle was further reassured on 15 July when he saw Sir 
William Baker who thought that everything was in confusion, 
and that the City financiers did not think there was any 
17 
administration at all. West, whom he saw on the same day, 
reiterated theloyalty of the City to Newcastle and stated 
13. B. M. Add. Diss. 32940 ff241-242 Rockingham to Newcastle 4 duly 
1762. It is not clear who the "Sensible and considerable 
merchant" was but it was possibly Benjamin Farrar for 
Rockingham had been in contact with him in May 1762 (see 
above p- 1A and Rockinghhm was again in contact with Farrar 
in August 1762. See W. W. M. Rockingham Papers Rl-27 John 
Whiteacre to Mr. Thesiger 6 August 1762 and receipt enclosed 
of 10 August 1762. The wording of this letter is peculiar 
but perhaps Rockingham expected the fact that Bute was now 
in control to receive a popular reception in Scotland. 
34. B. M. Add. riss. 32940 f326 Newcastle to Duke of Cumberland 11 
July 1762. 
15. Ibid. f326 Newcastle to Duke of Cumberland 11 July 1762. 
16. Ibid. f342 Newcastle to Devonshire 15 July 1762. 
17. Ibid. f372 Newcastle, to Hardwicke 16 July 1762. 
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18 
that Samuel Marsh, the governor of the Bank of England, was'so 
perturbed with the situation that he was intent on resigning. 
Marsh was aparently connected with Newcastle and Bariiholomew 
Burton. Newcastle regarded-th&t as a measure that would distress 
the administration, but thought it was his duty to restrain 
Marsh, partly because he thought that it would create too much 
panic, and partly because he feared that Marsh would be replaced 
19 
by a man far less friendly to himself. 
Thus on 18 July Newcastle was able to write in exultation 
to Hugh Valence Jones 
It Where will these gentlemen get money? I wish I knew, 
whether any of the considerable men in the City were 
at Lord Bute's"t' 20 
and at the same time was making quite sure of the loyalty of 
21 
Sir George Colebrooke and Rose Puller. On the 23 July he was 
able to report to the Duke of Devonshire 
"The violence and run against U. y Lord Bute within City 
and.... Country is very strong. " 22 
By the end of July 1762 Newcastle thus felt his policy of 
embarrassing the government by maintaining the allegiance of 
the City financiers was reaping dividends. This was particularly 
so after the Duke of Bedford made a conciliatory approach to 
23 
him to stop him going into opposition. Concerning this he 
18. Samuel Marsh had replaced Bartholomew Burton as the Governor 
of the Bank of England for 1761-1762, See above p. 
This does not conflict with the statement made on p. j:. where 
Newcastle referred to Bartholomew Burton as the Bank; 
Newcastle, was in the habit of thus referring to Burton. 
19. Ibid. ff372-373 Newcastle to Hardwicke 16 July 1762. 
20. Ibid. f399 Newcastle to Hugh Valence Jones 18 July 1762. 
21. Ibid. f385 Newcastle to Thomas Hotham 17 July 1762; ibid. f389 
Newcastle to, Rose Fuller 17 July 1762; B. M. Add. Mss. 32941 
f44 Rose Fuller to Newcastle 23 July 1762. 
tll 
, ýý 
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wrote to Hardwicke 
But I am solicited every day to know what part my 
Friends should take and we must come soon to some 
determination, with regard to our Publick Conduct. 
I hinted to Your Lordship in one of nay letters, that 
the run against a certain person is so great and so 
universal, that I doubt much, whether any additional 
strength could enable him to carry on the affairs of 
the Government. It would hurt those who might join 
with him without doing any real service. " 24 
Cautioned by Hardwicke 
25 
state of opinion in the City 
against over-optimism on the 
Newcastle replied 
" As to what Your Lordship very kindly observes, that 
People, who may come to me may aggravate the report of 
the Run against a certain great Man; I always make 
allowances for that. As to my enquiring about it; I 
don't know any way of doing it, but hearing what people 
say upon it, and making my own observations upon the 
truth, or probability of the accounts I hear. The 
universal reports from the country are to that purpose; 
and particularly most strongly in Yorkshire. (26) 
-' My Friends in the City upon whom I can most depend, 
viz, dir. Burton, Mr. Tho(mas) Walpole and Sir G(eorge) 
Colebrooke say, that these reports from the country 
are even stronger than in the City; and I have reason 
to think, the run in the City is great. 
''` One instance of it, is remarkable, those who 
think or have thought the Peace sure, whose Fortunes 
are greatly engaged from that Belief, are not only as 
strong themselves, but think it is impossible for a 
certain person to go on with success as the most 
interested or disappointed person can do, either for 
his own resentment or to please and make Court to 
other people. " 27 
Hardwicke's caution was wise and Newcastle was over- 
optimistic. The only evidence in the Newcastle Papers that 
22. Ibid. f37 Newcastle to Devonshire 23 July 1762. 
23. Ibid. f108 et" seg Newcastle ýt'o , Hardivicke 29 July 1762. 
24. Ibid. flO8 Newcastle to Hardwicice 29 July 1762. 
25. Ibid. f94 Hardwicke to Newcastle 29 July 1762. 
_26. Perhaps Newcastle was thinking of Rockingham's letter of 4 July 1762. See above p. 134- and n. 13" 
27. Ibid. ff128-129 Newcastle to''Hardwicke 31 July 1762. 
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may be taken as a basis for the foundation of his opinion on 
sentiment in the country in general is the isolated letter 
28 
from Rockingham. The rest of his opinion would seem to be 
based on what his City associates told him, and it must be 
realised that Newcastle was at Claremont at this time, well 
away from the centre of the political stage. Perhaps his 
allies liked to reassure him and keep him optimistic; he had 
been in power so long that they must have felt fairly certain 
his period without office was to be very brief. They may 
well have believed that their future depended on encouraging 
him to attempt to return to power. 
In spite of Newcastle's false optimism it would seem, 
however, from the evidence presented above, that his policy 
was earning some rewards. The government had been sufficiently 
embarrassed for the Duke of Bedford to approach Newcastle in 
29 
order to secure his neutrality. The end of July was, however, 
the high-water mark of success for this policy, for Newcastle 
was always restrained for fear of being accused of factious 
behaviour. Consistency of behaviour both in and out of power 
was necessary. when opposition was still tainted with disloyalty. 
Only by consistency could charges of faction be avoided. I 
B. HE GOVERITIAENT : 
In August 1762 disturbing symptoms began to appear for 
138 
Newcastle which were to lead by the end of the year to the 
"Massacre of the Pelhamite Innocents" and the abandonment of 
his policy of "superficial neutrality". 
These symptons were twofold. Firstly, Newcastle's attempt 
to embarrass the government through the financiers failed 
because of their natural proclivity to support administratibn, 
and secondly the ministry was becoming able to negotiate a 
successful peace. The factors were inter-connected. It was 
partly because of the fact that they were expecting to conclude 
peace that Bute and his colleagues were able to escape from 
their financial problems. 
30 
On 5 August Newcastle wrote to Barrington that "all the 
world" was astonished that the Treasury had been able to settle 
all their debts before the adjournment, particularly as debts 
had been paid in cash no additional money had been borrowed, 
and Parliament was not to meet until the usual time after the 
summer adjournment. Newcastle desired Barrington to find out 
how this had been arranged for he said 
"If this is so Your Lordship, and in consequence, myself, 
have been grossly imposed upon; and shall make a very 
poor figure, when this point is known; and comes to be 
debated in Parliament (for that it will be). We shall 
be reckoned (with reason) very ignorant in our office, 
and very weak Ministers, to have laid so much stress 
upon a point; which now comes out so strongly against us, 
and to have carried it so far, as to leave our offices 
upon it. " 31 
30. Barrington had been promoted to Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in March 1761 and had resigned with Newcastle in May 1762: f 
ý. 
_ý l 
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At the same time as Newcastle received this disturbing 
news the rumours that peace was near which had been current 
32 
for some time, became much stronger. On 7 August Newcastle 
wrote to Hardwicke " The talk of immediate Peace is stronger 
33 
than ever and it is expected by everybody" and on the same 
day he wrote to the Duke of Devonshire It All I hear, is, the 
34 
triumphs of peace.... " To Newcastle the issue of peace was 
vital, for if Bute managed to conclude a successful peace his 
popularity would be increased and the ministry strengthened; 
moreover the conclusion of any peace would lessen the financial 
burdens on the administration and so render Newcastle's plans 
to embarrass the ministry, through the loyalty of the 'monied 
interest' to himself, of no avail. 
Thus on 11 August 1762 when Newcastle was able to write 
to Hardwicke 
" It is certain, Lord Bute gives out everywhere that the 
Peace is sure, or made, tho' the people in the City, 
who have immediate correspondence with France, and 
were the most positive that the peace was sure begin 35 
now to doubt of it and, I believe have acted accordingly. " 
he must have felt relieved. He continued 
"I should almost be tempted to think that my Lord 
Bute has taken a resolution to conclude the peace at 
any rate, whether France will give proper security 
or satisfaction, about Spain, or not, and that the 
people in the City imagine, the Council will give into: 
31. B. M. Add. MMss. 32941 f160 Newcastle to Barrington 5 August 1762 
quoted Namier England in the Age etc pp. 414-415. 
32. See for instance B. M. Add. %Zss. 32940 f403 Newcastle to Sir 
Joseph Yorke 19 July 1762. 
33. B. MM. Add. Mss. 32941 f177 Newcastle to Hardwicke 7 August 1762. 
34. Ibid. f179 Newcastle to Devonshire 7 August 1762. 
35. Ibid. f203 Newcastle to Hardwicke 11 August 1762. 
y/-3F%. / 
But I should much doubt whether this Council will 
finally object to any thing which my Lord Bute shall 
insist upon-" -36 
Newcastle was keeping in close contact with the leading 
merchants and his friends among the financial classes over 
the issue of the peace. In the same letter he reported to 
37 
Hardwicke that on Sunday 8 August "Many dined here.... both 
of the City and St. Janies end of town. " One individual of 
38 
this party who is identifiable is Sir George Colebrooke. 
Twice in the next few days Newcastle admitted that he-was 
getting most of his information about the peace . negöti'a't'ions 
39 
from his City friends. These seemed by the middle of August 
quite willing to allow Newcastle to believe that peace was not 
near and he was unwilling to accept the fact that the Ministry 
was able to make a satisfactory peace. Indeed he must have 
been unaware what concessions Bute was willing to make, and 
his opinion that it would be difficult to make peace was 
probably based' on a false assessment of the extent to ' ihich 
Bute was willing to'go in order to secure it. Newcastle 
seemed also to be unwilling to read the signs that indicated 
that the conclusion of peace was near that weze: apparent in 
the high level of the stocks, and the attitude of those in 
the confidence of the Ministry. - He explained these things 
as a ministerial device to deceive people and a proclivity 
40 
to engage in stock buying, or jobbing. 
5b" Z bia. fl US i ewcast. Le to xarawi. cxe 11 August Ufb: &. 
37. Ibid. f207 Newcastle to Hardwicke 11 August 1762. 
38. Ibid. f173 Halifax to Newcastle 6 August 1762. 
39. Ibid. f245 Newcastle ,, to Barrington 15 August 1762. ibid. f264 
Newcastle to Devonshire 17 August 1762. 
40. g Ibid. f243 Newcastle to Devonshire 15 August 1762. ibid 
f2 5 W&eycastle to Barrington 15 Auaust 1762. 
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Gradually however, Newcastle had to acce_t the fact that 
41 
peace was going to be made. As soon as he realised this he 
must have also realised that his attempts to embarrass the 
ministry financially through maintaining the loyalty of the 
City financiers to himself had failed; and by 24 August he 
was trying to reorientate his policy towards the City 
42 
financiers. On that day he saw them and on the following day 
he wrote to Hugh Valence Jones 
It I find the City ... begins... to demand, or ex ect, some 
compensation for restoring the Havannah to Spain 
( which they look upon now as certainly taken). But 
I don't believe any such thing is intended by our 
ministers. " 43 
In his Memoirs Horace Walpole recorded that the City financiers 
and mercantile classes were irritated by the alacrity with 
44 
which Bute sought peace after the conquest of Havannah and 
Newcastle was trying to capitalise on this incipient feeling 
to rally his former adherents. 
Newcastle's position was growing more difficult. The 
negotiation of a successful peace was likely to be. popular 
with the financial and mercantile classes, because they felt, 
as they had done in 1761, that it would mean the revival of 
45 
commerce. Moreover, with the failure of Newcastle's efforts 
to embarrass the administration financially the loyalty of 
41. See for instance Ibid. f264 Newcastle to Devonshire 17 -'j 
August 1762; bid. f302 Newcastle to HardNvicke 19 August 1762. 
42. Ibid. f346 Newcastle to Right Honourable Lady Isabella 
Finch 22 August 1762. 
43. Ibid. f353 Newcastle to H. V. Jones 23 August 1762. 
44. See Horace Walpoles Memoirs of the Reign of King George 
the Third first published by Sir Dennis Le Marchant re-ed 
by C. F. Russell Barker, London 1894, Vol. I, P. M. 45. See above p. 7*-. 
the financiers and merchants would be more difficult to hold. 
Indeed, it must have come as a shock to Newcastle at this time 
even if he did not regard it as an omen öf the future, to find 
that Thomas Walpole and Joseph Mellish, two of his most J. oyäl 
adherents among the mercantile classes, had been deprived of 
46 
their contracts. This sort of event was very likely to shake 
the loyalty of Newcastle's mercantile followers. 
In turning to the peace terms as he was nov, doing, to 
find a suitable subject to rally his supporters, especially 
that of his mercantile friends, Newcastle was ta: ckl ng a--very 
difficult issue. He could only criticize those concessions 
Bute made which he himself had not agreed to when in power; 
otherwise he was likely to lay himself open to the charges 
of faction and inconsistency. Pitt was in a much better 
47 
position for his hands were not tied,; Newcastle was clutching 
at straws. Both he and Hardwicke, and for that matter most 
of the other leaders of his party, were inexperienced in the 
art of opposition, and opposition was the position that 
Newcastle was now approaching. Hardwicke thought opposition 
beneath his dignity and contrary to his duty. Moreover he 
believed all opposition futile that did not have the support 
of Pitt in the House of Commons. He had made this clear to 
48 
Newcastle as early as 28 May 1762. The situation was made 
more difficult because Pitt had no intention of co-operating 
46. B. Ni. Add. Mss. 32941 f341 Newcastle to iaohn Gore 21 August 
1762; ibid. f366 John Gore to Newcastle 23 August 1762. 
47. Winstanley, 6§. 616. p. 138. 
48. Yorke 
_p. cit. 
Vol. III, pp. 361-363; B. M. ADD. MSS. 32939 ff53-55 
Hardwicke to Newcastle 28 May 1762. 
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with anybody in opposition, especially not Nefrcastle. Moreover 
there were differences between the Old Whig lawuers, Hardwicke 
and Charles Yorke, and Lord Chief Justice Pratt 
1, 
Pitt's chief 
legal adherent. At the root of this controversy was the rivalry 
between Pratt and Charles Yorke for the Woolsack further com- 
49 
plicating the situation. 
Hardwicke was by no means the only important member of 
Newcastle's party who seemed to be trying to thwart his plans 
N 
for opposition. On the 26 August the Duke of Devonshire 
wrote to him 
"I think the Peace if made on the terms we have heard is 
a good one and therefore in justice to our characters we 
ought to support it, besides it is so very near what 
we ourselves approved of, that we could not well do 
otherwise; as to the giving up St. Lucia, it certainly is 
not an object to continue the War upon, viz, France had 
an account of the situation of her affairs and out of 
necessity yielded that Island, it is by all accounts so 
necessary for her and would have been such a thorn in 
her side, as might have induced her to have endeavoured 
to regain it the very first opportunity. I own freely 
to your Grace I am for a lasting Peace in order that this 
Country may take breath, and the way to obtain that 
desirable end, is not to force such upon our Enemy's as 
they shall sit uneasy under, for in that case they will 
be tempted to break it the first moment they see a chance 
of doing it with success. Yöu ask me what is to be done, 
which is a question very difficult to answer, in my poor 
opinion we must wait a little for events, things will 
probably clear up something more between this and the 
meeting of Parliament, then will be the time to gome to 
some resolution, for my part I shall be very ready upon 
every-occasion to show my friendship to Yr. Grace and 
to do whAt.... is most for the good of the whole. " 50 
Newcastle persisted in his policy, however. A week later 
49. Yorke 9M-Si--t- pp. 363-367. 
50" . B. M. Add. Mss. 32942 ý ff9-10 Devonshire to Newcastle 25 August 1762 part quoted England in the Age etc, Namier, pp. 339-340 
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he reported to Hardtiwicke that "there seems to be a great 
spirit, rising against; what are supposed to be the conditions 
51 
of the peace". When he replied Hardwicke gave Newcastle some 
ground for hope for he acknowledged that this discontent 
would increase as soon as news was recdived that Havannah 
52 
was taken, and a conversation that Newcastle had with his 
friend the Comte de Viry, the Sardinian ambassador, on 3 
September seems to have increased his hopes that he would 
find something in the peace terms by which he could rally his 
53 
supporters and embarrass the government. 
When on the following day Newcastle saw the King and 
George III made some remarks which seemed intended to pacify 
Newcastle he concluded" that it had some relation to the 
violent spirit which there is now in the City against the 
54 
supposed terms of the Peace. " which John Clevland had reported 
55 
to him on the previous day. 
The colleague who seemed to be giving Newcastle the 
most encouragement at this time in his policy was Rockingham. 
On 6 September he «rote to Newcastle 
It The expectation of Peace seems to me to have given 
rise to more diffidence and jealousy and few are shy 
in expressing it.... A strong administration backed 
with national confidence would have found it a very 
difficult task after the great successes we have had 
to make a Peace in any degree adequate to the expecta- 
tions.... " 56 
51. Ibid. f86 Newcastle to Hardwicke 30 August 1762. 
52. Ibid. f120 Hardwicke to Newcastle 1 September 1762. 
53. Ibid. f142 Memorandum September 1762. For Viry see Namier 
England in the Aye etc pp. 81-82. 
54. B. M. Add. Iss 32942 f148 Memorandum 4 September 1762, 
55. Ibid" f171 Newcastle to Devonshire 4 September 1762. John 
Clevland 1707-1763 Secretary to the Admiralty. 
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and Newcastle replied enthusiastically 
"I agree with Your Lordship, that, if the Peace is not 
both with France and at the same time with Spain, it 
will be liable to great objection and that seems to 
be the universal opinion... Should we miscarry there (Havannah) it would be and especially upon the 
conclusion of a Peace, a most fatal thing, and the enemy 
would not fail to avail themselves of it. " 57 
About this time Newcastle had a long conversation with 
Hardwicke vrhä forced him to agree that any opposition without 
Pitt was hopeless and that the unpopularity of Bute was not a 
suitable eject for opposition, the only possible one being 
the terms of peace. Hardwicke also pointed out that to rally 
his supporters Newcastle would have to oppose the peace on 
terms that he and Hardwicke had previously agreed to while 
members of the administration, bacause the minor points such 
as the issue of the possession of St. Lucia and Cleves and 
58 
Wesel would be insufficient to rally popular opposition. 
Newcastle was in a difficult position and he acknowledged 
59 
as much to Lord Kinnoull on 12 September. While he wished 
to rally the opposition that appeared to be crystallising in 
the City, and while to some extent Rockingham appeardd to be 
urging him on, the rest of the Old Whig leaders especially 
Hardwicke and Devonshire appeared to be endeavouring to restrain 
him, and he had no desire to affront them. On 20 September 
he wrote to Rockingham sending him papers which explained both 
56. Ib d. f182 Rockingham to Newcastle 5 September 1762. 
57. Ibid. f223 Newcastle to Rockingham 11 September 1762. 
58. B. M. Add. Mss. 35353 f292 Hardwicke to Yorke 9 September 1762 
quote Yorke ýR" . Vo1. III, p. 415. See Namier England in the Age etc pp. '340-341. 
59. B. PM1. Add. I; Mss. 32942 f233 Newcastle to Lord Kinnull 12 
September 1762. 
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his attitude and that of Devonshire and Hardwicke. 
In these circumstances Newcastle could do nothing definite 
until the exact terms of the peace were made known. During 
61 aj these weeks he tried to convert Hardwicke to his way of thinking, /I 
62 ; 
held a dinner party for some of his City adherents., Hefr. dsda to 1, 
believe rumours that the Duke of Devonshire and the rest of 
63 
his own followers were about to be turned out of office and a 
report from two government contractors Samuel Touchet and 
flicholas Linwood that the government had received sufficient 
money to carry them through the following year. Instead 
Newcastle obtained for himself a report from Sir Joshua Vanneck 
that the City financiers had no confidence in Bute's adminis- 
64 
trat ion. On 3 October 1762 he concluded 
" The only thing, which can be at present resolved upon, 
is to wait and see the great result of the negotiations 
of peace; and the method in case of its failure, that 
the Ministers will propose for carrying on the War, and 
whether as is suggested my Lord Bute himself finding the 
difficulty or impractica'&ility of going on, may not 
desire to retire to some other employment, or absolutely, 
to retire altogether from business. But in all events, 
a true zeal for the interest of this country in the 
terrible situation it is now in; and that regard, which 
many profess for those who have been driven by my Lord 
Bute, out of the administration, should be sufficient 
to engage every single man, in either House of Parliamnt, 
who pretends or desires, to be thought a Friend, to be 
present the first day of the session. " 65 
60. Ibid. f307 Newcastle to Rockingham 20 September 1762. 
61. Ibid. f289 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 September 1762, ibid 
ff427-430 Newcastle to Hardwicke 30 September 1762. 
62. Ibid. f326 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 23 September 1762; 
ibid. f347 Newcastle to Hardwicke 25 September 1762. 
63. Ibid. f308 Newcastle to Rockingham 20 September 1762. 
64. B. M. Add. Mss. 32943 ff33-43 "Substance of a very material 
Conversation which I had the Honour to have with H. R. H. the Duke of Cumberland at Windsor Great Lodge on Friday last, the 1st instand some few observations of my own upon it" 
3 October 1762. 
65. Ibid. ff44-46 "Substance of a very Material Conversation etc. 3`October 1762. 
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When the news that Havannah had been taken arrived in the 
early days of October 1762 Newcastle felt that his hand had - 
been strengthened, for now the ministry would find it far more 
difficult to get a lenient peace approved, and Newcastle felt 
that the task of marshalling opposition over the peace 
preliminaries would be proportionately easier. 
To Rose Fuller Newcastle wrotel 
"I must begin with congratulating you upon a great Success 
at the Havannah; by which we have not only got the poss- 
ession of the Key of the West Indies but taken in effect 
thirteen large good ships of the line, and one million 
and half sterling in money. The Spanish Navy will not 
recover this in many years; and such a conquest and 
acquisition at this time, if made proper use of, must 
be of infinite service to the publick. " 66 
Fuller replied congratulating Newcastle that Havannah had been 
taken and continued 
"I think with your Grace if a proper use be made of this 
conquest, it must be of infinite benefit to the publick.. !' 
He wished that 
"those gentlemen-who are honoured with His Majestys' 
Councils may make such an use of it as may bring us 
to a safe, honourable and advantageous Peace-" 67 
This seems to have been the only mercantile opinion on the 
significance of the capture of Havannah that Newcastle obtained, 
It seems, however, to have been influential for when Newcastle 
wrote to Devonshire on 6 October he echoed Fuller's sentiments 
when he wrote 
bb. laia. r o Newcastle to Rose Fuller 2. October 1762. 
67. Ibid. f68 Rose Puller to Newcastle 5 October 1762. 
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"The conquest of the Havannah and the Consequences of 
it put this country in a high situation, and should 
enable our Ministers to make a solid and lasting Peace, 
with both Prance and Spain, and that they may do, if 
they are not hampered with previous promises and engage- 
ments. Some valuable consideration and compensation 
must be given for the Havannah, if it is to be restored 
or the nation will be in a flame; which must produce 
bad consequences. " 68 
In the next week Newcastle's opinion on the importance 
of Havannah seems to have developed further and on 14 October 
he wrote to Hardwicke 
"When People think lightly at first of the taking of the 
Havannah, they look upon it as an ordinary conquest in 
War; and like other Conquests, Martinico, Guadeloupe 
&c. may be given up for small considerations in order 
to restrain the rest, and make a good and reasonable 
peace; but in my humble opinion, the conquest of the 
Havannah and the acquisition of naval forces and treasure 
which has attended it, is quite a different thing, and 
requires different considerations and more explicit 
and reäl4-satisfaction. 
In the first place, Spain can never, at least in 
mang years, take it again by force, even with the united 
force-of France; and that in all restitutions is a great 
point. In the next place it shows Spain how little 
their offensive Family Compact avails them, Whilst we 
have the Havannah; and therefore it should and must be 
one of the sine ý qua nons for the rest itut ionl of it, that the Family Compact should be annulled in the 
clearest and most explicit manner, and without that in 
my humble opinion, nothing will do. If Spain can't 
retake the Havannah by Force, as long as we are in 
possession of it, they cannot bring Home any of their 
Treasure; and consequently the West Indies themselves 
are of no use to them. And, if that is the Case, what 
can Spain do,, or how long can they support any war in 
Europe ? This is not the case of any acquisition we 
have made from France.. " 69 
Interpreting the conquest of Havannah in this fashion 
Newcastle was hoping to challenge more strongly the adminis- 
tration, questioning; whether"the peace it was making was the 
68. Ibid. f71 Newcastle 
, 
to. Devonshire 6 October 1762.1 
69. Ibid. ff202-203 Newcastle to Hardwicke 14 Ocotber 1762.. 
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best possible when Britain had fought a victorious war. The 
capture of Havannah might seem to be the excuse for stronger 
opposition which Newcastle desired but it cannot be doubted 
that he genuinely felt that Bute was going to throw away the 
70 
advantages which had been gained. 
Hardwicke agreed with Newcastle over the importance of 
Havannah but felt that it would be very difficult for England 
"to keep and maintain" Havannah and pointed out that it was 
not possible for England to conquer Peru and Mexico but that 
71 
she could only stop the Spanish treasure fleet. He continued 
to advise Newcastle that it was . mpoibible to form any specific 
plan of opposition and that he must wait till something defi- 
72 
nite was known about the peace. Thus without any specific plan 
in view Newcastle began to rally his friends, among them his 
mercantile followers, for the opening of the new session of 
73 
Parliament. Rockingham) on Newcastle's instructions, faithfully 
74 
tried to rally his Yorkshire friends. Newcastle, as he had 
done in the past began to seek out financial information which 
75 
he no doubt hoped to use against the administration. This 
was to be of little avail, however, for the lenient attitude 
that the King and Bute had adopted towards Newcastle and his 
supporters was changing. They had now secured the support of 
Fox to lead the administration in the Commons 
?6 
Devonshire, 
70. See for instance B. M. Add. Mss" 32942 ff427-430 Newcastle 
Hardwicke 30 September 1762; B. M. Add. Mss. 32943 ff2l-22 
Newcastle to H&nsStanley 2 October 1762. 
71. Ibid. ff258-259 Hardwicke to Newcastle 17 October 1762. 
72. Ibid. f372 Hardwicke' to Newcastle '23 October 1? 562, quoted 
Namier England in the Age etc p. 361. 
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who had been summoned to the Cabinet Council had refused to 
attend and on 28 October he resigned his office of Lord 
77 
Chamberlain. 
From this time dates the beginning of the Massacre of 
the Pelhamite Innocents and an abrupt change in the fortunes 
of Newcastle and his followers. 
During the period since he had resigned office Newcastle 
had endeavoured by a nuiber of expedients to embarrass the 
administration in order to force himself back into power on 
more favourable terms. For most of these expedients the 
support of his mercantile adherents had been essential, 
especially the support of the financiers who had formerly been 
associated with Newcastle while he was at the Treasury; and 
when he turned to the peace terms as a suitable subject for 
opposition he was relying on the support of the mercantile 
classes because they would be more likely to be interested in 
the precise nature of the peace terms than the financiers. 
Newcastle was in a difficult position, however. He could not 
make an all-out bid for mercantile support because of the 
terms on which he had agreed to make peace when in office. 
The mercantile and financial classes, when Newcastle was 
73" l, Ä"rýuý Newcastle to Thomas. Pelham 23 October 1762. ? 4. I, bid"P395 Newcastle to Rockingham 23 October 1762; B. M. Add. Mss. 32964 fl0 Rockingham to Newcastle 25 October 1762. 
75" B" M"Add. Mss" 32943 f138 Newcastle to West 9 October 1762. 
76" Namier, England in the Age etc pp. 350-357. 
77" Ibid. pp. 369-372.1 
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in opposition, were in exactly the sine position as they had 
been when he was in office. They were a group whose support 
it was useful to have, but for whom Newcastle was unwilling 
to make any sacrifice to principle. He did not adapt his 
policy to gain the support of this class. 
It should also be pointed out that Newcastle's opposition 
tactics were not purely "tricks" to make himself indispensible 
and eventually to force himself back into power. In most 
cases, but especially as far as the peace was concerned, his 
behaviour was consistent and he did oppose on. matters of 
principle. 
Thus during the period immediately after Newcastle's 
resignation the weakening of his links with the 'monied 
interest' who traditionally supported administration can be 
observed. The persistent attempts of Newcastle to test and 
maintain this loyalty were not unnecessary. The 'monied 
interest' given the chance, would naturally support adminis- 
tration, for it was on administration that the governemnt 
financiers depended for their livelihood. Moreover, when 
Newcastle showed that he respected the wishes of members of 
the Whig hierarchy like Hardwicke and Devonshire before the 
wishes of the 'monied interest' the members of this interest 
would naturally tend to desert Newcastle.? 
fý.. ,. 
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The dismissal of Devonshire on 28 October 1762 seemed at 
first to Newcastle to be a heaven-sent opportunity to rally 
his friends and firmly unify the party. On 31. October 
Newcastle wrote to Lord George Cavendish noting that the 
dismissal was having the effect of drawing his supporters 
together, and suggesting, for the Duke of Devonshire to 
78 
consider, a policy of resignation among Newcastle's supporters. 
On 2 November Newcastle talked over the matter of resign- 
ation with the Duke of Cumberland and it was agreed that only 
persons of the highest rank or those holding the higher offices 
79 
should resign. Prior to this Lord George Cavendish had 
resigned, and on 3 November Rockingham resigned his office of 
Lord of the Bedchamber. This seems to have been a spontaneous 
action b Rockingham's on Devonshire's dismissal without the 
80 
prompting of Newcastle. Newcastle was elated at this time at 
the success of his policy and seemed to think it was having 
the best effect even among his mercantile followers for on 5 
November 1762 he wrote to the Duke of Devonshire 
" All the City are provoked to the highest degree (by 
Devonshire's dismissal) and amongst the foremost and 
loudest-is my old Friend Alderman Baker. I had him 
Sir Joshua Vanneck, Tommy Walpole and Fonnereau with 
78. B. M. Add. Mss 32944 ffl67-168 Newcastle to Lord George 
Cavendish 31 October 1762 quoted Namier England in the Age 
etc pp"372-373. 
79. B" M. Add. Mss. 32944 f206 et sea "An account of what passed 
this day at Windsor Lodge, 2 November 1762" see Namier, 
England in the Age etc, p. 372. 
80. Namier, England in the Atze etc pp-373-374. See also B. M. 
Add. Mss"32944 ff266-269 Newcastle to Granby 5 November 1762 
----ý___ W. W. M. R1-321VRockingham to Granby 4 November 1762. 
, 
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me on Thursday last, in the highest rage; and I can tell the Gentlemen in power, this treatment of one of their best Friends will not help their money affairs. " 81 
Newcastle was thus hoping that the treatment of Devonshire 
would so incense his friends that he would be able to strengthen 
their alliance and that he would again be able to follow the 
policy of financially embarrassing the ministry through the 
82* 
government financiers loyal to himself. He was also heartened 
by reports of the signing of the peace preliminaries that were 
beginning to come in; for controversy over the terms of the 
peace was an additional subject which could be used to rally 
his supporters. 
Two correspondents in contact with City merchants wrote 
to Newcastle on 5 November informing him. that they had news 
83 
that the peace had been signed. Devonshire, however, advised 
caution in the way that Newcastle and his supporters acted. 
On 
7 Novembeze wrote to Newcastle 
"You cannot--in my opinion be too cautious how you proceed, 
and take care that the first time we attempt to shew 
our streng$JS, y, - V% should be upon some point where we are 
well founded, and that we shall be strong upon. If 
the Parliament was to be judged by the disposition of 
81. B. M. Add. Mss. 32944 ff279-280 Newcastle to Devonshire 5 
November 1762. The Fonnereau mentioned is one of the 
Fonnereau brothers either Thomas (1699-1779) or Zachary 
Philip (1706-1778) They were both government contractors in 
partnership with Walpole. See vamier, Structure of Politics 
pp. 49-50. See also Namier and Brooke The House of Conmons 
1754-1790 Vol. II, pp. 447-498. 
82. See for instance B. M.. Add. Mss 32944 f364 Newcastle to West 
13 November 1762; B. M. Add. Mss 32945 f19 Barrington to 
Newcastle 15 November 1762. 
83. Ibid. f287 , Barrington to Newcastle 5 November 1762; ibid. 
f289 H. V. Jones , to'Newcastle 5 November 1762. 
154 
the Nation the run would be very strong against Lord Bute 
but I doubt that is not the case, as yet there are no overt 
acts; if the Preliminaries are signed before the Parliament 
meets there will then be some foundation to go upon, but 
in that case, My Dear Lord, let us weigh the teams well, 
and act consistently with ourselves, the great . anger will be(in avoiding peevish and ill-judged opposition) that we 
shall give stability to the minister. " 84 
Newcastle, however, was probably more interested in news 
that he received from Thomas Walpole that Pitt was dissatisfied 
with the peace. He immediately began to make efforts through 
this member of his mercantile supporters to form an alliance 
85 
with Pitt to oppose the peace preliminaries. 
Newcastle's hopes, however, were doomed to disappointment. 
He secured the resignation of Lord Kinnoull, but Kinnoull refused 
86 
to go into opposition, and no amount of pressure on Lord Granby 
from both himself and Rockingham could secure for Newcastle the 
87 
loyalty of Gr&nby and the Duke. of Rutland to his side. Neither 
f 
could he secure the resignation of Barrington and others although 
88 
they professed their allegiance to him, for they regarded 
89 
Devonshirets dismissal as "a single act and a private act". Thus 
for the most part the idea of rallying the party by beating up 
resignations on Devonshire's dismissal proved to be a damp squib. 
84. Ibid. f317 Devonshire to Newcastle 7 November 1762. 
85. Ibid. f307 Thos. Nuthail-to unknown (but probably Thomas 
Walpole) 6 November 1762; ibid. f333 Newcastle to Hardwicke 
9 November 1762. See also Namier England in the Age etc p. 388. 
86. Ibid. ff352-353 Newcastle to Hardwicke 13 November 1762. 
Cf. Namier England in the Age etc p. 379. ý 87. Ibid. ff375-377. See also B. M. Add. MMss" 32944; ýýet ýseg 
Newcastle 
too Granby 5 November 1762; W. W. M. R1-321b Rockingham to Granby 
4 November 1762; ibid. Rl-330 Duke of Devonshire to Granby 
17 November 1762. CP Namier and Brooke The House of Conmons 
1754-90 Vol. III, pp. 102-3. 
88. See amier, England in the age etc p. 378 et sep. 
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Hopes of forming a strong opposition on the terms of the 
peace proved illusory also. Approaches made to Pitt through 
90 
the Duke of Cumberland did not prove very successful and New- 
castle began to find that for himself there were difficulties 
in opposing the peace for on 15 November 1762 Hardwicke wrote 
to him 
"I find people in general, even our most particular 
Friends, much inclined to Peace, and determined not to 
oppose upon that head, providing it comes out to be 
admissable. They alledge that in this point, they 
followed Your Grace when in: that you instructed and 
convinced them that it was absolutely necessary, and 
they cannot contradict themselves. Here I beg leave to 
make an observation, that this will create the greatest 
difficulty to forming an opposition in conjunction with 
Mr. Pitt. Unless some great faults should appear, he 
will attack the Peace upon points, which we, whilst of 
the Council, agreed to viz, The Fishery, restoring 
both Martinique and Guadaloupe, and Gore' etc-and 
probably'will insist th t Your Grace and your Friends 
should join with him iit. You have always said that 
you would not contradict yourself and this will 
create a difficulty. " 91 
Later in the same letter Hardwicke continues 
"The greatest part of this reasoning is applied to the 
Point of forming an opposition upon the ill usage of 
the Duke of Devonshire and the indications arising 
from it as to the Court.... If the Peace when produced, 
should come out, not to be admissable, that will make 
another cause. " 92 
By the end of the month Newcastle had himself become 
convinced that Hardwicke's reasonings were valid and that 
89. B. M. Add. Mss" 32945 ff15-18 Hardwicke to Newcastle 15 
November 1762. Cf. Namier, England 'in theme etc pp. 378- 
382,384-386.; 
90. See Namier, England in the Age etc pp-388-389; B. M. Add. 
Mss-32945 ff83-87 Newcastle to Devonshire 20 November 1762 
91. B. M. Add. Mss" 32945 , ff15-16 Hardwicke to Newcastle 15 
November 1762. 
92. Ibid. f18 Hardwicke to Newcastle 15 'November 1762. 
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opposition on the peace was not possible. He also found a 
further 'insurmountable' objection in that only a few 'zealous 
93 
friends' in the House of Commons desired opposition. 
Thus after having his hopes raised by the prospect of 
rallying the party through the Duke of Devonshire's dismissal 
and opposition on the peace preliminaries Newcastle's. hopes were 
dashed to the ground. When on 23 November 1762 Newcastle summoned 
together Devonshire, Hardwicke and Rockingham, the leaders of his 
party he knew 'nothing will be done' but believed "we must.... 
94 
settle our matters, that our Friends may know our intentions. 
Rockingham at this time seems to have been keeping himself 
well-informed on the state of the war. About 20 October he 
wrote a series of comments on this subject between the lines of 
a letter that he received from Lady Charlotte Wentworth. 
The Peace goes backwards, the war is to be 
most fit it should 
transferred to Portugal, the Spaniards gain ground 
impossible 
there very fast, and the opinion is that Lisbon will 
I am afraid so 
soon be beseiged. 95 
This is important evidence that Rockingham was both 
informed and interested in the state of affairs and there is a 
fbxther letter from Lady Charlotte Wentworth in which she 
96 
discusses the peace terms with her brother, and Devonshire was 
97 
also in correspondence with Rockingham at this time. 
yo. iota, rrlyd-lyö iNewcastle to narawlexe ; &v Novemuer IYb% 
944. Ibid. f106 Newcastle to Rockingham 21 November 1762. 
95. W. W. M. R1-312 Charlotte Wentworth to Rockingham (dated 
Wednesday night probably 20 October 1762) Rockingham's 
comments are printed in their correct place in italics. 
, 257, 
Newcastle must thus have found that his desire for 
opposition on the peace preliminaries was restrained by the 
caution of Hardwicke and Devonshire at his meeting with them 
on 23 November, and shortly after this meeting he considered 
it necessary to employ Legge to re-assure the country gentlemen, 
partly because he knew that his party was not going to make 
a forthright opposition on the peace preliminaries and partly 
because a political-broadside just published seemed to point 
to the fact that thg? x' loyalty to the Newcastle group was wav- 
98 
ering. 
At the same time he hunted out his papers on the peace 
negotiations when he was still in power, so that he and 
his 
colleagues should know precisely to what they were committed, 
and in a long letter to Hardwicke on 27 November 1762 he 
discussed the matter in detail and discovered at least some 
points on which it was clearly still possible for them to 
oppose the Peace Preliminaries. He concluded his letter 
It The Duke of Grafton and our warm Friends: press 
extremely to bringing on some point immediately: or we 
shall lose all our Friends. The question only is what 
that point shall be. Can anything arise out of the 
Preliminaries,, or the negotiations relative to them, 
which we can properly come into ?I should think there 
might. Or, is there any other point, which can be 
thought of ?I should like that best. I don't know 
what Mr. Pitt will say or do. 11 99 
96. Ibid. Rl)327 Lady Charlotte Wentworth to Rockingham (post 
9 November 1562) 
97. Ibid. Rl-331 Devonshire to Rockingham n. d. (but dated from 
internal evidence as 18 November 1762) 
98. See B" M" Add. Mss 32945 f155 -Newcastle to Hardwicke 26 
November 1762; ibid. f160 Newcastle to Hardwicke 27 November. 
99. Ibid. ffl59-161 Newcastle-to Hardwicke 27 November 1762. 
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Thus Newcastle was still pressing for opposition on the 
Peace Preliminaries and trying to point out the necessity for 
it to hold the party together. Yet, as he knew Devonshire and 
Hardwicke's reluctance to oppose on this point, he endeavoured 
to palliate them until they were convinced that opposition was 
necessary and thatothe Peace Preliminaries were the only point 
on which it was possible and practical to oppose. Newcastle had 
to convince Hardwicke and Devonshire that opposition was consis- 
tent with their former behaviour and they were thus not liable 
to be charged with creating a factious opposition. 
Hardwicke was, however, extremely reluctant to be drawn 
into opposition:; l On the same day that Newcastle wrote to him 
he wrote to Newcastle 
"I find it from all quarters that the burden and tedium 
of the war, and the desire of peace, are so strong in 
the generality of Parliament, and of the nation(abstracted 
from the interest-or wild part of the City of London, ) 
that the very name of peace is agreeable to them, and. 
they would have been content with terms rather lower 
than we have yet been told of these Preliminaries.... 
I make no doubt but Mr. Pitt, if present, will declaim 
and flame in his way against this Treaty in general and 
so will my Lord Temple; but they will take in, and perhpp$ 
lay the chief stress upon, topics wherein we cannot agree 
with them: and I find many of our Friends so tired of 
the leading of Mr. Pitt and the violence of his friend 
Beckford, during the former administration, that they 
express great aversion to follow him. " 100 
On the 28 November having considered Newcastle's letter 
concerning the peace terms Hardwicke could find no grounds for 
101 
opposition. Thus by 29 November Newcastle was writing to 
100. Ibid. M66-8, Hardwicke to Newcastle 27 November 1762. 
101. . Ibid. f176' Hardwicke to Newcastle '28 November 1762. 
ýF art. 
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Hardwicke agreeing with him that he thought it was inadvisable 
to oppose the peace, and stating that only a few of his 'zealous 
102 
friends' in the House of Commons were anxious for opposition. 
Newcastle did, however, point out to Hardwicke that he 
did not consider the peace terms satisfactory considering the 
103 
position in which Britain had finished the war and he concluddd 
his letter to Hardwvicke 
"Mr. Onslow also acquaints me that there appear'd the 
first day the greatest disposition in the House to shgw 
spirit; that Beckford was never so heard in his life; 
that our Friends are most pressing for some point to 
shew themselves upon; and that they will not be easy 
without it; and that if nothing else can be found out, 
they will attack the Peace, which they think the most 
popular point they can go upon ... MM Nephew Onslow tells 
me, that our Friends in the House of Commons are desirous 
of collecting themselves together, that they may knew 
one another; for that purpose they wish to have a 
meeting - they are sure, they shall be 180 at least. 
This deserves consideration, as I told Mr. Onslow... " 
Mr" Onslow says that if nothing is done and that soon, 
we shall not only lose all our Friends; that they will 
think themselves sacrificed; that they have belonged to 
us, and will belong to us: But if after all they have 
done, it is to end in nothing, they must and will go 
Elsewhere and that the Duke of Grafton is the strongest 
in this way of talking. " 104 
Newcastle was in a difficult position. He did not wish 
to disagree with the restrained councils of Hardwicke and 
Devonshire, yet he seems to have seen in the peace a good 
opportunity for opposition and the means by which he could 
draw the party together. As his letter to Hardwicke shows he 
was greatly worried about the unity of the party, and his 
sincerity in agreeing that opposition to the peace was inadvisable) 
J. U. `SiDla. I .L o-J. Newcastle to Hardwicke 29 November 1762. 
See above p. 154 Cf. Namier England in the. Age etc pp. 390-391. 103. B. Mi. Add. Mss" 32945 f198 Newcastle to Hardwicke 29 November 17 104. Ibid. ff200-201 Newcastle to Hardwicke 29 November 1762. 
For the Onslows see Namier and Brooke The House of Commoild 
160 
may be questioned, for the day before he wrote to Hardwicke, he 
received a letter from Sir George Colebrooke, saying that he 
had not been present at the opening of Parliament but that he 
would come to town as soon as Newcastle thought it necessary. 
In his reply Newcastle urged Colebrooke to be in Parliament the ° 
105 
following week when the peace preliminaries were to be considered. 
Sir Lewis Namier points out that a group of Newcastle's 
friends who were zealous for opposition dined together on 30 
November 1762. This group consisted of the Duke of Grafton, 
Lords George and John Cavendish, Lord Middleton, Thomes Towns- 
hend Junior, Charles Townshend 'the Spaniard', Lord Villiers, 
106 
George Onslow and Richard Hopkins. Although there were no mer- 
cantile members present at this meeting Newcastle in a letter 
to Thomas Walpole on 12 December 1762 makes it quite obvious 
that his mercantile supporters were members of this group that 
107 
was anxious for opposition, and in the debate on the peace 
preliminaries during the first week in December they voted 
108 
with this group. Thus the group that was to crystalise itself 
as the vanguard of the opposition in 1763 and 1764 was already 
beginning to form by the end of November 1762. It was this 
group that was to find a meeting place at Wildman's Tavern and 
104. cond. 1754-1790 Vol. III, pp. 227-8. The two Onslows 
mentioned here are George Onslow (1731-1792-) and his cousin 
George Onslow (1731-1814) who married Henrietta Shelley, a 
niece of Newcastle. 
105. B. M. Add. Mss. 329 f186 Sir George Colebrooke to Newcastle 
28 November 1762; ibid. f186 Newcastle to Sir George 
Colebrooke 28 November 1762. 
106. Namier, England in the Age etc p, 392. 
107. Ibid. f285 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 12 December 1762. 
108. Ibid. ff239-241 Division List from Lord=John Cavendish 
2 December 1762.: 
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through the club formed there Rockingham was able to secure his 
hold over the party as its next leader. 
The situation which had now developed was to continue for 
some time. The younger zealots of the Newcastle Whigs were 
anxious for opposition and demanded leadership. Newcastle was 
anxious to give it to them and to direct the opposition but 
was restrained because of the disinclination of Hardwicke and 
Devonshire to appear at the head of what might be called a 
factious opposition. Newcastle was also finding it difficult 
to select a leader for this opposition in the House of Commons 
and it was in the House of Commons that most of these zealots 
sat. Legge, Newcastle's most trusted and experienced follower 
in the House of Commons, was as reluctant to lead an opposition 
as his colleagues in the Newcastle Whig hierarchy who sat in 
109 
the House of Lords. Moreover the failure to secure an opposition 
110 
alliance with Pitt weakened opposition to the peace preliminaries. j{ 
For the time being Newcastle was thus powerless to do 
anything effective to rally his party and was forced to confine 
himself to writing letters to try and maintain their allegiance. 
On 12 December he wrote to Thomas Walpole who he often used 
as a contact with his mercantile adherents 
"We must go on with spirit; but at the same time, with 
prudence and moderation.... At present we act like 
children and expose ourselves and our Friends too. 
Many of our friends are still angry; I hope you will 
endeavour to quiet our City Friends, if there are any 
of them uneasy, at what has passed. 
I am sure you will execute your commission to 
-LUV* Ibid. if280-281 Newcastle to Devonshire 12 December 110. See Namier, England in the Age etc pp. 395-396. 
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Sir George Colebrooke and Nesbit with all marks of 
affection on my part possible. The Peace is now over, 
and I dare say, we may depend upon both of them in every 
thing else-111 Pray talk to them of the supposed 
intention of the Court, to attack me, by a motion for a 
Commission of Accounts, or a Secret committee of enquiry. 
The First possibly can't be opposed; But I hope a Secret 
Committee will be fought to the last. 112 
Upon these questions, I should flatter myself, that 
my former Friends who have left me, will think their 
honours so far concerned as not to suffer any attack 
upon me personally - See, how our Friends in the City 
are disposed at present. " 113 
Newcastle was thus coming to the conclusion that the 
only thing to do for the time being was to wait until a suit- 
able opportunity occurred for him to rally his friends and 
114 
confirm their loyalty. By 12 December however, he was becoming 
alarmed because he found that some of his former City friends 
had not/ thrown in their lot with Lord Bute. On 16 December 
he had a meeting with the government contractor Zachary 
Fonnereau, who admitted as much to him and stated that he had 
115 
changed sides because of economic necessity. Newcastle was 
alarmed at this. He wrote to Thomas Walpole 
112- 
113- 
114. 
115. 
"I am afraid, this will have a very bad effect, and his 
example will encourage others to do the same, so that 
I expect tobe left with only yourself, Mr. Burton, Mr. 
Mellish and Sir William Baker, good substantial ones 
however.... 
Colebrooke and Nesbit had not voted with Newcastle's 
'zealous friends' in the debate on the Peace Preliminaries 
in the first week of December. See B. M. Add. Mss 32945 Mt ff239-241 Division List from Lord John Cavendish 2 December 
Newcastle was still alarmed at the possibility of an 
enquiry into Treasury Accounts while he had been First 
Lord of the Treasury. See above p. 99'`. E`g. 
B. M. Add. hiss. 32945 ff285-286 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 
12 December 1762. 
Ibid. f290 Newcastle to Hardwicke 16 December 1762. 
Ibid. f301 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 17 December 1762. 
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Tell Nesbit, that I beg to see him, on Wensday 
morning at Newcastle House. I will do all I can to fix 
him and Sir G"Colebrooke. I believe, it is Tom Fonnereau 
who had done this, with his Brother; and he has contri- 
buted also, to the getting off Henniker and Major. " 116 
Newcastle must have now felt that his worst fears were 
being justified. Failure to unify the party and provide a 
lead for opposition was resulting in the defection of his 
friends , particularly the government financiers and the 
merchants who the government could hope to win over by dangling 
contracts before their eyes. Yet it was precisely at this 
117 
time that the "Massacre of the Pelhamite Innocents" was at its 
height. On 23 December 1762 Halifax wrote to Rockingham dis- 
118 
missing him from his Lord Lieutenancy and Newcastle had known 
119 
of this and many other dismissals as early as 19 December. 
The "persecution" at this time was far more widespread 
than that on the occasion of Devonshire's dismissal and made 
a better opportunity for rallying the party. It is difficult, 
however, to see what effective action even a united group could 
have taken in protest. Yet Newcastle failed to use this, the 
best opportunity so far presented, to draw the party together. 
The main reason-for this would seem again to have been the 
120 
cautious policy advocated by Hardwicke and Devonshire. 
1160 lbid. i'302 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 17 December 1762. 
For the Fonnereaus see Namier, a. cit. pp. 398-399 for their 
desertion to Bute see Namier, Structure of Politics p"50 
For Major see Namier, England in the Age etc p. 399 n, l. 
11?. For the "Massacre of the Pelhamite Innocents" see Namier, 
ap. cit. p"403 et gea. 
118. W. W. M. R1-336 Halifax to Rockingham 23 December 1762. 
119. B. M. Add. Mss. 32945 ff312-313 Newcastle to Hardwicke 19 
1 December 1762. 
120. Hardwicke had written to Newcastle on 20 December counsellix 
caution. See ibid. f323 Hardwicke to Newcastle 20 December 17 
ýý 
In a letter to Rockingham on 26 December Devonshire 
explained the reasons for his actions. He wrote 
"I have wrote my mind fully to the Duke of Newcastle 
" that w4should if possible keep our people quiet for 
some time, wait for events, and see what steps the 
ministers take, if they propose any thing that is wrong, 
oppose it, if not let them alone, by which means we 
shall gain time to collect our strength and see who we 
can depend upon, if we can get leaders and a tolerable 
corps of Troops I am for Battel, but I am against 
appearing in a weak opposition as we shall make an 
Insignificant figure, prejudice our friends and do no 
while on 29 December he wrote to Newcastle 
"I am against factious opposition but the time has 
come for us to be very watchful that these people to 
secure their point should not endanger that excellent 
constitution and that we should transmit that invaluable blessing whole and entire to our posterity which our ancestors risked their lives and fortunes to secure. " 
122 
In this appeal to Whig principles lies the explanation of 
Devonshire's attitude. He wished to act a dignified part in 
accordance with the principles of his party. 
While the old Whig hierarchy resolved to bide their time 
and endeavoured to restrain the fretful Duke of Newcastle the 
younger zealots of the party were less patient. On Tuesday the 
21 December there was a meeting at George Onslow's at which 
the Whig hierarchy were }represented by Rockingham and 
Newcastle and the "younger zealots" many of whom had been 
121. W. W"M. R1-339 Devonshire to Rockingham 26 December 1762. 
122. Ibid. Rl-341 Devonshire to Newcastle 29 December 1762. 
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present at the meeting on 30 November were represented. Among 
their representatives were Lord Bessborough, Lord Frederick 
Cavendish, Lord Middleton, Lord Villiers, Thomas Pelham and 
Thomas Townshend. Newcastle stated that 
" They were all, except Offley, violent for a club, Lord 
Bessborough as much as any of them; and I think, at Last 
the Marquess gave into them. They said there wav nothing 
to be done without it; that they must collect their 
friends; and they seemed much elated with the effect, 
whihh the violences and persecutions have had everywhere. 
I opposed, to the utmost, these clubs or meetings, 
that they carried much the air of faction. One of them 
(I think it was My Lord Villiers or Onslow) said they 
liked it the better; they were glad the Ministers should 
see, there was a faction against them. I then said, it 
would expose their weaknesses, for no one doubtful 
Friend would come near them. I have done my part, 
what they will do I know not. " 124 
It seems strange that Newcastle who from October 1762 had 
been trying to rally the opposition should disapprove when it 
seemed that some form of opposition was at last beginning to 
present itself. But there were two obstacles in Newcastle's 
eyes to the formation of a "club" which idea was now coming 
to the forefront. Firstly it was the idea of the younger 
members of the party, not of the great nobles and as such 
Newcastle looked down on it as factious, and secondly 
Newcastle, knowing Hardwicke's and Devonshire's opinions on 
opposition could hardly favour such a plan. Yet it would 
seem he had ai. hankering to. For' after his report of the 
meeting of 21 December to Devonshire he continued 
, uo. tjee above p. l''" 124. B. M. Add. Mss. 32945 f'341 Newcastle to Devonshire 23 December 
1762, quoted Namier, England in the Age etc p. 417. 
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"If the Duke (of Cumberland) Your Grace, the Duke of 
Grafton, the Marquess of Rockingham, My Lord Hardwicke 
and My Lord Kinnoull shall be of the opinion that any 
opposition, at present is impracticable, or inadvisable, 
let them say so, and I assure Your Grave, I shall 
acquiesce, with great pleasure and satisfaction. I have 
sheaved my inclination to support the Whigs. If they 
and the chief amongst us think it should be pushed now - 
I have done my duty and shall be very easy. " 125 
Devonshire, hovtever, continued to advise that the party 
should be quiet and collect their strength. He wrote 
"I am strongly against a club, when once an opposition 
is formed, it may be very proper, but till that is settled 
it would only have the pppearance of Faction, and I am 
afraid would be of no service, as the Jolly Fellows are 
more numerous on the other side of the question. " 126 
Lord Kinnoull on whose advice Newcastle placed much reliance 
also came out strongly against 
127 
for the same reason. 
the idea of a political club 
Thus at the end of 1762 Newcastle had failed to unify the 
party and although at times his followers had succeeded to 
some extent in embarrassing the government this had secured 
no permanent effect. During the last months of the year he 
had failed to find a suitable subject for opposition to which 
the party could agree and which was the only thing that could 
unify the party. Newcastle's hesitation, mainly it seems 
because of the restraint exercised by Devonshire and Hardwicke 
had hastened the desertion of some of the mercantile members3 
125. B. L. Add. Mss. 32945 ff346-347 Newcastle to Devonshire 23 
December 1762. 
126. Ibid. f373 Devonshire to Newcastle 26 December 1762. I have 
been unable to trace any particular connotation of the 
term "Jolly Fellows". 
127. Ibid. ff376-377 Kinnull to Newcastle 26 December 1762 
quote Namier, England in the Age etc p. 417. 
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for these were the men who had most to gain from administration 
and most to lose by wandering in a political wilderness. This 
equivocal policy was also beginning to result in the fragment- 
ation of the party as shown by the meeting of 30 November and 
the agitation for a 'club' which came to the forefront when 
the "younger zealots" met the representatives of the "Old Whig" 
128 
hierarchy on 21 December. 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly what Rockingham's 
opinion was at this time. His correspondence with Lady 
Charlotte Wentworth shows that he was keeping in close touch 
129 
with political events and Devonshire's letters to him seem to 
show that the elder members of the hierarchy believed that he 
130 
too needed restraining from going into violent opposition. 
There is also the fact that Newcastle mentions him specifically 
as giving permission for the formation of a club. If this is 
the case he was more far-sighted than Devonshire, Hardwicke 
and Newcastle. For tt was basically this desire for a club 
which was to develop into the club at "Wildman's Tavern" that 
was to form the nucleus for the opposition in 1764. This was 
partly responsible for bringing Rockingham to power and was 
131 
to do much to ensure his ascendency in the party. 
128. See above p. 160, 
129. See above p. 1ý6. 
130. See above p. 1b4" 
131. See below º. 234-235. 
CHAPTER 11N 
118 1763 - FRUSTRATION AND STAGNATION 
The year 1763 was one of frustration and stagnation for 
Newcastle. Tendencies that had appeared since the dismissal 
of the Duke odl Devonshire grew more marked and he was increas- 
ingly unable to hold his supporters together. He searched in 
vain for a satisfactory opposition policy and a satisfactory 
opposition alliance. Thus at the end of the year he was no 
nearer returning to power than at the beginning. 
Mainly due to Newcastle's failure in these matters, the 
dissatisfaction with his policy, which by the end of 1762 had 
1 
already resulted in the demand for a club, continued to grow 
and in January 1764 crystallised with the formation of the 
Cotery at Wildman's., These trends caused both a decline in 
the importance of the 'monied interest' in the Bld Whig party 
because Newcastle's policy had failed, and a growth in the 
importance of the representatives of the rest of the conmer- 
cial classes in the formation of the Cotery. It is these 
developments which must now be traced. 
At a conference with Rockingham which Newcastle reported 
to Hardwicke on 1 January 1763 he stated that both he and 
Rockingham agreed that people were so i*l"timidated by the 
dismissals that were taking place, that all open opposition, 
even in the Coffee Houses, was silenced and that there was 
a real threat to freedom of speech. Newcastle also felt that 
because the City of London had decided to present an address 
See above pp. i -TLI s. 
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of thanks for the Peace of Paris that the City had been intim- 
2 
idated as well. When Thomas Walpole wrote to Newcastle informing 
3 
him that he had been dismissed from his contracts, Newcastle 
wrote in reply, after condoling with Walpole on the loss of 
his contracts 
"I can't say, I am quite pleased with the Account I have 
from the City, where I hoped, these violences would have 
made a greater impression, than, it is said they do. 
I hear, People, are afraid to say anything in Coffee 
Houses, against what is doing. If Liberty of Speech 
is taken away without Doors, and corrupted majorities 
will do anything, within, what are we to expect ? 
I am told also, that the Clamorous City begin to 
change their minds; and will soon have a strong address 
in favour of the Terms of the Preliminaries. Pray let 
me know.... how our Friends in the City stand at present, 
and what effect these late violences have upon them; 
and particularly what they have done to you. I dare 
say Burton continues right; and by what I hear, I should 
hope Sir George Colebrooke and Nesbits - The Fonnereaus 
I'give over; and Major, and Henniker, I suppose some 
of them are to have your contract. 
If things droop a little in the City, they gain 
strength and spirit in other places. My old friend My 
Lord Hardwicke is everything I could wish.... " 4 
When Walpole replied he reported that the Ministry had 
been negotiating the loan for the forthcoming year and on the 
same day, 14 January, Bute had announced that the definitive 
peace treaty would be signed. Walpole endeavoured to 
2. B. M. Add. Mss" 32946 ff10-12 Newcastle to Hardivicke 1 January 
1763. It should be noted that the address came from the 
Court of Aldermen and not the Common Council of the City 
to whom the peace was distasteful. See Sharpe 22. . 
Sit. Vol. 
III pp. 72-73. 3. B. M. Add" Hss. 32946 -f17 Thomas Walpole 
to Newcastle 1 January 
1763; ibid. fl9 Thomas Walpole to Samuel Martin (copy) 27 
December 1762. 
4. Ibid. ff49-50 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 4 January 1763. 
For the Fonnereaus, Major and Henniker see above p. 163 n. 116.. 
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reassure Newcastle that his friends were loyal and that many 
people were discontented with the present administration but 
were incapable of doing anything about it. He also pointed 
out that the ministers had not consulted the 'monied interest' 
about the new loan, only some officers of the great chartered 
5 
companies. 
At the beginning of February 1763 Newcastle found a 
bye-election at Lewes a valuable means of rallying his 
mercantile supporters, for Sir Joshua Vanneck, Thomas Walpole 
6 
and Rose Fuller were all involved, but the chief subject in 
his mind which he found useful for rallying his party at this 
time was the peace terms. Although the Peace Preliminaries 
had been approved in the House of Commons in December 1762 
7 
by a majority of 319 to 65, the full terms of the definitive 
Treaty were (towards the end of January 1763) only just 
becoming known. When Newcastle began to get precise news of 
the exact terns, especially that France was to retain the 
right to fish off the coast of Newfoundland, he wrote to 
Hardwicke regarding the policy they had adopted in December 1762 
"In all events the very negotiations upon any explan- 
ation of the Preliminaries shews the absurdity 
rý 
5. Ibid. ffl25-127 Thomas Walpole to the Duchess or i ewcasti. Le 
15 January 1763. Walpole 's letter was written to the 
Duchess because the Duke was ill from 4 to about 18 
'Xanuary. See ibid. ff49-145. 
6. Ibid. f285 Thomas. Walpole to Newcastle 1 February 1763; _ 
f299 same to same 2 February 1763; ibid. f315 Newcastle to 
Rose Fuller., 4 'February 1763; - ibid. f327 Rose Fuller to 
Newcastle 5 February 1763; ibid. f337 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 
6 February 1763;, ibid. f355 Rose Puller to Newcastle 7 
. -February 
1763; . B. M. Add. riss. 32947 f7 Newcastle to John 
Pelham 15 February. 1763e; 
7. See "The-Peace of Paris 1763" by Kate Hotblack in Royal-, 
Historical Society Transactions 3rd Series, Vol. II, London, 
1908, p"235 
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in giving such a general approbation to them as the two 
Houses did, and not only proves the propriety, but even 
the necessity there was of coming to no Resolution, till 
they were settled finally; which was all, that we proposed 
.... The more difficulty these Gentlemen found in settling 
the Peace, the more shameful was it for them, to propose 
to press such an absolute, hasty and precipitate appro- 
bajrion; and the more significant was it, that our Friends 
could not see that, at the time. " 8 
With these words Newcastle endeavoured to arouse Hardwicke 
and remind him of their actions and policy in the previous 
December. He wrote a similar lettet to Rockingham but was 
far more outspoken and specific about the French fishing 
9 
rights off Newfoundland as a cause for discontent, probably 
because Rockingham was far more ready for opposition and more 
closely associated with the group of "extremists" than 
10 
Hardwicke. Mercantile opinion on the question of the 
fisheries is not recorded in either Newcastle's or Rockingham'S 
correspondence but the west country merchants were sufficiently 
against the restoration of French fishing rights to petition 
the government, for Newcastle was alarmed when he thought that 
11 
the administration had supressed the document. Feeling that 
the opposition would be much stronger with the support of Pitt, 
12 
however, and judging that he would be hostile to the Peace terms 
Newcastle endeavoured to persuade Devonshire and Rockingham 
13 
to go and see Pitt. This approach was to be made 
properly through the hierarchy of the Newcastle 
8. See B. M. Add. M2ss. 32946 ff145-7 Newcastle to Hardwicke 19 
January 1763"" . 'ý .'' 9. Ibid. fl51 Newcastle "to Rockingham 19 January 1763. 
10. See above p. 165. 
11. Ibid. fl94 Newcastle'to Hardwicke 24 January 1763. 
12. Por Pitt's ideas on the peace terms -see Hotblack loc. cit. 
p. 326 et 
ýsýeý 
sea. 13" B. M. Ac" It r. 32946 f259 Newcastle to Rockingham 31 January 
ý- 
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Whigs, not by the younger zealots who were demanding opposition 
14 
and Newcastle resisted their proposal to go in a body to Pitt. 
Thus even as early as the end of January 1763 the increasing 
stagnation of Newcastle's policy was evident as was the 
growing coherence of the youthful and more powerful "extreme" 
members of the party. 
Newcastle felt that there were two points on which it 
was most easy to oppose the Peace Treaty. These were the 
restoration to France of territory on the Coromandel coast 
in the East Indies and the right of the Frenck to fish off 
Newfoundland. He felt that to secure a peace treaty the 
negotiators in Paris would have to give up both these points 
and these were the two points over which it would be most 
15 
convenient to oppose the administration. 
Efforts to get into contact with Pitt in order to concert 
measures for opposition were at first delayed because Pitt 
was ill and when on 17 February, Devonshire had seen Pitt 
there was very little hope of a systematic opposition because 
the latter pleaded that his health was too bad to allow him 
to attend Parliament regularly. He refused to enter into 
any direct opposition but would only come to Parliament 
13" contd 1763; ibid. f236 Newcastle to Devonshire 31 January 1763 
14. Ibid. f264 Newcastle to Hardwicke 31 January 163. 
15. Ibid. f261 Newcastle to Hardwicke 31 January 1763. The 
appearance of the definitive Treaty raised the East India 
issue for Newcastle'because. of the greater precision of 
its definition and elaboration of detail of the East Indian 
Articles. For this see "The East India Company and the 
Peace of Paris" by L. S. Sutherland, The English Historical 
-. Review Vol. LXII, London 1947, pp-179-190. 
16. B. M. Add"Mss. 32946 f329 Devonshire to Newcastle 6 February 1763 
«1r- 
17 
"upon any national or constitutional points. " When Rockingham 
was sent on the same mission to Pitt at the beginning of March 
he seems to have been more successful because on 8 March there 
was. a great opposition dinner at Devonshire House at which 
Hardwicke, Rockingham, temple, Devonshire, Newcastle and Pitt 
18 
were all present. 
The alliance which emerged from this dinner was much more 
for a concerted opposition against the proposed Cider Duty 
rather than a whole-hearted agreement for opposition to the 
Peace Treaty because on 18 March 1763, when the definitive 
treaty was about to be laid before the House of Commons, 
Newcastle advised that the opposition should merely allow the 
treaty to be on the table, te did not urge for any opposition 
19 
motion on the matter. Newcastle was, however, being urged on 
to oppose by the younger zealots and the mercantile section of 
his party. On 25 March Thomas Walpole wrote to Newcastle 
reporting a conversation of his with a "very sensible man" 
on the sixth and twenty-fifth articles of the definitive 
20 
treaty and pointing out the injustices of these articles. 
Walpole concluded his letter with a call for opposition, 
mentioning that Sir William Baker with whom he had discussed 
17. B. M. Add. Mss" 32947 f21 Devonshire to Newcastle 17 February 
1763. 
18. Ibid. f180 Rockingham to Newcastle 4 March 1763; See Yorke 
9M. cit. Vol. III, p. 381. The meeting between Rockingham and 
Pitt seems to have been chiefly on Newcastle's prompting 
see W. W. M. Rl-367 Newcastle to Rockingham (Friday morning) 
but dated in Rockingham's hand-writing as 4 March 1763. 19. B. M. Add. Mss" 3294,7 f246 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 March 
1763. For the Cider Tax see below p. 179-181. 
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the matter agreed with him. There is little doubt that 
opposition would have received the blessing of Pitt. In a 
letter to Newcastle on 9 April 1763 he described the Peace of 
21 
Paris as "ruinousP, and "fatal" and it was Hardwicke's luke-warm 
support and difficulty in adapting himself to opposition that 
22 
seems to have been the chief obstacles. In these circumstances 
all Newcastle could do was to endeavour to maintain the loyalty 
of his mercantile adherents. Stephen and Rose Fuller had 
23 
been invited to Claremont. George Onslow was watching the 
24 
City merchants and Sir Joshua Vanneck had invited the 
Newcastle Whig leaders to dinner and Newcastle had returned 
25 
the invitation. 
When Newcastle at last decided to move on the question 
of the Peace of Paris it was on the question of the addresses 
of thanks that were being drawn up and then seems to have 
been rather too late to do anything really effective in the 
way of opposition. These addresses also tended to become 
confused with the issue of, Wilkes and the "North Briton" No. 
45 case which was coming to the forefront at this time and 
this complication rendered the action that Newcastle and his 
; ýu" iDia. rr3uy-, 6 J. U lnomas vYaipoie to Neweastle zo Marcn 17o0. 
The sixth article of the Treaty ceded the colonies of 
St-Pierre and Miquelon to France and the twenty-fifth 
article guaranteed Hanover. 
21. B. M. Add. Mss. 32948 f84 Pitt to Newcastle 9 April 1763. 
22. Ibid. fl Hardwicke to Newcastle 1 April 1763. 
23. Ibid. f79 Stephen Fuller to Newcastle 8 April 1763. 
24. Ibid. f5 G. Onslow to Newcastle 2 April 1763. 
25. Ibid. f223 T. Walpole to Newcastle 4 May 1763; ibid. f242 
Bessborough to Newcastle 6 May 1763; ibid. 'f269 Thomas 
Walpole to Newcastle 12 May 1%63. 
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friends were trying to take to stop the addresses less effective. 
The "North Britons' No-45 had appeared on 23 April 3363 
and as is well known Wilkes was subsequently arrested under 
26 
a '° general warrant, *. On 1 and 2 May 1763 ivewcastle reported 
the widespread alarm in the City at the arrest and imprisonmeht 
27 
of Wilkes. In the days following Wilkes's arrest the `traditionall- 
split' among the Newcastle Whigs began immediately to appear. 
The 'zealous young gentlemen' of the party agitated for a 
public gesture on behalf of Wilkes while Hardwicke advised 
caution. Newcastle as usual took the advice of his older but 
28 
more influential friends. 
On 12 May Thomas Walpole reported to Newcastle that the 
Court of Aldermen of the City of London had drawn up an address 
of thanks for the Peace of Paris without calling a Common 
Council, in much the same way as the East India Company had 
not called a general Court. Walpole assumed that this failure 
to summon a full assembly was because of the weight of popular 
opinion against the Peace of Paris. He also believed that 
any attempt tp procure an address from the merchants would 
zed 
meet with little success and critici/addresses that were not 
obtained with the " free and open voluntary concurrence of the 
29 
people". In addition to this George Onslow on 14 May, although 
he described an address from the merchants as "serious" 
26. See Wilkes and Liberty by George Rud , Oxford, 1962 p"23. 27. B. M. Add. Mss 32948 ff201-202 Newcastle to Hardwicke 1 May 
1763) ibid. f211 Newcastle to Lord Lincoln 2 May 1763. 
28. Rude oR. cit. p. 25. 
29. B. M. Add. Mss. 32948 ff269; i270 Thomas Walpole to Newcastle 
12 May 1763. 
17t 
because it had above 300 signatures, could dismiss it as being 
"generally looked on as a mere forc'd thing" and chiefly 
30 
promoted by merchants who were supported by Bute. 
Newcastle by this time saw danger in both the addresses 
and in the Wilkes issue. On 15 May he wrote to John White 
urging him to stop any address from Nottinghamshire. He 
concluded his letter 
"I am sorry to see the stile of the address of the 
Few Aldermen. That with it, I hear, that of the 
merchants will be the same, viz, to avoid saying much 
of the Peace, and to enlarge against the spirit of 
Faction which, they suppose is now arising. I conclude 
they mean Wilkes s affair, but that still will do hurt, 
and I suppose, all the addresses will follow it which 
makes it incumbent upon our Friends to stop addresses 
where they can-" 31 
On 18 May George Onslow again reported to Newcastle on 
-31 
the state of the address of the London merchants. He was 
forced to admit an increase in the number of the signatures 
from 300 to 900 but as-before stressed the fact that very few 
were the wealthier and more influential merchants. He continued 
by reporting that the dissenters had decided not to address. 
Newcastle's old friend Dr. Chandler appeared to be the leader 
32 
of the anti-petitioning movement amongst them. There is no 
evidence that pressure was brought to bear upon the dissenters 
but it would have been easy for Newcastle's views on the matter 
to have been passed on orally to Chandler. 
30. Ibid. ff281-283 George Onslow to Newcastle 14 May 1763. 
31. Ibid. ff291-293 Newcastle to John White 15 May 1763. The 
addresses referred to are those mentioned above p. 275- 
32. Ibid. ff316-317 George Onslow to Newcastle 18 May 1763. For 
Chandler see above pp. 51-52. 
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Newcastle was in a most equivocal position at this time. 
Pressed by the younger zealots of, the party to throw his lot 
in with the popular stand and support "Wilkes and Liberty" he 
knew only that Hardwicke did not want the younger members of 
the party to have their heads and was unaware that he had 
33 
advised the arrest of Wilkes. Thus because Newcastle was 
unable to take a stand on the issue he gained nobodys sympathy. 
On 24 May he wrote to Rockingham 
"I am still uneasy at these addresses, which are founded 
upon a most absurd and injurious insinuation that we 
(whom they call the opposition) are putting personal 
affronts and indignities upon the King which God knows, 
in the furthest from our thoughts how much ao ever we 
may dislike and oppose His Majesty's weak, or arbitrary 
Ministers-" 34 
and to Devonshire on 21 May 
" We hear little of the Peace now, all turns upon Faction 
and the personal affront to the King; and this new 
ground has certainly produced the address of the Court 
of Aldermen and of the numerous company of merchants 
in the City, and I am afraid, will produce a great many 
addresses in counties and towns which otherwise would 
not have thought of it.... " 35 
Devonshire agreed with Newcastle's analysis of the situation 
36 
and could offer little consolation. 
Other issues were also influential during these months. 
In February 1763 Newcastle had rallied his mercantile supporters 
to crush a further attempt to enquire into government finance 
- ,  
33. Cf. Rude op. cit. pp. 23,25. 
34. B. M. Add. Mss. 32948 f371 Newcastle to Rockingham 24 May 1763. 
35. Ibid. f345 Newcastle to Devonshire 21 May 1763. 
36. Ibid. f393 Devonshire to Newcastle 27 May 1763. 
37 
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when he was at the Treasury, but this no doubt made him 
cautious when Sir William Baker began to lead a movement for 
enquiring into profiteering for the loan for 1763. On the 
18 March in the House of Commons 
" Sir William Baker expatiated on the monstrous proport- 
ion of the present loan and the confusion it made among the subscribers and stated the price of the 4% cents (sic) at the time of making the loan. " 38 
This issue was apparently first brought to the fore-front 
by John Wilkes and Newcastle unsuccessfully endeavoured to 
39 
consult Hardwicke and Devonshire on the issue. Wilkes desired 
that the names of subscribers to the loan might be laid before 
the House of Commons It in order to observe upon the immense 
40 
profit of it. " Newcastle wrote reservedly to Hardwicke that 
My opinion was and is, that it might be a proper motion 
to make; but that it ought not to be made without being 
maturely considered and well supported. " 41 
Newcastle continued by saying that Legge and Temple agreed 
37. B. M. Add. Mss" 32946 f351 Barrington to Newcastle 7 February 
1763; ibid. f365 Barrington to Sir John Phillips (copy) 9 
February 1763; ibid. f369 Sir John Phillips to Barrington 
10 February 1763; ibid. f379 Newcastle to Barrington 11 
February 1763; ibi7d. f381 West to Newcastle 11 February 1763; 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32947 f23 Mansfield to Newcastle 17 February 
1763; ibdd f27 Onslow to Newcastle 17 February 1763; ibid. 
f57 C. Yorke to Newcastle 22 February 1763; ibid. f61 West 
to Newcastle 22 February 1763; ibid. f265 West to Newcastle 
23 March 1763. The idea of an enquiry into Government 
finance was very distasteful to Fox as well as Newcastle, Fox had been Paymaster-General during the war. See Namier 
and Brooke Charles Townshend, p. 86. 
38. B. M. Add. Mss. 32947 f242 West to Newcastle 18 March 1763. 
39. Ibid. f246 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 March 1763. There was 
at this time general indignation at the particularly favourable terms for the 1763 loan. See The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics by L. S. Sutherland, Oxford, 1962, p. 104. 
40. Ibid. f246 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 March 1763. 41. Ibid. f246 Newcastle to Hardwicke 18 March 1763. 
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with him on this issue and concluded 
"Wilkes I hear will make the motion himself; Sir William 
Baker, and our warm friends are much for it.... To be 
sure a formal motion which is a formal attack upon the 
Treasury should not be made except we are sure of its 
being well supported by Mr. Pitt and others. " 42 
Thus this project for opposition eagerly seized upon by 
the younger zealots was not carried further partly becajzse of 
Newcastle's personal fears of this sort of motion and partly 
because it was only receiving the support of the younger 
, members of 
the party and not the established hierarchy. 
'A further issue was the questib oof opposition to the 
Cider Bill which was passing through Parliament in March 1763. 
On the 23 March 1763 the Common Council of the City of London 
petitioned against the bill, not because it affected them so 
much but because it was a matter of principle; the bill was 
an extension of excise duty and as such was anathema to them. 
The Newcastle Whigs seem to a large extent to have missed 
this opportunity for opposition. The London petition was the 
last episode in an opposition which had for the most part 
' 43 
come from the independent country gentlemen, and on this 
occasion Lord Strange for the administration pointed out that 
"He had a great regard for the Merchants of the City 
but none for the Incorporated Body who were chiefly 
shopkeepers who arrogantly look upon themselves to 
prescribe to the Legislature and to take'the lead in 
42. Ibid. f246 Newcastle to Hardw ce 18 March 1763. 
43. See Sharpe op. cit. Vol. III, p. ? 3. See also the petition of 
the City printed in History Debates and Proceedings of Both 
Houses of Parliament 1743-1767 (Debrett)-London 1792 Vol-III 
P-148. and, Sir FrancisDashwood, an Eighteenth Century 
Independent by'Betty Kemp. London 1967, p. 54 et se 
v1ý . 
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setting an example to the other Boroughs for clamour 
that would look down upon them and keep them under and 
rather than increase their corporate influence was for 
lessening it. " 
William Dowdeswell, not yet connected with the Newcastle 
and Rockingham Wigs, and Bamber Gascoyne whose father had 
44 
been Lord Mayor of London supported the petition. Prior to this 
45 
on 7 March 1763 Pitt had spoken against the Cider Tax. This was 
followed by the dinner at Devonshire House on 8 March where 
Pitt and the Newcastle Whigs apparently aggeed to concert 
46 
measures against the Cider Tax. This opposition was, however, 
47 
unsuccessful. Rockingham reported to Newcastle that Pitt thought 
the Cider Tax should be opposed on 28 March in the House of 
Lords when the City of London were to present a further petition 
48 
against the Act in that House. There was little attempt to 
organise opposition, however, and although on this occasion 
49 
Hardwicke spoke against the tax the opposition was unsuccessful. 
Thus the opposition to the Cider Tax had again been used as an 
opportunity to secure the allegiance of Pitt and had been 
carried on by the leading members of the Newcastle Whig hierarchy. 
44. B. M. Add. Mss" 32947 f267 West to Newcastle 23 March 1763. For 
Gascoyne see Namier and Brooke The House of Commons Vol-III 
pp. 486-491. For Gascoyne's connection with London see Namier 
Structure of Politics pp. 108-111. 
45. See The Parliamentary History ed. W. Cobbett, London 1813, 
Vol. XV, p. 1307. It was during this debate that Pitt 
christened Grenville the "gentle shepherd". Cf. Steven 
Watson 22.. 2 1 t. p. 93.1 
46. Yorke 2. cit. Vo1. III, p. 381. -See above p. 173. 
47. See Commons Journal Vol. XXLX, p. 60. 
48. B. M. Add. Mss" 32947 f317 Rockingham to Newcastle 26 March 1763 
See also "House of Lords Journal Vol. XXX, 1763 pp. 380-381, 
Parliamentary History Vol"XV, p. 1311 and 1316 where it is 
stated that this was the first time that the Lords had been 
known to divide against a money bill. 
49. Yorke o. cit. Vol" III, p. 381. See also W. W. Md. R1-369 Newcastle ho Roc ng-iam 25 March 1763, ibid. R1-320 Newcastle to ockingham 27 March 1763. 
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This was an issue that was scarcely likely to interest the 
merchants especially as the City of-London petition had made 
the point that the excise would have to be paid by private 
50 
persons and not by traders, unlike the excise tax on beer. 
Moreover the Cider Act was a measure of local importance, 
particularly for the west country. London merchants would not 
be particularly concerned with cider, neither would they, used 
as they were to paying excise, be particularly concerned at**`the 
extension of the excise into private houses. It is thus not 
surprising that Newcastle made no real effort to arouse his 
mercantile followers. 
The fourth issue was the question of the East India 
Company. By February 1763 Clive and Sul ivan were in total 
disagreement and Clive decided to thrown in his lot with the 
51 
Parliamentary opposition. Clive's rival, Su7/ivan, was a close 
friend of Lord Shelburne the protdtge of Fox and Bute, and 
Sul/ivan had supported the administration over the East Indian 
62 
terms of the Treaty of Paris. In February 1763 the rivalry 
came to a head in the contest for the Direction of the Company 
50 
between Clive and Sul, tivan. or the first time the great Whig 
'leaders now in opposition took up voting qualification in the 
East India Company and decided to use that election as a ground 
54 to challenge the government in a traditional stronghol d. 
,; vu* Lords Journal Vol. XXX, pp. 3 51. See Sutherland op. cit. p. 9. 52. Ibid. pp. 92-99. 54.11d. p. 104. i 
53. Ibid. p. 100. 
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By the middle of March Newcastle was using all his 
influence tp persuade his mercantile supporters who had any 
power in the East India Company to support Clive ggainst 
55 
Su]f'ivan. Clive and the Newcastle Whigs won the first round 
of the contest in the General Court on 15 March 1763 when 
Thomas Rem the secretary to the Company was exonerated from 
blame for the East Indian Articles of the Peace of Paris but 
the election of Sul/ivan to the Directions- in April 1763 
was a triumph for the/administration and brought to an end 
the opposition attempt to challenge the ministry in this 
56 
commercial stronghold. 
The results of these attempts at'opposition, the weight 
of Hardwicke's opjnion, the charges of ' faction ý the violence 
of the younger zealots pf the party and the fear of losing 
the friendship--:. of Pitt gained by joint opposition to the 
Cider Sat, now seemed to drive Newcastle in one direction. 
By the beginning of June he was endeavouring to restrain the 
younger members of the party, while accentuating the need for 
co-operation with Pitt, the danger of losing his friendship, 
and the importance of the dinners which had been held in 
57 
March to cement the alliance with him. Newcastle took heart 
in the fact that the Court of Aldermen and the Common Council 
58 
of the City of London had refused to address end agitated 
55.13. M. Add. Mss" 32947 f273 Newcastle to West 23 March 1763. 
See also other letters on East India QffdLöers in B. M. Add. 
Mss. 32948. See Sutherland 92. cit. p. 107. 
56. Ibid. pp. 108-109.57. 
See B. M. Add. Mss. 32949 f6 Newcastle to Hardwicke 2 June 1763 
ibid. f15 Newcastle to the Earl of Kinnoul 3 June 1763. 
58. Ibid. f6 Newcastle to Hardwicke 2 June 1763; Ibid. f33 George 
Onslow to Newcastle 3 June 1763. 
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for action against Cambridgeshire to stop that county doing 
59 
likewise. The county did, however, address, but Newcastle 
described it to Hardwicke as harmless because it contained 
60 
more about war successes than the peace. There were, however, 
so many addresses that Newcastle was forced to evolve a new 
policy and on the 7 June he wrote to Hardwicke 
t'Lly opinion is, that the Spirit of addressing now 
prevails so generally, that it will be difficult to 
stop them anywhere, especially in Counties, where there 
are numbers of Tories, who will insist upon it, and 
Whigs who are disposed to it. In that case, nothing 
can be done, but as Your Lordship says, to make it as 
harmless as possible, with regard to puffs of applause, 
and quite innocent as to reflections &c, which is the 
spirit of most of the late addresses. " 61 
Moreover the administration was now making attempts 
through Pitt and Rockingham to strengthen itself by bringing 
into office either Pitt and his supporters or Newcastle and 
62 
his supporters. These negotiations were to last until the end 
of August and it is not surprising that during this period 
Newcastle's attitude to opposition was much more subdued. 
While pursuing this moderated policy' Newcastle still had 
to maintain the loyalty of his more "extreme" followers. A 
valuable opportunity presented itself at the end of June 1763 
through a bye-election in Essex and Newcastle made strerous 64 
efforts to rally his followers support for John Luther. He 
ýý. ý 
59.. Ibid. f36 Newcastle to Hardwicke 4 June 1763. 
60. Ibid. f175 Newcastle to Hardwicke 20 June 1763. 
61. Ibid. f52 Newcastle to Hardwicke 7 June 1763. 
62. Ibid. f6l Hardwicke to Newcastle 8 June 1763; ibid. f70 
Newcastle to Hardwicke 9 June 1763; Rockingham Memoirs 
Vol. I, p. 168 t sea; B. M. Add. Mss. 32949 f225 
_ 
Hardwicke to 
Newcastle 29 June 1763.63. 
Rockingham Memoirs p. 170. 
64. For him see The Houise of Commons 1754-1790 by Namier and Brooke Vol. 1 p" 
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65 
brought pressure to bear on Nicholson Calvert and on the 
66 
dissenters through Rose Fuller and also urged Sir William 
67 
Baker to obtain the support of his "City Friends" and thus 
provided a means of re-opening a contact with Sir William Baker 
which had lapsed for some time. He wrote to Baker 
" It is so long since I have had the pleasure of seeing 
you, that I own, I long for an opportunity of talking 
over with you the present unintelligible system of 
affairs.... I see a great run of addresses, which I 
conclude, are obtained by much solicitation, and from 
an inclination in weak and interested men, to take 
any Pretence granted or not to make their Court-" 68 
The difference in Newcastle's attitude towards Hardwicke 
and Baker on the question of these addresses exemplifies the 
role that he was playing in trying to conciliate both the 
hierarchy of the party and the younger zealots, for Hardwicke 
was a leader of one faction and Baker a leader of the other. 
In reply Baker stated that the addresses were "solicited 
and in some cases extorted". He went on to suggest that the 
Newcastle Whigs should arrange for counter addresses to be 
drawn up thanking members of Parliament for opposing the Cider 
Tax which "might be extended upon more general plans to answer 
the purpose of showing the Sense of the people throughout 
the Kingdom. " Baker visualised thanking members of Parliament 
for opposing the preliminaries of the Peace of Paris and went 
on to illustrate how difficult it had been for the ministry 
65. See B. M. Add. Mss 32949 f202 Nicholson Calvert to Newcastle 
26 June 1763; ibid. f224 Newcastle to Nicholson Calvert 
28 June 1763. 
66. Ibid. f214 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 28 June 1763; ibid f248 
Rose Fuller to Newcastle 30 June 1763; ibid. f277 Samuel 
Stehnett to Newcastle 6 July 1763; ibid-f302 Newcastle to 
Rose Fuller 9 July 1763. 
67. Ibid. f220 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 28 June 1763. 
68. Zbid. f220 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 28 June 1763. 
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69 
to procure the address from the City of London. 
Newcastle grasped eagerly at Baker's suggestion. Here was 
a likely method of reconciling the old Whig hierarchy and 
the 
younger section of the party. Here was what appeared to be a 
useful tactic for opposition which steered clear of 
the danger- 
ous ground of Wilkes and one also that did not 
hinder the 
negotiations to strengthen the ministry which were 
in progress. 
So Newcastle sent Baker's letter to Hardwicke describing 
it as 
a "sensible letter" but endeavouring to be cautious and agree 
with Hardwicke for he wrote 
"I question much whether the Project of Counter Addresses 
would do. But there is no harm in considering it, and 
sounding our Friends upon it. What does Your Lordship 
think of tt 2" 70 
Hardwicke in reply agreed that Baker's letter was every 
sensible". He expressed a wish to talk over "several material 
things" in the letter with Newcastle as soon as possible but 
continued 
It As at present advised, I feel the Project of Counter 
addresses or application of thanks to members for the 
opposition to the Peace would not succeed or have the 
effects proposed; because I am convinced that the 
objections to the Peace, such as it is, take place 
much more in the Town than in the Counties. People 
in the Country are in general glad to be relieved from 
a State of War and I believe would with great difficulty 
be induced to enter into any public protestations 
against it; even in a limited way wherein Sir William 
Baker puts it. " 
Hardwicke continued by discussing the proposal with 
re3&tion to the cider tax. Here he felt that the additional 
69. Ibid. f230 Sir William Baker to Newcastle 29 June 1763" 
70. IbTl. ff242_3 Newcastle to Hardwicke 30 June 1763. 
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revenue was necessary forrgobernment and as on the question of 
the peace vWWOOr he said that the Newcastle Whigs were likely 
to be charged with inconsisttncy. In this case he referred 
Newcastle back to Walpole's Excise Duty of 1734 which they 
71 
had supported. 
In the face of these objections from Hardwicke no real 
attempt seems to have been made otoeeimbark--g on the policy 
that Baker suggested although Onslow on 7 July did send 
Newcastle a copy of the Surrey constituents address of thanks 
to their members for opposing the Cider Tax and urging them 
72 
to seek the repeal of the same, and on 20 July 1763 Newcastle 
wrote to Devonshire 
It There is to be q4reat meeting at the Assizes at 
Croydon, for th County of Surrey, where the Address 
to the King will certainly be rejected, and the thanks 
of the County given to their representatives for 
their conduct in Parliament by a very great majority. 
We in Sussex shall content ourselves with not 
addressing, and without giving thanks to our members, 
which might start the other question. This indication 
of the real spirit in the county will not be agreeable 
to our ministers. " 73 
and this seems to show that at least some attempt was being 
made to follow Baker's suggestion. This, however, was 
strictly a compromise. It seems as if Newcastle was adopting 
as much of Baker's policy as he could without annoying Hardwicke, 
He was still folowing the road of compromise and endeavouring 
71" Ibid. f252 Hardwicke to Newcastle 1 July 1763. For the 
question of the inconsistency of opposition see above pp. 
194, -146. For Newcastle's support of the 1734 Excise Duty 
see Sr Robert Walpole, the Kings Minister by J. H. Plumb, 
London 1960, p. 254. 
72. B. M. Add. Mss" 32949 f287 Onslow to Newcastle 7 July 1763, ibid. f289 Copy of Address. 
73. Ibid. f379 Newcastle to Devonshire 20 July 1763. 
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to hold the extreme sections of the party together. 
On this issue Rockingham stood firmly on the Bide of 
Baker and Newcastle. Newcastle continued his letter to 
Devonshire by saying 
I long to know how our Friend the Marquess finds things 
in Yorkshire; and whether there is that zeal and spirit 
for Whiggism, which there used to be; which indeed 
appears most surprisingly in the Counties nearer London2'2 
74 
Newcastle was soon to be answereddfor on 25 July Rockingham 
75 
wrote jubilantly that there was to be no address from Yorkshire 
and on 30 July Newcastle replied congratulating Rockingham on 
the rejection of the address in Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire 
and reporting the state of affairs in Surrey and the other 
southern counties where Newcastle was also attempting to 
76 
secure the rejection of addresses. 
Newcastle gained nothing from this policy of compromise. 
On the one hand the protests were not strong enough to make 
a rallying cry for Baker and the more extreme sections of the 
party, while on the other they were sufficiently irritating 
to annoy the administration and possibly ivltilatecl the position 
of the Newcastle group in the negotiations that were going 
on during the summer of 1763. Newcastle by supporting Hardwicke 
( who had not been honest with Newcastle over his opinion on 
77 
the Wilkes issue) while endeavouring to palliate Baker and 
his friends had placed himself in a most equivocal position. i 
75. 
76. 
77. 
Ibid. f382 Newcastle to Devonshire 20 July 17630 
Ibid. f406 Rockingham to Newcastle 25 July 1763. 
Ibid. f438 Newcastle to Rockingham 30 July 1763. 
See above p. 17. 
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Rockingham who had absented himself in Yorkshire was, as far 
as can be seen, still on good terms with both the extremists 
and the hierarchy. Perhaps this was the first step to 
Rockingham's eventual accession to the leadership of the party. 
In his frantic search for an opposition policy that would 
hold the party together Newcastle almost missed what was to 
be the main and most successful issue for opposition in the 
Parliamentary session which was to commence in December 1763. 
This was the question of Wilkes and the 'North Briton' case. 
On 8 July Hardwicke had written to Newcastle and commented 
78 
on the affair and on 11 July Newcastle replied 
"Your Lordship rightly says ' The most material Part of 
this affair seems to be the strong and violent Run, 
which appeared in the City of London on this occasion 
against the Couht; I don't wonder they feel severely 
what has passed in this affair. They will never be 
able to get over it. It will run like wildfire thro'out 
the whole Kingdom and they have no Character amongst 
them respectable enough, to be able to stand it. " 79 
On 13 July Newcastle wrote in very similar terms to 
80 
Devonshire. He probably thought personally that this was a 
good rallying point for the opposition and perhaps by this 
time sensed that Hardwicke had reservations. Yet there is not 
a great deal more heard of this issue and no attempt was made 
by Newcastle to use this to rally the younger section of his 
party. 
In spite of the uselessness of Newcastle's policy it must 
11 
'II 
"(b. ti" NM"ACLCL. Mss. 32949 f297 Hardwicke to Newcastle 9 July 1763. 
79. Ibit f317 Newcastle to Hardwicke 11 July 17634, 
80. Ibid. f334 Newcastle to Devonshire 13 July 1763. 
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be admitted, that he came near to returning to office in 
August 1763 for in that month Pitt was nearly able to form 
81 
an administration with the , 
Newcastle* Whigs and on 29 August 
Newcastle was able to draw up a list of his friends whom he 
82 
wished to be considered for positions in the new government. 
Amongst these were Sir William Baker, Nicholson Calvert, Rose 
Fuller and Capel Hanbury. During these negotiations Pitt was 
also considering Rockingham for the post of First Lord of the 
83 
Admiralty and suggested his name to the King for that office. 
Newcastle, however, was much more in favour of Rockingham { 
84 
becoming Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 
When the negotiations proved abortive Newcastle was 
really left without a policy. He persisted in trying to 
85 
cement an opposition alliances with Pitt, a tactic which had 
not proved successful before. 
On 24 September he wrote to the Duke of Devonshire 
" The great point of all to be now considered is, if 
Mr. Pitt (whether from any management of my Lord Bute, 
or desire, or expectation of having the negotiation 
renewed with him or (which, I own, I think rather to 
be the case) from an unwillingness to engage, in the 
present miserable situation of things, and the little 
hopes of success) should finally refuse to take any 
active part - what in that case, we and our Friends 
should do, as to our conduct in Parliament ? Whether 
First, we should, in all Events, summon our -. Friends, in both houses, to attend, or send their PRox$ a? 
81. See W. W. M. R1-382 Devonshire to Rockingham 30 August 1763 
see also Rockingham Memoirs Voll, p. 172 William Pitt to 
Rockingham 28 August 1763. B. M. Add. Mss. 32950 f312 Hardwicke 
to Newcastle 2 September 1763. 
82. Ibid. f273 "Lords and Members of Parliament removed or 
resigned or who are to be considered" 29 August 1763. 
83. Ibid. f312 Hardwicke to Newcastle 2 September 1763. 
. 84. Ibid. f349"Lords and Members of Parliament" 6 September 1763 85. W. W. M. R1-389 Rockingham to either Newcastle or Devonshire 31 October 1763. 
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and, whether, in consequence of that, we should form a 
plan of acting with those, who may be willing to join 
with us? And if that were to be the case I am persuaded 
Mr. Pitt would soon follow; But I give no advice-" 86 
On the same day Newcastle wrote to John White urging him 
to be in London before Parliament met and to encourage as many 
of their supporters as possible to be there so that they could 
87 
consider what it was best to do. When rite replied he stressed 
the need for a united plan of opposition as soon as possible, 
but Newcastle could find no plan and was still calling for a 
88 
meeting of his supporters to evolve some policy. 
There was in August, September and October 1763 a financial 
crisis in the City but consultations between Newcastle, Thomas 
Rous and Bartholomew Burton brought Newcastle no nearer a 
89 
policy although generally in the past he had found some possible 
topics for opposition in financial matters. A false alarm at 
this time that there was to be an enquiry into his conduct of 
affairs while at the Treasury did nothing to improve things 
and Newcastle's inability to reach a satisfactory policy on 
finance must be related to Grenville's growing influence in 
90 
the City. 
Thus by 6 October 1763 Newcastle was thoroughly disconcerted 
and wrote to Devonshire 
86. B. M. Add" Iss. 32951 ff152-153 Newcastle to Devonshire 24 
September 1763. 
87. Ibid. ff168-169 Newcastle to John White 24 September 1763. 
88. Ibid* ff259-260 John White to Newcastle 1 October 1763; 
i ib. ff249-254 Newcastle to Devonshire 1 October 1763. 
89. B. M. Add. Mss" 32950 f179 Rockingham to Newcastle 20 August 
1763; ibid. f235 Newcastle. to Devonshire 27 August 1763; 
ibid. ff381-382 Newcastle : to Cumberland 10 September 1763; 
B. M. Add" rdss" 32951 `f265 Newcastle to Hardwicke 3 October 1763, 
90. Ibid. ff292-293 Newcastle to Hardwicke 4 October-1763; ibid 
ff295-296 H. V. Jones to Newcastle, 4 October 1763; ibid. ff, 3 
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"I am weary, at my age, and when I am determined to 
have no Employment, or an Honourable sinecure, nothing, 
purely for the sake of my name, if that is of any 
consequence, I will no longer be the vinegar of an 
opposition, without knowing of whom that opposition is 
to consist. I give myself a great deal of useless 
disagreeable trouble. Why should not My Lord Rockingham 
come to town? His Lordship is infinitely more concerned 
than I am and much more able to take a journey than I am. + 
The Parliament meets the 15th of November, in a little 
above a month from this day. We shall some of us, see 
one another next week, and I suppose after that, not 
till the day before the meeting of Parliament. Nobody 
sent for, and who can send for any body, before they know 
whether anything is to be done? For one I cannot. " 91 
A week lated Newcastle was still no nearer forming any 
plan of opposition but when he wrote to Legge on 13 October 
1763 he stated that Sir William Baker urgently wished to see 
92 
Legge. This is important.. Baker was the leader of the extreme 
section of the party and he was one of the prime movers in 
the formation of Wildman's club. From this point the initiative 
in leading the opposition passed from Newcastle to the younger 
members of the party. 
Since he had fallen from office Newcastle had endeavoured 
to hold his party together. This had been possible while 
subjects for opposition presented themselves but even so the 
party began to break down into its component parts, the most 
notable division being the split between hierarchy and the 
'young extremists'. Newcastle was only able to contain the 
latter group while he could offer a vigorous policy. When 
90. (contd) H. V. Jones to Newcastle 6 October 1763; For 
Grenville's growing influence in the City see Joseph Salvador to Charles Jenkinson 21 October 1763; same to same 31 October 1763, printed The Jenkinson Papers ed. Nanette S. ducker, London 1949 , pp. 209-212. 91. Ibid. f331 Newcastle to Devonshire 6 Ocböber 1763. 
92. Ibid. f395 Newcastle to Legge 13 October 1763. 
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this was no longer possible the younger group formed their 
own organisation and took the lead in opposition. 
Winstanley sums up the situation at the end of 1763 most 
succinctly when he writes 
"Before the end of November the administration had 
accomplished the most important part of its work, and 
the expulsion of Wilkes Thom the House of Commons, which 
took place on January 19th 1764, was only the logical 
outcome of all that had gone before. The Whigs had 
been routed and discredited, and their disgrace was not 
that they failed to save a popular hero, but that they 
had omitted to settle their differences before entering 
upon the fray. Torn asunder by internal dissensions, 
they had been rendered impotent for decisive action. 
Charles Yorke and Pitt had openly opposed one another 
and Newcastle had refused to sign the protest of the 
peers against the limitation of Parliamentary privilege 
because of his friendship for Hardwicke. The Duke 
of Devonshire, disgusted by Pitt's conduct, threatened 
to retire from political life unless the latter mended 
his behaviour; Charles Townshend and Lord Temple were 
not on friendly terms, and Charles Yorke, supported by 
his family, still cherished designs upon the chancel= 
lorshipi Thus something very much like confusion after 
the rout prevailed in the camp of the opposition. The 
Wilkes case had proved a very apple of discord and 
the ministers acted wisely in prolonging the discussion 
of that question. The Whigs would not recover the 
ground they had lost until they discovered a point of 
attack upon which they were all agreed, and which Pitt 
approved.... Salvation was to come, however, and a 
triumph to be enjoyed, all the greater because of the 
previous humiliation. " 93 
Newcastle had pursued a policy of compromise that had brought 
little result. He had wanted to leave the door wide open for 
himself and his party to come back to office, and he had been 
reluctant, mainly because of the advice of the older hierarchy 
of the party, to enter into a systematic opposition. Yet he 
had endeavoured to maintain the allegiance of the more extreme 
93. Winstanley op. cit. p. 195. 
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zealots like Baker who were anxious for action and went as 
far as he could without annoying Hardwicke in order to palliate 
the zealots. His attempts to bring pressure on Hardwicke to 
sanction a more active opposition indicate that Newcastle 
himself believed that this would be a useful tactic. 
In these political circumstances it is hardly surprising 
that the merchants remained in the background. The financiers 
were demonstrating their natural desire to remain friendly 
with administration for economic reasons, the Newcastle Whigs 
were giving no real lead to the rest of the merchants involved 
in politics. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
THE RISE OF THE OPPOSITION AT WILDMAN'S CLUB. 
(A) INTRODUCTION. 
In the foregoing chapters it is easy to discover a clear 
distinction between the Old 17hig hierarchy centered around 
Newcastle, and the younger and more extreme men of the party 
who were to form the basis of Rockingham's support. To the 
former group were attached the 'monied interest' on which 
Newcastle placed so much reliance, to the latter merchants oft 
the type so valuable to Rockingham when he came to power. The 
position of Sir William Baker in this structure is peculiar. 
Although strictly part of the 'monied interest' Baker always 
had more sympathy with the radical element and acting as 
Newcastle's city leader aligned himself more closely with the 
1 
mercantile interest. Baker's attitude was to make him import- 
ant in the evolution of Wildman's Club and this was a devel- 
opment of supreme importance in the history of the Newcastle 
Whigs for it brought Rockingham to the centre of the party 
and when the rest of, the older generation had died marked him 
out as Newcastle's successor. Moreover, although the mercan- 
tile element was not dominant at Wildman's Club it was an 
important interest, over one sixth of the members having 
2 
strong mercantile interests and the pressure put on Newcastle 
and the rest of the Old Whigs by Wildman' s was a radical and 
a mercantile pressure, similar to that exerted on Rockingham 
during the Stamp Act Crisis. 
1. See above p. 184.2. See below p 
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The inactivity of Newcastle and the rest of the hierarchy 
in November and December 1762, particularly over the Peace 
of Paris, provoked a split in the ranks of Newcastle's 
supporters resulting eventually in the formation of Wildman's 
3 
Club. 
In aletter written to Hardwicke on 29 November 1762 
Newcastle noted that some of their supporters "were desirous 
of collecting themselves together" and unless an issue was 
found on which they could display their strength in Parliament 
4 
they had threatened to look elsewhere for leadership. The 
following day Newcastle himself was informed by Onslow that 
a group of these supporters had dined at Grafton's house, 
shown themselves to be extremely discontented with the lack 
of a plan for opposition, and pleaded for action. Onslow 
ended his letter with an impassioned plea for an opposition 
5 
During December 1762, however, when the debates on the 
Peace Preliminaries took place in Parliament no real plan of 
6 
opposition had been prepared and the party was very divided. 
This equivocal position was created by the conflicting 
7 
loyalties of the Yorke family, by'Newcastle's failure to gain 
8 
a thorough-going alliance with Pitt, because Newcastle was 
3. See above pp. 11 1. 
4. B. M. Add. T, Mss" 32945 ff200-201 Newcastle to Hardwicke 29 
November 1762 quoted above p. 159 also part-quoted Namier 
England in the Age of the American Revolution pp. 391-392. 
5. B. M. d. TvIss. 32945 ff227-230 G. Onslow to Newcastle 30 November 
1762. Cf. Namier England in the Age of the American Revol- 
ution pp. 391-392. 
6. Ibid. pp. 396-397. 
7. Charles Yorke left the Commons without voting, while { 
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9 
so war weary he was unwilling to strongly resist peace and 
finally because Hardwicke was insisting that Newcastle's policy 
in opposition should be consistent with former policy when in 
10 
office. 
Following this failure Newcastle did his best to reassure 
and rally his supporters but 
the debate on the Peace Prel 
that some of them decided to 
which did not have Newcastle 
(B) THE ORIGIN OF THE CLUB. 
The political club that 
considering their attitude before 
iminaries it is scarcely surprising 
form a separate organisation 
at its head. 
was eventually to become known 
as "Wildman's" made its appearance some time after a decision 
to form a club was taken at a dinner at George Onslow's on 
Tuesday 21 December 1762. Newcastle was present at this 
dinner and reported to the Duke of Devonshire that the "young 
men" of the party were strongly in favour of forming a club 
and eventually Rockingham had given in to thema. Newcastle 
stated that he had opposed the club strongly on the grounds 
that it would lay them open to charges of faction and expose 
11 
their weaknesses. Newcastle was supported by Devonshire in 
12 
his attitude and also by Lord Kinnoull who wrote 
7. contd Lord Royston voted for the Preliminaries there but 
Hardwicke himself both spoke and voted against the Prelimin- 
aries in the Lords. The Yorkebs were torn between a desire 
to attain high office under the Crown and loyalty to the 
political party which they had supported for so long. Ibid P-396. --- 
8. Ibid. p. 395.9. See above p. 155 10. See above pp. 145" 11. B. M. Add. Mss" 32945 ff341-347 Newcastle to Devonshire 23 December 1762 quoted above p. 165. part-quoted Nmier op" cit. pp. 416-417. For the age of these men see ibid. p. 392. 12"B. 11- Add. Mss. 32945 figa Devonshire to Newcastle 26 December 
. 
1762. See above p. 
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"As to the Club proposed, it appears to me to be a 
measure attended with many bad consequences .... For my 
own part, I never will join in a measure which appears 
to me factious, But it is of little consequence what 
I do, I shall never be a favourite with the young men 
of spirits.... Your Grace's dignity and credit which is 
both great at home and abroad must not be committed by 
these very worthy very amiable, but very zealous and 
much heated young friends. " 13 
Sir Lewis Namier says the next action of the"young men" 
on 31 January 1763 was an attempt to seek Pitt's help, an action 
of which Newcastle disapproved, and which, as I have explained 
previously, he wanted carried out only by members of the hierarchy. 
14 
of his party. Namier then concludes that by June 1763 Newcastle 
was himself taking the credit for the success of the organisation. 
His conclusion is based on a letter to Lord Kinnull on 3 
June 1763. In this Newcastle wrote 
"The Society, which we had so successfully established 
by our dinners of the most respectable persons in both 
Houses, of which Lr. Pitt and my Lord Temple were 
principal parts, had given such a new spirit to our 
affairs, that soon showed itself in both Houses, and 
particularly in the House of Lords, to such a degree, 
that in the opinion of everybody, that was one of the 
principal causes of the sudden and not surprising 
retreat of the IvIinisters. " 15 
From this one would be led to believe that the club which 
was to become Wildman's grew steadily within the ranks of the 
Old Whig party. 
Namier's conclusion is erroneous. The club that was to 
become Wildman's, although it did spring from the meeting on 
13. B. M. Add. l. 2ss. 32945 f385 Kirnnoull to Newcastle 26 December 176 
14. See Namier op. cit. p. 417; See above pp. 171-172. 15. See Namier 2p. cit. pp. 417-418; B. M. Add- IIss. 32949 f15 Newcastle to Kinnoull 3 June 1763. Namier's error is perpetuated in His Majesty's Opposition 1714-1830 b A. S. Foord, Oxford 1 ., 4, pp. 311,343. y 
7rk 
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21 December 1762 nevertheless grew up apart from the main 
development in opposition tactics and the attempted alliance 
with Pitt in 1763. I believe that the club existed informally 
during 1763 and its formal inauguration and rise to the fore- 
front of opposition politics did not come until the Wilkes case 
became the promkent issue in politics very late in 1763 and 
early in 1764. 
It is true that the next move of the "young men" on 31 
16 
January 1763 was to endeavour to seek Pitt's help, but Newcas- 
tie strongly deprecated this procedure because the move was 
not coming from the recognised leaders of his party. On the 
same day that he wrote to Hardwicke reporting what the "young 17 
men" desired to do, and that he was strongly against it; he 
also wrote to Rockingham and Devonshire urging them to go and 
see Pitt. On 5 February Newcastle wrote to Devonshire enqui- 
ring whether he had seen Pitt, without mentioning any other 
visit and on 6 February Devonshire replied saying that he was 
19 
unable to see Pitt because the latter was ill. Therefore it 
seems unlikely that any of the "young men" saw Pitt during 
this period and there is no evidence showing that they did. 
Indeed, when Devonshire eventually saw Pitt on 17 February 
and Rockingham on 4 March 1763, the letters in which each of 
them report their visits make no mention of any contact 
16. See above pp. 171-172. 
17. B. M. Add. Mss" 32946 f264 Newcastle to Hardwicke 31 January 1763 
18. Ibid. f259 Newcastle to Rockingham 31 January 1763; ibid 
f266 Newcastle to Devonshire 31 January 1763. 
19. Ibid. f317 Newcastle to Devonshire 5 February 1763; ibid 
f399 Devonshire to Newcastle 6 February 1763" 
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20 
between the younger members of the party and Pitt. Furthermore, 
on 18 March 1763, when Hardv, icke wrote to Newcastle reporting 
a motion that Wilkes was about to make, calling for the sub- 
scribers to the last government loan, he stated that "Sir 
William Maker and our warm friends were much for it" but also 
made it quite clear that neither he, nor Baker and his friends., 
21 
had any idea of Pitt's opinion of the matter. Indeed, it seems 
to have been Rockingham's mission to Pitt which was successful 
because on 8 March 1763 there was a great opposition dinner 
at which most of the Old Whig hierarchy and Temple and Pitt 
were present, but there is no record of the presence of any 
22 
of the "young men" at this dinner. There is further evidence 
that Rockingham was in contact with Pitt later in March, May 
23 
and June 1763 but no evidence that the "young men" of the 
party were in contact with him. Thus, if (bearing these points 24 
in mind) one re-examines Newcastle's letter to Kinnoull two 
facts immediately etkerge. Firstly, Newcastle writes of the 
society consisting of the"most respectable persons in both 
25 
Houses. " On no other occasion does he speak of the group 
that were to emerge at Wildman's club in these terms and 
indeed it is easy to believe that he would be very reluctant 
to describe its members in this way. Secondly, the specific 
mention of Temple and Pitt also leads one to believe that 
20. B. M. Add" Mss. 32947 f21 Devonshire to Newcastle 17 February 
1763; ibid. f180 Rockingham to Newcastle 4 March 1763. 
21. Ibid. f246 Hardwicke to Newcastle 18 March 1763. 
22. See Hardwicke Correspondence V01. III, p. 381 also p. 182. The 
dinner seems to have agreed on concerted opposition to the Cider Duty more than anything else. 
23. W. W. M. Rl-370 Newcastle to Rockingham 27 March 1763; B-11. 
Add. Mss. 32948 f404 Newcastle to Rockingham 29 May 1763; 
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Newcastle was referring to meetings that were inaugurated on 
8 Larch 1763 and consisted only of opposition leaders and 
not the "zealous young men" as well, as Sir Lewis Namier's 
statement would seem to infer. 
Moreover, on the day before Newcastle wrote to Kinnoull he 
had written a letter to Hardwicke discussing the Wilkes affair 
in which he contrasted the violent attitude of his "youmg 26 
zealous Friends" with the very moderate attitude of Pitt, and 
in an interview with Charles Yorke on 8 June 1763 Pitt spoke 27 
of being united with the "great Whig Lords"- 
There is further evidence to support my contention that 
"Wildman's" developed away from the mains-tream of the opposi- 
tion which Newcastle was trying to develop, based on an alliance 
with Pitt. 
Firstly, James Grenville wrote to his sister, Pitt's wife, 
on 20 January 1764 that, 
"Our Club goes on with renewed vigour, I am infinitely 
perplexed by the pressing of many quarters to be of 
it. " 
28 
If Pitt was associated with the club, Grenville was hardly 
likely to report in these terms to his wife. Ploreover, no 
mention is made in this letter of any associations between Pitt 
and the club. 
Secondly, in the two lists of members of the club that I 
have found, one of which is in Almon's History of the Late 
Minority and the other in the Newcastle Papers, although Temple 
23. contd B. M. Add. MTss" 3294 f56 Hardwicke to Newcastle 8 June 
1763.24. See above p. 197" 25. See above p. 197" 
26. B. LT. Add. Mss" 32949 f6 Newcastle to Hardwicke 2 June 1763. 
27. Ibid. f61 Hardwicke to Newcastle 8 June 1763. 
28-Chatham-Correspondence Vol. II, pp. 276-277. James Grenville to 
Lady Chatham 20 January 1764. Grenville eras a supporter of 
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is listed as a member as well as the rest of the Old Whig 
29 
hierarchy, Pitt is not. The list in Almon is given for the year 
30 
1764 although the pamphlet was not published until 1766" 
Newcastle's list is dated 9 February 1764. It should be noted 
that both these lists were drawn up well after the foundation 
of the club when it had achieved a place in the party and the 
inclusion in these lists of the hierarchy does not invalidate 
my argument that the club developed outside the main ranks of 
the party. 
Thirdly, Newcastle was sceptical about the club even as 
late as July 1764 and in the letter expressing his scepticism 
of the club he writes to Legge about the necessity of securing 
31 
Pitt's help. This would seem to support my contention that 
union with Pitt was not attempted through the zealous young men. 
In the History of the Late Minority Almon wrote 
"The case of Mr. Wilkes furnishing the minority with 
several strong and important -questions, some gentlemen 
of weight and character early in the preceding winter 
proposed to the party a scheme of association, the purpose 
of which was to keep their friends together, and to give 
them the pleasure of meeting and conversing together. The 
idea was approved by a great part, though not all the 
minority; and a tavern in Albemarle Street kept by Mr. 
Wildman was fix' d upon for the place of meeting. " 32 
This distinguishes between the decision to form a club 
28. (contd) Pitt. See Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 
1754-1790 Vol. II, p. 346. 
29. London 1766 pp-297-300; B. M. Add. Aiss" 32955 f409-414 "List of 
the Club" 9 February 1764. 
30-The first impression of Almon's pamphlet published in 1765 
was only 12 copies (see note inside cover of 3rd impression 
1766) several larger impressions followed in 1766. 
31. B. M.. Add. Mss" 32960 ff332-333 Newcastle to Legge 20 July 1764. 
32. Almon op. cit. p. 297. 
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in December 1762 and the actual formation of the club after the 
Wilkes issue became prominent and indeed this was what occurred. 
In June 1763 Newcastle seems to have been out of contact 
with the more radical element of his party. There is no evidence 
that he was in contact with any of those Who had advocated a 
club in December 1762 but he did try to renew his contact 
with Sir William Baker, admitting that he had been out of touch 
33 
with him for some time. Baker had not been present at the 
34 
meeting of 21 December 1762 but as a protagonist of strong 
opposition he seems to have been moving close to the "zealous 
young men" and the advocates for a club. Err; stlö: e seemed to 
35 
feel this on 18 March 1763 when he reported Wilkes'smotion. 
It is true. that in September 1763 Newcastle was using Thomas 
Walpole as an emissary to Pitt and Walpole was to be a member 
of the club, but he is to be classed more as one of Newcastle's 
government contractors or financiers and as a loyal Newcastle 
36 
supporter than as one of the "zealous young men. " There is 
indeed no concrete evidence of any formation of a club before 
the end of 1763 and I would suggest that up until this time 
no attempt was really made to organise the body and if it 
existed it was in a very unofficial way. It would really be 
surprising if any "semi-official" body had come into existence 
after March 1763 and before the end of the year for Parliament 
33. B. M. Add. Mss. 32 4 f220 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 28 
June 1763. 
34. See above p. 174. 
35. B. M. Add. IIss. 32947 f246 Hardwicke to Newcastle 18 March 
1763. See above pp. 178-179. 
36. See B. M. Add. LIss" 32951 f126 Thomas Walpole to Newcastle 21 
September 1763. Cf. Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 
1754-1790 Vol. III, pp. 598-602. 
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was in recess for most of this time and the chief members of 
any "club" would be away from London. 
Newcastle's correspondence gives indications of a body 
of opinion, not properly organised, outside the Old Whig hier- 
archy which he did not really consult in his search for a 
thorough-going alliance with Pitt. On 1 October 1763 he wrote 
to Devonshire 
"I must earnestly beg.... that the Duke (of Cumberland) 
would appoint a meeting with Mr. Pitt.... Whatever is 
agreed upon I shall most readily and cheerfully come into, 
whether thro' Mr. Pitt's obstinacy - the real opinion 
of His Royal Highness and Your Grace, should be that, 
that, in the present situation of Mr. Pitt, nothing is to 
be attempted. Or whether you should think, that notwith- 
standing, our other strength should be collected and con- 
sulted and then, that it should be seen, what is the 
opinion of those, who must undertake the Business of the 
House of Commons, and what part they will take. " 37 
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the "zealous 
young men" who had decided to form a club took no formal action 
for some time, perhaps because of Newcastle's opposition. They 
may have met together informally at dinners, indeed it is 
reasonable to suppose they did, but there is no evidence to 
suppose that any more specific action was taken. 
The actual formation of the club seems to have been a 
result of actions by Legge, Sir William Baker and Charles 
Townshend (1728-1810). On 20 July 1763 Newcastle wrote to 
Devonshire saying that Legge was in the "rightest way imag- 
inable" convinced that "all clans amongst us, must act toget- 
her" and suggested Pitt, Charles Yorke, Sir William Baker 
and himself should meet to "propose a plan for the sessions. " 
37. B. M. Add. Mss. 32951 f254 Newcastle to Devonshire 1 October 7 
38. -B 'M. Add. Mss. 329449 ff380-38 Newcastle to Devonshire 20 July 1763. See above pp. 185-1869190. 
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This suggestion is very interesting for Legge was proposing 
a meeting of the leaders of the "clans" of the opposition rather 
than a meeting of the hierarchy. There was Pitt whose support 
both Newcastle and the "zealous young men" were anxious to 
secure, there was Yorke the Attorney General to represent the 
views of the Yorke family, Baker to represent the views of those 
who supported a more violent opposition and Legge himself to 
represent the opinions of the more "orthodox" of Newcastle's 
supporters. Devonshire does not seem to have been impressed 
with the idea and in his reply agreed only that"t3eere should be 
a meeting of the most considerable of our friends" and Hardwicke 
and other'members of the Old Whig hierarchy would hardly have 
been more enthusiastic. Moreover at the end of August the 
idea must have gone into abeyance when Pitt attempted to form 
an administration and Newcastle and other members of the ppos- 
ition had held out to them every prospect of taking office again. 
By 10 October, however, Newcastle was suggesting a meeting 
of thirteen leaders of opposition on 10 November (just before 
the meeting of Parliament). These thirteen, who were to plan the 
campaign for the ensuing session, included representatives of 
the Yorkes and of the Pittites but no representatives of the 
41 
"zealous young men". Three days later, however, Newcastle wrote 
39. B. M" d. Mss" 32950 ff10-11 Devonshire to Newcastle 2 August 176 
t 40. For this see above p. 189. Is 
41. B. M. Add. Mss" 32951 f369 "Heads of Business" 10 October 1763 
Newcastle's thirteen men were the Duke of Grafton, Duke of 
Devonshire, Duke of Bolton, Duke of Portland, himself, 
Marquis of Rockingham, Earl of Hardwicke, Earl temple, Pitt, 
Legge, Charles Tozwmshend (1725-1767) Charles Yorke and James 
Grenville.! 
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to Legge saying that he was going to send Sir William Baker 
42 
who very much wanted to see him In his reply Legge sd that 
he was very anxious to see Baker and wrote 
"I think if Mr. Pitt, Charles Tovvmshend (1725-1767)j, The 
Attorney General, Sir William B& er and Your Humble 
Servant had an alliance - offensive and defensive; and 
could meet frequently together, and concert Plans of 
operation, it might possibly produce some good; the case 
and the times require great union, and concert, and will 
by no means, admit so material a defalcation from the 
Alliance, as the Attorney General and his Father. " 
Legge, however, if he was very enthusiastic about having the 
"zealous young men" represented in the inner councils of the 
party by no means underestimated the importance of Newcastle 
himself for he continued 
"If you should be jaded and give out, I don't know who 
there is of weight and experience and ability, and credit 
enough with the Whigs to replace you, and become the 
common centre of union, who will keep open House and open 
hands for them, and be if not the Vinegar at least the 
secretary pf the opposition, I don't see, nor who can, 
and yet without such an offiber and standard to resort 
to, I think the whole Corps will strrggle,. as the Court 
Brokers could wish them to do. These are but gloomy and 
unpleasant considerations, but I hope in a little time 
they will blow off, and that we shall all see our way 
clearer, than we have hitherto been able to do. " 43 
Newcastle on 16 October wrote to Devonshire saying that Pitt 
had been willing, when Newcastle saw him on 12 October, to confer 
with Legge, Charles Tovmshend (1725-1767) and Sir William Baker 
and was obviously trying to convert Devonshire to Legge's scheme. 
But Newcastle also made it clear that there was now a distinct 
42. Ibid. ff395-396 Newcastle to Legge 13 October 1763" 
43. Ibid. ff397-398 Legge to Newcastle 13 October 1763. 
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rift between Pitt and the Yorkes who had taken the government's 
44 
line on the Wilkes issue and indeed from this time onward it 
became quite clear that any thorough-going alliance with Pitt 
was impossible, chiefly because Newcastle insisted on including 
the Yorke family in the alliance but also because Pitt was 
45 
unwilling to make a whole-hearted alliance. Meanwhile it seems 
4 
very probable that Legge had made contact with Baker and this 
served to bring Baker, who was to be influential in the form- 
ation of the Wildman's Club, into the inner councils of the 
party. 
It was planned that Rockingham should hold a dinner party 
on 11 November 1763 before the opening of the new session of 
Parliament. By 27 October Newcastle was considering who 
should attend this. In a memoranda of that day he noted his 47 
intention of having Baker attend the function and on 29 
October Newcastle wrote to Cumberland 
"It was agreed with the Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of 
Grafton, My Lord Rockingham and Myself, that we should 
dine at my Lord Rockingham's on Friday the 11th of 
November, the Friday before the meeting of Parliament. 
I suppose the persons to be there will be the Duke of 
Grafton, Duke of Devonshire, Duke of Portland, Lord 
Rockingham, myself, Duke of Bolton, Lord Hardrvicke, 
Lord Temple, Mr, Pitt, Mr. Legge, Mr. Charles Townshend 
(1735-1767), the Attorney General, Query Mr. James 
Grenville, Query Sir William Baker. " 48 
44. B. M. Add. Mss" 32952 ffl-12 Newcastle to Devonshire 16 October 
1763. 
45. B. M. Add. lvMss. 32952 f23 Newcastle to Rockingham 16 October 176 
". ibid. f51 Newcastle to Devonshire 21 October 1763. 
46. B. P: I. Add. Mss" 32951 f398 Legge to Newcastle 13 October 1763" 
47. B. M. Add. Mss. 32952 f108 "Heads of Business" 27 October 1763. 
48. Ibid. f121 Newcastle to Cumberland 29 October 1763. 
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The only person who can be said to have been a represent- 
ative of the "zealous 
obviously considerable 
dinner was never held, 
ill and partly because 
49 
this kind. 
young men" was Baker and there was 
doubt about his invitation. This 
however, partly because Rockingham was 
Pitt refused to attend any meeting of 
When Parliament opened, however, the opposition had found 
a rallying cry, for the issue of Wilkes was the most important 
matter before the government and they succeeded remarkably 
well in harrying the government. This success gave them a 
new unity. Moreover, Legge and Baker were in the fore-front 
of the attack and were probably co-operating and the evident 
hostility of Charles Yorke at this time possibly served to 
50 
ram home the need for absolute unity. 
Thus by 9 January 1764 Lloyds Evening Post was able to 
report 
"A numerous and formidable Society of persons of 
distinction, abilities and influence in the nation 
is now forming, and a large house of a deceased 
Nobleman is hired for their Assemblies, which Society 
is to be called The Cotery of Revolutionists or of 
Antiministerialists from the French word Coterie, 
vulgarly called a Club in English. " 51 
In a memorandum on 15 January 1764 which consists of a 
series of points to be discussed at a meeting of opposition 
leaders Newcastle wrote that he wished to discuss %vith Baker 
49. Ibid. ffl43-144 Rockingham to Newcastle 31 October lIZ63; 
ibid. f166 Newcastle to Rockingham 1 November 1763; ibid 
ff184-191 Newcastle to Devonshire 2 November 1763. 
50. B. M. Add. Miss" 32953 f16 Onslow to Newcastle 23 November 1763; 
ibid. f37 Onslow to Newcastle 24 November 1763; B. LS. Add. I ss .. 32954 f38 George Onslow to Newcastle 18 December 1763. 
51. No-1013 6-9 January 1764 p. 25. There were further remarks 
about the club in the next issue of the same newspaper. 
208 
52 
the latter's plan of opposition. Sir William Baker was in. 
close contact with the j. advogatestc for an oppostion club, 
and it is reasonable to suppose that this matter would be . 
mentioned and Newcastle would make his sentiments known. 
A piece of positive information about the formation of 
Wildman's Club is in a letter from Legge to Newcastle on 30 
January 1764 when the club is obviously being formed and 
53 
membership is under discussion. Legge wrote 
"Our friend the Spanish Townshend (1728-1810)communi6ated 
to me the nature of the minority club, of which I am 
very ambitious to be an original subscriber and signify 
as much to him by this night's post. I honour the 
Establishment and make no doubt but the day will come 
when both the Institution and the members of it will 
be treated with respect, love and veneration in this 
land.. Townshend will probably communicate to you the 
prudential and political reasons which make me approve 
the establishment exclusive of the personal vanity of 
making me one of the company. I have received a letter 
from Prouse (54) who will be in England about the end 
of May next.... Make him a member of this Club meo pericule 
at least eventually. I think it will do a great deal 
of good and I hope also that Dowdeswell (55) is already 
of itt' 56 OW 
51" (contd) The house had been Lord Waldegrav s. See Walpole 
gp. cit. Vol. 3, p. 281 n. Waldegrave died in 1763. 
52. B. P! '. Add. Mss. 32955 f186 "Points" 15 January 1764. 
53. Ibid. ff314-315 Legge to Newcastle 30 January 1764. 
54. Thomas Prouse I. I. P. (1707-67) A country gentleman friend of 
Legge's. See Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754- 
1790 Vol. III, p. 366. 
55-William. Dowdeswell (1721-1775) who was to be Rockingham's. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer was a country gentleman. He 
appears in a list of Newcastle's dated 23 November 1763 
headed "Some friends in the House of Commons" (B. Tt. Add. rdss 
32953 f20 but as a query) Namier and Brooks, The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, pp. 333-335 state that he never joined the opposition club and in May 1764 Newcastle still 
classed him as a doubtful friend. He is not listed as a member of the club in either Newcastle's or Almon's list. 56. B. M. Add. IJlss" 32955 ff314-315 Legge to Newcastle 30 January 1764, 
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It thus seems that if Newcastle had not entirely approved of 
the club he was actively concerned with it when it was 
r. 
form®&1y constituted. When Newcastle replied to Legge on 4 
February 1764 he wrote 
"I have desired that your name and Offley's may be enter'd 
of the Club. As to the other Gentleman (Prouse) tho' I 
have the greatest honor and regard for his character, 
being not personally known to him I think he might think 
it wrong in me without particular direction from himself. 9 
57 
Newcastle was not then in control of the club but possibly 
he was exercising some sort of "honourary presidency" for the 
"zealous young men" would no doubt be unwilling to go ahead 
with the project without at least the nominal support of their 
titular leader. Thus, without mentioning the club, Newcastle 
persuaded Brice Fisher to see Sir William Baker in early 
February 1764 and on 9 February Fisher's name appeared on the 
58 
list of members of the club. 
Formation of the club seems to have been very rapid at 
this time for on 6 February 1764 George Onslow was able to 
write to Newcastle from "Wildman's" and there is a list of the 
members of the club containing 106 names in the Newcastle 
59 
Papers dated 9 February 1764. Thus it may be concluded that 
the final organisation of Wildman's Club took place in late 
January and early February 1764 and it was by no means a direct 
57. Ibid. f361 Newcastle to Legge 4 February 1764. John Offley -' 
1717-1784) M. P. 1747-1774. For him see Namier and Brooke 
o2. cit. Vo1. III, p" 223. Offley was a loyal Newcastle supportel' 58. B. IM. Add. Mss" 32955 f356 Brice Fisher to Newcastle 'Friday ` 
morning' most likely 2 February 1764 as Brice Fisher was listed as :a member of the club on 9 February 1764. Ibid. 
E E. f409 "List of the Club" 9 February 1764. 
59. Ibid. f366 Onslow to Newcastle 6 February 1764, ibid f409 "List of the Club" 9 February 1764. 
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60 
result of the meeting of December 1762" Even though Newcastle 
kept in touch with the organisation, its formation was for the 
most part the work of the "zealous young men" of the party. 
(C) THE MPMBERSHIP ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITIES OF WILDMAN'S CLUB. 
Wildman's Tavern was situated in Albe/marle Street London 
61 
and it was here that the club meetings were held. In his 
Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Third Horace Walpole 
states that on January 1764 
"The Court was alarmed at a club which the opposition 
formed themselves, holding their weekly meetings at a 
tavern erected on the occasion by one Wildman in 
Albe/marle Street. " 62 
In view of this statement and the fact that there is a 
letter from Wildman to Newcastle headed Albeymarle Street 
concerning the club and dated 1765 there can be little doubt 
63 
that this was the location of it. 
The only direct evidence of the club's organisation is in 
64 
Wildman's letter to Newcastle of 25 January 1765. This letter 
was written after the club had been seriously weakened in the 
latter part of 1764 and Newcastle himself was making an effort 
to revive it. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the 
arrangements in early 1764 were any different from those in 
60. See above p-196. 
61. B. M. Add. 21ss. 32965 f301 Thomas Wildman to Newcastle 25 
January 1765. 
62. I can find no evidence to support Walpole's statement that 
the tavern was erected at this time. If it were in Lord 
Waldegrave's furnier house (see above p. 207) this could not 
be so. Probably Walpole means the tavern was opened at 
this time. Walpole 42m. it 
Vol. II p. 45. 
63. See above note 61. B" M. Add. Mss. 32965 f301 Thomas Wildman 
to Newcastle 25 January 1765. See Appendix 3. 
64. B. M. Add. Mss. 32965 f301 Thomas Wildman to Newcastle 25 
January 1765. 
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early 1765. In January 1765 the arrangements were that Almon 
provided facilities for dinner every day from Monday to 
Saturday. The cost of the table was to be £3.10.0 each day 
and it was to be for ten members. Each member of the club was 
to pay four shillings per week subscription and if there were 
above ten members present the additional ones were to be 
65 
charged proportionately. Dinners were thus a prominent part 
of the club's activities and it is reasonable to suppose that 
political discussions at dinner and speeches and toasts after- 
66 
wards to rally the party were the club's major functions. If 
Wildman as providing six dinners at £3.10.0 each every week 
this means he had to take £21 per week in subscriptions to 
cover his cost, and points to the fact that there were at least 
105 paying members at the beginning of 1765 and Newcastle's 
list of the club consists of 106 names. It is dated 9 
February 1764 and was thus completed shortly after the found- 
67 
ation of the club. Almon's list in the History of the Late 
Minority consists of. 149 names. This.. Almon states is for the 
68 
year 1764. An examination of both lists shows that 105 of the 
65. Ibid. f301 Thomas Wildman to Newcastle 25 January 1765. 
66. Horace Walpole stated that there were only weekly meetings 
in 1764. His information may have been inaccurate because 
all the other evidence points to the fact that meetings 
were held more than once a week. When Newcastle wrote 
about "a I3uzza at Wildman's once a week" he was thinking 
of the weekly meetings arranged at Wildman's during the 
Parliamentary recess in the summer of 1764. See ; bblove P. 221. 
See also B. M. Add. Mss 32960 f332 Newcastle to Legge 20 July 
7.1764. 
67. B" M-Add. Mss" 32955 f409- 
68. pp. 297-300 
23.2 
106 names in Newcastle's appear in Almon's, 44 names appear 
in Almon's list that do not appear in Newcastle's and one name 
that of Sir Matthew _, F etherstonhaugh, appears on Newcastle's 
list but not on Almen's., This points to the fact that 
Newcastle's list was a provisional list compiled earlier in 
69 
the formation of the club than Almon's. 
Of the 150 persons that can be compiled as a list of. 
members by combining Newcastle's and Almon's list, twenty-eight 
70 
were peers and twenty-three were neither peers nor did they 
71 
in 1764, sit in the House of Commons, although some of them 
72 
had been members of Parliament or were to become so later. 
There were among the club members twenty-nine persons with 
strong associations with trade and industry, if they were 
not all actually merchants and twenty-six of these twenty-nine 
were sitting in the House of Commons. 
At first sight it may not seem that the proportion of 
the mercantile interert was very high, but it numbered among 
69. The case of Sir Matthew e herstonhaugh is peculiar but 
the inclusion of his name was possibly a mistake of Almon'S 
or an error in Newcastle's source of information, for no 
event in 'etherstonhaugh' s life (see Namier and Brooke 
The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, pp. 422-423) or his 
connection with Newcastle, as shown in the Newcastle. Papers 
suggest a reason why he should join the club at its form- 
ation and leave shortly afterwards. 
70. These did not all sit in the House of Lords in Efigland as 
some of these were Irish peers. This twenty-eight includes 
nobody sitting in the House of Commons. 
71. X.: Pla includes a few peers e. g. Lord Frederick Cavendish 
who, sat in the House of Co, eons. I include in this list 
members dying in 1764 or 134ing elected in that year. 72. These figures are compiled, from Judd op"cit and Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790.12 names appear in neither. Thus an analysis of Almon' list does not agree 
with C. B. Cone's statement in Burke and the Nature of Polit i The Age of the American Revolution Kentucky 1957, p. 6. 
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it men like Sir George Colebrooke and Sir William Baker who 
were respected and influential supporters of Newcastle and 
who were in the van of the campaign for forming an opposition. 
Moreover the number of persons in the group with mercantile 
interests is out of all proportion to the number in Parliament 
at the time. Namier states that about fifty merchants were 
elected to Parliament in 1761 and in 1763 there were about 
73 
eighty-five members with commercial interests. Thus the 
mercantile interest was far more strongly represented in the 
Wildman's group than in Parliament as a whole and this 
representation, both because of 1+P numbers and because of the 
74 
individuals concerned was bound to be influential. 
In the History of the Late Minority Almon wrote that the 
club was instituted to keep the opposition together and to 
give members of the club the pleasure of "meeting and 
75 
conversing together". In his Biographical, Literary-and 
Political Anecdotes he noted that the "object, of the institu- 
76 
tion was singly to preserve union: ' In spite of this, however, 
the club immediately began political agitation, for "at the 
77 
commencement of the institution" a political pamphlet was 
72" contd that this list includes only M. P. members. 
73. See above p. 6. 
74. The leading members of the group having close association 
with trade among the twenty-nine were Sir William Meredith, 
Sir George Colebrooke, Sir William Baker, Henry Crabb Boult of 
Peter Burrell, Bartholomew Burton, Sir Matthew Featherston- 
haugh, Brice Fisher, Rose Fuller, Capel Hanbury, Frazer 
Honeywood (died January 1764) John Thomlinson, and Thomas 
Walpole. 
75. Q. cit. p. 297. 
76. London 1797, Vol. II, p. 37. 
77. Ibid. p. 38. 
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published entitled A Letter from Albetmarle Street to the 
78 
Cocoa Tree Almon states that this pamphlet was produced by 
Earl Temple almost single-handed and 
"One design of it was to proclaim the creed or what he 
hoped was and would continue to be the creed of the 
minority from their headquarters, that the nation 
might know the doctrines they professed, and the 
principles they avowed. But though the pamphlet was 
generally approved by the nation, yet there were some 
persons in the minority who thought it declared tho 
much. " 79 
This pamphlet stated that the reign of George I and 
George II had produced no real issues concerning the "Liberty 
of the subject" but the early years of George III had furnished 
80 
an important question which showed who were true Whigs. 
Temple's pamphlet focussed attention on General Warrants and 
it was this issue which the opposition found most useful. 
When the new session of-Parliament had begun in November 1763 
Newcastle and his supporters had pressed the government as 
81 
hard as they could on the General Warrants questtLon. After 
Christmas, however, with the issue narrowed down to a complaint 
of breach of privilege the new strength gathered by the 
opposition at Wildman's was clearly demonstrated. 
The complaint against the King's messengers for imprison- 
ing Wilkes and for tie seizure of his papers was to be heard 
on 13 February 1764. For this motion some of the leading 
members of Wildman's issued a "whip" to all members of the 
club. Each member of the club who dined there on 9 February 
78. London 1764. The pamphlet was reproduced in the 
Gentleman's Magazine for April 1764. 
79. Bio .a hical Literary and Political Anecdotes p. 38. 80. A Letter from Ae mar e Street to the or-na Tree pp. 22-23. 81. See Correspondence in B. LI. Add. M. op. 4. 
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82 
undertook to speak to his friends. Newcastle did not entirely 
approve of this idea of the limitation of the "whip" to the 
John 
club alone. He wrote to Lord/Cavendish that he thought "the 
summons should not be confined to members of the club only" 
and that he had"sent to several that are not members . of the 83 
club. " 
The first critical division on the Wilkes issue was taken 
early on 16 February 1764, after an all-night sitting and this 
dividion and the next division on 18 February marks the high- 
water mark of the power of Wildman' s. The figures on 16 
84 
February were 207 v197. On 18 February they were 234 v. 220. 
85 
The minority was listed and published in a broadsheet and in 
A letter to a Noble Member of the Club in Albemarle Street 
86 
from John Wilkes Esq at Paris Wilkes wrote 
"Your information that these (the broadsheets) lie in 
heaps with the two volumes of the North Briton, the 
Royal Register, and Gazetteer upon the table at 
Wildman's gives me great pleasure, as well as the 
resolution lately made to subscribe for pamphlets and 
not to suffer dinner to come upon the table till both 
Houses break up. Cultivate Wildman's. Such a coterie 
is of infinaite impobtance. " 87 
82. B. M. Add" biss. 32955 f421 Lord John Cavendish to Newcastle 9 
February 1764; ibid. f444 Onslow to Newcastle 12 February 1764. 
83. Ibid. f434 Newcastle to Lord John Cavendish 11 February 1764. 
84. For a discussion of these figures see Namier, Structure of 
Politics pp. 150-152. See also Almon History of the Late 
Minority p. 271; B. M. AW. Mss" 32955 f33 Newcastle to Pitt 
18 February 1764. 
85. Published February 1764. There is a copy of this broad- 
sheet in the British Museum at Call Mark T"1554. See 
Namier Structure of Politics p. 151. 
86. London 1764. The pamphlet is obviously addressed to Lord 
Temple. 
87. Ibid. p. 3. 
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An analysis of the division of 18 February shows that of 
the ninety-nine members of Wildman' s who were members of 
Parliament eighty-eight voted in the minority. Of the eleven 
who did not vote with the minority seven were not in Parliament 
on that day and appear in the list of absentees at the foot of 
the broadsheet; one Frazer Honeywood had died and only three 
88 
cannot be accounted , for. 
The reputation that the club gained in the public eye 
through its activities on the Wilkes issue is graphically 
89 
portrayed in Churchill's The Candidate in which he wrote 
"What Patron shall I chose ? shall public voice 
or private knowledge influence my choice ? 
Shall I prefer the grand retreat of STOWE 90 
or seeking patriots, to friend Wildman's go ? 
To Wildman's cried Discretion (who had heard 
Close standing at my elbow every word) 
To Wildman's; art Thou mad ? canst Thou be sure 
One moment there to have thy head secure ? 
Are they not all (let observation tell) 
All marked in Characters as black as Hell, 
In Doomsday Book by Ministers set down 
Who stile their pride, the honors of the crown ? 
Make no reply --- Let Reason stand aloof --- , Presumptions here must pass as solemn proof. 
That settled Faith, that Love which ever springs 
In the best subjects, for the best of Kings, 
Must not be measured now, by what men think, 
Or say, or do -- by what they eat and drink, 
Where, and with whom, the question to be try'd 
And Statesmen, are the Judges to decide; 
No Juries call' d, or, if call' d kept in awe, They, fools confess'd, in themselves vest the law. 
88. These three are John Jeffreys, John Walsh and William Earle. For them see Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754- 1790 under Jeffreys, Walsh and Earle, Vol. II, pp. 374-375, 673, Vol. I II , pp. 602-603. 89. LoiUon 1764, p. 11.90. Earl Temple's country seat. 
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Each dish at Wildman's of sedition smacks 
Blasphemy may be (jospel at ALM 91 
Peace, good DISCRETION peace -- tii fears are vain 
Ne' er will I herd with WILDMAN' S factious train 
Never the vengeance of the great incur, 
Nor, without might, against the mighty stir. 
If, from long proof, my temper you distrust, 
Weigh my profession, to my gown be just; 
Dost thou one person know, so void of grace 
To Pay his court to Patrons out of Place. 
These divisions on the Wilkes case, however, marked the 
high-water mark of the power of the club and from this time 
onwards it grew weaker. Almon suggests the reason for this was 
the fact that 
"These patriots now thought they had done enough to get 
themselves into offices, and they were afraid of attemp- 
ting anything further lest they should ruin the 
probability of their supposed success.... " 92 
It is true that the opposition at Wildman's, like any 
other Parliamentary opposition, was seeking power but the 
administration had not been defeated or forced to negotiate 
with the opposition. No member of the Newcastle Whigs entered 
the ministry in the months after February 1764 and there is no 
evidence in correspondence that the leaders of the opposition 
felt that further opposition would ruin the chance of the 
Newcastle Whigs returning to power. Indeed, Wildman's seems 
to have become less powerful mainly because of the lack of 
another subject with which to harry the ministry. 
In his Letter to a Noble Member of the Club in Albeimarle 
Street Wilkes had noted the necessity for Wildman's to advocate 
91. Almacks was a famous gambling club in the City. See London 
Coffee Houses by Bryant Li1lywhite, London 1963, p. 670. 92. History of the Late Minorit pp. 283_286. 
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popular causes if it were to remain powerful, and on 25 
February 1764 Newcastle wrote to Charles Townshend that 
"the minority is now come to be so considerable, that 
we must consider what points of opposition will meet 
with generä3 approbation. " 
Yet he made it quite clear that he was still more concerned 
with an opposition which gained its strength from an alliance 
with Pitt than from Wildman's club. Later in the same letter 
he continued 
"Our Friends are every day calling out for a point. 
The difficulty is to find a good one. " 94 
Newcastle suggested Grenville's budget and the proposed 
measures affecting the North American Colonies, but his idea 
never gained the full support of the majority at Wildman's, 
even if those with commercial associations were active in 
95 
opposition. Moreover, in March 1764 when these topics were 
discussed in the House of Commons, Newcastle, and Charles 
Townshend the man on whose leadership he relied, were preoccu- 
peed with the death of Hardwicke and his replacement as Lord 
96 
High Steward at the University of Cambridge. Indeed Newcastle 
keif excused himself from attending a meeting of 100 
members at Wildman's on 8 March for this reason, thus missing 
what seems to have been a golden opportunity of rallying the 
97 
opposition. In the absence of Charles Townshend and Legge, 
93. p" 5. 
94. B. M. Add. Mss. 32956 ff103-104 Newcastle to Charles Townshend 
25 February 1764. 
95. Ibid. f104 Newcastle to Charles Townshend 25 February 1764. 
See below p. 244. 
=et seg. 96. B. Y. Add. Mss. 32956 II O0-400 passim. See also Namier and 
Brooke Charles Townshend pp. 115-116. See below p. 244. 
97. B. M. Add. Mss" 32956 f252 Newcastle to Devonshire 7 March 1764 
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who was ill, it fell to Sir William Baker to lead the opposition 
to Grenville' s budget. Baker found himself in a difficult 
98 
position and did not make an all-out attack on Grenville. 
Later in the month Newcastle tried unsuccessfully to retrieve 99 
the position, and on 23 March Onslow reported to Newcastle 
regarding Grenville's American Revenue Act 
"Something must and I believe will be done. The uneasi- 
ness of our People grows every hour, and I fancy there 
will be a meeting of some People tomorrow night at 
Wildman' s. It 100 
Efforts to rally the group, however, mainly because of 
differences between Newcastle and Charles Townshend and Newcas- 
101 
tle and Charles Yorke proved abortive. 
It was moreover, not only Newcastle and Charles Townshend 
who were ceasing to drive the Parliamentary opposition. In 
March 1764 Pitt, on the excuse of ill-health, had practically 
102 
ceased to attend Parliament. This not only deprived the group 
at Wildman's of part of its inspiration but it made more 
difficult Newcastle's self-appointed task of forging a thorough. 
going alliance with Pitt, and Newcastlets interest in opposi- 
tion declined. Temple, also, was less intent on driving the 
opposition and Almon admits that A Letter from Albelmarle 
Street was Temple's last effort to preserve the unanimity of 
103 
the opposition. 
97. contd It should be noted that all the evidence points to 
Newcastle only once personally attending a meeting at 
Wildman' s. See below pp. 229,232. 
98. See below p. 247.99. See below pp. 247-248. 
100" B. Nä. Add. lMMss" 32957 f225 Onslow to Newcastle 23 March 1764. 
101. See below pp. 247-248. 
102. Ibid. 32957 f5 Newcastle to Legge 13 March 1764; History of 
the Late Minority p. 289. 
.. -______. _103. 
iiographical, Literary and Political Anecdotes Vol. 11, p" 38" 
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Thus on 8 March 1764 an attempt to rally the opposition 
on the question of the Cider Tax met with only a half-hearted 
support. Almon notes that the opposition was handicapped by 
the absence of Pitt and Charles Townshend and states that many 
of the opposition were absent and did not attend partly because 
the members from the cider counties had not helped them in 
104 
the General Warrants division. He goes on to say that not 
only the coherence of the opposition broke down but that 
105 
Wildman's declined and even ceased to exist. This was not, 
however, the case and the club at Wildman's continued to exist 
its driving force coming from the "zealous young men" who had 
been the founder members. 
Regular meetings at Wildman's seem to have been maintained 
on the same basis, at least to the end of the Parliamentary 
session. Moreover on 19 April 1764 Newcastle, who was now 
becoming anxious about the unity of the party during the summer 
recess attended Wildman's and "prompted the Resolution of 
having a general meeting of the club the day before the 
106 
opening of the session. 
The "zealous young men" did more than Newcastle hoped, for 
104. History of the Late Minority p. 289. DoNdeswell can be 
cited as an example of a "cyder Member" who did not support 
the Minority on the General Warrants issue, but Legge rege 
arded Dowdeswell as one of his adherents and the fact 
that he did not support the opposition may have been due 
to Legge' s absence from Parliament. 1 See B. PSI. Add" Mss. 
32956 f6 L@gge to Newcastle 16 February 1764. 
105. History of the Late, Minorit p. 290. Biographical, Literate 
and Political Anecdotes Vol. II, p. 38. 
106. Ibid. 32958 f184 Newcastle to Lord Cornwallis 20 April 1764 This is probably the only time that Newcastle personally 
attended the club. 
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on 24 May at an "excellent dinner" they agreed to meet weekly 
107 
every Thursday during the summer, but a more dangerous rift 
now appeared between Newcastle and the "zealous young men" at 
Wildman' s. 
In May 1764, on the prompting of Charles Yorke, Newcastle 
108 
pressed the Archbishop of Canterbury to appoint George ]lay 
to the office of Dean of the Arches which had recently become 
vacant. Hay had supported the government in February 1764 on 
the Wilkes issue and on 17 February had been a prominent 
government speaker. It was out of deference to the Yorke 
family that Ne9, tle reluctantly supported Hay's candidacy 
for the position. 
As Hay had played such a prominent part against them in 
February 1764 it is not surprising that the group at Wildman's 
were annoyed when they heard of Dr. Hay's promotion. They were 
in no position to understand Newcastle's devious mancwres to 
retain the friendship of the Yorke family. Thus on 8 June 
1764 Newcastle wrote to the Duke of Devonshire 
"I hear some of my Friends at Wildman's and particularly 
my good Friend Sir William Baker, are loud in blaming 
me for the part I have had in Dr. Hay's promotion; and 
neither allow Mr. Yorke's insisting upon it, or the 
providing for my Cambridge Friends to be an excuse or 
justification. Some People are not desirous to have 
men of the first abilities and consideration, to act 
with us for reasons of their own. " 110 
107. Ibid. 32959 f91 G" Onslow to Newcastle 25 May 1764. 
108.1715-1778. M. P. 1754-56,1757-1778. 
109. For this issue see Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, pp. 599-600. 
110. B. M. Add. üiss" 32959 f310 Newcastle to Devonshire 8 June 1764. 
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On 12 June Charles Townshend who had been staying with 
Sir William Baker found him "unreconciled to Dr. Hay's unmerited 
111 
promotion but cheerful sanguine and pleased. " On 13 and 18 
June Newcastle wrote to Legge noting that Baker and his friends 
at Wildman's were loudly protesting about Hay's promotion. on 
the latter occasion he wrote of the necessity of Legge, 
112 
Devonshire and Rockingham standing with him over the issue. 
Newcastle also tried to get into touch with Thomas Walpole 
so that he could explain the matter to another of the prominent 
113 
and more moderate members of the club. By 19 June, however, 
Newcastle was writing to John White complaining of the attitude 
of both Baker and Thomas Walpole over the "Dr. Hay Affair". 
Newcastle stated that he had Rockingham, Legge, Lord John 
and George Cavendish and Lord Bessborough to support his point 114, 
of view and that he would explain the matter fully to White. 
The worst of the quarrel now seems to have been over, 
however, for on 22 June 1764 George Onslow wrote to Newcastle 
"I was by no means in spirits (because Legge was dying) 
to enjoy the very good company at Wildman's where your 
Grace's Health and your Toast are established and 
constantly drunk, most sincerely. I'll answer for it 
by everybody present, who were Lord Bessborough, Lord 
Middleton, Lord Charlemont, Lord G"Cavendish, Lord 
Cornwallis, Sir Alexander Gilmore, Scawen. Fitzherbert, 
Sir Anthony Abdy, myself and 2 or 3 more. " 115 
111. Ibid. f365 Charles 70wnshend to Newcastle 12 June 1764- 
112. Ibid. f377 Newcastle to Legge 13 June 1764; ibid. f439 
same to same 18 June 1764- 
113. Ibid. f373 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 14 June 1764; ibid 
f407 Thomas Walpole to Newcastle 15 June 1764; ibid. f417 
Newcastle. to Thomas Walpole 16 June 1764. 
114. B. M. Add. Uss. 32960 f17 Newcastle to John White 19 June 1764. 
115. Ibid. f20 Onslow to Newcastle 22 June 1764. James Scawen 
M. P. d. 1801 and William Fitzherbert J& P. 1712-1772 were 
supporters of the Newcastle Whigs. 
223 
Furthermore on 5 July Onslow wrote to Newcastle again 
that he proposed to dine at Wildman's and than come and see 
116 
him, without mentioning the Dr. Hay affair, and by the 18 
July a rapprochement was taking place beiUeen Newcastle and 
117 
Thomas Walpole. 
The "Dr. Hay" affair did, however, have two lasting effects. 
Firstly, Newcastle immediately began to distrust the type of 
opposition that the club represented even more than before 
and to pin his faith still more on an alliance with another 
opposition group. On 20 July he wrote to Legge 
"His Grace (Devonshire) is very constant in his attendance 
at Wildman's every week, but believe me, nay Dear Legge, 
I know enough of this country to be convinced, that 
a Huzza at Wiildman's once a week, will not do alone 
tho a very good thing. There must be other publick 
demonstration of union, there must be a constant union 
and concert, of reputable and efficient people in both 
Houses, who must conduct affairs, and they must be 
supported by Wildman's and the nation.... I flatter 
myself you will be able to.... convince some people of 
the error of depending solely, upon a popular Cry among 
our Friends, and others, that if they will take their 
Parts, they shall meet with the Encouragement they 
expect, and above all, one necessary man, that he shall 
be satisfied. " 118 
and he wrote to Thomas Walpole who was in contact with Pitt 
119 
at this time in similar terms on the same day. 
Secondly a definite rift now appears between Newcastle 
and Sir William Baker who was really Newcastle's City leader.. 
116. Ibid. f188 Onslow to Newcastle 5 July 1764.. 
117. Ibid. f314 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 18 July 1764; ibid 
f316 T. Walpole to Newcastle 18 July 1764; ibId f328 same 
to same 19 July 1764. + 1 
118. Ibid. f332 Newcastle to Legge 20 July 1764. 
119. Ibid. f336 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 20 July 1764. 
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1 
As recently as 30 April 1764 Charles Towrmshend had written 
to Newcastle that "Sir William Baker should be desired to put 
120 
the City in motion" and although on 20 July and 1 September 
George Onslow reported to Newcastle of successful meetings 
at Wildman's in neither case is there evidence that there 
were mercantile or City men present except for the reconciled 
521 
Thoaa&s Walpole. On 8 September 1764 Newcastle wrote to 
Rockingham 
"I find this promotion of Dr. Hay is worked up with 
great violence amongst our Whig Friends, and particularly 
in the City where certainly it has done dir. Yorke at 
least, very great mischief; and render'd him very 
unacceptable to all our best Friends-" 122 
and on 30 September he wrote to Thomas Malpole in a style 
which suggests that Newcastle hoped Walpole would mediate 
123 
between him and Sir William Baker" 
The rift becrteen Baker and Newcastle was very important 
for when in November 1764 Baker began to campaign for a 
vigorous opposition in the forthcoming Parliamentary session 
Newcastle was unable to restrain him. The link between 
Newcastle and his more radical followers who supported Baker 
became more tenuous and Newcastle's connections with his 
120. B. Li. Add. Mss" 32958 ao C" Townshend to Newcastle 30 April 1764,, 
121. B. M. Add. Uss" 32960 f343 G" Onslow to Newcastle 20 July 1764 
when Onslow reported a meeting of "The Duke of Devonshire,, 
Lord Bessborough, Lord Cornwallis, Thomas Walpole and 
twelve more and B. M. Add" Riss 32962 fl G" Onslow to Newcastle 
1 September 1764 when he reported a meeting of "Lord 
Frederick (Cavendish) Lord Bessborough, Fitzherbert... 
Thomas Walpole, Walsingham and four or five more. 
122. W1. W. Ai. R1-433 Newcastle to Rockingham 8 September 1764. 1Cf. 'B. MA. Add. Mss"32962 ff52-53 Newcastle to Rockingham 
8 September 1764 (copy). 
123. Ibid. f179 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 30 September 1764. 
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mercantile adherents became weaker. Indeed as late as January 
1765 Newcastle felt that there was still an unhealed breach 
124 
between himself and Baker because of the "Dr, Hay affair-" 
On 8 October 1764 Onslow reported to Newcastle 
"Our Friends at WVildman's are desirous of meeting more 
often than once a week and beginning to get together 
and as Tonnny Walpole says to shew spirit and zeal. " 125 
But in November 1764 Onslow reported twice to Newcastle the 
126 
smallness of the number meeting at Wildman' s. There were 
several reasons for this. Firstly, as Onslow admitted, there 
127 
, were not many members in London. Secondly, Newcastle's 
policy of'seeking an alliance with Pitt aszcorner stone of 
opposition policy was bound to weaken 17ildman's. Moreover, 
at this time he was further elaborating this policy by 
entrusting the leadership of the opposition'to Charles 
328 
Townshend and General Conway. Clearly he had far more faith 
in these tactics than in the use of Wildman's club and as 
Sir William Baker was campaigning for an opposition that 
Newcastle regarded as too violent and which was bound to 
spring from WWildnian' s it was to Newcastle's advantage that 
this club should become weaker. On 14 November he wrote 
124. B. LI"Aid. biss. 32965 f40 Newcastle to Rockingham 4 January 
1765. See below p. 229. 
125. B. tai. Add. hiss. 32962 f197 Onslow to Newcastle 3 October 176q 
126, B. M. Add. LZss" 32964 f99 G" Onslow to Newcastle 23 November 
1764; ibid. f146 G" Onslow to Newcastle 30 November 1764. 
127. Ibid. f146 Onslow to Newcastle 30 November 1764. 
128. B. M. Add. Liss. 32963 ff5O-52 Newcastle to Albemarle 26 
October 1764. Wd. W. rd. R1-441 Rockingham to Newcastle 23 
November 1764. This policy seems to have been approved 
by Cumberland which made it all the more acceptable. 
See B. Vii. Add" Diss. 32963 ff364-367 "Substance of what 
passed with H. R. H. the Duke of Cumberland at Cumberland 
House Satdy. Nov 10th 1764.11 
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to Rockingham 
"I hear Sir William Baker declares for opposition and says 
he will bring one on, and lay some Points before the Housq, 
if nobody else will. He has I don't doubt very indiscreetly 
held a Language, which if known, will do great hurt and 
offence to those I am sure, we want; But I doubt, we may 
meet with difficulty to get them. Sir William Baker says 
I will do without them; that the nation is irritated 
against the present Ministry, that they will fall of 
themselves, whether they are attacked or not, and that he 
thinks we ought to give a Push or Shove. 
I must acquaint your Lordship that I find the conver- 
sation very popular with all our young men and zealous 
friends and particularly the Cavendishes and Spanish 
Charles Townshend. I laid this before H. R. H. (CumberlanQ 
It did not make much impression; he commended entirely 
the zeal of our young Friends but was clearly of opinion 
that we must not be governed and led by Sir William Baker 
and some very well intentioned young friends. " 129 
Cumberland believed that opposition without Pitt's help 
stood little chance of success and was willing to countenance'it, te 
but although Newcastle agreed there was little chance of success 
he believed, that unless lip-service at least was paid to the 
opposition planned by Sir William Baker and the "zealous young 
men" at Wildman's, he would lose the support of this group, and 
this might have drastic results even to the extent of leading 
130 
to the actual disintegration of his party. Baker's advocacy 
of a violent opposition and his strong reaction in the "Dr. Hay 
Affair" had brought him into closer sympathy with the "zealous 
young men" and Newcastle was no doubt perturbed at the thought of 
his Cit 
129. Ibid. ff377-378 Newcastle to Rockingham 14 November 1764. 
130. w. WM. R1-444 Newcastle to Rockingham 12 December 1764. In 
October and early November 1764 Baker seems to have been 
negotiating unsuccessfully with John Almon for the establish- 
ment of a Wilkite weekly paper; See Rea 
, 
off. cit. p. 93. 
r 
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adherents and the young radicals pursuing an opposition 
possibly under the leadership of Baker. 
A slight revival of Wildman's club appears to have taken 
place in early December 1764 as its members began to come to 
131 
London for the new session of Parliament, but at the same 
time there were doubts that the club would continue on its 
present footing for on 4 December 1764 the young Duke of 
Portland wrote to Newcastle a fetter in which he deplored 
the lack of opposition leaders, yet pointed to the "zealous 
young men" and continued 
"Would it not be prudent to have the same appearance 
in publich as if opposition was to be carried on with 
the spirit that was wished for last year ? Should not 
the club at Wildman's be continued as heretofore and 
the question of the warrants be renewed and suppgrted.. 
..? All this I humbly apprehend might be understood 
by a few, might prevent disunion and have the weight 
and effect in the world. " 132 
There seems to have been no definite plan in Newcastle's 
mind to change the constitution of Wildman's even though he 
was coximg increasingly to favour the leadership of the 
opposition by a few prominent men, and about 11 December he 
133 
sent venison as a present to the club. 
Indeed in January 1765 Wildman's club threatened to 
assume the role of centre and meeting place of the opposition 
which it had played in February 1764. There were two factors 
131. B. M. Add. t. ": ss 32964 f230 Onslow to Newcastle 7 December 1764 
ibid. f477 Onslow to Newcastle 21 December 1764. 
132. Ibid. f192 Portland to Newcastle 4 December 1764. 
133. Ibid. f249 George Onslow to Newcastle 11 December 1764. 
4 
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that prevented this. Firstly Newcastle relied on an opposition 
alliance and secondly he was reluctant to allow the leader- 
ship of the opposition to be undertaken by anybody else than 
a recognised Parliamentary leader. This had served to eilarge 
the gap between the hierarchy of the opposition led by 
Newcastle on the one hand , and the "zealous young men's and 
Baker on the other. Only one man seemed able to bridge that 
gap and this was Rockingham who was fortunate as he came 
through the "Dr. Hay affair" unscathed and there is nowhere 
any criticism of him, even if Newcastle believed that he had 
134 
his full allegiance over the affair. This meant that, with 
the death of Legge and Devonshire in 1764, by the beginning 
of 1765 Rockingham was the only member of the hierarchy of 
the party who could reconcile the opinions of Newcastle and 
the more aristocratic members of the party, on the one hand 
and the "zealous young men" and the City on the other. As 
Rockingham was to form a ministry within the next year and 
to succeed to the leadership of the party this achievement 
was of the greatest importance in his evolution as a political 
leader. 
Thus at the beginning of January 1765 Rockingham was 
dining at Wildman's with junior members of the Whig hierarchy, 
like Sir George Savile and Portland and seeking to find the 
con on ground for an opposition policy that would satisfy 
134. See above p. 224. 
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both Newcastle and the group led by Baker. A meeting was held 
at Sir George Savile's house similar to that of the previous 
year and Rockingham took the lead in endeavouring to thrash 
136 
out an opposition policy. He hoped to revive the question of 
General Warrants as a topic for opposition and was quite 
willing to use both the traditional hierarchy and the 
"zealous 
137 
young men" for this purpose. 
An attempt was made, possibly by Rockingham himself, to 
involve Newcastle personally in the proceedings at Nildman's " 
Newcastle was, however, reluctant to attend the club. He 
confessed at the time that he had never personally attended 138 
a meeting at Wildman's to organise opposition. 
Newcastle still hankered after the leadership of his 
party by the traditional aristocracy. He still had reservations 
about the "zealous young men" particularly after the 
"Dr. Hay 
affair: On 4 January 1765 he wrote to Rockingham 
"Don't mind what I said about Baker. It will not have 
the least influence upon me, but to be sure, his 
behaviour to me this su mier has been most ungrateful 
and absurd. To be rubning at me about Dr. Hay, to be 
forming his plans, entering into engagements for 
opposition, without saying one single word to me of it, 
considering his situation and mine is most extraordinary. 
Believe me, LIy Dear Lord, the weight of nobility 
your Lordship, the Duke of Portland, the Duke of Grafton, 
the Duke of Bolton, Lord Ashburton, Lord Spencer, Ld. 
Cornwallis, Ld. Bessborough, the Cavendishes may do 
135. B. M. Add. Mss. 32965 flO Newcastle to Rockingham 2 January 
1765; ibid. f28 same to same 3 January 1765. 
136. Ibid. f36 George Onslow to Newcastle 4 January 1765. For 
the meeting at Savile's the previous year see Almon 
History of the Late Minority pp. 269_270. 
137. B. M. Add. LIIss" 32965 f29 Rockingham to NetiScastle 3 January 
1765. 
138. Ibid. f38 Newcastle to Onslow 4 January 1765. 
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something but that we feel the great loss (of the Duke 
of Devonshire) ; and I much doubt whether H. R. H. (Cumber- 
land) in his present state of health and firm opinion 
of the impossibility of making even a tolerable figure 
in our opposition will take an active part. Sir George 
Savile, I always reckon among the first of the nobility. 
But Sir William Baker and my Friend Sir William 
Meredith to be the undertakers and the Heads of such a 
national opposition we ought to hope for success from, 
will be impracticaUle"At the same time, I am for keeping 
up the Ball and shall give all possible assistance in 
my power. But we must take care not to expose ourselves 
to hurt, and rather confirm than disturb the present 
ignorant, disjointed and I think ill-disposed administ- 
ration in their employment. 
But this is a matter to be talked on, wvhen we meet. " 
139 
Rockingham replied on the same day trying to allay 
140 
Newcastle's fears and a few days later Newcastle even seems 
141 
to have been contemplating dining at Wildman's. It was on 
25 January that Thomas Wildman wrote to Newcastle describing 
the club and from this letter I have drawn the conclusion 142 
that the membership of the club was over 100 at this time. 
Indeed, the club still seems to have been active. On 5 
January 1765 Lord Bessborough wrote to Newcastle 
"What your Grace mentions of the company at Wildman's 
being very sanguine is certainly the case,, and they 
only want some proper subject to be active upon. The 
General Warrants is the only one at present, that they 
talk of, and a good one it is, however, I wish there 
was some other subject, as this one cannot hold always 
and if the majority have any sense they will give that 
point up, as It seems most of the lawyers of their side 
declare such warrants illegal. " 143 
139. Ibid. f40 Newcastle to Rockingham 4 January 1765. 
140. Ibid. f42 Rockingham to Newcastle 4 January 1765. 
141. Ibid. f125 Ashburton to Newcastle 7 January 1765. 
142. Ibid. f301 Thomas Wildman to Newcastle 25 January 1765. 
143. Ibid"f93 Bessborough to Newcastle 5 January 1765. 
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Thus the revival of activity at Wildman' s club was 
centred around an attempt to revive the Wilkes issue. This, 
144 
unfortunately, was played out, and Bessborough's statement 
shows that it was the failure of Baker and the "zealous young 
men" to find another subject around which all sections of the 
party and the opposition groups could be rallied that limited 
the success of the club in 1765. I describe elsewhere in this 
work the activities of the Newcastle Whigs with regard to 
Grenville's American Stamp Act. This episode shows how 
spasmodic opposition became when the subject was not very 
145 
controversial. In Newcastle's correspondence reference to 
sporadic attempts at opposition on other topics, for example 
Grenville's budget, show that the subject was not sufficiently 
controversial to rally either all Newcastle's party or the 
146 
majority of opposition groups. Moreover by March 1765 G ren- 
ville seems to have been establishing the traditional link 
between administration and the City and this weakened Sir 
William Baker's ability to rally the opposition, and made him 
147 
more reluctant to play a leading part in it, probably for 
fear of weakening his position in the City. ', That opposition 
there was thus become led by independent country gentlemen 
148 
like William Dowdeswell who really had no following. 
144. See for instance ibid. f326 George Onslow to Newcastle 
2 February 1765. 
145. See below pp. 255-273. 
146. See B. iI. Add. Mss. 32966 flO Onslow to Newcastle 3 March 1765; 
ibid. f103 Newcastle to Onslow 26 March 1765. 
147. Ibid. f79 Newcastle to Onslow 26 March 1765; ibid. f103 
Newcastle to Onslow 26 March 1765; ibid. flll Newcastle to 
Rockingham 26 March 1765; ibid. f115 Onslow to Newcastle 
28 March 1765. = 
148. Ibid. f46 Newcastle to Conway 12 March 1765; ibid: 'i: - - :. 
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In spite of the difficulties facing it Wildman's did not 
die and indeed seems to have lasted until the formation of 
the first Rockingham administration, as during the negotiations 
for the formation of this ministry there are references to the 
club. At the beginning of the negotiations in June 1765 when 
149 
Newcastle was anxious to find a position for Sir William Baker 
one wonders to what extent Newcastle was motivated by the 
fact that Baker was a leader of the violent opposition centred 
at Wildman's, and to what extent he was motivated by the fact 
that Baker was his leading mercantile supporter, and influen- 
tial in the City. 
On 1 June 1765 Newcastle wrote to Rockingham noting 
that it was necessary for the "zealous young men! ' at Wildman's 
150 
to be patient and on 17 June he wrote to Portland 
"We all have great obligations to the Duke (of Cumberland) 
for this signal mark of his patience, condescencion 
and judgement. Sure, the great man (Pitt) after all 
that has passed, will not excuse the King and if he 
does, sure our good friends at Wildman s Sir William 
Baker &c. will not approve it. " 151 
A "very great" meeting at Wildman's On 20 June 1765 
failed to achieve anything, mainly because, Pitt at this time 
was at the point of withdrawing from the negotiations to 
152 
form a ministry. Finally on 1 July 1765 when Newcastle 
148 (contd) f79 Newcastle to Onslow 26 March 1765; ibid. fl15 
Onslow to Newcastle 28 March 1765. 
149. Ibid. f407 "Names" 16 May 1765; ibid. f415 "Persons who 
should be immediately considered 17 May 1765" ; See 
also below p. 
150. B. M. Add. Mss" 32967 f3 Newcastle to Rockingham 1 Jute 1765.; 
151. Ibid. f 53 Newcastle to Portland 17 June 1765. 
152" Ibid. f89 Onslovr to Newcastle 21 June 1765. 
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wrote to Portland describing the state of the final negotia- 
tions that were to result in the first Rockingham administ- 
ration he concluded his remarks on this topic with the words 
"I hope you will approve what I have done. The Boys of 
Wildman's shall not be the Whig party. " 153 
No matter how facetious this remark was it serves to prove 
that right up to the formation of the first Rockingham admin- 
istration, Newcastle had fears that the organisation at Wildman' s 
club would lead to the weakening of the power of the traditional 
. aristocracy in his own party. 
1 
With the event of the first Rockingham administration I 
hove been unable to find any further reference and assume that 
154 
the organisation now broke up. Its members had achieved their 
aim, they had broken up the ministry, and their colleagues 
the Whig hierarchy, if not they themselves, were now able to 
enjoy the perquisites of office. 
Thus when Almon wrote 
"But vhen the party was broken and disheartened, the club 
dwindled to almost nothing; meetings were seldom,: and 
the companies small. So that in a little time the 
house barely furnished the shadow of a party. " 155 
he was by no means accurate, and he seems to have greatly 
exaggerated the decline in the club that occurred after the 
campaignover the Wilkes issue in February 1764. This no 
doubt was because of Almon' s close link with Lord Temple. His 
works tend to give all the credit for Wildman's to Temple and 
153. Ibid. f187 Newcastle. to Portland 1 July 1765. 
154. There was, however, an attempt to revive it in November 1766. 
See below p. 464. 
155. History of the Late L inority p. 300. 
w 
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he was probably trying to imply'that with Temple's withdrawal 
from the leadership of the opposition the club broke dorm. 
As this section has shown, however, this was by no means 
the case. Wildman's was a club that originated because the 
"zealous young men" of the Newcastle Whigs were discontented 
with the treluctance of their aristocratic leaders to launch 
a whole-hearted opposition. The controversy over Wilkes and 
the "North Briton" No. 45 enabled the rest of the opposition 
temporarily to ally itself with the club in early 1764, but 
once this issue was played out Wildman's resumed its essential 
character as the focal point for the pressure of the younger 
and more active of Newcastle's supporters, as a vehicle by 
which they hoped to put pressure on him and to encourage him 
to a more active opposition. In this form it survived right 
up to the formation of the first Rockingham administration. 
Newcastle himself always seems to have been aware of the true 
nature of the club, and over the period it existed his attitude 
to it does not seem to have chamged. He always had reservations 
about Wildman's because he felt it was challenging the position 
of the traditional Whig hierarchy. 
Wildman's is important to this thesis because the mercan- 
tile element, as shown above was strongly represented there 
and was particularly active in the formulation of policy and 
leadership, especially through Sir William Baker. The club is 
also important because it played a significant role in the 
rise of Rockingham as a political leader. Rockingham was 
always able to remain friendly with both Newcastle and the 
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"zealous young men" and indeed it shows Rockingham for the 
first time in the light of a leader who could reconcile 
individuals who had very different points of view. The club 
because 
was also significant for Rockingham/he came into close contact 
with Sir William Baker and the "monied" and mercantile interests 
in national politics and those interests were to be of supreme 
importance during his political career. 
The importance of Wildman's as a cohesive force must not 
be overlooked. In the eighteen months of its exj stence 
the 
club must have done a great deal to unify the party- For 
the 
first time Newcastle and Rockingham were able to ascertain 
exactly who were their supporters. Only one person 
defected 
from Wildman's or regretted belonging to it during 
this 
155 
period. 
The rise of Wildman' s club was thus a very signif 
scant 
episode from the point of view of this thesis, and it also 
seems to have been a episode which to some extent has 
been 
misinterpreted in the past, mainly due to the polemical 
literature published by Almon. 
_ The 
1B O. This was Harcourt Powell. See Namier and. BrooKe 
House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. III, pp. 312-313' 
... 
/ 
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APPENDIX. 
THE LOCATION OF V! ILDMANt S CLUB. 
Some confusion has arisen in secondary works over the 
precise location of Wildman's club and it appears possible 
that Thomas Wildman owned more than one club or tavern and 
their walls were the home for more than one political club. 
It does seem from the statement of Walpole, however, and from 
the remarks in "Lloyds Evening Post" quoted above (P-20t that 
the tavern was opened specifically for the club. In London 
Coffee Houses (p. 648) Mr. Bryant Lillywhite locates Wildman's 
Coffee House at Bedford Street, the Strand, and continues by 
saying that it is impossible to reconcile the writings of 
Henry B"Wheatley in London Past and Present (London 1891), 
E. B. Chancellor in Annals of Covent Garden and its Neighbourhood 
(London 1930) and Annals of the Strand (London 1912) and the 
Survey of London (Vol. XXIX, The Parish of St. James, Westminster 
L. C. C. 1960). 
Wheatley in one place locates Wildman's house in Bedford 
Street, the Strand, and in another at the "Bedford Head" 
Southampton Street, Covent Gardena (See Lillywhite 2. cit. p. 648 
Cf. Wheatley op. cit. Vol. I, pp" 147-148, Vol. III, p. 515 and Vol. I, 
p. 143. ). 
He describes the "Bedford Head" as "a noted tavern for 
eating drinking and gaming in Southampton Street, Covent Garden" 
states that it existed as early as 1716 and continues that 
during the period 1760-1770 it was kept by Wildman, the brother- 
in-law of Horne Tooke, at one time an intimate friend of John 
Wilkes. Wilkes, in one of his letters to Junius states that 
'he' had long known dir. Wildman and for several years belonged 
to a club which met once a week at the "Bedford Head" (Wheatley 
op. cit. Vol. I, p. 143 quoting Letters of Junius Vol. I, p. 367. ) 
Wheatley' s work is based on A Handbook for London by 
Peter Cunningham (2 Vols. London 1849) but this work throws 
no light on Wildman's club at all, neither does Club Life in 
London by John Timbs. (London 1866) 
Chancellor appears to have plagiarised Wheatley but also 
to have come to: independent conclusions. In The Annals of the 
Strand (p. 46) he writes that Wildman's famous coffee house, the 
home of the Wilkeites was located in Covent Garden. He also 
notes that Charles Churchill refers to Wildman's in his poem 
The Candidate (London 1764 p. 11) but this poem contains direct 
reference to a proscribed opposition and I believe it refers 
to the "zealous young men" who frequented a club in Albermarle 
Street. This poem was mentioned in the Gentlemens Magazine 
for May 1764 and described as just published (p. 243. In April 
1764 Churchill was still working on the poem. See The Corres 
pondence of John Wilkes and Charles Churchill ed. E. H. Weatherly, 
New York, 1954 p. 83, n 14. ) and so appeared at the time when 
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the "Old Whig Wildman's Group" was making an impression on 
public opinion. In Annals of Covent Garden Chancellor identi- 
fies the "Bedford" or "Bedford Head" Southampton Street with 
the inn of that name at 41 Maiden Lane, Covent Garden and 
connects both Churchill and Wildman, the brother-in-law of 
John Tooke with it. From this it seems probable that there was 
a second club held at an institution owned by Wildman which 
had close tlilkeite association but at what date it is not clear. 
Neither list of members record Wilkes as being a member of 
Wildman's club (Cf. History of the Late Minority pp. 297-300 and 
B. M. Add. tiss" 32955 f409 "List of the Club" 9 February 1764? ý 
and in view of Thomts Wildman' s statement, Horace Walpole s 
statement and the fact that John Almon who was responsible 
for the publication of The History of the Late Minority wrote 
in his Memoirs of John Almon, Bookseller, of Piccadilly (London 
1790, p. 16) that 
"When the opposition club called the Coterie Evas 
established at Wildman' s in Albemarle Street (176-1) 
Lord Temple put 1Jr. Almon' s name in the regulations of 
the house as bookseller and stationer to the club. " 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Wildman's club with 
which this work was concerned was in Albeymarle Street and 
had no association with the Wilkeites club, if the latter 
existed at all. This view would seem to be supported by the 
L. C. C. Survey of London (Vol. XXIX, Parish of St-James, West- 
minster, Part L, The South of Piccadilly, London 1960, p"330 n. 
the most scholarly of the modern surveys. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
T HB WHIGS AND THE AMERICAN COLONIES PROM THE PEACE OF PARIS TO THE PASSING OF THE STAMP ACT. 
A. 1763-1764- 
The attitude of the Newcastle Whigs towards the American 
colonies has, for the most part, been summarily treated in the 
preceding narrative. It was however, not an issue that 
suddenly sprung into prominence with the passing of Grenville's 
American Stamp Act. Questions of American policy were of 
importance in the counsels of the Newcastle and Rockingham 
Whigs before 1765, but they were ususally subordinate to other 
matters and were considered by Newcastle merely as further 
issues on which to oppose the ministry. 
The bearing of the Canada v Guadeloupe controversy on 
the American colonies during the negotiations for the Peace of 
Paris has been noticed above. It is also to be noted that 
when Newcastle opposed the Peace he was not taking the territory 
versus commerce line. Instead of denouncing American conquests 
and demanding that they should be exchhnged for sugar islands, 
the finality of the continental acquisitions was conceded 
and the attack was concentrated on the impotence of Bute's 
ministry which had failed to secure anything in the West Indies 
after a year of additional success, Indeed, it seems that 
with Newcastle and his mercantile followers, particularly. 
Sir William Baker,,, the security motive had the strongest 
weight. This-was a shift in emphasis in established mercantile 
ideals. It involved a preference for territory where 
2a9 
acquisitions could best be justified from the economic stand- 
point becausei provided markets for British produce; IIPI 
was a preference for future safety both in the commercial and 
"security" fields. This was not a new colonial theory but 
the retention of Canada was to have significant effects on 
1 
the trends of British colonial policy after 1763. 
The next occasion on which-American affairs became import- 
ant to Newcastle was in the summer of 1763 when he was endeav- 
ouring to cement an alliance with Pitt. On 11 August 1763 
Newcastle wrote a long letter to Devonshire reporting a 
meeting oW1th: -Fitt. Pitt. Newcastle discussed the difference 
of opinion that had appeared at the meeting and stated that 
in addition to Pitt's ideas on foreign policy 
"the disturbances and insurrections in Ireland, the 
settlement of our colonies and new acquisitions in 
America, in which he(Pitt) was afraid, he might differ 
essentially with others, as perhaps, he might not think 
measures of power and force would be proper to obtain 
the view proposed, viz, the quieting of the insurrections 
in Ireland and the settlement of our Colonies, upon a 
proper foot with regard to themselves and their mother 
country. " 2 
Newcastle had also discussed American affairs with the Duke 
of Cumberland at this time and in his letter to Devonshire he 
I. See above pp. 94-a See also "British Motives for Expansion 
in 1763, Territory, Commerce or Security" by P. J. Ericson in 
Papers 'of the 'Michigan Academy of Science Arts and Letters 
Ann Arbor 1942, pp. 592-594. 
2. B. M. Add. Mss. 32950 f71 Newcastle to Devonshire 11 August 1763. 
The disturbances in Ireland at this time were associated 
with the "White 1ys" movement and agrarian discontent. They 
were also possibly associated with'the Earl of Northumberland to the Lord Lieutenancy. See The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century by J. A. Froude, London 1874, pp. 1-44. 
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informed the latter that Cumberland believed that 
" The settling our colonies in America.... must be done 
in such a manner to keep them dependent upon the 
mother country-" 3 
Newcastle thoroughly endorsed this opinion. 
It was at this time the British government was arranging 
the 1763 Ordinance. In the original draft, the Board of Trade 
under Shelburne, proposed that General Murray should be made 4 
governor of Canada without an elected assembly. Newcastle 
soon knew about this proposal for he commented to Devonshire 
on 11 August an the effect that this was likely to have on 
the American Mainland colonies. 
"Such an establishment.... I apprehend, Wouldthaketuthe 
very foundation of our Colonies, who would with justice 
expect that that would be their fate very soon. This 
would blow up all our Trade, and make such confusion 
there. that neither our old nor new settlements would 
be of use to this country. This would certainly bring 
Mr. Pitt forth in the strongest manner, and I apprehend 
is very contrary to My Lord Hardwicke's opinion, upon 
the subject of our Colonies. "- 5 
From this it becomes obvious that to Newcastle the chief 
value of the colonies was trade. This was a typically 
3. B. M. Add. MIss" 32950 f82 Newcastle to Devonshire 11 August 1763" 
4. See Kndillenberg op. cit. p. 98. The negotiations for this 
ordinance in which both Shelburne and Egremont played a 
leading part culminated in the Royal Proclamation of 
October 1763. On 8 July Shelburne had suggested the 
restriction of settlement in the west of Canada to avoid 
friction with the Indians. Egremont replied on 14 July 
suggesting that the western territory so reserved should 
be under the authority of the'Governor of Canada. Shelburne 
objected to this because the Governor of Canada would thereby" 
become in effect the commander-in-chief of American forces 
and suggested that the commander-in-chief be given command 
over the lands not included within a civil government. 
See The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations 1748- 
1782 by A. H. Bas-qe, New Haven U. S. A. 1925, Yale Historical 
Publications VOI. XIV, pp. 131-135 where it is also suggested 
that in this affair Newcastle obtained inaccurate information 
ý.. 
mercantilist attitude to colonies, but on the other hand it 
suggests that Newcastle must have regarded the merchants 
trading to the colonies as being of great significance if he 
considered colonial trade as the prime reason for the import- 
ance of the colonies. 
In a further conference with Pitt on 12 October 1763, 
Newcastle endeavoured to propose the issue of North America 
as a topic on which the Newcastle Whigs could co-operate with 
Pitt in opposition. On this occasion Newcastle asked Pitt 
if at the opening of Parliament he would r_otporpsothethe 
motion to thank the King for his proclamation to North 
America, as the full extent of the proclamation was not yet 
known. Pitt, however, refused to oppose such an address 
because "it signified nothing" and did at least show that the 
6 
ministry were doing something. 
Thus on the same day Newcastle wrote to Rockingham 
"He (Pitt) has now taken his part, and will on no 
account enter into an active part in support of a 
proper opposition. " 7 
American affairs next sprang into prominence in January 
1764. During the autumn of 1763 the Treasury had been invest- 
igating the custom house scheme for a revision of the, Molasses 
Act of 1733. Statistics had been gathered, opinions of 
merchants and colonial agents had been taken, and by mid 
4 (con7d) at secondhand. See also "Lord Shelburne and the 
Pr 2Ii=tdzoti of 1763" by R. A. Humphreys in English Historical 
Review Vol. XLIX London 1934, pp. 241-264. 
5. B. Iii. Add. Mss" 32950 f83 Newcastle to Devonshire 11 August 1763. 
6" B. i. Add. Mss" 32952 f7 Newcastle to Devonshire 16 October 1763. 
7. Ibid. f23 Newcastle to Rockingham 16 October 1763. 
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December 1763 the Treasury's plan for lowering the molasses 8 
duty and using it for revenue was known. Newcastle's interest 
in the North American colonies at this time was probably first 
aroused by a letter written to him by George Onslow on 25 
December in which he stated that 
"It is generally believed that the accounts from North 
America are excessively bad. " 
and suggested that Newcastle should gain further details from 
9 
Thomas Walpole. Newcastle knew of the proposals for the 
molasses duty by the middle of January 1764 for on 15 January 
he noted that he wished to discuss with Sir William Baker and 
Charles Townshend (1725-67) among other American issues; 
"The state of N" America 
The taxes to be laid there 
The molasses duty reduced to two pence.... 
The Stamps. " 10 
The position of Sir William Baker as a "semi-official" 
adviser on American affairs to Newcastle has been mentioned 11 
above. Charles Townshend was also regarded as one of the 
Newcastle Whig experts on colonial affairs. It was Townshend 
who, as President of the Board of Trade, had in March 1763 
first proposed that the molasses duty be reduced to twopence 
. 12 
a gallon. Material in the Newcastle Papers points to the 
fact that the discussions with either, or both Townshend and 
Baker, took place on 18 January 1764 but there is no evidence 
13 
of the result of this discussion 
" See "The Passage of the Sugar Act" by A. S. Johnson in William 
and Mary Quarterly 3rd series Vo1. XVI, No. 4 Williams-burg Va. 1959 , pp. 511-512. 
9. B. M. Add. Mss 32956 ff201-202 G" Onslow to Newcastle 25 December 
1763. Alarm had been created in N. America by the measures 
lirenville had taken in 1763. See Johnson loc. cit. p. 513. 
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For the next month the issue of America became of secondary 
importance with the growing excitement over the Wilkes case 
when the opposition was able to press the ministry so hard on 
16 and 18 February 1764. In the circumstances it was hardly 
surprising that American affairs receded into the background. 
Yet by 25 February 1764 Newcastle , in his search for further 
topics for opposition, was considering both Grenville's budget 
in general and the American proposals contained therein. He 
informed Charles Townshend that there would be good material 
for opposition when the budget was opened and dealt with 
specific measures stating 
"The next point of consequence arising from them (the 
budget proposals) is their disposition of North America: t 
The Duke of Devonshire has already talked to you upon 
it and you must suggest to us, what it may be proper 
to do there. 
But the great point of all is, that Mr. Pitt, Charles 
Yorke and you should thoroughly understand one another, 
and I see with pleasure that that may easily be-" 14, 
Newcastle wanted the advice and opinion of his expert on 
American affairs but he made it quite plain that to him 
following expert advice was of secondary importance to the 
achievement of unanimity among the factions and hierarchy of 
the Whig party. 
9. (contd) For an account of t-he co-operation between the aamiR 
istration and the merchants and lobbying by the merchants at 
this time see Agents and Merchants, British Colonial Policy 
and the Origins of the American Revolution 1763-1775 by Jack 
M. Sosin, Lincoln Neb 1965, p. 41 et seg,. 
10" B. M. Add. Mss. 32955 , f186 "Points" 15 January 1764. 
11. See above p. +120-121. 
12. See Namier and Brooke Charles Townshend pp. 38-40,91-92s, 
114-115,142-145. 
13. B" M. Add. Mss" 32955 f230 "Considerations for the Company this 
day" 18 January 1764.; 
14. B. M. Add. Mss" 32956 f104 Newcastle to Charles Townshend 
23 
February 1764. ' 
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In spite of Newcastle's desire for a plan of campaign 
It 
little attempt was made to concert measures. On 7 March two 
days before Grenville was due to open the budget Newcastle 
wrote again to Charles Townshend 
"On Friday is the Budget; no man in England knows better 
than yourself, what should be said, or done upon it; 
and therefore I am sure, you will judge what it may be 
proper to do. Sir William Baker I am sure will act 
with you-" 15 
Moreover, Newcastle had now become preoccupied with the 
replacement of Hardwicke, Lord High Steward of the University 
of Cambridge, who died on 6 March 1764. Townshend was 
Newcastle's chief agent in the election. He was sent to 
Cambridge and was still there when Grenville opened the 
16 
budget debate on 9 March. Thus on 8 March he rerlied to 
Newcastle 
"As to the Budget Sir William Baker has my papers; it 
is not a day for division: and you are to judge how 
far the election should give way to it. I shall 
obey not advise. " 17 
Newcastle evidently decided that the Cambridge election 
was of more importance than the budget because Townshend 
was not recalled from Cambridge. Townshend was, in any case, 
probably reluctant to come as he had previously spoken in 
15. Ibid. f250 Newcastle to Townshend 7 March 1764 quoted 
Namier and Brooke Charles Townshend p. 115. Charles 
Townshend had sp©ken in favour of American Taxation in 
theComanons on 7 March when Grenville had stated that he 
intended to tax America. Ibid. p. 114. 
16" Ibid" pp. 115,123.. 
17. B. M. Add. Mss. 32956 f248 Charles` Townshend to Newcastle 
'Thursday' (8 March 1764) This document is dated 7 
March 1764 but Thursday was 8 March 1764. Quoted-Namier 
and Brooke Charles Townshend p. 115. 
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favour of American taxation and would not want to lead an 
opposition. 1,. 2oreover he was at this time preparing to desert 
the opposition. In addition Pitt and Legge were ill on 9 
March and absent from Parliament as was Charles Yorke due 
18 
to the death of his father. It thus fell to Sir 'William Baker 
to lead the Newcastle Whigs in the House of Commons in answer 
to Grenville's budget proposals. Grenville opened the budget 
with a speech that lasted three and a quarter hours which 
contained among other proposals the Sugar Bill and the 19 
resolution which was to lead in 1765 to the Stamp Act. Baker 
made a short speech in reply upon a plan apparently laid 
20 
down and agreed with Townshend. 
Baker's reply to Grenville was by no means one of 
violent opposition. He criticised certain details of the 
domestic measures suggested by Grenville and went on to 
deal with the intended colonial measures. He believed that 
Grenville's proposal of a duty of threepence a gallon on 
foreign molasses was too high to allow the French West Indies 
to sell to the British colonies and that it would "throw 
the 
21 
trade into other channels" and suggested a duty of twopence 
18. Cf" Namier and Brooke Charles Townshend p"116. 
19. The fullest report of Grenville 's speech is in the Harrowby 
Manuscripts, Nathäniel'Ryder'ä Parliamentary Diary, 
Document 62. I am indebted to the Earl of Harrowby for 
allowing me to use these documents. At the end of the 
document there is a note that Grenville spoke for two 
hours and thirty five minutes. In B. M. Add. Mss. 32957 f5 
Newcastle to Legge 13 March 1764 Newcastle states that 
Grenville spoke for three and a quarter hours. According 
to Horace Walpole, Grenville spoke for two hours and 
forty minutes. See Walpole to Hertford 11 March 1764 
printed Correspongencq" pf''Horace Walpole ed. Mrs. Paget 
Toynbee Vol. VI, Pxford 1909, p. 25. 
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a gallon, rising later. Baker agreed with the duties proposed 
on the importation of foreign commodities into the colonies 
except that on indigo; he believed indigo was necessary for 
colonial cloth production and that the Carolina indigo industry 
was not great enough to supply the needs of the colonies. 
Thus in general Baker agreed with most of Grenville's proposi- 
tions. Nathaniel Ryder noted that he 
"Agrees perfectly to our right to tax the colonies. 
Thinks the power of the crown extends no farther over 
the colonies than it does in England. And yet this 
power has been exerted by orders passed there by the 
King in Council which have gone to the plantations 
as kind of laws-" 
Moreover Baker specifically stated that he did not object to 
an American Stamp Duty and made some suggestions fo22the 
improvement of the administration of the Stamp Duty. 
It is difficult to understand why Baker replied to 
Grenvil. e in this way. The budget was an issue on which 
Newcastle was hoping to rally the opposition; moreover it 
was a subject on which the Newcastle Whigs had apparently 
plenty of warning. Baker was the leader of the group at 
Wildman's who were enthusiastic for opposition and yet he 
20. B. M. Add. Mss. 32956 f342 Newcastle to Charles Towns e 
10 March 1764. 
21. Baker seems to have been right in believing that the duty 
was too high. See The Navigation Acts and the American 
Revolution by Oliver M. Dickerson, Philadelphia, 1951t 
p. 86 where it is also stated that after the second revision 
of the duty in 1766 foreign molasses almost replaced 
British molasses in the colonial market. 
22. Harrowby Mss. ' Nathaniel Ryder's Parliamentary Document 62 
Report of Budget Debate 9 March 1764. 
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missed a golden opportunity. Nor is the attitude he adopted 
23 
consistent with his attitude during the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Mr. A. S. Johnson suggests the reason why the 1764, budget did 
not rouse the opposition was because Grenville planned no 
new taxes at home, and intended raising all necessary funds 
for the coming year without resorting either to borrowing 
or to further demands on British citizens. He suggests that 
the House of Commons would not object to making the colonies 
24 
pay a tax that otherwise they would have to pay themselves. 
It seems likely that Grenville's proposals were sound and 
popular enough for Baker to find it difficult to rouse 
opposition against them. Although Baker was acknowledged 
25 
to be a strong speaker he was not a leading Parliamentary 
tactician, and he would therefore find it hard to oppose 
Grenville. Moreover it was unusual for a man of the status 
of Baker to lead the attack on a man of the status of Grenville. 
Indeed Newcastle himself seemed. satisfied with Baker's reply 
and ascribed the deficiencies of the opposition solely to 
26 
the absence of Yorke and Townshend. 
Newcastle now tried to retrieve his position. He made 
streýous efforts which achieved little success to arouse 
Townshend and Yorke against the American measures. He was 
23. See below p. . 
24. Johnson loc. cit. p. 513. 
25. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution 
p. 241.26. 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32957 f5 Newcastle to Legge 13 March 1764. 
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unsuccessful because Townshend would not oppose without the 
27 
support of Yorke who was unwilling to enter into opposition. 
When Newcastle tried to rally his friends by telling them 
that Townshend intended to criticise Grenville's budget speech 
Townshend grew annoyed and stated quite specifically that 
28 
this depgnded on Yorke's support. 
Newcastle had little chance at this time to capitalise 
on mercantile opposition to the American duties. Sir Lewis 
Namier ascribes the division of the opposition partly to the 
clash between West Indian and North American interests 
29 
especially on the molasses duty but the situation seems to 
have been more complicated than this. Grenville's proposals 
of 1764 were an effort to strike a compromise between the 
interests of the West Indian merchants and the American 
continental merchants. The planters interest was served by 
raising the duty on foreign produced zukaricand the threepenny 
duty on foreign produced molasses would lessen the demand 
27. Namier and Brooke Charles Townshend p. 118. Townshend's 
father also died at this time and this prevented him from 
attending the House of Commons. 
28. Ibid. p. 118. 
29. Ibid. p. 118. 
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for that commodity while encouraging the growth of sugar 
plantations, especially in Jamaica and the newly acquired 
Windwvard Islands. On the other hand the American continental 
interest was served because of the moderate nature of the 
30 
duties to be imposed. There is no evidence that the American 
merchants intended to protest against the molasses duty. On 
14 March 1764 West reported to Newcastle that on 22 March 
the American merchants would "apply (to Parliament) to be 
heard against so much as relates to the drawback on Foreign 
31 
Linnens" and on 26 March 1764 John Thomlinson discussed the 
new duties in a letter to his father and noted that British 
merchants would oppose the proposals on foreign linen but 
said nothing concerning any mercantile opposition-to the 
32 
other measures. In these circumstances Newcastle had 
no clear cut issues on which to rally 
30. The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol-X, 
The Triumphant Empire - Thunder Clouds Gather in the West 
1763-1766 by L. H. G pson, New York, 1961, p. 226. 
31. B. M. Add. Mss. 32957 f47 West to Newcastle 'Wednesday 5 o' clocl; t 
docketed 14 March 1764. Grenville proposed removing the 
drawback on foreign linen re-exported from Great Britain. 
This meant that foreign cloth would be as cheap when sent 
directly to the colonies and this would cause a substantial 
loss to British merchants. See also ibid. fl14 West to 
Newcastle 16 March 1764.1 
32. Records amd Letters of the Family of the Longs of Longville 
Jamaica and Ham ton Lodge Surre ed" R. M. Howard. London, 
1925, Vol. l, p. 226" John Thomlinson M. P. to his father 
John Thomlinson 26 March 1764. John Thomlinson 1731-1767) 
was the son of Major John Thomlinson (d. 1767) contd, ) 
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his mercantile followers. Moreover he was coming under 
pressure from Rose Fuller, who had chiefly West Indian, but 
also American interests. On 16 March Fuller wrote to Newcastle 
"He (Fuller) thinks the American Bill a very beheficial 
one to this Kingdom and most essentially to the Sugar 
Colonies - that he can see no reason for putting off 
the commitment of it beyond Thursday unless it be 
designed to give opposition to it, which he should be 
concerned to find and in which he could not joyn. The 
aforementioned Bill will not bear any delay for the old 
one expiring with the session (of Parliament) and there 
will be if it should be passed on Thursday, be(sin)cscarce 
time left to notifye the new one to prevent North 
America from being filled with French produce both of 
Europe and America-" 33 
It is again worthy of note that Fuller's attitude was in 
marked contrast to his attitude at the time of the Stamp Act 
Crisis when he was Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
House and was accused of partiality towards the Ministry and 
34 
the American cause. 
Newcastle's efforts to organise opposition were thus 
frustrated by the hostility of the West Indian interest, the 
equivocal attitudes of Townshend and Yorke, and the half- 
hearted nature of the opposition of Baker and the American 
merchants. It is not surprising that he now began to have 
reservations about opposing the American proposals. On 23 
32. (contd) For these see Namier England in the Age etc pp. 246- 
247. The family had strong connections both with the West 
Indies and New Hampshire and were both planters and merchants 
See Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol-III, 
pp-522-523. See also my Barlow Trecothic tc, pp. 23-24. 
33" B. M. Add. Zss. 32957 f116 Rose Fuller to Newcastle 16 March 
1764. Newcastle was apparently trying to postpone the committee 
stages of the bill in order to gain time to rally his forces 
and especially to get Townshend to consider the measure. 
See ibid. f87 Newcastle to Yorke 15 March 1764. The expiring bill referred to was the Molasses Act 1733. 
34. See Smith 
, Q2" cit. PP- 
14-16 and below pp. 378-379. 
25M 
35 
March he wrote to the ailing Legge urging him to send his 
ideas on the measure to Townshend but added: - 
"I rather think that it seems to be the opinion of 
some of our best friends that it would be imprudent to 
hazard any great point of consequence so late in the 
session and when we should not have time to proceed 
upon or carry into execution any measure of consequence, 
or any advantage, which by our success, or by the great- 
ness of our numbers we might prosper by it. " 36 
Legge began to gather information for a pamphlet to answer 
Grenville's proposals but it was of little use for Newcastle's 
differences with Townshend and Yorke were now approaching a 
climax. He was still trying to encourage Baker to oppose 
37 
Grenville but on 23 March Townshend wrote to Newcastle explain- 
ing that Yorke wished to avoid opposition on minor issues and 
that Pitt was of the same opinion and was against all taxation. 
Townshend could see no point in opposition unless it was 
strongly supported and explained that he had voted against the 
molasses duty in committee on the previous day "in civility 
38 
to Sir William Baker. " Thus on 23 March 1764 the Revenue 
Bill passed the committee of the Whole House "after a Debate 
39 
of several hours and a Division of more than two to one-" 
Newcastle now tried to get Rockingham to put pressure on Yorke 
to support., Townshend, he also wrote to Yorke himself urging 
35" Legge was suffering from the fatal illness which led to 
his death on 23 August 1764. 
36. B. M. Add. hiss. 32957 ff230-32 Newcastle to Legge 23 March 1764 
37. Ibid f173 Sir William Baker to Newcastle 19 March 1764. 
38. Ibid. f240 Townshend to Newcastle "Friday morning" 23 March 
1764. Baker had stated that he considered the duty on 
molasses too high and was thus likely to vote against the 
measure in connittee. See above p. a 
39. Israel Mau L it to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay 
23 March 1764, Massachusetts Archives Vo1. XXII, Bastan 1'9 3» 
Letters 1763-1773 pp-46-47 quoted Gipson op. cit. Vol. X, p. 225. 
25M 
40 
him to support Townshend, but Yorke declined to do so. It was 
novr that Townshend grew annoyed with Newcastle for saying that 
he was going to attack Grenville's budget proposals and 
Newcastle was forced to apologise to Townshend, pointing out 
that he had done it solely in the hope of rallying his friends 
and did not realise that the opposition depended on Charles 
41 
Yorke's support. 
It can therefore be concluded that the Newcastle Whigs 
failed to oppose Grenville's American proposals in 1764 mainly 
because their leader was unable to achieve any sort of unity 
among his followers to agree to a policy of systematic 
opposition. This suggests also that the opposition that 
Newcastle planned was not one of principle but one that was 
based on political expediency. In his search for an issue to 
embarrass the ministry Newcastle discovered Grenville's budget. 
When he found that the issue was not agreeable to all members 
of his party Newcastle was quite willing to allow the subject 
to drop and American affairs faded into the background until 
the passing of the Stamp Act when Newcastle went through almost 
42 
sit i-identicä1s o manoeuvres for similar reasons. 
In 1764 among Grenville's American proposals the Stamp 
Act resolution had appeared. Consideration of the resolution 
40. Ibid. f278 Rockingham to Newcastle 27 March 1764; ibid f288 
Newcastle to Yorke 27 March 1764; ibid. f290 Yorke to 
Newcastle 'Tuesday morning' (27 March 1764) 
41. Ibid. f296 Newcastle to Townshend 28 March 1764. 
42. See below pp. 255-273. 
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was postponed for a year. Various reasons have been put forward 
for this postponement. It has been suggested that Grenville 
wanted more information, that he wanted to establish a 
prededent of consultation with the colonies, or that he wanted 
43 
to give the colonies an opportunity to tax themselves. 
Professor Gipson suggests however, that one of the reasons 
for the postponement was because of the opposition that the 
44 
measure threatened to provoke in the House of Commons. This 
could well have been the case. Grenville was an astute 
Parliamentary tactician and he probably smelt danger in the 
Stamp Act proposals when they began to arouse opposition and 
thus pressed for their postponement. In 1764 the Newcastle 
Whigs were in a far stronger position to oppose than they 
were a year later. The mercantile element was newly unified 
by Wildman's and fresh from its success over the Wilkes issue. 
Legge and Devonshire who were dead a year later were in 1764 
at least theoretically, available to help to lead the party. 
Moreover, the merchants were beginning to become organised to 
protest. As long as Grenville could maintain the argument on 
the issue of right to tax he was on unimpeachable ground, but 
inevitably once the Stamp Act was put before Parliament 
expediency would have to be debated and here the merchants 
could speak from experience and Grenville could not. Grenville 
43. "The Postponement of the Stamp Act" by E. S. Morggn in 
William and Mary-Quarterly 3rd Series, Vol. VII, no. 3, 
Williamsburg 1950, pp. 353-392 also"The Preparation of the 
Stamp Act" by OR. Ritcheson in ibcid. 3rd Series, Vol. V, No. 4 
Williamsburg 1953, pp. 343-857.. 
44. Gipson qM" cit. Vol" X, p. 258 quoting Pennsylvania Gazette 
10 May 1764. 
I 
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was thus wise to defer the meauure and in this and in his 
whole handling of the budget proposals in 1764 he contributed 
no mean share to the inefficiency of the opposition of 
Newcastle and his followers. 
In view of what had happened in 1764 and what was to 
happen in 1765, however, it is interesting to note that when 
Charles Yorke asked Newcastle what measures of the administ- 
ration he objected to in November 1764 Newcastle stated amongst 
others 
It The Regulations in the West Indies and the new 
acquisitions of which I did not pretend to be a 
sufficient judge; But, that in fact, there was such a 
discontented spirit in all the Colonies, that it 
might cost much more, than we could spare, to keep 
them quiet-" 45. 
Thus among the Whig hierarchy Newcastle at least was 
aware that all was not well in the American colonies before 
the end of 1764. 
45. B. 1. Add. Mss" 32964 ff7O-71 "An account of what passed on 
a visit which Mr. Charles Yorke made me here this day 
in the presence of Mr. Fred Montagu who came with Mr. 
Yorke. " 21 November 1764.11 
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B. THE PASSING OF THE STAAIEP ACT. 
It is generally accepted that the Stamp Act passed through 
the British Parliament with very little oppositionn. This view 
has, however, been challenged by Professor F. J. Ericson in 
an article which perhaps has not received the attention it 
2 
deserves. This difference of opinion is significant for the 
present work because it is important to know how far, and for 
what reason, the Newcastle and Rockingham Whigs opposed the 
Stamp Act. This facilitates an understanding of both the 
development of opposition policy and the attitudes adopted 
by the members of this party and their mercantile supporters 
during the Stamp Act Crisis. 
The first debate on the Stamp Act took place on 6 
February 1765 when George Grenville reminded the House of 
Commons of the Stamp Act Resolution of the previous year. 
It seems that the best "first hand" account of this debate 
3 
is among the Harrowby Manuscripts and this is incomplete. 
Grenville, opening the debate, stated that taxing the American 
colonies was a difficult matter because of lack of precedents. 
He said that there was no doubt as to Parliament's right to 
tax the colonies and went on to justify this right. 
1. See for instance Miller off-. cit. p. 112. Namier, England ddin 
the Age etc p. 240. Horgan, The Stamp Act Crisis pp. 67-70. 
2. "The. Contemporary British Opposition to the Stamp Act" by 
F. J. Ericson in Papers of. the Michigan Acadeng of Science 
Arts and Letters Vol. XXIX, Ann Arbor 1943, pp. 409-505. 
30 Harrovwby Manuscripts, - Parliamentary Diary of Nathanial 
Ryder, Document 61. 
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Grenville then stated that the year's delay had been in 
order to gather information, and that the tax was necessary 
to defray the increased cost of defending the colonies and 
to help solve the economic problems of the mother country after 
the Seven Years War. He rejected the argument that America 
should not be taxed because it would cause disturbances there, 
remarking that all new taxes met initially with opposition and 
if the Stamp Tax was not enacted for this reason it would lead 
ultimately to not taxing America at all. Grenville concluded 
by explaining why the Stamp Act was the most practicable tax 
that could be enacted. 
Beckford replied to Grenville arguing the impropriety of 
this form of tax. He was the only person to dispute the right 
of Parliament to tax the colonies and he moved for the Speaker 
of the House to leave the Chair. He was supported by Barrg 
who stressed the lack of information about the effect of 
Grenville's previous American measures and by Richard Jackson 
who argued that in the case of Chester and Durham, Parliament 
had agreed to their representation in order to tax them. 
Lord Notth spuke in, favour of Grenville. but the opposition 
was sustained by one of the Towinshends and a'further speech 
4 ".. 
by Barre. _The Diary in -the 
4. Ibid. Document 61. For Jackson's speech see The Fitch Papers 
v vauavv V ivaav ü. io V V1-1GC11 º7VG1G VY V1.4. V LJ. J. 
Hartford Conne cut 1920, P-316.,; Richard Jackson to Thomas 
Fitch February 1IZ65;., ibid. p. 320, Jared, Ingersoll to 
Thomas Fitch , 11 February., 1765. - :- Jackson referred to 34 and 35 Henr"VIII, c 13 , 
and, 25 Car. II, c 9. The -To; vnshend who 
spoke against . the Bill . was either "S anish". -Charles (1728- 1810) or. Thomas (1701-80) or Thorns 
(1733-1800) 
but not ..., Charles (1725-67) who later spoke for the Bill. 
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Harrowby Manuscripts now becomes more fragmentary but Sir 
William Meredith, Charles Garth, Rose Fuller, Sir William 
Baker and Barre, for a third time in the famous speech in 
which he apostraphised the Americans as "Sons of Liberty" 
5 
supported Beckford. On the other side Robert Nugent, Charles 
Townshend and Charles Jenkinson supported Grenville. Ryder's 
notes are now not full enough to conclude which side Sir 
6 
Joseph Mawbey, Sir John Gibbons, William de Grey, and George 
7 
Dempster took but other information proves that de Grey 
supported Grenville and Dempster opposed him" 
Ryder's account terminates at this point before the 
debate had finished but further important information can 
be gathered from other sources. The only division during the 
passage of the Stamp Bill was taken in this first debate and 
this is the only occasion that it is at all possible to gauge 
the strength of the opposition. Alderman Beckford contending 
that the Stamp Act would "not go down" in the Colonies moved 
that the House adjourn. The motion was defeated by 245 votes 
5. This speaker described as "NugerMll by Ryder was Robert 
Nugent (1709-88) M. P. for Bristol. See "The Stamp Act 
Crisis: Bristol and Virginia" by WWJ. E. Minchinton in The 
Virginia Magazine of History-and Biography Vol. LXXIII, No. 
2, Williams-burg April 1965 p. 148. See also Namier and 
Brooke The House of Commons Vol III, pp. 218-222. 
6. "De Grey" was giving a legal o inion, thus it is likely 
to be William de Grey (1719-81) the Solicitor General, who 
wasýJery probably speaking for the administration. See 
Namier and Brooke The House of Commons Vol. II, pp. 308-309. 
7. Other evidence shows that Dempster both spoke and voted 
against the Stamp Act on this occasion. See Letters of 
George Dempster to Sir Adam Fer , sson 1756-1813 ed. Sir James Fergusson, London 1934, p. 85. letter of 26 January 
1775. See also "Scottish Opinion and the American Revolution" 
by Dalphy I"Fagerstrom in William and Mary Quarterly Vol. 
XI, 
WilliamsblargZ April 1954, p. 256. 
8 
to 49. There is no list preserved naming the minority but 
they seem to have been mainly those who had connections 
9 
with the West Indies or America. There is no indication that 
the supporters of the Rockingham and Newcastle Whigs were 
particularly strong amongst them. 
After the defeat of Beckford's motion for the adjournment 
on 6 February, Grenville introduced the Stamp Bill itself on 
13 February. Parliament refused to hear petitions against the 
Bill because they were against a money bill and because they 
cast doubts on the authority of Parliament. A petition from 
the London merchants trading to America and colonial petitions 
10 
were thus not heard. When Parliament refused to hear petitions 
another champion of the colonies, General Conway, emerged to 
protest against taxing the colonies unheard. His protest 
8. Miller op. cit. p. 113 quoting Parliamentary History Vol. XVI, 
p. 40. See also Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis pp. 67-68. 
See also The Bowdoin and Temple Papers, Collectionsof the 
Massachusetts Historical Society 6th Series, Vol. IX, 
Boston 1897, p. 49. Thomas Whately to John Temple 9 
February 1765 2juoted Gipson off. cit. Vol. X, P-271. 
9. Namier, England in the Age etc p. 240. 
10. Their reasons appear to be genuine. See Morgan "Postpone- 
ment of the Stamp Act" p. 394. In 1733 the House of Commons 
had agreed not to receive petitions against Money Bills 
except from the City of London which had special righýhs 
See Precedents and Proceedings in the House of Commons 
by John Hatsell, London 1818, Vol. III, pp. 230-233,237-238 
Cf" also Commons Journal Vol. XXX, pp. 147-148 and Fitch Papers 
loc. cit. 333. Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch 6 March 1765. 
See also "Charles Garth and his Connexions" by L. B. Namier, 
in English Historical Review. Vol. LIV, London 1939 p-650. 
Charles Garth to Committee of Correspondence of South 
Carolina, 17 February 1765. 
_ 
Cf. Sosin 2p. 
. 
Sit. p. 61. 
ý: ý.. 
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was, however, unavailing and the Stamp Bill passed to the 
committee stage where minor amendments were made and without 
11 
a major division eventually to the House of Lords. 
In the House of Lords there again seems to have been 
l2- 
little debate. Indeed in the following year when the Lords 
repealed the Bill and the minority protested, one of the 
reasons they gave was that it had passed their House without 
13 
one dissentient voice. This might possibly, however, be 
accounted for by the fact that there was already a constitu- 
tional precedent that the House of Lords did not interfere 
14 
with Money Bills. 
The evidence presented above is not detailed enough to 
reach any conclusion on the amount of opposition to the 
Stamp Act, and evidence of a secondary nature must therefore 
be considered. Professor Ericson states that the traditional 
interpretation of the easy passage of the Stamp Act is based 
on two statements, firstly one by Horace Walpole who refers 
to "one slight day on the American taxes" and secondly one 
by Burke in 1774 when he said 
11. Cf. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, pp. 157-192; Morgan, The Stampf 
Act Crisis pp. 68-70. In his Origin of the American 
Revolution p. 207 Professor Kn6llenburg implies there was 
a second division. on one of the petitions offered on 
15 February 1765. I have found no other evidence to 
support this conclusion, however,, Knollenburg would seem 
to have misinterpreted Ingersoll's words which do not " 
necessarily imply there was a second division. The 
Commons Journal Vol. xxx, p. 148 does not imply there was 
a division. Charles Garth did manage to get one amend- 
ment in the committee stage. See Namier, "Charles Garth 
etc" loc. cit. p. 651. Charles Garth to Committee of 
1:. Correspondence of South Carolina 22 February 1765. 
12. Lords Journals V01. XXXI, pp. 63 67. 
13. Ibid. Vol. XXXI, p. 308. 
ýý 
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" As to the fact ofastrenuous opposition to the Stamp 
Act, I sat as a stranger in your gallery when the Act 
was under consideration. Par from anything inflam- 
matory, I never heard a more languid debate in the House. 
No more but two or three gentlemen, as I remember, 
spoke against the Act, and that with great reserve and 
remarkable temper. There was but one division in the 
whole progress of the Bill, and the minority did not 
reach more than thirty-nine or forty. In the House of 
Lords I do not recollect that there was any debate or 
division at all. I am sure there was no protest. In 
fact the affair passed with so very little nafxe, that 
in town they scarcely knew the nature of what you were 
doing. The opposition to the Bill in'aEftglahdhc! tQ''r&AUld 
have done this mischief because there scarcely ever 
was less opposition to a bill of consequence-" 15 
In his Memoirs, Walpole partly contradicted himself for here 
he wrote 
It When Grenville moved the resolutions, Colonel Barr( 
was the first and almost the single man to oppose them 
treating severely Charles Townshend who supported the 
motion. Barr', Alderman Baker and a few more proposed 
to adjourn the consideration but were defeated by a 
majority of 245 against 49 after a debate that lasted 
till nine o'clock. On the fifteenth(February) when the 
bill was brought in Rose Fuller presented a petition 
from Jamaica desiring to be heard against it by counsel. 
This Grenville with heat and haughtiness, opposed, as 
it was a petition againsta money bill. Conway pleaded 
for receiving the petition showing the distinction 
between this and taxes laid at home, where the persons 
to be taxed have representatives with whom they can 
trust their interests, and who uan object to any designed 
burthens that may be too oppressive. Charles Yorke made 
a long speech against receiving the petition; but it 
was in truth a set speech in favour of the bill, and 
occasionally applied to the petition. The House ill- 
relishing opposition to a tax which was not to fall on 
themselves, the petition was rejected and the bill 
easily passed. " 16 
14. See The Law and Cust n, of the Constitution by Sir W. T. 
Anson 5th edn. ed. G. A4. L. Guyer, Oxford 1922, Vol. I, p. 282. 
15. Ericson loc. cit. p. 489, 'Walpole Letters ed. Toynbee Vo1V3II, 
p. 187 Walpole to Hertford 12 February 1765 " Burke' s 
speech on American taxation; oWorkt. VoL II , p. 414. 16. Walpole Memoirs Vol. II, p. 56. 
26a 
This description does not show that there was a great 
amount of heated controversy, but the bill does not seem to 
have encountered abnormally little opposition. Walpole noted 
particularly that the House rose at nine o'clock whereas 
another authority noted that the division was taken "about 
17 
midnight. " Rising at either of these times could be a normal 
days' business, if not slightly longer than usual'and the 
government does seem to have made some attempt to rule colonial 
petitions out of order. This, it can be concluded does not, 
fully agree with Walpole's statement in his letters or his 
remark in his Memoirs a few pages earlier where he says with 
reference to the Stamp Act "This famous bills little understood 
18 
here at the time, was less attended to. " These statements by 
Walpole, indicating firstly that the Act was little under- 
stood and secondly that the Commons were reluctant to oppose 
a tax that did not fall on themselves are of particular 
interest with reference to the Newcastle and Rockingham Whigs 
and will be considered later. 
Burke, as Ericson noted, also seeme to have contradicted 
19 
himself. Here the evidence is more concrete, for in the 
Annual Register for 1765 Burkeo ote 
1T. Morgan., The Stamp Act Crisis p. 68. Morgan s' about midnight" 
is probably drawn from Namier, "Charles Garth etc" p"650. 
Garth to the Committee of Correspondence of South Carolina 
8 February 1765. Perhaps it is possible to compare this 
with the sharply contended Cider Duties of 1763 during 
the course of which 6 divisions were taken. See Parliamnt- 
ary History Vol. XV, pp. 1307-9. 
18. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis p. 49. 
19. Ericson, loc. cit. p. 496. 
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"It must be owned however, to the honour of parliament 
that however smoothly the vote concerning the propriety of 
laying a stamp duty on the colonies might have passed the 
lower house in the preceding session, the final laying it 
on in the present was attended with no small debates, both 
as to the British legislature's right to tax the colonies 
without their concurrence, and the expediency of exercising 
that right, if any, for the present purpose; though the 
petitions questioning the jurisdiction of parliament were 
not suffered to be read in that house and the agents for 
the colonies refused to concur in another petition, which 
might have established a precedent of their being heard on 
behalf of their respective colonies against the tax. " 20 
In this Burke seems to show that there was some opposition 
to the Act. His statement quoted earlier was made later in 
his career in 1774 and by that time the Rockinghamites non- 
opposition to the Stamp Act had become part of their political 
doctrine as a matter of convenience as will be seen later. 
After disposing of Walpole's and Burke's statements Mr. 
Ericson continues by saying that the record of the passage 
of the Stamp Act through Parliament has to be drawn from 
accounts in the American press as the Parliamentary History 
is fragmentary. Ericson states that the various accounts 
"were contradictory but agreed that considerable opposition 
21 
was voiced within and without Parliament. " 
20" See Annual Register Vol. VIII, 1765, p. 34. It is not clear- 
when Burke wrote the Annual Register for 1765 but it would 
seem to have been after the formation of the Rockingham 
administration. See Cone op. cit. pp. 58,59,82,83. The 
point about the expediency in the quotation would seem to 
support this view. The second petition Burke refers to 
would seem to be a reference to Grenville's plan that the 
agents should agree to the taxation of America and thus 
set a precedent of consultation. Cf. Laprade loc. cit p. 745. 
See also "Edmund Burke; a Generation of Scholarship and 
Discovery" by Donald C. Bryant in The Journal of British 
Studies Vol. II, no. l, Hartford, Connecticut 1962 p. 103. 
21. Ericson loc. cit. pp. 493-4 who quotes London Evening Post 
January 15-17,24-26,26-29 as evidence of this. See also The Preliminaries of the American Revolution in the English 
Press 1763-1775 by P. J. Hinkhouse, London 1923 pp- 52. 
.:.. 
Ericson's contentions are to a large extent supported by. 
Professor Laprade who first of all takes Burke's statement 
in the Annual Register and comments that the opposition to 
the Stamp Act was not as little as is generally supposed, to. 
Secpndly, Professor Laprade states that. while the bill was 
on its way through Parliament the opposition, especially from 
interested circles in the City, became more emphatic, and 
notes that when Grenville asked if anybody objected to the 
right of Parliament to tax the colonies 
"The members with mercantile connections, who realised 
and were disquieted by the probable consequences of 
the measure may not have replied on this point real- 
is-ing the futility of their opposition... "Beckford later insisted he spoke against the bill. " 22 
With regard to the American press it is obvious that 
the correspondents of the American newspapers would like 
their readers to believe they opposed to the best of their 
ability what they knew was going to be an unpopular measure, 
and the opposition was more likely to be reported there than 
in England. 
There is also a degree of conflict in the reports on 
the debates given by Americans at the time. Benjamin Franklin 
23 
noted that the debate was less heated than many turnpike bills, 
Jared Ingersoll wrote two reports in one of which he stated 
that the opposition was chiefly from absentee West India 
22- 
23. in ed. A. H. Smythe, New York, 
planters and members connected with the colonies and 
2W& 
A few of the heads of the minority who were sure to 
thwart and oppose the mintst1y in every measure of 
what nature or kind so-ever. I say except those few 
persons so circumstanced there are scarce any People 
here, either within doors or without, but what approve 
the measure now taken with regard to America. " 24 
In a second report Ingersoll gave a full account of the 
first debate and commented on Barres famous speech 
" These sentiments were thrown out so entirely without 
premeditation, so forceably and so firmly, and the 
breaking off so beautifully abrupt, that the whole. 
house sat awhile as amazed, intently looking and 
without answering a word. " 
He however, concluded his report with the figures for the 
division and the comment 
" The truth is I believe some who inclined rather against 
the Bill voted for it, partly because they are loth 
to break the Measures of the Ministry, and partly 
because they don't undertake to inform themselves in 
the fullest manner upon the subject. " 25 
As noted above many speakers against the Act on 6 February 
1765 had connections with either the American or West Indian 
colonies. William Beckford, Rose Fuller, Charles Garth Sir 
William Baker and Sir William Meredith may be quoted as 
examples. There is no evidence, however, that points to any 
organisation of opposition by the Newcastle group, although 
Ingersoll perhaps associated Baker's speech with that of a 
26 
member of a systematic opposition. Mr. Steven Watson suggests 
24. See "A Collection of the Coreespondence and Miscellaneous 
Papers of Jared Ingersoll" ed. F. B. Dexter in Papers of the 
New Haven Colony Historical Society Vol. IX, New Haven 1918 
p" 317. 
25. Fitch Papers 2 p. cit. p. 317 et seg Jared Ingersoll to Thomas 
Fitch 11 February 1765. 
26. I refer here to Ingersoll's reference to "a few of the Heads of the minority who were sure to thwart and oppose the mincist#. k 
ibn every measure of what } hure or kind 
what so-ever. See above 'i. and n. 2;. 
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that there was an organised opposition or constitutional 
grounds and that Rockingham personally declared opposition 
27 
to the Stamp Act. The reports on the debates do not substan- 
tiate the first statement and I can find no evidence to 
support the second. If Rockingham did oppose the Stamp Act 
it is an extremely important fact but it is not consistent 
with his behaviour in the autumn and winter of 1765-1766 
when he was seeking information and considering what attitude 
28 
to adopt towards the Act. 
Ericson asks why, if the opposition was so great as he 
believes it to have been it was so soon forgotten and offers 
reasons for this. Firstly he suggests that the opposition 
became "confused with the rather divided stand of the Old 
29 
Whig group. " Newcastle, Ericson states, was anxious to 
alienate neither the American nor the West Indian merchants 
and cites Dr. Sutherland and Winstanley in support of thit 
30 
statement. This theory conflicts directly with the evidence 
presented above that opposition to the Stamp Act was coming 
31 
from both West Indian and North American interests. The 
Act would hit both North American and West Indian merchants 
and was one of the few measures which they could possibly 
unite against. Thus it seems probable that the co-operation 
27. Steven Watson off. cit. p. 106. 
28. See below pp. 326-366. - 29. Ericson loc. . p. 494. 30. Ibid. p. 494. Cf" Sutherland loc. cjj. pp. 50,54-55,58, 
Winstanley°`op. cit. pp. 214,218. 
31. See above pp"25258. 
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between the two groups of merchants at the time of the Stamp 
Act Crisis began in February 1765, and this was the first sign 
of the breaking down of the antipathy between them. Had he 
been able to organise a whole-hearted opposition it is reason- 
able to believe that Newcastle could have secured a compromise 
between the two groups. 
A more likely explanation for the equivocal attitude of 
the Newcastle Whigs is that their leaders were unwilling to 
allow a topic advocated by the "zealous young men" to become 
a major issue in opposition policy. ' This, is any case, was 
32 
a time when the organisation of opposition was weak. 
Grenvillets proposals were probably "little understood" 
by the majority of the Newcastle Whigs, as Walpole notes. No 
doubt members knew that if the Americans did not provide 
additional revenue they themselves would have to find it, and 
therefore they would be a little wary of opposition to the 
Stamp Act. Thus if they were 91 sorganised the Rockingham 
Whigs would probably have preferred to forget the episode. 
On 19 March 1765 Onslow wrote to Newcastle saying that 
Pitt was "not without his complaints of the American tax 
33 
not being sufficiently objected to this year. " Ericson 
cites this as evidence-of-the divided-stand of the Newcastle - 
Rockingham group. - The precise wording should be noted. 
32. See Winstanieyr op. cit. pp. 216-217. See- above p. 31. 
33" B. Iii. Add. Mss. 32966 - f69 Onsloiv ý to Newcastle 19 March 1765. 
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The word "sufficiently" suggests that there was at least some 
opposition and Pitt's comments would seem to mean that what 
little opposition there was, was not developed to the extent 
it could have been. There is no evidence in Newcastle's 
correspondence of any planned opposition to the Stamp Act. 
He, personally, did not reject a Stamp Duty out of hand for 
34 
he had considered one in 1766 and 1757. One is therefore 
led to the tentative conclusion that the "zealous young men" 
of the Newcastle - Rockingham group considered the Stamp Act 
as a possible subject for opposition and'began to use this 
topic. Finding they were not getting the necessary support 
from the traditional leaders of the party they dropped the 
issue although a few of the more extreme of the group at 
Wildman's carried on their opposition to the bitter end. 
It seems extremely unlikely that the reason why the 
subject was not developed to the full was the division of 
mercantile interests. Wh( seems more likely is a division 
of opinion among the Whig leaders. Charles Yorke, an important 
supporter of Newcastle was in favour of the bill. If the 
Rockingham administration were later forced to pass the 
Declaratory Act partly because of his scruples over repeal 
they were more likely to give way on what was a very minor 
35 
matter in deference to his-opinion. ' Thus Morgan points out 
34. For this see Jared Ingersoll A Study in American Loyalism 
in Relation to British Colonial Government by L. H. Gipson, 
New Haven, U. S. A. 1920 p. 116. See also "English Stamp 
Duties 1664-1764" by Edward Hughes in English Historical 
Review Vol. LVI, Londdn . 
1942, pp. 234-264. 
35. For Charles Yorke and the Stamp Act Repeal see below p. 361. 
For his support of the Stamp Act see The Life of Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke by Sir George HArrii. ,o on 14?, Vol. 
II 
x667 
the opposition had insufficient solidarity to force h straibht 
vote on the Act and could only force a division on whether to 
adjourn. the debate and Ritcheson suggests that with the 
growing reaction to Grenville's American measures of 1764 
there was a growing conviction that the 'Imperial Parliament 
should demonstrate its right to tax the colonies in a very 
36 
positive manner. 
Ericson's s1rcond reason for the fact that the opposition 
to the Stamp. Act was so soon forgotten is that the Rockingham 
group were willing to allow the story of their opposition to 
go by default in order to establish an excuse for so soon 
repealing the Stamp Act. This, states Ericson, they secured 
on the plea that Grenville had hurried the bill through 
before the members had "opportunity to inform themselves on 
37 
the head. " At first sight this argument might appear to be 
illogical because a party which stated that it had always 
opposed the Act would seem to be in a far stronger position 
to repeal it than one that did not. In fact it is not so.! 
If the opposition to the Act was at the best half-hearted 
and the party divided, Rockingham and his colleagues when 
in power, might have been asked the awkward question c--' Why 
they had not opposed the Act more and the unfortunate division 
in their party could have easily have become an effective 
36. Morgan, The Stamp Act -Crisis p. 68 Jtitcheson loc. cit. p. 
557. See also Natnier, ' CCharles Gart1 tc" loc. cit. p. 650. 
Charles Garth to Committee of Correspondence of South 
Carolina 17 February 1765. 
37. Ericson loc. cit. p. 494 quoting Considerations on the 
American Stamp Act and the Ministers who planned it 
London, 1765. 
I 
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weapon for the Grenvilleites. Rockingham and his supporters 
moreover, did not become interested in the question of the 
expediency of the Act until they were actually In power. At 
the beginning of 1765 they were interested only in the subjects 
which appeared theoretically good for opposition and with 
which they could hope to worry the government. Very few 
people in England at the beginning of 1765 could have real- 
ised'that the Stamp Act was to become a major constitutional 
political and economic issue. 
Professor Litprade summarises the position with regard 
to Parliament most succinotay. He writes 
"Parliament assembled in January 1765 in a vastly 
different atmosphere from that in which it had adjourned 
in the previous spring. True, the dismissal of 
General Conway from his army post for his votes on 
general warrants had insured the meddlesome activity 
of Thomas Walpole against the ministry. But Charles 
Townshend and Charles Yorke, being young men in a-hurry 
were seeking the greenerrpastures of ministerial power. 
Legge, Hardwicke and Devonshire had died, Shelburne 
was on a honeymoon, Pitt had quit the fight ill and 
disgruntled, and could not be induced by Newcastle to 
come forward. A suggestion that a weekly paper would 
help the cause found Almon willing to publish, but no 
one to write except the ineffective Walpole. This 
total dissolution of organised opposition did not mean 
a corresponding increase in the strength of the ministry 
though it did mean, as always in the eighteenth century 
that, lacking influential means to lend weight or 
influence to the-other side, the support of ministerial 
proposals was usually overwhelming. Under these 
circumstances, -when forty-nine members of the House 
of Commons divided against the Stamp Act in committee 
it is a misinterpretation of the facts to conclude 
there was little opposition to it. " 38 
38. Laprade op. cit. p. 744. 
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It is therefore more just to conclude that there was nobody 
to rally opposition, rathan thati there was no opposition. 
Outside Parliament and the Newcastle and Rockingham 
Whig group there appears to have been considerably more 
opposition to the Stamp Act. The Gentleman's Magazine 
describes the Act as the bill"that has been so warmly agitated 
39 
without dcmrs" " Opposition was great enough for pamphlets 
40 
to be written to defend the Act. The agents met with Gren- 
ville tp protest against the bill and they did not work with- 
out the aid of the American merchants. Barlow Trecothick, 
who was to be so important later as Chairman of the Committee 
of London Merchants during the Stamp Act Crisis, was 
chairman of a committee of merchants that worked against 
the 
41 
passing of the Stamp Act. As Morgan points out, the colonial 
non-importation movement after the Sugar Act of 1764, combined 
with the depression after the Seven Years War was making 
itself felt in England, but though they were generally 
opposed to the Stamp Tax the merchants had not yet become 42 
sufficiently alarmed to mobilise and concert their opposition. 
39. Gentlemans Magazine Vol- London 1765, pp-188-189. 
Ericson loc. cit. p. 496. 
40. See Ericson loc. cit. pp. 500-502. 
41. Ericson loc. cit. p. 497" See also my Barlow Trecothick etc 
p"27 where Trecothick's activities are treated in detail 
Cf. Jensen M. cit. p. 127. Morgan off. cit. pp. 63-64. For the 
work of the agents'see also Namier "Charles Garth etc" loci 
cit. pp. 649-652 Charles Garth to Committee of Correspondence 
of South Carolina 8 February 1765, same to same 17 February 
1765, same to same 22 February'1765. 
42. Morgan The Stamm Act Crisis p. 63. 
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Jasper Mauduit rej. orted in January 1765 "the merchants talk 
43 
much but cannot bring themselves to Act. " On 11 February 
Jared Ingersoll reported, however, 
"The merchants in London are alarmed at these things; 
they have had a meeting with the agents and are about 
to petition Parliament upon the Acts that respect 
the trade of North America. " 44 
There is no evidence, however, that either the merchants 
or the agents were concerting their plan of campaign with 
either Rockingham Ord Newcastle and the rest or the group. 
Indeed, there was no reason why the agents and merchants should 
co-operate with the parliamentary opposition. There was at 
this time no tradition of co-operation between the American 
and mercantile interests and the Rockingham Whigs and it was 
not an auspicious time to begin such co-operation while they 
wwere in opposition. Success was more likel3r to be achieved 
by petitioning the actual government in power. Ericson 
concludes by saying 
" The evidence presented in this paper does not prove 
opposition to the Stamp-Act in 1764-5 equal to that 
made in 1765-66. Neither the Americans, nor their 
merchant allies in Britain were as skilled in propaganda 
as they were soon to be. It is possible that the 
opposition by riot boycotting and political protest was 
so striking after 
the 
summer of 1765 that the more 
normal protests of the former writers sank into the 
background of mens'memories. Both Grenvilleites and 
43. Massachusetts Archives Vol. XXIII, p. 426 quoted Morgan, 
The Stamp Act Crisis p. 63. 
44. Fitch Papers op. `-p. 326. Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch 
11 February 1765. -On'15 February Rose Fuller did attempt to present a petition against the Act from the London 
merchants trading to America. See Pitch Papers op. cit. 
p-332. Jared Ingersoll to Thomas Fitch 6 March 1765. Bor these petitions see also Commons Journals Vo1. XCC, p. 147 where no London petition is mentioned but one from "Persons trading to and interested in the Island of Jamaica" which perhaps Fuller might have presented. 
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Old Whigs were willing to allow the facts to be suppressdd. 
Historians have too frequently quoted a few statements 
tending to prove that there was little dissension. 
However the most significant agitation was probably that 
mad4in committee meetings, private interviews, ' and 
activities outside Parliament.... Especially important 
was the aid secured(by the agents) from such men as 
Trecothick and Fuller, F: ", who were to be the key men in the movement for the repeal of the Act they had 
sought to prevent. Even the deprecatory list of 
opposing forces showed a respectable number, of political 
and economic leaders on Americas side. It seems clear 
that the old Whig party did not come out in full force 
against the Act; but this does not prove lack of activity 
on the part of the 'friends of America'.. '.. The evidence 
on the whole supports the contention that a large 
number of influential Britons felt that a significant 
innovation in colonial policy was being made and that 
they made vigorous opposition to it. " 45 
As far as the Newcastle Whigs were concerned this was 
not an episode during which they co-operated whole-heartedly 
with the mercantile classes. Nor was it an episode from which 
they learned a great deal which was to be of value in the 
future. Nor would it seem that the Rockingham administration 
took office with any preconceived notions on the correctness 
of the American Stamp Act. They did not have or evolve any 
policy on American measures at the time of the passing of 
the Stamp Act. The Newcastle Whigs did not come out whole- 
heartedly against the Act because leadership was lacking 
and as in 1764 there was a division of opinion among the 
upper ranks of the group. a'' : '. 7 . r. Newcastle and 
his intimate friends were sceptical of the group at Wildman's 
" Ericson loc. - cit. pp. 504-50 
awl 
and of any initiative coming from them. Yet some of the 
group of Wildman's who indulged in opposition primarily to 
embarrass the government must have known of the opposition 
the agents and the merchants were making. Because of the 
lack of evidence one cannot deduce any co-operation between 
the two groups, but at the end of 1765 when they were in 
dire need of support Rockingham and his colleagues probably 
remembered the activities of Trecothick and his friends 
at the time of the passing of the Stamp Act and realised 
such support was now invaluable to them. 
:? ýý 
C. THE 1765BUDGET AND THE P 
MUTINY AND QUAK 
OF THE AMERICAN 
0 
Shortly after the failure of the opposition on the Stamp 
Act, Newcastle twice wrote expressing dissatisfaction because 
of the lack of opposition to Grenville's 1765 Budget. 
Newcastle was particularly dissatisfied with the performance 
of Sir William Baker whom he believed had sufficient technical 
knowledge of finance to launch a full-scale attack on Grenville's 
1 
"plans of oeconomy. '" S 
Baker was probably restrained by reasons similar to those 
2 
that had'hdndicapped him in the previous year. Moreover, 
Newcastle's correspondence betrays no evidence of, any attempt 
to organise any opposition, to Grenville's 1765 budget. This 
suggests that the. factors that had weakened the opposition 
to the passing of the Stamp Act were still operating. At the 
same time, however, Newcastle's supporters do seem to have 
been making a conscious attempt to gain the support of the 
City when they supported in Parliament a City petition for 
3 
the rebuilding of London Bridge on 17 March 1765. 
On 1 April 1765, however, the Newcastle Whigs succeeded 
in arousing themselves on the American Mutiny Bill. Baker 
was in the van of the opposition and the clause which was most 
attacked was that which allowed troops to be quartered in 
1. B. M. Add. Mss" 32966 f103 Newcastle to Onslow 26 March 1765; 
ibid. fill Newcastle to Rockingham 26 March 1765. 
2. See above pp. 245-247, 
3. B. M. Add. Mss. 32966 f55 Onslow to Newcastle 17 March 1765; 
ibid. f79 Newcastle-to Onslow 21 March 1765. 
275 
4 
private houses. This was a cause that was dear to the 
Newcastle Whigs for it involved the freedom of the subject 
as much as either the Wilkes case or the Cider Duties had done. 
Moreover the North American merchants led by Barlow Trecothick 
5 
were active in opposing this measure. Although there is no 
evidence to suggest that there was co-operation between these 
opposition groups, each group must have been aware that the 
other was working towards the same end and this probably made 
the coalesence-of the two groups at the time of the Stamp Act 
Ctisis rar i er'. sy. The incident provides another interesting 
parallel with the Stamp Act. The two groups were again 
working independently to "oppose a measure. " Thuir efforts 
were again unsuccessful. When the two groups united in early 
1766 and Newcastle's party was in power they were successful. 
f 
4. Ibid. f136 Onslow to Newcastle 8 Monday night' (1 April 1765 
5. See my Barlow Trecothich etc p. 29. ' See also George Grenville 
to Welbore Ellis 27 April 1765 printed in Additional 
Grenville Papers ed. John R. G" Tomlinson, Manchester 1962, 
p. 266.: 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
TIT ROCKINGHAM WHIGS COMO TO POWER. 
A) NEWCASTLE AND ROCKINGHAM 1762-1765- 
During the period which encompasses the rise and devel- 
opment of Wildman's Club and the attempted opposition on 
American affairs Newcastle did not neglect established lines 
of attack on the government, nor did he neglect to try to 
conciliate his mercantile supporters in the usual way. 
Newcastle sought their help in elections and they were in 
turn rewarded with seats in the House of Commons. There were 
two notable examples of this in 1764. On the death of Frazer 
Honywood, the member for Steyning, Sir William Baker advised 
Richard Fuller to seek the support of Honywood's heir, Sir 
John Honywood, and stand for that borough. Sir John agreed 
and Fuller's candidature was successful. Fuller, a banker, 
originally in partnership with Frazer Honywood was a consider- 
a ble speculator in government stock. He received Newcastle's 
whole-hearted support and West commented to Newcastle about 
Fuller and his business 
"As the correspondence of the shop is very great having 
the draught of the Bristol banks, the very postage of 
their letters would amount to near £800 per annum and 
it is otherwise thought to be great service to the 
House to have one of the partners in Parliament. Sir 
Williemm Baker was one of the first promoters and has 
great influence over our Fuller-" 1 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32955 f320 West to Newcastle 31 January 1764; 
ibid. f426 John Butler to Rev. Hurdis 10 February 1764; ibid 
f434 Newcastle to Lord John Cavendish 11 February 1764. See 
Namier and Brooke \ The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, 
p. 477. Richard Fuller does not appear to have been related to Rose Fuller. 
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It was, however, not sufficient for a merchant merely to 
recommend a friend for in August 1764, when Sir George Colebrooke 
endeavoured to bring into Parliament a Sussex friend, Mr. 
Wicker, Newcastle received the suggestion with hostility and 
reported to another Sussex correspondent " all that Sir I}eorge 
Colebrooke could say could not rbconcile me with 1111. Wicker. " 
Wicker never seems to have entered Parliament and the case 
shows that if Newcastle was willing to go out of his way to 
oblige his mercantile friends he was discriminating in the 
choice of candidates he alowed them to make-2 
Newcastle tried to keep the City financiers loyal to his 
cause and to embarrass the government financially through 
their loyalty to him. On 4 November 1763 he wrote to Devonshire 
3 
that the "City was more determined than ever" to oppose. On 
18 January 1764 financial affairs appear in a memorandum for 
discussion by the party leaders. By 25 February 1764, immedi- 
ately after the opposition had run the government so close on 
the Wilkes issue, Newcastle was considering financial affairs 
4 
as an important topic for opposition. When the heat of 
this Parliamentary session was over and during the summer 
2. B. M. Add. Mss. 32961 f32 Sir George Colebrooke to Newcastle 
3 August 1764; ibid. f44 Newcastle to Colebrooke 4 August 1764 
ibid. f204 Newcastle to John ý , 13 August 1764. 
3. B. M. Add. Mss 32952 f285 Newcastle to Devonshire 4 November 1763 
4. B. M. Add. Mss" 32955 f230 "Considerations for the Company this 
day" 18 January 1764;. ibid. f104 Newcastle to Charles 
Townshend 25 February 1764. See above p. 218. 
I 
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recess Newcastle tried to keep in contact with his mercantile 
followers and still hoped to embarrass the administration 
5 
through the financiers. 
Newcastle was not the only leader of the party who cherished 
this hope, for on 30 April 1764 Charles Tovvrnshend wrote to 
Newcastle concerning opposition policy in the next session of 
Parliament and suggested, among other things, that 
"Sir William Baker should be desired to put the City in 
motion, both as an example to other counties and as the 
attack nearest home. " 6 
In September 1764 Newcastle was worried about the results 
7 
that the promotion of Dr. Hay would have among his supporters, 
and as late as March 1765 Onslovi reported to Newcastle 
"I hear from tin re ucdiced people that he (Grenville) has 
got no credit in the City and is thought there to 
govern by Amyand and Cust. Baker persists in it that 
he has shown himself ignorant and mistaken-" 8 
By this time, however, Newcastle seems to have had doubts 
about the loyalty of the financiers for he replied to Onslovi 
5. B. M. Add. Mss" 32958 f154 Sir William Baker to Newcastle 17 
April 1764; ibid. f236 Newcastle to Charles Townshend 29 'j 
April 1764; B. M. Add" Mss" 32960 f328 Thomas Walpole to Newcastle 
19 July 1764; ibid. f337 Newcastle to Sir George Colebrooke 
20 July 1764; ibid. f390 Newcastle to Thomas Walpole 25 July 
1764; ibid. f466 Newcastle to Sir George Colebrooke 31 July 1764 
6. B. M. Add. P1ss" 32958 f260 Charles Townshend to Newcastle 
'Monday evening' (30 April 1764) 
7. B. rd. Add. Mss. 32962 f53, Newcastle to Rockingham 8 September 
1765. For the promotion of Dr. Hay see above pp. 221-225. 
8. B. iT. Add. Riss. 32966 f55 Onslow to 'Newcastle 17 March 1765. 
For George Amyand (1720-63) and Peregrine Cust (1723-85) 
as financiers who sup i Grenville see Namier and Brooke 
The House of Commons 754-1790 Vol. II , pp. 20-21, . 291-293. 
nf 
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"I see Mr. Grenville' s credit gains every day notwith- 
standing Sir William Baker's private opinion that he 
is ignorant and mistaken. " 9 
This is a convenient point to turn aside and comment on 
the policy that Newcastle had adopted towards the City finan- 
ciers ever since his fall from power. While he was at the 
Treasury, Newcastle, as noted above, had forged strong links 
with the City financiers and had been careful to maintain 
10 
their friendship, for in an age when the government relied on 
private loans in advance to underwrite its expenditure for the 
current year the friendship of the City bankers and financiers 
was a valuable asset. These financiers were of two chief 
types. Firstly, there ware officials of the Bank of England 
and other great chartered companies such as the East India 
and South Sea Companies which had close links with the govern- 
ment. Secondly, there were the owners of and partners in the 
great private banking houses, men like Sir George Colebrooke 
11 
and Sir Joshua Vanneck. 
When Newcastle went out of office he persistently 
tried 
toi! -maintain the loyalty of both classes of financiers in the 
hope of financially embarrassing the new government, and thus 
eventually, it is reasonable to suppose, forcing himself and 
his friends back into office as the only men who could possibly 
negotiate a loaf. 
9. B. M. Add. Mss" 32966 f79 Newcastle to Onslow 21 March 1765. 
Newcastle seems to have had a more accurate idea of the 
situation than Baker. See B. M. Add. Liss. 38404+ f175 Joseph 
Salvadore to Charles Jenkinson 1 April 1765 printed Jucker 
off. cite pp. 352-353. 
10. See aTove pp. 91-22- 
11-See Namier Structure of Politics p. 58. See also Vanier and 
Brooke The House of Conmons 1754-1790 Vol. II, pp" 235-237" 
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This policy was foredoomed to failure. Newcastle failed 
to realise that the Bank of England was bound by the very 
nature tf its constitution to be in close alliance with the 
government in power as were also the chartered companies, who 
12 
depended both on the government and on the Bank of England. 
Moreover, lending money to the government, was to the great 
bankers, more a matter of business than of politics; they 
depended upon government contracts and the loans they could 
make for their livelihood. To rely on their support was thus 
to a great extent bound to be unsuccessful. Dr. Sutherland 
has pointed out how " each Treasury in turn took mss to forge 
13 
its personal links with monied interests in the City. " It 
thus seems fair to criticise Newcastle for embarking on what 
appears to have been futile tactics. With his long experience 
of politics and particularly his knowledge of the working of 
the Treasury it seems reasonable to conclude that he would 
at least have some understanding of the allegiance of the 
financiers. However, due to the peculiar circumstances of 
Pitt's relations with the merchants, his own with the City 
financiers and the split in mercantile opinion in the City 
of London, Newcastle had secured the downfall of the Pitt- 
Devonshire administration of 1756-7 partly through his 
12. For the close alliance of the Bank of England, the great 
Chartered Companies and the government see Sutherland The East India Compa y in Eighteenth Century Politics p"23 
et seq. also The Bank of England, A History by Sir John 
Clapham, Cambridge 1950, Vol"I, 1694-1797,1944 pp. 53-104. 13. See Sutherland "The City of London in Eighteenth Century 
Politics" 22" cit. p. 5j. 
1ý 
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alliance with the City financiers. Perhaps in 1762 he thought 
he could do the same again. It is true that after the end of 
1762 these tactics cease to loom as large in Newcastle's plans 
for opposition but it can be seen that he still had faint 
hopes of using them until the formation of the Rockingham 
administration. It seems that he was becoming more interested 
in maintaining the financiers as potential sillies when the 
Newcastle Whigs returned to office rather than embarrassing 
the administration. 
In 1763 and 1764 Newcastle also tried to rally opposition 
when the government made, what he considered to be, unwarranted 
dismissals. This policy can be seen when Major General At court 
and General Conway were dismissed in December 1763 and April 
1764 and also on the rumoured dismissals of Philip Honeywood, 
15 
Sir John Griffin and General Conway in December 1763. 
The only new tactic for opposition suggested in this 
period came not from Newcastle but from Charles Townshend. 
On 30 April 1764 when he was reviewing the prospects for 
opposition Townshend suggested the setting up of a daily 
14. Sutherland "The City of London and the Devonshire Pitt 
Administration" loc. cit. assim See also Sutherland "The 
City of London in Eighteenth Century Politics" ý" cit. T). 56" 
15. See B. M. Add. Mss. 32954 f76 Newcastle to Albe/marle 19 
December 1763; ibid. f122 Newcastle to Devonshire 21 December 
1763; ibid. f237 Newcastle to Devonshire 27 December 1763; 
Ibid. f223 George Onslow to Newcastle 26 December 1763; 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32955 f130 Newcastle to Albe/marle 10 January 
1764; B. M. Add. wiss. 32958 f192 Newcastle to Charles Townshend 
21 April 1764; ibid. f218 George Onslow to Newcastle 26 
April 1764; ibid. f220'Newcastle to Legge 26 April 1764; 
ibid. f236 Newcastle to Townshend 29 April 1764; Por William 
AiCö. t see, Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-90 
Vol. II, p. 5 for , 
Philip Honeywood see ibid. -pp-635-63U' for 
Sir John Griffin see ibid. Vol. il , pp. 553-555. 
2za 
16 
opposition newspaper. This plan was taken up to a certain 
extent by Newcastle but he never tried it as whole-heartedly 
17 
as he did the more traditional tactics. Moreover in 1764 
Newcastle was not only preoccupied with traditional opposition 
policies but also perturbed by his traditional fear of an 
investigation into his organisation of Treasury finance during 
18 
the Seven Years War. 
Thus when negotiations which were to lead to the formation 
of the first Rockingham administration were set on foot in 
1765, Newcastle had been out of power for almost exactly three 
years. Immediately after his dismissal he had tried to 
embarrass the administration by seeking to maintain the 
loyalty of the government financiers. At first this policy 
was used to persuade Bute that Newcastle was essential to an 
administration. It had succeeded with the Pitt-Devonshire 
19 
administration. After optimism about the success of this policy 
Newcastle had gradually lapsed into opposition to the government. 
The failure of his policy was hastened because the administration 
were able to conclude peace and emphasised by the traditional 
20 
loyalty of the financiers to the government in power. 
Newcastle was thus forced to search around for other 
16. B. M. Add. reiss. 32958 f260 Townshend to Newcastle 30 April 1764. 
See above p. 
17. B. 11. Add. Mss. 32958 f311. Newcastle to Camberland 5 May 1764; 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32959 f125 Newcastle to Legge 27 May 1764; see 
also, Laprade 1oc. cit. p. 
744 quoted above p. 269, 
18. See Newcastle s correspondence with Barrington in-B. 11. 
Add-Mss-32955 and 32957. 
19. See above pp. 12 t 1. 
20. See above pp-13 nd 
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means of opposition. He tried to use the peace terms and the 
dismissal of the Duke of Devonshire. His efforts failed 
because of the reluctance of the other members of the Whig 
hierarchy to enter into a full-scale opposition. The pleas 
of Hardwicke and Yorke for "consistency" and "moderation" can 
usually be ascribed to their fear of promoting an opposition 
that could be described as factious and tainted with disloyalty 
21 
to the Crown. Newcastle sought support from the hierarchy of 
his own party, or through alliance with the leaders of another 
Whig group rather than trusting in the younger and more violent 
22 
members of his own party. Thus the most successful attack on 
the government in 1763 was the attack on the Cider Duties 
23 
when Newcastle had the support of Pitt. But the general lack 
of success of Newcastle's tactics may be seen in the fact 
that he was nearest returning to power when his opposition 
24 
was at its lowest ebb. 
When Wildman's club was formed there was a growing breach 
between Newcastle and the "zealous 
because Newcastle was reluctant to 
25 
support elsewhere. How smallapart 
of Wildman's club demonstrates how 
26 
by the rest of the Whig hierarchy. 
organisation needed his support is 
young men" of his party 
trust them and sought 
he played in the formation 
much Newcastle was restrained 
Yet, how much this 
shown by the fact that 
21. See above p. 182 et. seq. 
22. See above p. 183 ems. 
23. See above pp. 179-181. 
24. See above p. 183. _v e 25. See above pp. 2P5-201s. 
26. See above pp- 196-210, 
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Wildman's was nearest to success over the Wilkes issue and 
27 
on this they had the full support of Newcastle. This success 
was not followed up and because of weaknesses in leadership 
and divisions in opinion the club was unable 4degUete1rctp 
attack Grenville's American measures of 1764 and 1765. This 
exemplifies the paralysing effect of the divided stand of 
28 
Newcastle and other members of the party hierarchy. 
Thus in late 1764 and early 1765 the rift between 
M 
Newcastle and the "zealous young men" continued to grow. 
Mutual suspicion was increased particularly by the "Dr. Hay 
29 
affair- It In the middle of 1765 Newcastle was no longer able 
to bridge this gap. There was only one man who could; this 
was Rockingham. 
In October 1761 Newcastle had regarded Rockingham as 
30 
an important local territorial magnate, but as Newcastle's 
position weakened after the fall of Pitt and he did all in 
his power to rally the dwindling number of his supporters, 
his contact with Rockingham increased. In a world where 
Newcastle felt his power to be slipping away from him it was 
perhaps natural that he should look to Rockingham because 
he wielded more power than any of the other Whig Lords and 
because it was essential to maintain the loyalty of Yorkshire 
to the Old Whig cause. In the final crisis that led to 
bee above pp-; 2i4: -216, . 
28. See above pp. 238--254.;. 
29. See above pp- 991=2-2. %. 
30. See above pp" J93-39. ßZ.. 
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Newcastle's resignation he kept in close contact with the 
young Marquis, informing him of events and it is indicative 
of his attempts to maintain Rockingham's loyalty, that one 
of Newcastle's last acts at the Treasury was to secure certain 
31 
appointments which Rockingham wanted. This suggests that 
Rockingham was becoming more than a local territorial magnate. 
When Newcastle hesitated on the brink of opposition in 
1762 after his resignation, Rockingham's importance increased. 
Because of the disgust in Yorkshire over the Peace of Paris 
Rockingham was able if 2a. ZP Jo identify himself with the 
manoauvres of Newcastle in opposing the peace. It was 
perhaps fortunate that Newcastle decided to oppose the peace 
otherwise bath he and Rockingham would have found embarrassing 
the speeches of Savile and Armytage which were representive 
32 
of the discontent in Yorkshire. Rockingham was thus able o 
strengthen his position in the Old Whig party while adopting 
a policy that was popular with his Yorkshire supporters. 
When in December 1762 Rockingham resigned his post of 
Lord of the Bedchamber and was subsequently dismissed from 
his Lord-lieutenancy he had concerted measures with Newcastle 
and he was one of the "Pelhamite Innocents". These events 
were followed by a spontaneous outburst of support in 
31. See above p. laß. See also B. M. Add. Mss. 32938 f291 Rockinngharn 
to Newcastle 15 May 1762; ibid. f427 Newcastle to Rockingham 
24 May 1762. 
32. See "The Rockingham Connection and County Opinion in the 
Early Years of George III" by C. Collyer in Proceedings of 
the Leeds Philosophical Society (Literary and Historical 
Section) Vol" VII, part IV, Leeds 1955, pp. 251-268.. 
25%. 
Yorkshire which were heightened by the management of the 
demonstrations by Rockingham's 
33 
Rockingham Club at York. His 
to Newcastle was again clearly 
presented no Address of Thanks 
agents, particularly in the 
power in Yorkshire and allegiance 
shown in 1763 when Yorkshire 
34 
for the Peace of Paris. 
In the following years while Newcastle's power declined 
Rockingham strengthened his position in the party. While 
the Old Whig hierarchy was restraining Newcastle in opposition 
Rockingham was able to identify himself with the "zealous 
young men-" 
It was Rockingham at the meeting of 23 December 1762 
who gave into the idea of a club, and he was able to do this 
35 
it seems, without arousing the displeasure of the hierarchy, 
36 
although there was an attempt to restrain him at this time. 
In 1763 and 1764 Rockingham was again able to maintain 
authority over the "zealous young men" without incurring 
the displeasure of the Old Whig hierarchy. Several reasons 
may be offered for this. To some extent his vehemence may 
have been excused because of his youth, he was often absent 
in Yorkshire and was thus inaccessible to the rest of the 
leaders while Newcastle continually embroiled himself in 
controversies. - Moreover Rockingham already had a reputation 
37 
for disinterestedness in politicsy and he also pursued the 
recognised lines of opposition. He was for instance instru- 
mental in securing the support of Pitt in the agitation 
33" Ibid. pp. 258-260.34. Ibid. pp. 260-261. 
35. See above p" t 36. See above P-1-61;. 
37. See above pp" 5-9T;. 
" `x'-87 
38 
against the Cider Duties. 
As the breach between Newcastle and Wildman's widened 
Rockingham became more important as a mediator. Dr. Sutherland 
has noted that it was Wildman's that helped to gain the 
support of the mercantile classes for the first Rockingham 
39 
administration and Rockingham was in a fortunate position 
at this time. Secure in Newcastle's good will he was able 
at the same time to exercise a restraining influence and 
leadership over the "Wildman's Group". Rockingham was not 
afraid of men like Sir William Baker whose outspoken opposi- 
tion Newcastle found embarrassing and moreover Rockingham 
was being consulted by the "Wildman's Group" whereas Newcastle 
0 
was not. At the beginning of 1765 Rockingham was co-operating 
closely with the group at Wildman's in organising the 
41 
opposition for the coming session of Parliament. 
Everything was thus beginning to point to him as the 
next leader of the Old Whigs. The deaths of Hardwicke, Legge 
and Devonshire had not only removed Rockingham's rivals but 
made Newcastle lean more heavily upon him Perhaps he was 
42 
diffident and of mediocre ability and he may have desired to 
38. See above, P. M. 
39. Sutherland "Edmund Burke and the First Rockingham 
Administration" loc. cit. p. 150. 
40. Guttridge The Early Career of Lord Rockingham p. 31. 
41. See above pp-249-240. See also B. d. L ss. 32965 flO 
Rockingham to Newcastle 2 January 1765; ibid. f28 
Rockingham to Newcastle 3 January 1765; ibid. f36 Onslow to 
Newcastle 4 January 1765. 
42. The traditional view of Rockingham' s ci le ºoncbot wdrds 
politics and mediocre abilities is still accepted by most 
authorities. See for instance Steven Watson on" cit. p. 113 
and the introduction to Vol- IV of The Correspondence of 
Edmund Burke ed. John A" Woods, Cambridge 1963. Part of 
g88 
be neither a party leader nor a national politician but the 
fact that he represented the aristocratic Whig principles of 
the Newcastle group, his associations in Yorkshire and his 
gift of "reconciling individuals and inspiring devotion among 
43 
a group" drove him into the party leadership. As Burke wrote 
for Rockingham's epitaph, he 
"far exceeded all other statesmen in the art of drawing 
together, without the seduction of self-interest, the 
concurrence and co-operation of various dispositions 
and abilities of men whom he assimilated to his 
character and associated in his labours. " 44 
In 1765 the Duke of Cumberland thus found him the only 
alternative to Grenville, and in selecting Rockingham as 
leader of a ministry clarified Rockingham's position as 
leader of a party and made hire a national politician. This 
event was supremely important for Newcastle's successor had 
to be not only a man able to secure the allegiance of a 
party but also a man who had at least some experience in the 
art of government. 
42, contd the intention of this thesis is to challenge this 
notion, see above p. A, but it is not on the other hand 
maintained that Rockingham was full of enthubiasm for 
politics or a politician of genius. The connection of 
this diffidence with Rockingham's health is dealt with 
below p. 294. 
43. Collyer, "The Rockingham Connection etc" loc. cit. p. 261. 
44. Quoted Albe/marle off. cit. Vol" II, p" 245. 
T. 
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B) THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST ROCKINGHAM ADMINISTRATION. 
In July 1765 Rockingham did not begin his term of office 
with his own mercantile following. This support had to be 
painstakingly built up through the Stamp Act Crisis and the 
1 
succeeding commercial measures. When he came to power he was 
young and inexperienced but he gained recognition as leader of 
the Newcastle Whigs and when it became obvious that Rockingham 
was to be first minister he inherited from Newcastle certain 
commercial connections. In the formation of the ministry 
one can trace a certain "formal donation" of mercantile 
supporters from Newcastle to his successors, and Newcastle, 
who had determined to remain in the background, passed on to 
Rockingham the commercial and financial support that remained 
to him after the years of opposition. 
No claim van be taade however, that Rockingham came to ppwer 
with the unanimous backing of the mercantile classes. It 
must, for example, be noticed that the Grenville administvation 
was not without its own commercial backing and on 7 July 1765 
Lord Hyde wrote to George Grenville that 
"Many monied men and merchants (among others Mr. Harley) 
grieve at your intended removal. " 2 
1. See below I?. 326-409, 
2. See The Grenville Papers(Being the Correspondence of' 
Richard Grenville, Earl Temple R. C. and Right Hon. George 
Grenville) ed. W. J. Smith, -, London 1853, p. 69. For Thomas 
Harley (1730-1804) see Namier and Brooke The House of 
Commons 1754-1790 Vo1" II, pp. 586-588. He was the fourth 
son of Edward Harley, '"3rd Earl of Oxford. A wine merchant, he spoke for general warrants yet voted against them. He 
voted against the Cider Duties and also against the repeal of the Stamp Act. In 1768 he became Lord Mayor of London. 
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Moreover, Grenville's wife recorded in her diary for Friday 
19 July 1765 that 
"The Governors of the Bank came to Mr. Grenville, said they 
did it as a mark of respect, that they sincerely lamented 
his dismission and could never do business with any man 
with the same ease that they had done it with him. " 3 
To understand the way in which Rockingham achieved high 
office and gained Mercantile support before the Stamp Act 
Crisis it is necessary to trace the development of the 
negotiations begun by the Duke of Cumberland in early May 
4 
1765 to restore Pitt and Newcastle to power. In the early 
days of these negotiations the group at Wildman's, in which 
the mercantile element led by Sir William Baker was strong, 
were more in favour of Pitt taking office than even Newcastle 
was himself, and he was very much afraid that they would ruin 
the negotiations. Regarding this he wrote to Rockingham on 
1 June 1765 that 
"Our friends (Wildman's) must be prudent, avoid'any 
offensive discourse on either side; and not be running 
officiously to Hayes which can do no good, and may 
produce great mischief. " 5 
Because Newcastle was reserved and did not seem to be throwing 
himself whole-heartedly into the attempt to bring the negotia- 
tions to a successful conclusion he earned the opprobrium of 
3. The Grenville Papers Vol. III, p"220" The diary that Smith 
describes as Grenville's`was"in fact-written by his wife. 
See Thomlinson 22. cit. p. 4 et seQ. See also Savadge 
, 
off,. cit p. l 
4. See W. W. M. R13 "The Duke , of Cumberland's narrative of changes 
in the ministry"' pp. 9-il. For' an account of the earlier 
negotiations -see The Duke of Newcastle's Narrative of the 
Changes-in the Ministry 1765-1767 ed. -Mary Bateson, Royal Historical. Society, London 1692, PP. 1-20. See also "John Roberts M. P. and the first Rockingham Administration" by J. E. Tyler in English Historical Review Vol. LXXVI, Londo 1932, pp. 5427-560. " For a general account of these negotiations see Winstanley op. cit. p. 220 t sue. 
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6 
Sir William Baker. Yet Newcastle was sufficiently in sympathy 
with the group at Wildman's to recognise their Aspirations for 
7 
a ministry with Pitt at its head. 
When the negotiations with Pitt had finally broken down 
Newcastle, although he was personally determined not to hold 
8 
high office, on 27 June 1765 put forward his own plan for an 
administration, nominating Rockingham as First Lord of the 
9 
Treasury. It was finally agreed at a meeting held at Newcastle's 
house on 31 June 1765 that they should endeavour to form a 
new administration and insist that some of Bute's principal 
friends should be removed. 
There was some dissension at the meeting. Rockingham, 
Newcastle, Lords George John and Frederick Cavendish, Conway 
and Portland were part of a majority who agreed to try to 
form a ministry while George Onslow, Thomas Walpole and Charles 
Townshend (1725-1767) were of the opinion that the attempt 
10 
should not be made in the existing circumstances. 
5. B. M. Add. Mss" 32967 f3 Newcastle to Rockingham 1 June 1765" 
Pitt was living at Hayes at this time. 
6. Ibid. f8 George Onslow to Newcastle "Thursday noon" 6 June 
1765. Also the negotiations were apparently rendered more 
difficult because the riots of the weavers on 15 and 16 
May 1765 made it appear as if a change in administration 
would be giving in to the riots. See W. W. AI. R13 "The Duke 
of Cumberlands Narrative etc" pp. 24-27. 
7. See ibid. f53 Newcastle-to Portland 17 June 1765 quoted 
above p.: 232. 
8. Ibid. fl43 Newcastle to Ashburnhäm 27 June 1765; ibid f157 
Newcastle to Albemarle 29 June'1765. See also Bateeon 
M. cit., pp. 22-33.. 
9. See ibid ff128-139 "Plan' of a new administration 27 June 1765'i 
see also ibid f142 Newcastle, to. Ashburnham 27 June 1765" 
10. See W. W. Iii. R1-455 Newcastle-to Albemarle printed Albemarle 
off. cit. Vol. I, pp. 218-220; Walpole Memoirs Vol. II, p. 134. 
4m 
Rockingham's rise to the position of first minister had 
been unusual. Although in the negotiations with Pitt in August 
1763 he had not seemed unwilling to accept the post-of First 
11 
Lord of the Admiralty, on 7 May 1765, hcý. be Zä ý 1:; ý, u 
found that Rockingham 
"Objected to any employment for himself, believing he 
might be of more use (as) an independent man, than 
personally engaged in the Service. " 12 
Later however Cumberland wrote that although Rockingham 
"from private reasons and inclinations, prefers a private 
life and really thinks he might be equally useful to his 
King and Country; yet when he saw the shyness of our 
friends, he shook off his natural dislike and was ready 
to kiss the King's hand in (what)ever shape was most 
for the public service in general. " 13 
Thus, before 27 June, Although Rockingham had refused the 
post of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland he had accepted the more 
14 
sinecurial office of Lord Chamberlain. And yet Rockingham 
possessed a very real claim to lead a ministry. Cumberland 
and the King may have been more willing to accept him because 
the administration was regarded by them purely as a stop-gap 
15 
until the services of Pitt could be secured. Rockingham was 
11. B. M. Add. Mss" 32950 Hardwicke to Newcastle 5eptemoer j. -too"i 
See also Winstanley off,,. cit. p" 174 and also p. l$Q. abpve. 
12. W. W. M. R13 "The Duke of Cumberland's Narrative etc" p. 12. 
13. Ibid R13 pp"22'23. 
14. B. M. Add. Ilss" 32966 ff395-401 Memorandum 15 May 176,5. Cf. 
The Correspondence of Ring George III, ed" Hon. Sir John 
Fortescue, Vol. I, 1760-1768 London 1927 p. 92 No- 61. See also 
Additions and Corrections to Sir John Fortescue's Edition 
of the Correspondence of George III , Vol-Ts by L. B. Namierv 
Manchester 1937, p. 43. See also W. W. M. R1-454 Sir William 
Meredith to Rockingham 29 June 1765; ibid R1-473 Rockingham 
to Sir William Meredith n. d. but may be dated from internal 
evidence as July 1765.1 
15. See for instance B. L. T. Add. Mss. 32967 f3 Newcastle to Rockingham 
1 June 1765.. 
ab 
too inoffensive to irritate Pitt, and was probably regarded 
as the sort of person who would do very little to entrench 
himself in power. George III in July 1765 was in no position 
to realise that Rockingham would have to face a crisis of the 
first magnitude in America and that his ministry would, as a 
result, inaugurate against the King's wishes, a policy towards 
the American colonies which was, in many senses, revolutionary. 
In 1765 the King had to have as the leader of a new 
administration someone who could command votes in the House 
of Commons and Rockingham could do this more than any other 
of the leaders of his party. The "Old Whigs" were almost of 
a "federal" nature at this time. There was a group that 
acknowledged Newcastle as leader, another group led by Rocking- 
ham and other smaller groups led by men such as Portland, the 
Cavendishes, Richmond and Sir George Savile. Rockingham 
was the only man who could command the loyalty and allegiance 
of all these groups. When Pitt refused to form an adminis- 
tration the only other obvious leader of a new government 
was the ageing Duke of Newcastle, but when it became obvious 16 
that he was more intent on playing the "elder statesman" 
than leading the administration Rockingham was presented to 
George III as the only possible alternative to the"hated" 
Grenville. 
Rockingham's explanation in a letter to Sir William 
Meredith in July 1765 would seem to be an accurate account 
of the situation. 
16. See above p. and note 8. 
W4 
It It must surprise you to know that I am at the head of 
the Treasury, especially when you knew I would not 
undertake Ireland from the situation, of my health and 
the difficulties I thought might ensue, but indeed the 
necessity here, made it necessary that something 
should be done, and therefore however unsuitable I 
might be for that office from my health and inexper- 
ience in the sort of business, yet I thought it incumbent 
on me to acquiese in the attempting it, rather than 
throw any fresh confusion into the negotiations which 
had too mt zydifficulties without nW adding to them by 
a refusal of which my own private care and comfort 
have no doubt strongly inclined me to-" 17 
Once it was decided that Rockingham was to lead the new 
administration Newcastle gave him every assistance although 
he later et4td4hat 
"The putting my Lord Rockingham at the Head of the 
Treasury and thereby making him the first minister was 
done without my immediate knowledge, but very much 
with my approbation, for I profess to you now, he is 
the person in all England I wish there. " 18 
Newcastle was against the "Boys of Wildnan' s" holding a great 
10 
deal of power in the new administration. This becomes clear 
in his attitude to Sir William Baker, perhaps the most 
prominent of Newcastle's mercantile supporters. On 3 July 
1765 ?: Zrs" Grenville recorded in her diary 
"Mr-Grenville knows very authentically that the manage- 
ment of the King's business in the House of Commons 
has been offered to Sir William Baker who declined it. " 20 
17. W. W. M. R1-473 Rockingham to Sir William Meredith n. d. but 
may be dated from internal evidence as July 1765. Rockinghar 
protestations concerning his health were quite justified. 
Always suffering from either congenital asthria or tuber- 
culosis he contracted syphilis in 1750 while in Italy on 
the Grand Tour. He died in the influenza epidemic of 1782 
suffering from both influenza and "water on the chest". 
119. Se3ee-. so W. W. Pa. R170 Doctor's Certificate in Italian and Historical Memoirs of my Own Time by Sir N. W. Wraxall, Bart 
Lo dn 1904, . 472-473. 18. B. f. Ädd. R2ss. 3972 f114 et seg Newcastle to John White 3 December 1765 quoted Bateson 22. cit. p. 36. 19. B. M. Add. hiss. 32967 f187 Newcastle t 
and above p. 23. to Portland 1 July 1765 
M 
There is nothing in either the Newcastle or Rockingham Papers 
to substantiate this piece of information, and in view of the 
21 
efforts to secure the assistance of Charles Townshend and 
other more prominent politicians it seems that it can have 
been no more than rumour. Perhaps Grenville merely expressed 
his opinion of Baker in a derisory way to his wife. Rockingham 
however, did consider appointing Baker as head of the Board 
22 
of Trade, and Baker was prominent enough to expect at least 
a minor office. He does not seem to have found favour with 
Newcastle, however, possibly because of Newcastle's hostility 
towards the Wildman's group, the growing rift between Baker 
and Newcastle since the "Dr. Hay affair" and possibly because 
23 
of Baker's known "violence in opposition. " 
In spite of his reservations about Wildman' s, , ', Newcastle 
did try to find offices for his mercantile supporters. Rose 
Fuller presents one instance of this. On 30 June 1765 Fuller 
appears nominated in Newcastle's lists as "Treasurer and 
24 
Paym, aster of the Ordnance. " By 1 July this had been modified 
25 
to "One of the Ordnance Places or Paymaster of the Marineall 
26 
and the same statement occurs in another document on 2 July. 
20" The Grenville Papers Vol. I1, p. 2Q5. 
21. Namier and Brooke Charles Townshend pp. 134-137. 
22. W. W. M. R14-2 Rockingham 's notes on removals etc July 1765. 
23. See above pp. 1ýet sea et passim. Baker does not appear 
on Newcastle's lists for an appointment. 
24. B. M. Add. Mss 32967 fl621OPlan of a New Administration and a 
Disposition of Employment'in the House of CommonsII30 June 
1765. 
25. Ibid. f185 "Taken: out of the'List of those not yet provoded 
for" 1 July 1765. 
26. Ibid. f195 2 July 1765: 1 
m96 
In a similar paper dated 6 July Rose Fuller's name is deleted 
27 
under the heading Ordnance. On a paper dated 7 July 1765 and 
headed "Items for the Earl of A1bee'marle" Newcastle writes "It 
is much to be wished Mr. Rose Fuller could have something He 
28 
would be a very useful man" and in a letter to Rockingham on 
12 July Newcastle wrote that if Frederick Montague would not 
accept a seat at the Board of Trade "I would most earnestly 
recommend for the public service Mr. Rose Fuller. I know, 
except my Lord Dartmouth, he would be more use than all the 
rest of the Board". Later in the same letter he ggain pressdd 
29 
Rockingham to find Fuller a place and as late as 29 July 
30 
Newcastle was maintaining his efforts but Fuller eventually 
disappears from the lists unprovided for. He next appears 
31 
as Chairman of the Stamp Act Committee. The merchant Capel 
Hanbury's hopes of office were also supported by Newcastle 
32 
but not as persistently and Hanbury too was unprovided for. 
It should be noted that an attempt had been made to find 
offices for Baler, Fuller and Hanbury prior to this in the 
33 
abortive negotiations of August 1763. 
27. Ibid. f257"Plan of a New Administration and a Disposition of 
Employment in the House of Lords and Commons" 6 July 1765; 
Cf. f261"Taken out of the List of those not yet provided 
for' 6 July 1765. + 
28. Ibid. f273" 
29. Ibid. f346-53 Newcastle to' Rockingham 12 July 1765. On 21 
July Newcastle was still suggesting Puller for the Board 
of Trade, See B. M. Add. Mss. 32968 f140 "Items for my Lord 
Rockingham 21 July 1765" 
O. Ibid. f233 "Short Items for my Lord Rockingham 21 July 1765-11 
31. See below p077. 
32. See B" M"Add" Mss 32967 f185"Taken out of the list of those not yet provided for" 1 July 1765. Ibid. f195 "Taken out of the list of those not yet provided for 2 July 1765. This 
n o 17 
Sir George Colebrooke also playe1his part at this time 
in bringing mercantile pressure to bear upon Newcastle. Although 
he appears to have been interested primarily in regaining the 
34 
contracts he lost in 1763 he was not slow in putting forward 
the view of the City financiers and merchants. On the 4 July 
in a letter to Newcastle he wrote 
"Personages in your Grace's situation, often ask us, 
after news out of the City, and what their friends in 
this part of the world are apt to say - May I be permitted 
to enumerate the Heads of our opinions and give your 
Lordship no further trouble 2 
Some public mark that dir. Pitt approves of this A(dminiü) 
That his plan on politics is to be pursued. 
That My Lord Chief Justice Pratt is to be publicly 
rewarded. 
That the present Parliament be dissolved, in order to 
redress the Mischiefs done in this Parliament by another 
That the unprovided debt be liquidated and a tax found 
for the interest. 
That the Navy of England be kept upon a most respectable 
footing the guilty punished and the others rewarded. " 35 
Although one cannot say that this opinion had great weight 
with Newcastle and the ministers for most of the suggestions 
put forward were common sense ones which Newcastle and his 
ciblleagues already had in mind, and kept in mind throughput 
the administration, this letter must have done something to 
reinforce Newcastle's opinion. 
It has already been pointed out that many of the mercantile 
supporters of the Newcastle and Rockingham Whigs were dissenters, 
32. contd Capel Hanbury must be the M. P. for Monmouthshire viho 
died in 1765. He is not identical with the man who gave 
evidence before the Stamp Act Committee. See below p. 351. 
Cf. Smith 
, 
off. chit. pp. 288-290. 'i 
33. See above p. - 
34. See B. P, M. Add. Mss. 32967 f434-436 Colebrooke to Newcastle 15 July 
l fc5, 
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36 
and that a high proportion of these were Quakers. Perhaps for 
this reason Newcastle was especially interested at this time in 
conciliating the dissenters and he encouraged Rockingham to 
secure their support by making contact with the&r leading 
37 
ministers concerning the matter of the Royal Bounty. Newcastle 
personally took some action in this direction, for there is 
among his papers a letter from Thomas Toller (a dissenting 
minister Newcastle mentioned specifically to Rockingham) enclosing 
a list of the distribution of the Royal Bounty to dissenters. 38 
These were sent at Newcastle's particular request. 
Newcastle also pressed Rockingham to find an office for 
James West, the former Secretary to the Treasury and Newcastle's 
39 
friend and faithful servant. On 10 July Newcastle wrote to 
Rockingham imploring him to restore West to his old position 
or make him one of the Lords of the Treasury for, as he put 
it., West 
35. Ibid. f226-227 Colebrooke to Newcastle 4 July 1765. Colebrooke 
had stated earlier in the letter that Pratt should be rewarded 
as a 'sop' to Pitt, as an able lawyer and as a popular figure. 
He did get a peerage. The reference to the navy in connection 
with the punishment of the guilty is probably a reference 
to the decline in the British navy after the Seven Years War, 
see for instance The War for America by Piers 2wacksey, London 
1964, pp. 166-167; or possibly a reference to george Grenville' s 
economies. See also The Royal Nav a, History by William 
Laird Clowes. Lon jAn, 1898 . Vol. II , p. 365. 
36. See above Part i, Chapter II. 
37. B. M. Add" Mss" 32967 f180 "Measures" 1 July 1765. There is a copy 
of this at W. W. M. Rl-456 _ dated 6 July 1765. See above PPM-49. Cf. Namier and Brooke The House of Con eons 1754-1790 Vol. 11, 
pp-576-5M; 
38. B. M. Add. Mss. 32968 f206 Thomas Toller to Newcastle 23 July 1765 
ff2088210 List of distribution of Bounty to the dissenters. 
39. B. M. Add. Mss. 32967 f338 Newcastle to Rockingham 11 July 1765; 
ibid. f346 same to same 12 July 1765; ibid. f390 same to same 14 July 1765.: 
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"has a peculiar knowledge of the Character and dispositions 
of the several considerable men in the City, that was of 
great use to me, and I really believe if he would accept 
either of these, he would be of service to your Lordship 
as well as to the publick. " 40 
There is more in this than a simple desire to provide 
West with office. He had proved useful to Newcastle in the 
past and Newcastle without doubt realised how much the new 
young, inexperienced first minister would need every assistance. 
he could get in the coming months. At the same time he was 
endeavouring to introduce Rockingham to other mercantile 
contacts, especially Bartholomew Burton, a director and former 
governor of the Bank of England. Burton eventually saw Rocking- 
ham on 17 July with some of the other directors of the Bank of 
41 
England. On Sunday 21 July there was a dinner party at Newcastle'$ 
where Rockingham again met Burton and other City friends of 
42 
Newcastle. Moreover to keep the allegiance of these same men 
Newcastle was endeavouring to get contracts that they had lost 
43 
returned to them. 
Rockingham did not only build up his mercantile support 
by inheritance from Newcastle. He made efforts himself in 
this direction. One attempt may be seen in the employment of 
John Roberts as, his secretary. Roberts as a former secretary 
40. Ibid. f303 -Newcastle to Rockingham 10 July 1765" 
41. Ibid. f316 Rockingham to Newcastle 11 July 17654 f352 
Newcastle to Rockingham 12 July-1765. 
42. See B. M. Add. N. iss" 32968 f60 Bartholomew Burton to Newcastle 
18 July 1765; f82 Newcastle to Rockingham 19 July 1765. 
43. Ibid. f361''P1an- of- a'-new Administration and a disposition 
of employment in' the Housep'of. Lords and Commons' 30 June 1765; 
f260 document- of, same, title 6 July 1765, Cf. Portescue . it Vol. I, 'pp. 128-161.2 2c 
. ya 
to Henry Pelham and as a Lord of Trade had many useful 
44 
connections. Rockingham also made a personal effort to persuade 
Sir William Meredith to accept a post at either the Admiralty 
45 
or the Board of Trade. Meredith had strong connections with 
46 
commerce in general and with Liverpool in particular. Rock- 
ingham wrote to Newcastle about this appointment but his ideas 
47 
seemed to have gained little sympathy from the latter, although 
Meredith's name appears in lists of both Newcastle and George 
III as a member of the Board of Trade. Rockingham did, 
however, eventually succeed in getting him appointed as a 
48 
lord of the Admiralty. 
Before the Stamp Act Crisis the first Rockingham adminis- 
tration gained commercial support mainly by a process of 
inheritance from the old leader of the party, Newcastle, but 
also to some extent by the efforts of Rockingham himself. 
The support gained in this way was, however, the support of 
financiers and merchants who we, -e- typically loyal to adminis- 
tration. It was the Stamp Act Crisis which was to win over 
the main body of the trading classes. 
44. For Roberts see Tyler loc. cit. pp. 547-560. See also "Three 
Eighteenth Century Politicians" by L. B. Namier in English 
Historical Review Vol. XLII, London 1927 p-408- See also 
. 1amier Structure of Politics passim. 45. W. W. M. Rl-473 Rockingham to Sir William Meredith n. d. but. 
can be identified from internal evidence as July 1765. 
46. For Meredith see Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 
1754-1790 Vol. III, pp. 130-133. Meredith had joined the 
Rockingham group and Wildman's during early 1763. Before 
this he had supported Grenville. 
47. B. M. Add. Mss 32967 f316 Rockingham to Newcastle 11 July 1765, 
ibid. f374 Rockingham to Newcastle 'Friday night' (11 July 1765) ibid. ff182-183 "Plan of a New Administration" 27 
June 1765. Cf. Fortescue offo cit. Vo1. I, p. 32 No- 101p ibid 
pp"153-159 No-130 "List of Removals etc" 9 July 1765. 48. Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol-III, 
p. 13le, 
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CHAPTER IX. 
THE FIRST ROCKINGHAM ADMINISTRATION. 
A) INTRODUCTORY. 
During the first Rockingham administration there was a 
constant interchange of advice and information between Rockingham, 
Newcastle, and their colleagues and those engaged in trade and 
commerce both in London and the provinces. This is not 
surprising for the major measures taken by the administration 
were. of a politico-economic nature. Burke's claim that 
Rockingham's government was the first to consult merchants and 
encourage their meetings cannot be regarded as the literal 
1 
truth. Indeed in 1764 Grenville had both consulted and been 
2 
consulted by the West Indian merchants. On the other hand 
it cannot be disputed, as this chapter will show, that the 
opinions of the merchants exercised a great influence on the 
leaders of this administration. 
When the Rockingham administration came to power in July 
1765 its leader seems to have been quite unaware that in a 
very short time he would be faced with a political crisis of 
the first magnitude caused by Grenville's American Stamp Act. 
There were however signs that all was, not well with American 
commerce and comments in the daily press indicated the slackness 
1. Burke Works -Vol. II , p" 4. See above p. 3. 
2. See The Free Port System- in the British West Indies A St 
in Commercial Policy 1766-1822'by Frances Armytage Royal 
Empire Society, Imperial-Studies)' London 1953, p"25. 
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3 
of American trade and the poor reception of the Stamp Act. 
Lord Dartmouth, soon after assuming office as First Lord of 
Trade in July 1765, received a letter from Dennys de Berdt 
pointing out the depression of the American trade and Dartmouth 
4 
met colonial agents and merchants during the summer. Moreover, 
on the very day that he was ordered to relinquish the Treasury, 
Grenville took steps to see that the revenue of the Stamp 
Act remained in America to defray the cost of the military 
5 
defence of the colonies. 
The first definite news that Rockingham received of the 
6 
American riots was about 5 October 1765, but the Virginia 
Resolutions had been known since August 1765. On 30 August 
1765 the Duke of Newcastle had written to General Conway 
asking to be excdsed a meeting at the Duke of Cumberland's 
7 
that night because of the ill-health of the Duchess. A 
minute of the meeting sent to Newcastle by Conway proves that 
; 5.5ee Tor instance Lloyds Evening Post and British Chronicle 
No. 1240 3-5 July 1765, No. 1241 9-8 July 1765. Cf Hink- 
house off. cit. p. 55. 
4. See Dennys de Berdt to Lord Dartmouth n. d. but endorsed 'recd. July 1765' printed in "Letters of Dennys de Berdt 
1754-1770" ed. Albert Matthews in Publications of the 
Colonial Society of Massachusetts Vol. XIII, Transactions 
1910-11 Boston 1912, pp. 431-432. De Berdt, a merchant, 
was agent in London for the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives, November 1765 to April 1770. Cf. Sosin 
op. cit. p. 71. 
5. Seems A Postscript to the, Stamp Act. George Grenville's 
Revenue Measures a Drain on Colonial Specie 4" by Jack M. 
Sosin, American Historical Review Vol. L%III, New York, 
July 1958, pp. 922-923. t 
6. See Smith 
, 
off. cit. p. 47., 
M'3 
the meeting was to discuss a dispute with the Assembly of 
8 
Jamaica and the Virginia: Resolutions. In his letter Newcastle 
had written 
"The business that you meet upon this night, is of the 
utmost importance; and I am afraid, attended with diff- 
iculty. For my own part, I don't pretend to be a judge 
of what should be done. I am afraid what has been done 
has not produced the desired effect. I conclude General 
Amherst will be consulted and some honest North American 
merchants should be talked to. I suppose my Lord Dart- 
mouth will furnish you with all the lights that are 
come to the Board of Trade. " 9 
Amherst had been British commander in America during the 
10 
Seven Years War and was thus considered knowledgeable on 
American affairs and apart from officials Newcastle suggested 
the American merchants should be consulted as they were probably 
more informed about conditions in the colonies than anybody 
else in the country. The important conclusion that can be 
drawn from this letter is that before the Stamp Act Crisis had 
commenced a leading member of the first Rockingham administra- 
tion had realised that the American merchants could give valu- 
able advice and assistance on American affairs. Newcastle's 
efforts to gain mercantile support did not stop here. In 
September 1765 he made strong but unsuccessful efforts to 
secure the election of Barlow Trecothick, the leader of the 
American merchants in London as member of Parliament for Shore- 
ham. The Efforts of Newcastle failed because Trecothick was 
B. M. Add. Mss" 32969 f221 Newcastle to General Conway 30 
August 1765. i, 
8. Ibid. f=55-6 Conway to Newcastle 1 September 1765; ibid f257 r1, Sinute of the Meeting of His Majesty's Servants at His Royal Highness's the Duke of Cumberland's 30 August 1765" 9. Ibid. f221 Newcastle to Conway 30 August 1765. 10. See Dictionary of National Biography Vol. Zipp. 357-8. 
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unable or unwilling to afford the expense of standing for 
11 
Shoreham and because he sought election for the City of London. 
During the counse of the corresppndence about Shoreham 
Newcastle made the interesting statement that Trecothick was 
already considered an authority on North American affairs and 
that the Rockingham administration would be glad of his advice 
12 
within Parliament. 
Although the administration did not receive definite news 
of the American riots until October 1765 as early as 11 
September 1765 Newcastle was noting "The Stamp Act" in memoranda 
13 
as an item for discussion with Lord Rockingham. In the same 
memoranda Newcastle also mentioned the trade of the American 
colonies in general and the trade with the foreign West Indies. 
By 9 October Newcastle's memoranda had grown far more specific 
and he wrote about "The Disturbances and Riots in New England 
14 
&c. 11 and "The Violence in America-" By 12 October 1765 
Newcastle was writing to Rockingham a 
It I am very much at a loss in my own opinion what to 
do upon these American Disputes.... I see great incon- 
veniences on both sides of the question, and very little 
effect by enforcing the execution of... the Stamp Duty, 
by force the asserting the Right of this country to 
11. B. P, 4. Add. MMss" 32970 f50 Trecothick to Newcastle 24 September 
1765; ibid. f52 same to same 24 September 1765; ibid. f54 
Newcastle to Trecothick 24 September 1765; ibid. f76 same 
to same 26 September 1765; ibid. f56 "Shoreham Proposals" 
24 September 1765; ibid. f82 Trecothick to Newcastle 27 
September 1765. Cf. my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 91-93; 
Smith off. cit. pp. 91-93. 
12. B. M. Add. Mss" 32970 f54 Newcastle to Trecothick 24 September 
1765. Cf. Smith 2P. cit. p. 92. 
13. B. IT. Add. Mss- 32969 f344 "Items for Lord Rockingham" 11 
September 1765. 
14. Ibid. 32970 Memoranda 8 October 1765. 
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lay taxes there for I very much fear you will scarcely 
be able to get much from it and by the perturbation of 
the clandestine trade, they will not be in a position to 
pay much, or to receive and pay for our manufactures 
from hence-" 15 
By the middle of October Rockingham was thus aware of 
the ctisis that was to face him in the American colonies. He 
had not been idle on American affairs meanwhile. On 14 August 
1765 the Daily Advertiser spoke of the "Elegant Entertainment" 
given to the Rockingham leaders by the West India merchants 
16 
at the King's Arms Tavern. There was a constant supply of 
information on American affairs through both official and 
17 
private channels, and at the end of September 1765 Rockingham 
was in contact with the Archbishop of York over ecclesiastical 
18 
affairs in America. By 25 October 1765 Rockingham was thus 
writing to Viscount Irwin 
"I don't imagine Mr. G. Grenville' s popularity is very 
high in your neighbourhood. The difficulties he has 
thrown upon trade by very incondiderate regulations 
must affect any opinion in his favour among the mercan- 
tile gentlemen, and the notable confusion which he has 
raised in America, tho' it lays difficulties upon the 
present administration, yet so far it serves them, as 
it shows that he had neither prudence nor foresight. " 
19 
Thus by October 1765 American affairs were looming 
large in the eyes of the leaders of the Rockingham administra- 
tion. It was obvious moreover that this was not a single 
clear-cut issue. There was the question of the general 
15. WW. M. R1-504 Newcastle to-Rockingham 12 October 1765. 
The "clandestine trade" referred to is the trade with the 
foreign West Indies. 
16. M Cone op. cit. p. 82. - 17. See below pi. 341-363. 
18. See above p, 69. 
3Q6 
depression in the American trade, the clandestine trade 
with the foreign West Indies, and the problem of the American 
resistance to the Stamp Act, and the depression in trade 
caused by the Stamp Act itself. 
Doctor Sutherland has divided the commercial policy of 
the ministry into three phases. Firstly there was "a general 
but vague feeling that something shoilld be done to revive 
the North American trade? This feeling was connected with 
the bullion question and the trade with the foreign West 
Indies. Secondly there was the Stamp Act Crisis and thirdly 
the investigation into North American and West Indian commerce 
which led to the Free Ports Act of 1766 and related commercial 
20 
measures. It is obvious that the general question of the 
American commerce underlay all these phases of commercial 
policy. Although these phases overlapped and were inter- 
connected it is a convenient sub-division by which to discuss 
the first Rockingham administration. 
19. Rockingham to Viscount Irwin 25 October 1765 printed 
Historical Manuscripts. Corrnnission - Reports on Manuscripts 
in Various Collections Vol. XVIII, (Lindley- Wood Papers) 
London 1913, p. 183j, printed Ritcheson o. cit. p. 41. 
20. Sutherland "Edmund Burke and the First 11oc Bingham Ministry" 
English Historical Review Vol. XLVII, pp. 46-72. 
ßl7 
B) THE BULLIOIA AI\TD THE TREASURY MINUTE 
15 NOVEMBER 
The initial American problem with which the first Rocking- 
ham administration was faced was that in an attempt to reform 
the administration of the colonial customs laws and improve the 
revenue from colonial trade Grenville had in 1763 and 1764 
prevented the North American and West Indian colonies obtain- 
ing bullion and other goods from the foreign West Indies. This 
had always been a clandestine trade but it was vital to the 
British colonies for they--used the bullion obtained in this 
way to pay for goods obtained from the mother country. 
Grenville's actions, involving the cutting off the supply of 
gold, led to the stopping of remittances of specie to GretLt 
21 
Britain and the cancellation of orders to British manufacturers. 
It must be emphasized that this was not a problem created by 
the Stamp Act, although it was created by legislation to 
which the Stamp Act formed a climax. As early as April 1764 
Grenville had been forced to deal with the problem and measures 
which seem to have been an attempt to solve it were taken on 
22 
6 June 1764 and February 1765. These measures which implied 
the admission of bullion allowed foreign. vessels to take 
"refreshment" in British ports but did not allow the bringing 
23 
in of foreign goods. These measures were only a partial 
21. Armytage o? o" cit. pp. 24-27. See also The Rise of the British 
Treasury, Colonial Administration in the Eighteenth Century 
by Dora Mae Clark, Yale Historical Publications, Vol. XX, 
New Haven U. S"A" 1960, pp. 135-136. 
22. Armytage 
, 
off. cit. pp. 25-26. B. M. Add. Mss. 33030 ff190-192, 
Evidence of Mr. Beeston Long before a committee of the House of Commons, 17 February 1766; P. R. 0. Treasury Minute,. B"oK, T. 29 Vol. =I, p. 192 et seg. 
e©8 
solution to the problem. They did not for instance allow 
24 
the Florida merchants to import vital dyestuffs. 
In the letter in which he cmngratu. ated Dartmouth on 
coming to office Dennys de Berdt mentioned the bullion trade 
but the first specific reference to this problem in the papers 
of the leaders of the new administration seems to be in a 
memoranda of Newcastle's dated 11 September 1765 and headed 
VItems for Lord Rockingham". One of the t items' is "The 
25 
Opening the trade with the Spaniards in America. " Further to 
this on 12 October 1765 John Roberts wrote to Newcastle after 
Newcastle had asked him for his opinion on "American Affairs" 
Roberts wrote 
"I... am at a loss how to understand what your Grace 
is pleased to require of me; The general expression 
American affairs, not confining me to any particular 
part of a subject which is very extensive and compre- 
hends much variety of matter. " 26 
Roberts confined his remarks to the general disorders in 
America and did not mention the bullion trade specifically 
but he did write 
" If your Grace be pleased to fix upon any ne distinct 
point I will endeavour to procure materials from the 
Board of Trade for your better and more full information. 
27 
23. Armytage off?. cit. pp. 25-26. Cf. Clark op. cit. p. 136. 
24. Armytage op. cit.. p. 26. 
25. Dennys de Berdt to Lord Dartmouth July 1765 in Letters of 
Dennys de Berdt loc. cit. p. 431; B. le?. Add. Mss. 32969 ff344-45 
fair copy at ff 364-65 "Items for Lord Rockingham" 11 
September 1765. 
26. B. T. I. Add. Mss. 32970 ff 302-03 John Roberts to Newcastle 12 
October 1765. 
27. Ibid. ff302-03 John Roberts to Newcastle 12 October 1765. 
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Newcastle used Robert's letter in a memoranda which he prepared 
for discussion with the Duke of Cumberland on 13 October, but 
28 
there is again no specific mention of . the bullion question. 
The first important c&. tion in this affair seems to have been 
taken by Rockingham between 19 and 24 October 1765 when he 
sent to Newcastle, Lord Northington and Charles Yorke specially 
written memoranda relating to the bullion trade. In his cover- 
ing letter it each case Rockingham apparently stressed the 
29 
urgency and importance of the matter. Mrs. Armytage says that 
the papers sent to Newcastle were "possibly written by the 
30 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Dowdeswell"" Her evidence 
as to the authorship of the papers is based on the fact that 
Newcastle wrote. to Rockingham with regard to one of the papers 
saying 'I am glad to-see, for the sake of the., pilblic and your 
31 
Lordship that so able a-paper comes from the hand it doest and 
a statement of Northington's that. he had 'perused the several 
papers with Mr. D's proposal to alter the regulations put on 
trade' and that he agreed with Mr. Dowdeswell that 'the Acts 
32 
never intended-to prohibit bullion'. This is very slender 
evidence on. which to base even a tentative conclusion that the 
28. Ibid* f312 
, 
"Items for the, Duke of Cumberland" 13 October 17g 
29. Armytage 
, 
op. cit. p. 31' is more - inclined` to date these papers 
about 22°Oetober.: but-Neweastle wrote to Rockingham thanking 
him for sendingthe'papers in question on 20 October. See 
B. M. "Add" R2ss. 32970' f422 , Newcastle"to Rockingham 20 October 1765; Cf. ibid. 32971- f13, Newcastle. to Rockingham 22 October 
'1765. 
; See also"-W W. M. R1-512 Rockingham to Northington (draft)ante'23 October l765;, ibid. R1-513 Northington to 
Rockingham 23 October 1765; : i_bid. Rl-515 Charles Yorke to 
Rockingham '25 October 1765; B. 84. Add. Iss. 35911 ff63-64 
Rockingham to Charles Yorke 24 October 1765. Yorke and Northington were consulted as the chief legal officers of the administration and this was a matter on which an 
official opinion was necessary. 
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papers were written by one man. From their varying nature it 
would seem that they come from the pens of different authors. 
Moreover, in the setae letter mentioned above, Newcastle wrote 
"I easily grasped the authors of the three respective perfor- 
33 
manes", and discusses the merits of each of the three papers 
he had been sent. This points to the fact that each paper 
came from an independent hand. 
As these papers seem to have exerted considerable influence 
on the formation of policy at this juncture it is worthwhile 
to consider them and their authorship in some detail. Copies 
of the three papers sent 'bra Rockingham to Newcastle exist 
in the Newcastle Pppers and two of the three in the Rockinghmm 
r"Y - 
Papers, and a copy of the third'in the Burke Papers. These 
three papers are entitled "Considerations on the laws made 
for the increase of navigation and for the regulation of the 
plantation trade, as far as they relate to the bullion trade" 
"Memorial on the Treaties with Spain! " and "Proposals". 
Newcastle, When writing to Rockingham, speaks of these three 
papers, but Northington of. several and identifies Dowdeswell 
positively-as the' author of the set of "proposals". This is 
34 ;., 
confirmed in a , 
draft letter by. Roc1 ingham. Additional papers 
30. Arrnytage off- cit- p. 31. 
31. Ibid. pp. 31-32. B. M. Add. riss: 32971. f13 Newcastle to 
Rockingham 22 October 1765"' 
32. Armytage op cit. pp: 31-32; ,' 
wY. W: M. R1-513 Northington to 
Rockingham 23 October. 17650 
33. B. M. Add" Mss" 32971 f13 'Newcastle to Rockingham 22 October 1785 
34. W. W. M.. R35eb See' below p"314" 
.^ 
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among the Newcastle Papers are docketed "Mr. D's Paper... " I 
"Reflections upon the trade in general and upon the trade with 
the Spanish West Indies in Particular" and "dir..... thoughts 
35 36 
on the American trade. " Mrs. Armytage identifies the author 
of the last paper as John Roberts but in this paper it is 
stated that 
"Mr.... differs in opinion with Mr. R. in toto. Mr. R. 
is for laying aside the authors and Mr..... thinks.... " 
which points to John Roberts being the author of another 
paper, not of this one. Moreover when Newcastle wrote to 
Rockingham on 22 October he stated categorically that John 
Roberts had not written any of the three papers he received 
37 
but identifies him as the author of a fourth paper. This 
must be the "Reflections" and it is this paper with which 
"Mr...... thoughts" disagrees. 
; j5. Loples of the three papers sent by Rockingham to Newcastle- 
exist at W. W. M. R35 "Letters, Minutes, Reports, Statistics 
relating to the Bullion Trade, October - November 1765" 
and at B. M. Add"Mss. 33030 ff392-7 "Considerations on the 
laws made for the increase of navigation and for the 
regulation of the plantation trade, so far as they relate 
to the bullion trade" ff297-307 "Memorial on the Treaties 
with Spain"' ff311-316 "Proposals" and at B. 1+ß. Add. Mao 32971 
ff29-35 "Considerations etc" ff36-43 "Memoirs on the 
Treaties with Spain" ff22-28 "Proposals". In the Rocking- 
ham Papers the "Proposals" are at R35-8 h, i, j, (3 copies) 
the "Considerations" at R35-8 d, e, f, g, (9, copies). Contrary 
to what dirs. Armytage says no copy of the "Memoirs" is in 
evidence at W. W. M. R35 but there is a copy in the Burke 
Papers. at Bk25b "Memorial of the former treaties with Spain with regard to Trade" Other papers on the bullion trade exist in B. M. Add" biss. 32971 ff44-45 "Mr-D's Prtp er" ff46-63 "Reflections upon trade in general and upon the trade with _the 
'Spanish west Indies in particular" ffl6-21 "Mr..... thoughts on the American trade. " 36. Armytage op. cit. p. S2, n. 2. Other papers are also in evidence at W. W. bi. R35 and at W. W. M. Rl-317 where there are three extracts of letters concerning the Spanish trade and one 
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It is thus possible to identify Dowdeswell as the author 
of ob. e paper and John Roberts as the author of another, but I 
have not been able to find any evidence as to the authorship 
of the remaining papers although possibly some may have been 
composed by merchants or other American experts with whom 
the administration was in contact. Newcastle's concern with 
trade is obvious in his letter to Rockingham on 22 October 
1765 and it is in this that Dr. Sutherland sees the reflection 
of mercantile influence. Newcastle wrote 
"I have now read and considered, with the greatest 
attention and pleasure the three papers your Lordship 
was so good as to send me. They are all, in my opinion 
extremely well wrote, and prove sufficiently their 
point, that we are at liberty, both by law, and Treaty, 
to admit the Spanish bullion, into any part of our 
dominions in America, and that seems to be the point 
at present, contended for. But, as your Lordship 
drop'd to me in conversation, that that would not quite 
do our business, I do hope, if this method is finally 
approved, and carried into execution, liberty will also 
be given for Spanish vessels, to return with certain 
commodities, not interfering with our own manufactures, 
such as lumber &c; the produce of our northern colonies; 
or otherwise, the great stagnation of our trade with 
North America, and the exportations of our woollen 
manufacturers thither, will not be put upon the foot 
it was, before Mr. Grenville gave those fatal orders. " 
38 
36. (contd) letter with a paragraph concerning the Spanish 
trade underlined. - These are dated 20 April 1764,30 
January 1765, and 10 May 1765. There is also an additional 
paper-on the bullion trade in John Robert's hand at B. M. 
Add. M8s. 33030 ff68-73 endorsed "Trade November 1765" but 
see p. 338, belorw. ` For Yorke' s additional information see 
B. M. Add" Mss. 35911 f67 Governor Pownall to Yorke 3 
November "1765., 
y 
There are also copies of some of the three 
and another paper in the Yorke Papers. See ibid. ff91-98 
"Memoirs on, the. Treaty with Spain'', ibid. fflO9-116 
"Considerations, on the laws etc" ibid. ffll6-127 "Observa- 
tions I on'the Commerce of our Colonies with those of Spain 
so far as regards the Legality of the Importation of Bullion in Foreign Bottoms. " 
313 
The pressure put on the government by the northern 
industrial towns at this early stage of the ministry is also 
obvious from this letter. Moreover the petitions to the 
Treasury on 30 October 1765 made it clear that there was an 
39 
acute stagnation in both American and West Indian trade. 
Rockingham was also receiving private information on America 
at this time which pointed to the depression in trade and 
both he and Newcastle must have found it difficult throughout 
this crisis to ascertain to what extent the trade depression 
was caused by the stopping of the bullion trade and to what 
extent by the Stamp Act and Grenville's other American 
measures. In the same letter after some general comments 
Newcastle proceeds to examine each of the three papers in 
40 
detail. Later he continues 
"The last paper, the Proposals, is in my humble opinion, 
very proper as far as it goes, as I have before mentioned: 
But I would submit it to your Lordship's consideration, 
whether-it might not be possible (tho' I am afraid it 
may not) to remedy the fatal consequences of Iür. 
Grenville's orders, and brix%ing the trade back, upon 
the former foot, without doing it, in so public a manner, 
and giving such notice to it, to all the world; for 
tho' I admit, that the papers on that head sufficiently 
shews, that we have a right to admit their illicit trade 
into our colonies, yet what chicane Spain may make 
upon the interpretation of these treaties, nobody can tell. Other nations also may think themselves concerned 
0i. 5. N. Aaa" Niss": J! &y'I1 1714 Newcastle to Rockingham 22 October 17 
38. Ibid. f13 Newcastle to-. Rockingham 22 October 1765. Cf. - 
Sutherland 'Edmund Burke and the First Rockingham Ministry" 
loc. cit. p. 60. 
39. See petitions' in P. R. O. Treasury Papers T1/443" See below 
p. 316. 
40. B. M. Add. Mss" 32971 ffl3-14 Newcastle to Rockingham 22 October 1765. 
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to prevent it, and even Spain itself, when they see of 
what consequence this illicithtrade is of to us, may 
be endeavouring by all methods in their power and within 
themselves to prevent it; and this might in some measure .; ' 
disappoint our object. 
There is also one more obversation I would submit 
to your Lordship, whether, if this method is to be 
pursued, it might not be best to do it, from the 
respective offices, without any public application to 
the King, which possibly might be sent to the Privy 
Council. 11 
These two paragraphs probably explain why Rockingham I 
attempted to deal with the question of the American trade 
at the Treasury Board in the early months of the Rockingham 
administration rather than by a full-scale Parliamentary 
enquiry. 
There can be no doubt that Rockingham was in contact 
with merchants at this time for among the Rockingham Papers 
there is an undated document in Rockinghamts hand which is 
endorsed "Draft of 'observation relative to Mrr. Dowdeswell's 
Proposals" but which actually seems more like a draft of a 
letter that Rockingham sent with the Papers. It readd 
"The many memorials from the great trading ports and the 
information which we have desired and obtained from 
considerable merchants in London and the country has 
fully satisfied us that the complaints were well grounded 
and that it was a very desirable object to give relief. 
I will not longer detain your Lordship from the perusal 
of the enclosed papers only just to remark that since 
the proposals were drawn up by Mr. Dowdeswell it has 
occurred that in regard to the mode mentioned of the 
Board of Treasury applying to the King in Council it 
has been doubted whether that is a proper mode. " 
41. W. W. M. R35-6, f. ., 
j', 
aýý 
tý 
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This letter can hardly be to Newcastle from Rockingham 
for Rockingham would address Newcastle as Your Grace and not 
your Lordship, but Rockingham also sent the letters to 
Northington the Lord Chancellor, who was impressed by them 
and also to Charles Yorke the Attorney General. Sir William 
Baker, however, who was consulted abd was well qualified to 
speak on this issue took a less favourable viewsof the papers 
42 
than Rockingham. Thus, Rockingham it would seem had the 
opinion of some merchants on the question and also Sir William 
Baker the leading expert of the Rockingham Whigs on American 
affairs. In his speech on American taxation Burke stated 
i 
"Lord Rockingham very early-in that summer (1765) 
received a strong representation from many weighty 
English merchants and manufacturers, from govermors 
of provinces and commanders of men of war, against 
almost the whole of the American commercial,, regulations, 
and particularly with regard to the total ruin which 
was threatened to the Spanish trade. " ! 43 
That Newcastle was less well-informed at this time is 
shown by his memoranda entitled, "Points for Consideration 
with my Lord Rockingham tomorrow" dated 27 October-`1765 in 
which he notes he is going to ask Rockingham for the. opinion 
44 / 
of Northington, Yorke and, Baker. Indeed, one of Newcastle's 
constant complaints throughout. this ministry-was-that 
Rockingham 'failed to inform and consult him' and he wrote to 
Lord Albefmarle mentioning this on 28 October. 
42. See B. M. Add. Mss. 32971 f85, Rockingham to Newcastle 24 
October 1765. 
43. Works Vol* II pP. 399.: 
44. B. 1JI. Add. P. 4ss. 32971 the" original is at ff65-66 and a copy 
dated 
. 
28 October 'at ff173-176. ° 
45. B. M. Add. Uss" 32971 ff177-78 Newcastle to Albemarle 28 
October 1765. ' `'' 
.1aI 
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By this time as Doctor Sutherland notes there appeared 
to be some attempt at crystallisation of the mercantile 
46 
agitation. At a Treasury Board meeting on 30 October 1765 at 
which Rockingham, Dowd. eswell, Lord John Cavendish and Thomas 
Townshend were present memorials from the merchants of 
Manchester; Liverpool, Lancaster, Halifax, Leicester and 
Derby representing " the stagnation of the American and West 
Indian trade and the lack of remittances" were read and it 
was decided: to ask for the opinion of the Attorney General 
and Solicitor General concerning the legality of the importa- 
tion of bullion into the American colonies in foreign ships. 
On D November atüanother Treasury Board meeting a further 
petition this time from the Merchant Venturers was read and 
on the same day Thomas Townshend wrote to the Merchant 
Venturers stating that the Treasury Board had the matter in 
47 
hand and that Rockingham and Dotivdeswell had it "much at heartVV2 
Whether this mercantile' opposition was organised or not 
is difficult. to say. It may have been organised in embryo 
form by Barlow Trecothick in a similar manner to the petitions 
". 48 
to Parliament for the Repeal of the Stamp Act. 
46. Sutherland loc. cit. p. 60; P. R. 0. Treasury Papers T V443., 
ff47,53. 
47. P. R. 0. Treasury Minute Books T-29 Vol. XXXVII, pp. 192-6,204; 
See also petitions in P. R. 0. T1/443. See also Thomas 
Townshenci to Robert Nugent 5 November 1765, Merchant 
Venturers Correspondence, box marked '! Letters 1754 - Bundle 
"9" (Townshend had a seat on the Treasury Board) I wish to 
acknowledge the assistance of the Society of Merchant } 
Venturers in allowing me to use their records. See also 
W. W. M. R60 where there is a copy of a memorial from 
Liverpool and another from Lancaster, the Liverpool 
memorial bein docketed 17 August 1765. 
48. See below pp. 49-5th my Barlow Trecothick etc pp-39-439, 
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Yet it is strange that there is no memorial from the London 
merchants. That Trecothick was in contact with Rockingham 
is proved by a paper in his hand among the Rockingham Papers 
concerning remittances of the American contractors and he was 
examined as the agents representative by the Treasury Board 
49 
at which Rockingham was present on 8 August 1765. This affair 
was strictly a business matter but having made contact with 
him it seems probable that Trecothick was one of the London 
50 
merchants Rockingham consulted. Dr. Sutherland states that 
the questions asked Trecothick in the House of Commons in 
March 1766 point to some organisation at this time but I'am 
more inclined to believe this organisation-rffers to the 
51 
time of the Stamp Act Crisis. Sir George Savile, however, 
wrote a letter to Rockingham on 1 November 1765 which points 
to some organisation. He wrote 
"Capt. Gream writes that: i must be surprized at receiving 
a naked memorial without a: single line of explanation 
and void of mercantile . terms &c. -, The nakedness he 
means is that it does not state the causes of the 
decline of trade with the taxes and the Spanish matters. 
The last he. says he can-'account for as being a matter 
not to be talked of aloud, the first he blames much. 
I could not help: observing the circumstances and 
yet I am not sure but-it might do as well; pointing 
out the grievance might have looked concerted or at 
least the effect: of party spirits and the wonder does 
not want pointing-out.. --,, 'Their saying they are hurt and drawing.. no_consequenceihas. really I think more the air 
of sincerity. You can, find out. what hurts ' em. They 
zaf4 
49. See W. w. M. K35 paper commencing 
_ 
"by the 2nd April there 
remained in the ; hands of. Mr. _Apthorp 
the Agent" and rry 
Barlow Trecothick etc p-32. -- Cf. P. R. 0. Treasury Minute Books 
_T. 
29 ; Vol" XXXVIi, p. 89., 
50. See W. W M. R35=6, "; f, 
51. Cf. my- Barlow Trecothick' etc pp. 40-42; Sutherland loc.. j, ,. p. 60; rv B. M. d. Mss. 33030 f103. 
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speak as ignorant men our trade is hurt what the devil 
have you been doing. For our part we don't pretend to 
understand sour politics and American mattPrm hnt mir 
trade is hurt-" 52 
On 13 November 1765, the opinion of the Solicitor and 
Attorney General was ready and the Treasury Board, again 
with Rockingham present. resumed consideration of the new 
position of the manufacturing towns. On the basis of the 
advice of Yorke and his colleagues that bullion could be 
imported into the American colonies in foreign ships, 
instructions were sent out and a Treasury Minute prepared. 
The Minute Book states that besides the merchants memorials 
"several letters and papers relative to the present state 
of commerce" in America were read. The Minute was not finally 
ready until 15 November and a copy was sent by George Onslow 
53 
to Newcastle, on the following day. On 19 November Newcastle 
wrote to Rockingham expressing his approval in these words 
d 
"I cannot forbear beginning by expressing my great 
approbation of your Treasury Minute relating to the 
Bullion. It is in my humble opinion an able a paper 
as ever I read: and I am sure it will do you great 
honour. As well as an able, it is a very artful one; 
it proves its facts as it goes, shews the evil and the 
necessity of the remedy., -from undoubted proofs, from 
America, and the uncontroverted opinion of all the 
great manufacturing towns in England, and it shews 
also the power of doing it, by the tender opinions of 
our friend Charles Yorke; who is now a party concerned, 
to defend it. And in short it is as strong an article 
of impeachment, against George Grenville, as can be 
found, and It will shew you have been doing something. 
I must know the author. " 54 
52. W. W. II. R1-519 Sir George Savile to Rockingham 1 November 1765: 
53. See p. R. 0"' reasury. Minute Books 29 Vol. XXXVII, pp. 229-30, 
B. M. Aft. M®8.32971 ff394-5 Copy of Treasury Minute 15 
November 1765, ff402-3 Onslow to Newcastle 16 Noyember 1765. 
54,. B. M. Add. Mss. 32971 f422 Newcastle to Rockingham 19 
November 1765.1 
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This letter demonstrates several important points. It 
is quite obvious that there had been some difference of opinion 
over the proceedings with Charles Yorke. This gras perhaps an 
omen for the Stamp Act Crisis. Here a difference of opinion 
with Yorke was in great measure responsible for the exact 
55 
policy that the Ministry adopted. It shows also that Rocking- 
ham was by ne means a "passenger" in the administration as 
is sometimes thought. Indeed the Minute was apparently sketched 
out by Rockingham personally, then Grey Cooper, Charles Yorke 
56 
and John Roberts worked on it. Newcastle obviously realised 
that he played an important part in this particular episodes 
as Rockingham's regular attendance at Treasury Board meetings 
57 
during this episode seems to demonstrate his enthusiasm. 
The Treasury Minute Book'makes it quite obvious that the 
bullion question was brought to the notice of the administra- 
tion by mercantile and manufacturing interests and the 
Minute of 13 November 1765 was made strictly for th6ir benefit. 
Thus there seems little doubt that this was a question on 
which commercial influence was of supreme importance. The 
three papers that Rockingham sent to his colleagues definitely 
exercised considerable influence over the precise formulation 
of policy, and the method of execution. These papers could 
be interpreted as being. a justification for Rockingham's 
measures. They. infodrmed -the ministers that what they intended 
55. See below PP-, 361-362. 
56. Clark op. cam. p" 158. -, ', 
', :. 
57. For Rockingham' s attendance see P. R. 0. Treasury Minute 
Books T. 29, Vol. XXXVII, tYSay 1765 - May 1766. 
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to do was perfectly legal. It is possible that Rockingham 
was already playing for mercantile support, and that by 22 
October 1765 he already knew what he intended to do over the 
bullion question and his main problem was to convince the 
rest of the administration that what he intended to do was 
right. 
The final chapter in the episode of the bullion question 
was very similar to the final chapter in the episode of the 
repeal of the Stamp Act. On 25 November 1765 a letter of 
thanks for the Treasury Minute was read at the Treasury Board 
from the Merchant Venturers, and on 26 November a letter of 
thanks from the merchants and manufacturers of Liverpool 
58 
was read and on 2 December one from Lancaster. There is a copy 
of the letter from William Reeve, the Master of the Merchant 
59 
Venturers to the Treasury Board among the Rockingham Papers. 
He also sent a letter to Rockingham personally couched in 
60 
identical terms. 
Rockingham himself seems to have taken some measures to 
find out if the Treasury Minute met with the approval of the 
merchants. On 24 November 1765 Lord Strange wrote to him 
that he would have forwarded the address of the Manchester 
merchants sooner 
58. P. R. 0. Treasury Minute Book . 29 Vol. XXXVII f pp. 235,242, 
255., Cf. Below ppA52-453. See also T1/447 f381; T1/451 183. 
Thomas Townshend had-apparently seen that the Merchant 
Venturers. tigere informed, see Robert Nugent to William 
, Reeve 17 November,; 1765, -Merchant Venturers Records 
""Letters 1754 ,- , 
Bundle 10. "., 
59. °W. W. M. R56-1 William,. Reeve to the Lords Commissioners of 
the Treasury 21 November 1765. 
60. yy. 
CW. 
M. R56-2 William Reeve to Rockingham 21 
November 1765 
`opy) 
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" but that you were desirous of knowing if the Manchester 
Gentlemen approved of what was done. On what you 
said relative to the Minute I communicated to them 
only the purport of the order to the Commissioners 
of the Customs, and I find them well pleased with what 
is done. I expect a public letter of thanks from them 
to the Treasury, which shall be transmitted as soon 
as I get it. " 61 
On 29 November Strange sent a public address of thanks 
62 
to Rockingham from the Manchester merchants. In this address 
the merchants expressed some concern because the orders were 
confined to a few of the southern colonies whereas most goods 
63 
were sold in the northern American provinces. In his reply 
to the address Rockingham hastened to allay the fears of the 
merchants and stated that the measures were identical for 
64 
all the colonies. 
This episode is of the utmost interest. It betrays in 
mix ture many characteristics of the Stamp Act Crisis which 
was to follow so closely on its heels. As at the time of the 
Stamp Act Crisis, there were consultations among leading 
members of the administration, consultations with government 
experts on America, information and advice from merchants, 
mercantile pressure and petitions and a possible attempt to 
crystallise mercantile agitation. As at the time of the 
Stamp Act Crisis a definite crystallisation and organisation 
of mercantile agitation took place followed by government 
61. W. W. bi. R56-3 Lord Strange to Rockingham 24 November 1765. 
62. WWM. R56-5 Strange to Rockingham 29 November 1765. 
63. W. W. M. R56-4 Merchants of Manchester Address of Thanks to Rockingham 27 November 1765. 
64. W. W. LPL R56-6 Rockingham to Merchants of Manchester December 1765. (Draft). 
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action and finally letters of thanks. The only difference 
between the two affairs was one of magnitude. This difference 
was exaggerated because while the bullion question could be 
dealt with outside Parliament, the later crisis necessit ted 
a full-scale Parliamentary enquiry and thus had to be brought 
to full public notice. From his handling of the bullion 
question the youthful leader of the administration must have 
learned much, particularly in the organisation of politico- 
commercial legislation and must have gained much useful 
knowledge on the American colonies and acquired many contacts 
who were invaluable during the Stamp Act Crisis. 
At 
} 
r- f 
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Cý THE STAMP ACT CRISIS. 
1. Introductory. 
The Stamp Act Crisis is generally acknowledged to be the 
period when the Marquis of Rockingham and his colleagues 
endeavoured, to persuade a reluctant King, House of Lords and 
House of Commons that the repeal of the American Stamp Act 
was a political, economic and imperial necessaity. This was 
the crisis for the ministry for its life became dependent on 
the carrying of the repeal, but this crisis had begun for 
- Rockingham and his colleagues long 
before an attempt was made 
to introduce the repeal into Parliament. 
Dr. Sutherland has put forward the theory that the Stamp 
Act Crisis interrupted the ordered lines of commercial policy 
of the Rockingham administration which would probably have 
resulted in a reduction of the molasses duty and the passing 
65 
of the Free Ports Act, but before the Treasury Minute of 15 
November 1765 was formulated it must have been obvious to 
Rockingham and his colleagues that they had yet to face a 
major problem associated with the American Stamp Act and this 
knowledge must have influenced commercial policy which would 
not develop independent of the Stamp Act Crisis. 
The Crisis for Rockingham can be divided into four 
phases. In the first phase commencing at the end of August 
1765 Rockingham knew that all was not vvrell in'America, that 
the colonies appeared to be on the verge of revolution, that 
65. Sutherland " Edmund0 Burke and the First Rockingham Ministry 
loc. cit. p. 60 et sect. 
ºý 
i 
3Eý, 
there was a severe slump in British trade to the colonies and 
that a vital 'section of the community, the British merchants, 
66 
were unauf er-t}gg^a$eaerbsulthip. In this first period Rocking- 
ham must have felt that a political crisis was upon him yet he 
was incapable of 'acting until he had much more information. 
Thus the activities of the Treasury Board to enforce the Stamp 
67 
Act during these months gradually became r thing 3if1_*W. c9acade. 
Rockingham can'have had very little real hope that the Americans 
were going to settle down and accept the Stamp Act and during 
this-period his main task was to gain information., 
The second phase in the crisis was the period from the 
middle of November 1765 until nearly the end of January 1766 
during which the ministry formulated its policy. The final 
policy was " hammered out in two small informal meetings at 
68 
Rockingham's on 19 and 21 January 1766". This phase was probably 
the most difficult fvv Rockingham. He fully realised the 
weaknesses of his ministry and how imperative it was for it 
to either evolve a policy that was acceptable to the King and 
the Grenvilleites or to obtain outside support. Rockingham 
must have realised that Pitt was angling for office on his 
own terms and that he was unwilling to co-operate with the 
Rockingham administration in spite of all its efforts to 
66. See above p. 25 et sea. 
67. See below lip-326-5-28o 
68. See Charles Townshend, His Character and Career by Sir 
Lewis Namier, the Leslie Stephen Lecture 1959, printed 
Cambridge 1959 p. 24. 
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conciliate him. Failure to enlist the support of Pitt and 
inability to formulate a policy that would be successful in 
pacifying the Americans and at the same time acceptable to the 
King and to the other strong political groups forced Rockingham 
to look outside Parliament for support for his ministry. He 
thus turned to the merchants, and it has been suggested that 
the ministry was so long in reaching a decision on the Stamp 
Act because they were preoccupied in gaining mercantile support 
69 
which they needed in order to put pressure on Parliament. 
The third phase of the crisis was to execute the policy 
decided upon. Rockingham had to steer the Declaratory Act and 
the repeal of the Stamp Act through Parliament. The die was 
now cast and there was no going back. Every possible means 
had to be used to carry out the policy. The main difficulty 
lay in the House of Commons where the King's placemen and the 
Grenville faction were hostile. Here Rockingham used his 
70 
chief weapon, the merchants, with supreme skill. They were 
used in two ways. Firstly they gave evidence before the Stamp 
Act Committee and secondly they petitioned the House of 
Commons. By these two methods the necessary amount of pressure 
was brought to bear, independent'members were convinced and 
Rockingham justified the repeal on the grounds of economic 
necessity. 
69. Sutherland loc. cit. rt passim also British Politics and 
the American Revolution by C. R. Ritche son, Norman U. S. A. 
1950, pp. 23-62. Cf.. Morgan op. cit. P. 266. 
70tb See Ritcheson 22. cit. pp. 23-62, Sutherland loc. cit passim. 
Z26 
The fourth phase was less critical. It involved securing 
the acceptance of Rockingham's policy in the colonies. By 
repealing the Stamp Act, Rockingham had inevitably made 
Grenville appear mistaken in passing it in the previous year. 
To prove that Rockingham was right the repeal of the Stamp 
Act had to stop the trouble in the colonies and show that the 
symptons of discontent there had sprung from the way that 
the Stamp Act had affected trade. Professor Morgan has 
suggested that the Americans were demanding more than the 
71 
repeal of the Stamp Act in 1765-66, but it must be admitted 
that to a large extent Rockingham's measures were successful 
in pacifying the colonists. 
2. The Onset of the Crisis. 
The first definite news that Rockingham received of the 
American riots was on 5 October 1765 but the Virginia Resolu- 
72 
tions had been known since August 1765. In this situation it 
is not surprising that at a Treasury Board meeting on 13 
September 1765, at which Rockingham and his Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, William Dowdeswell, were present, orders were made 
to be circulated to colonial governors urging them to ensure 
73 
that the Stamp Act was executed. This measure indicates that 
the Rockingham administration was preparing to deal with any 
trouble that might arise in the American colonies and had at 
71. See Morgan 92. cit. pp. 2U2-25; 5v' 
72. See above pp. 30A et seg. 
73. P. R. 0. Treasury Pppers T-29 Treasury Minute Book Vol. 
CCVII i p. 131. 
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this time no intention of repealing the American Stamp Act. 
At a further meeting on 7 October letters were read from 
Andrew Oliver, the Stamp Distributor at Boston, announcing 
his resignation after the riots there and on 11 October the 
resignation of the New York Stamp Officer, James McEvers, 
was made known at the Treasury Board by the reading of a 
74 
letter from McEvers to Barlow Trecothick. Again the only 
reaction of Rockingham and his colleagues was to take action 
75 
to see that the Stamp Act was enforced, and this policy was 
continued as late as November 1765. Professor Clark has 
suggested that when Grenville fell there was a great deal of 
work for the actual administration of the Stamp Act still to 
76 
be done. This thesis is borne out by a copy of a letter among 
the Newcastle Papers from Thomas Whately to the Commissioner 
of Stamps dated 9 July 1765 explaining how the Treasury would 
appoint Stamp Distributors should a vacancy occur. The 
letter is endorsed, 
"This seems the only direction given by the late 
administration relative to the Stamp Act. " 77 
This continued enforcement of the Act may have been purely 
routine. 
The measures that the Treasury Board took in November 1765 
were far less positive than those taken in the previous months. 
74. Ibid pp. 159,165. For McEvers and Trecothick see my Barlow 
Trecothick etc pp. 22-23. CF Sosrhl cir /373, 
75. P. R. 0. Treasury Papers T-29 Treasury Minute Book Vol. 
XXRVII, pp. 159-165. 
76. Clark The Rise of the British Treasury p. 139. Cf. Sosin loc 
cit. pp. 924-5. 
77. B. M. Add. Mss. 32967 f290 "Copy of a letter from Mr. Whately 
to the Commissioner of Stamps 9 July 1765. tt 
Z2% 
Although, for instance, action was taken on 1 November 1765 
to see that the Stamp Act was enforced in New Jersey this was 
a special case; for William Coxe, the Stamp Distributor for 
that colony had resigned, the Board were informed, without 
the least sign of resistance to the Stamp Act. It is true 
that on the safte day the Board made efforts to obtain infor- 
mation as to the best method of paying over the revenues from 78 
the Stamp Act to the Deputy-Paymaster at New York, but this 
was merely an attempt to gain information and did not involve 
any policy decision on the enforcement of the Stamp Act. When 
the official resignation of Coxe was received on 25 November 
1765 it provoked no comment that is recorded in the Treasury 
79 
Minute Book, which is perhaps even more significant evidence 
that the minister's zeal for enforcement of the Stamp Act 
was declining. It would thus seem that if initially Rockingham 
was prepared to enforce the Stamp Act in the hope that after 
a display of disapproval the Americans would eventually settle 
down and pay the tax, his actions became increasingly hesitant 
until by the middle of November 1765 action at the Treasury 
Board can have been no more. than a facade while members of 
the administration sought information about the Stamp Act. 
Newcastle seems to have had some inkling of the gravity 
80 
of the approaching crisis as early as 30 August 1765. It was 
78. Clark on. cit. p. 197. 
79. Ibid p-234 
80" B. M. "Add. riss. 32969 f221 Newcastle to Conway 30 August 1765 
quoted above p. 301. 
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perhaps regrettable that he was absent from a Cabinet meeting 
on that date which seems to have taken a less grave view of 
the situation and resolved with regard to the Virginia Resolu- 
tions 
" If any instruction -a general approbation of what 
Gov. Faugier has done, a conclusion from his represent- 
ation of things that these violent resolutions were 
the effect of heat in a few members of the assembly 
present and that when the full assembly shall meet again 
and shall have had time to consider maturely the nature 
of the resolution taken they will with proper manage- 
ment be early brought to reverse them. 
That he should support by all prudent measures 
the authority of the British Parliament in that country 
and transmit constant accounts of every occurrence 
relative to this subject that shall appear important 
for his M(ajesty)'s information. " 81 
Rockingham himself does not seem to have been fully aware of 
the gravity of the situation as late as 23 October 1765" On 
that day Thomas Hollis showed Rockingham Jonathan Mayhew's 
account of Boston's attitude towards the Stamp Act and recorded 
in his diary that Rockingham was most civil and 
"read the letter attentively, but by no means appears to 
feel the impobtance of it nor the very imminent danger 
there is at this time of losing our northern colonies. 
That being the case with respect to him and also it 
should seem by his talk with his brother ministers..... " 82 
Professor Clark states, however, that Newcastle was ready for 
repeal of the Stamp Act by 12 October 1765 and cites as evidence 
a letter from Newcastle to Rockingham of that date. In this 
letter Newcastle questioned the utility of proceeding with the 
Stamp Act as he saw-little prospect of obtaining any worthwhile 
81. B. r. M. Add. Mss" 32969 f257 '! Minute of the Meeting of His Majesty's Servant at His.. Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland's 30 August 1765. " 
82. Bridenbaugh 2"' p. 199 quoting diary of Thomas Hollis. For 
Mayhew see Dictionary of American Btographyy ed"Dumas Malone Vol. XII, Lona =6, pp. 4 _. 
330 
revenue from it. It is perhaps reading a little too much into 
the letter to say by this date that Newcastle was ready for 
83 
repeal, for on the following day Newcastle wrote a memoranda 
for a meeting with the Duke of Cumberland on American aftairs 
in which he mentioned executing the Stamp Act by "fair means" 
and "some relief" after a dutiful subtis6ionttottheBP&itibh 
84 
Parliament and an application to the King. 
Rockingham had begun, however, in September and October 
1765, to gather information about the Stamp Act. During the 
Stamp Act Crisis he received a number of unsolicited and 
solicited dissertations about American affairs from'a variety 
85 
of people. The earliest of these dated. 5 September 1765 
was written by John Wentworth; another written by Henry 
McCulloh was received in October 1765. John Wentworth had 
strong political and mercantile associations with tNewi; CV, 
Hampshire, and LcCulloh had been closely connected with the 
86 
preparation of the Stamp Act. Other dissertations reached 
Rockingham in November and December 1765 and January 1766. One 
from Nicholas Ray who was a leading American merchant in Condor, 
was written on 29 November 1765; another, from Dr. ZEohn Fotheggi1 
a leading Quaker known to Rockingham was first written to Lord 
Dartmouth and passed on to Rockingham., In late December or ear 
83. Clark op. cit. p. 149 citing W. W. M. Rl-504 Newcast e to 
Rockingham 1Q October.; 1765 quoted' above pp. ýQ4- ay, 
84. B. M. Add. Mss. 32970. f312'1'Items for the Duke of Cumberland 
13 October 1765". 
85. Cf"The Introduction to my. Barlow Trecothick etc p. 11 et sue. 864 ` Ibid. pp. 81,157, et assim. 
r 
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January 1766 Rockingham received a dissertation from John 
Carter a country gentleman from Deal in Kent. Carter wrote 
originally to Newcastle on 14 December 1765 and the dissert- 
ation must have been passed by him to Rockingham. Malachy 
Postlethwayt, probably the country's greatest living economist 
wrote to Rockingham on 22 January 1766 and finally Thomas 
Crowley a Quaker merchant who wrote under the pseudonym 
87 
Amor Patriae wrote twice on 10 and 20 January 1766. 
In his dissertation Wentworth described the geography 1 .1 I 
and resources of the mainland colonies and questioned the 
'! 1 
ability of the Americans to pay the Stamp Duties because of 
the lack of specie in the colonies. He suggested the reform 
of the laws of trade and the reduction of the molasses duty 
to one penny per gallon and pointed out-the benefit that 
'. 
Great Brittain gained from the colonies under the mercantile 
system. Henry McCulloh pointed out the parts of the Stamp 
Act most objected to by the Americans, and while attempting 
to justify the Act again drew attention to the lack of specie 
in the colonies and suggested modifications to make the Act 
workable. Nicholas Ray suggested that the withdrawal of the 
British troops from America would render the Stamp Act unnec- 
essary but wanted the authority of the British Parliament 
over America asserted in terms similar to the Declaratory 
Act which was eventually passed, while Fothergill justified 
American resistance as actions against neasures that seemed 
87. Ibid. pp. 178,218,246,169 and 202. 
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to the colonists tyrnnical and oppressive. Fothergill thus 
desired that the colonies should be treated with kindness and 
the 'power' of Parliament to tax the colonies ignored. Carter 
suggested the withdrawing of all vestiges of British authority 
from America to bring the colonies back to loyalty, or a tax 
on all ships leaving for America as an alternative to the Stamp 
Act. Postlethwayt put forward a scheme for reconciling England 
and her colonies and the repeal of the Stamp Act in return for 
a declaration from the colonies that they would not manufacture 
goods that would prove detrimental to British industry. Crowley 
advocated suspension of the Stamp Act and the meeting of an 
88 
imperial Parliament to agree on a tax for America. The number 
of these dissertations and the variety of opinions expressed 
show that Rockingham was well-informed of the many possible 
courses of action open to him. 
Besides these dissertations Rockingham was receiving 
information from other sources. Perhaps the best example of 
this is the fact that William Bollan, the agent of the Massachu- 
setts Cduncil, in October 1765 began to send Rockingham infor- 
mation from America and he continued to do this throughout 
89 
the Stamp Act Crisis. 
During this period Rockingham was also endeavouring to 
get into touch with groups of merchants. When acknowledging 
the Manchester Merchants' Address of Thanks for the Treasury 
Minute of 15 November he wrote 
88. I_"pp. 81-86,155-157,213-217,178-183,246-247,167-169, 
202-204. F 
89.. lb id. pp. 237-239. Cf" Sosin op. cit. p. 73.11 
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"In the ensuing session of Parliament after the re- 
elections very important considerations ought and must 
come before the House of Commons. I mean particularly 
a thorough enquiry into the state of trade between this 
country and the colonies. Every information that can 
lead mens' minds to form right principles on so impor- 
tant a consideration will be of the utmost service.... " 90 
Meanwhile Rockingham had received letters from a Wakefield 
91 
woollen merchant, John Milnes, About the Stamp Act. The first 
letter was probably sent to Rockingham's Yorkshire friend 
Sir George Savile and passed to. Rockingham. The second was 
92 
written to Rockingham himself. Savile appears to have been 
procuring information for Rockingham from merchants. On 5 
November 1765 he wrote to Rockingham in a letter concerned 
with the decline in trade caused by Grenville's American 
93 
measures, "I have no answer from Leeds or Wakefield. '" 
By the end of 1765 two other figures in the Stamp Act 
Crisis, Edmund Burke and Joseph Harrison, had come into contact 
with Rockingham. Both were employed by him during the Stamp 
Act Crisis. Edmundr; ý Burke had become Rockingham's private 
secretary by 11 July 1765 and was thus in a position to help 
94 
Rockingham during the whole period of the Stamp Act Crisis. 
90. W. W. M. R56-6 Rockingham to the Merchants of Manchester 
December 1765 (draft) See above pp. 320-32). The re-elections 
referred to are the formal re-elections occasioned by the 
formation of the Rockingham administration. 
91. For Milnes see Wakefield, its History and People by J. N. 
Walker, Wakefield., 1934, p. 397. See also my Barlow Trecothick 
etc pp. 223-233. 
92. W. W. M. R24 Ivlilnes to "Sir" 21 November 1765 and ibid W. W. M. R24 Milnes to Rockingham 24 November 1765. Cf. my Barlow Trecothick etc p. 226. -"--" 
93. W W. M. R1-519 Savile to 'Rockingham 1 November 1765. 94. See Edm1 ndr' Burke to Charles O'Hara 11 July 1765 printed in The Correspondence of EämUncte Burke Vol. l 1744-1768 ed. T. W Copeland, Cambridge, 195 21` 1ý ' 
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Rockingham recorded on two occasions, 25 November 1765 and 
19 April 1766 making payments to Burke "For obtaining various 
information and materials relative to the Trades and Manufac- 
95 
tures. " Joseph Harrison seems to have been in contact with 
the administration very soon after its formation. In late 
June and early July he was on a sailing expedition with Sir 
96 
George Savile. In early October 1765 Harrison recorded meeting 
97 
and dining with William Dowdeswell. On 4 November 1765 Harrison 
gave evidence before the Treasury Board on the best method to 
98 
pay over the Stamp Duty to the Deputy Paymaster in America and 
in April 1766 Harrison was able to write to John Temple 
"Ever since the beginning of this session of Parliament 
I have lived at the Marquis of Rockingham's where I am 
at present employed as assistant to his private secretary 
Mr. Burke.... and my intimate acquaintance with American 
affairs has at this time enabled me to be particularly 
useful, so that I have the Satisfaction of enjoying some 
share of his Lordship's favour and confidence. " 99 
yo. Yu. uu. ivz. x15 lvotebooi or secret service vaymentis. ur. burxe 
Correspondence Vol. l, p. 211. Burke was paid £150 on 25 
November 1765 and £100 on 19 April 1766. These statements 
are recorded in WilN. 1t. R15-1 of which R15-2 is a duplicate. 
In W. W M. R15-3 it tis again recorded "Nov 25th Mr. Burke on 
acct .... £150" then written in Rockingham's hand "for 
obtaining various information and materials relative to 
the Trades and Manufactures-11 
96. See The Bovwdoin Temple Papers loc. cit. p. 65 Joseph Harrison 
to John Temple 12 July 1765. 
97. Ibid. p. 70 Joseph Harrison to John Temple 11 October 1765. 
98. P. R. O. Treasury Papers, Treasury Minute Book T-29 Vol. 
XXXVII p. 189. 
99. Bowdoin Temple Papers loc. cit. p. 72 Joseph Harrison to John 
Temple 15 April 1766 quoted my Barlow Trecothitk etc p. 100. 
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Harrison's appointment may have been due to the fact that as 
a former resident of the colonies, colonial merchant, and 
customs official he could provide valuable information for 
100 
Rockingham, but Rockingham may also have been motivated by 
the fact that in OcUöber 1765 he had arranged and sworn 
Harrison into a senior post in the colonial customs service 
only to learn almost immediately afterwards that the previous 
101 
holder was still alive and thus he had to disappoint Harrison. 
During the Stamp Act. Crisis Harrison acted as a useful link 
between Rockingham and American refugees coming to England, 
102 
he also procured several witnesses for the Stamp Act Committee. 
On 7 November 1765 Barlow Trecothick, the key mercantile 
figure in the repeal of the Stamp Act wrote to Rockingham on 
the subject of the Stamp Act for the first time. It is clear 
from Newcastle's efforts to secure his'election for Shoreham 
that he was already regarded"as a staunch supporter of the 
Rockingham Whigs and in August. 1765 Trecothick had given 
evidence before the Treasury Board on the question of remit- 
103 
tances to the British forces in America. 
Trecothick's first letter to Rockingham on the Stamp 
Act is endorsed 
"M1r. Trecothick, relating to the dangerous riots of America 
to trade and government on account of the Stamps. " 104 
100. Ibid. pp. 100-128"ß . See _ 
also my "Joseph Harrison and the ---ý I 
Liberty Incident'", in William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 
Vol. XX, No. 4, Ocotber, 
. 
1963, p-585. 
101. Bowdoin and Temple Papers, loc.. cit. p. 71, Joseph Harrison 
to John Temple 11 October 1765. 
102. See my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 115,116. Cf. Smith op. cit 
pp-39-72,. The term refugee is used as in Smith op. cit. 
to describe a British or colonial official who left the $ 
colonies because he had become unpopular through the St 11nn " 
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The letter is in a bundle that seems to have been collected 
together at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis and all the 
letters in it contain information about the riots in America 
and the Stamp Duty. 
Trecothick's letter is concerned almost entirely with the 
effects of the Stamp Duty upon trade. He pointed out that 
the refusal of the Americans to use stamped paper would mean 
that no American merchant could legally clear vessels for 
England and thus would not risk sending any. This, Trecothick 
stated, would deprive the sugar colonies of supplies and the 
British merchants of remittances. Thus British merchants in 
turn would be forced to stop exporting which would cause 
cancellation of orders to manufacturers and hence unemployment. 
Trecothick concluded 
"bey Lord the chasm is a terrible one, from 1st Nov. to 
Ist March the soonest any repeal or suspension of the 
Act can reach America, if Parliament is not to meet for 
business till January. So long a step to circulation 
must be fatal to all or most branches of American 
commerce.... Too gretkt delay and caution in administering 
the remedy may render the diseases of this embarrassed 
nation incurable; and even an upright and virtuous 
administration may therefore be deemed accountable from 
effects proceeding from the errors of their predecessors. 2 
105 
His letter put the viewpoint of-the merchants in a nutshell. 
They were concerned almost entirely with the effects of the 
Stamp Act on commerce and in'seeking an immediate remedy to 
103. For Trecothick and Shoreham-see above pp. . On the 
question of remittances-see P. R. 0. Treasury Papers, Treasury 
Minute Books T-29 Vo1. XXXVII; p. 87. 
104. W. W. M. R24-43 Trecothick ýto° Rockingham 7 November 1765. 
105. Ibid. R24-43 Trecothick to Rockingham 7 November 1765. 
ý3ý 
the embarrassment the Act was causing them. 
Rockingham replied inviting Trecothick to see him "on 
106 
Tuesday evening" at "a mere private dinner party. " Rocking- 
ham's draft reply is undated but Trecothifk had written on 
Thursday 7 November 1765. This leads one to believe that the 
107 
Tuesday in question must have been 12 November. This draft- 
letter and the subsequent meeting are important because they 
mark the beginning of Rockingham's efforts to formulate a 
108 
policy on the Stamp Act. 
Other leaders of the ministry were also active in securing 
information upon the Stamp Act. Although Newcastle constantly 
complained that Rockingham acted without consulting him and 
although helvas, to some extent, treated as an "elder states- 
man" by the rest of the administration the part that Newcastle 
played at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis was by no means 
109 
inconsiderable. Having excused himself from the meeting of 
110 
30 August Newcastle asked Conway to send him a Minute of the 
111 
meeting on which he commented and according to his memoranda 
in September he seems to have discussed the American problem 
106. Vif. W. M. R81-181 Rockingham to Trecothick (draft) undated 
This draft is endorsed "Lord Rockingham's memos and notes 
on American affairs" and also in pencil "Draft of a 
letter to Barlow Trecothick! ' The contents make it obvious 
that the second endorsement-is correct. 
107. Smith or. cit. p. 93 states that 7 November 1765 was a 
Sunday bitt see Handbook of Dates for Students of English 
History ed. C. R. ' _. 
einer, London, Royal Historical Society, 
1955. The accuracy of this can be confirmed by reference 
to the dating in B; 'M. Add. 2lss 32971. In my Barlow 
Trecothick etc I unfortunately followed Smith. 's dating. 108.; = See below pp" 341-342.109. See belog pp. 356-357.362- 110. See above p. 30Z. 3" 
ill. B. M. Add. Mss" 32969 f222 Newcastle to Conway 30 August 1765. 
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112 
fairly frequently with Rockingham. At the beginning of 
October 1765 Newcastle had written to his old friend and 
113 
colleague, John Roberts, for his advice on American affairs. 
Newcastle summarised RobertSs ideas in a memorandum for a dis- 
cussion with the Duke of Cumberland. The proposals involved 
treating the colonies sternly yet kindly. They were to be 
induced to submit to Parliament and petition the King on 
114 
account of their grievances. Moreover Newcastle was present 
at meetings when the Stamp Act was discussed in October 1765 
and gave his opinion in much the same way as he did on the 
115 
bullion question. 
Charles Townshend was another minister who was active at 
this time for on 24 October he wrote to Dr. Richard Brocklesby 
that he wanted to converse with an American merchant whose 
"name was Kelly" stating 
"I want to converse with a merchant on the nature cause 
and extent of the European, illicit American trade, and 
112. Ibid. f263 Newcastle to Conway 2 September 1865; the Minute 
is at ibid f257 "Minute of the meeting of his Majesty's 
Servants at his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland" 30 
August 1765. For Newcastle's memoranda see ibid. 343 "Items 
for Lord Rockingham 9 September 1765" ; ibid. f364 "Items 
for Lord Rockingham 11 September 1765. 
113. See above p. 30. and B. M. Add" Mss 32970 ff302-3 John Roberts 
to Newcastle 12 October 1765. 
114. B. Y.. Add" LMss" 32970 f312 "Items for the Duke of Cumberland' 
13 October 1765. 
115. See B. M. Add. Mss. 32970 f379 Newcastle to Rockingham 17 
October 1765 where Newcastle writes "I was surprised you 
had not the First Lord of Trade at our meeting the other 
night. I believe it is the first time that ever that 
happened upon business which regarded singly the American 
plantations". See alos B. Mi. Add. Mss. 32971 f317 "Considerations 1 
to be laid before my Lord Rockingham only" 9 November 1765. 
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to speak with him upon the efficiency or inefficiency of 
the last Act to prevent it-" 
He concluded 
"I cannot in a letter give my sentiments upon the subject 
of our difficulties in N. America.... but this I may say 
no Parliament ever met in such a critical minute nor 
did ministers upon so bold a precipice. " 116 
Although the desired meeting was obviously not primarily to 
discuss the effect of the Stamp Act, it shows that Townshend 
was at least interested in the trade to North America. On 30 
October he had still not seen Kelly for he wrote again to 
Brocklesby 
"I shall be very happy to see Mr. Kelly whose knowledge 
I know is very extensive and whose character and inde- 
pendence gives great weight to his information. " 
Trecothick and his lieutenant and fellow-merchant, Capel Hanbury, 
were trying to get into contact with Townshend at this time 
for in the same letter he wrote 
"I am to thank you also for the message from Mr. H(anbury) 
and iirr. T(recothick). They will find me open and candid 
very proud of their favour, and very free from prejudice. " 
117 
In another letter about the same time Tovvnshend wrote 
n 
116. Letters of Charles Tozrnshend to Dr. Brocklesby now in 
äßl. L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor Michigan; Townshend to 
Brocklesby 24 October 1765. Dr. Richard Brocklesby 1722- 
1797 was a Quaker doctor and friend of Burke. See the 
Dictionary of National Biograplhy_ Vol. VI, London 1886 p. 374 
In Edmund Burke, New York Agent by Ross J. Hoffman, Phila- 
delphia, 1956 p. 28 n. 8 the author states that some of 
these letters are to unidentified persons but the letters 
of 24,27,28,30 October, contain evidence consistent with 
them having been written to Burke. In the lack of con- 
clusive evidence I take the letters to have been written to Brocklesby but if they were written to Burke it seems h that he was in close contact with the merchants'at a date. far earlier than can be proved by the rest of the evidence presented in this thesis. I am indebted to the 
3.. 410 
"It will be a real pleasure and honour to me to receive 
the confidence designed by me by Mr. Hanbury and by Mr. 
Trecothick. I know their extensive trade. I respect 
their character and shall be happy in communicating 
with them upon the present formidable and unhappy temper 
and situation in the colonies. " 118 
Townshend who was in the country at the time stated that he 
was willing to come to town especially to meet Trecothick and 
Hanbury. On 10 November, however, Townshend had still seen 
nkither Trecothick, Hanbury or Kelly for he wrote 
"Will you let Mr. H(anbury) and Mr. T(recothick) know that 
I shall be very happy to see them on Saturday or Monday 
as shall best suit their convenience.... '. Kelly disap- 
points me much in not coming. " 119 
Townshend wrote on Sunday 10 November and from this letter it 
can be presumed he was in contact with the merchants by 16 Or 
18 November. 
The evidence presented demonstrates that Rockingham, 
Newcastle and Townshend were making effortb to secure an 
appreciation of the nature and extent of the American problem 
and other ministers were 
120 
ice. Rockingham' s 
activity is perhaps the most noteworthy. His industry, on the 
116" contd W. L. Clements Library for the loan of the microfilm 
of these and the _Jowdeewell 
letters. The Kelly referred 
to is probably the William Kelly whp appeared before the 
Stamp Act Committee. See Smith oj, " cit. pp. 174-193. 
117. Ibid. Letters of Charles Townshend to Dr. Richard Brocklesby 
Townshend tp Brocklesby 30 October 1765. The letters in 
brackets have been written in the sane hand as the draft. 
116. Ibid. Torrnshend to Brocklesby undated but endorsed October 
or November 1765. 
119. Ibid. Townshend to Brocklesby 10 November 1765. I have 
supplied the bracketed letters in this'quotation. 
120" Cf. Sosin op. cit. pp. 73-75. and Lloyds Eveninc Post 4-6 
December 1765 where it is reported that Sir vjIMam Meredith 
had been enquiring into the state of the cloth trade in 
Lancashire and another gentleman "under the direction of 
the Marquis of R-11 in Halifax. 
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basis of the evidence presented above, exceeded that of both 
Newcastle and Townshend and his attempts to gain both infor- 
mation and the sympathy of the merchants show that he was at 
least a conscientious politician, and establish that from the 
beginning the policy adopted by the administration was the 
result of careful and painstaking labour. In this early stage 
of the crisis Rockingham had gained advice from many different 
sources, and the information that he received represented 
many shades of opinion both British and American. 
3. The Formulation of Policy. 
The earliest meeting to discuss the policy that was to 
be adopted towards the Stamp Act seems to have been the 
dinner party to which Rockingham invited Trecothick in mid- 
121ý 
November 1765. "i. aving extended his invitation to dinner 
Rockingham wrote "I may then be able to talk more fully". 
Prior to this in the letter he had stated some of his own 
ideas on the Stamp Act. He wrote 
"The difficulties are great the importance of the 
obedience in the colonies and British Legislature is 
no slight matter and yet perhaps it may be beyond doubt 
that the occasion which gave rise to all this confusion 
was ill-judged here. The particular and great incon- 
venience which you mention were perhaps intentionally 
to be so in order to force the compliance-" 12.1. 
In reply to Trecothick's pressing for an earlier meeting of 
Parliament Rockingham continued 
eQ b Qye pe 55 t* For a summary o the amp Act rss from 
. '_. 
Jqh? ß? Ppojnt. _See $9ß n.. ß. ; g. 78cctrse . , -. ."-, e 122; y V. M. R81-181 Rockingham to Trecothick n. d. but see above 
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"When you consider the present circumstances you will 
not find that an earlier meeting of Parliament than 
intended can be of the utility you would hope., the 
Persons who were the planners &c of the Act will be the chief persons sitting in the House and the time 
necessary for re-elections must still be given before 
you could expect any moderation measures. Even as yet 
we have not all the evidence, which a few days or weeks 
will give us of the disposition of America and upon 
this point it is both necessary and wise to wait for 
good grounds to proceed upon. " 123 
Rockingham's draft reply is full of deletions and he obviously 
had considerable difficulty in composing it. He was finding 
already that 
"The dilerrnma of the Rockingham government... was to find 
a way to redress the grievances of the merchants, and 
at the same time assuage the injured honour of Parlia- 
ment and maintain at least the semblance of authority. " 
124 
The attempts to restore stricken commerce while maintaining 
the rights of the British Parliament to legislate for the 
American colonies was the -,. chief-'difficulty. 1 in formulating 
a policy. 
There are unfortunately no records of who attended, or 
what occurred at, the dinner-party which was held about 12 
November 1765 but as well as ma"ing the beginning of the 
attempts of the ministry to formulate a policy it also xtarkc 
the inauguration of co-operation between the Rockingham 
administration and the merchants on the question of the Stamp 
Act. ' as distinct from mercantile pressure on the administration. 
There was a further meeting of ministers on American 
123. W. W. W. M. R81-181 Rockingham to Trecothick n. d. but see abpve 
pj. 336-7 and for Trecothick"s request for an earlier meeting of Parlier 4 124. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis p. 265. 
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affairs on 20 November. This was called at Newcastle's 
request for he wrote on 17 November to Conway 
"I must beg you would be so good as to let us have a 
meeting on Wednesday night for any business, either 
American as was designed or any other that may require 
consideration. " 125 
Barrington, the Secretary of War wrote to Newcastle on 18 
126 
November confirming this meeting, but no evidence of what was 
discussed there exists. There can be little doubt that there 
were other meetings of Ministers and informal discussions 
towards the end of November similar to the meeting held on 
12 November, and the Ministry was also preparing the speech 
127 
for the opening of Parliament. 
Progress on the formulation of policy was slow. Rocking- 
ham at least had not made up his mind by the end of November 
1765. On 27 November he wrote that he hoped 
"to avoid the discussion of the Stamp Act till good 
Principles (wem=jlaid down for easing and assisting 
North America. " 128 
and as late as 31 December 1765 Burke was able to write to 
Charles O'Hara with regard to America 
"Administration has not yet conclusively (I imagine) 
fixed upon a plan in this respect, as every dais 
information from abroad may necessitate some alteration. 
". 
" biss. -32971 r405 ewcas e to Conway IV Rove er 176 126. B. M. Add. Mss" 32971 f414 Barrington to Newcastle 18 November 
1765. 
127. See B. M. Add. Mss 32972 f29 Newcastle to John Offley 23 
November 1765; B. M. Add" iss. 32972 f29 Newcastle to Conway 
24 November 1765. 
128. W. W. M. R19 Rockingham's notes on American affairs. Cf" 
Clark Rise of the British Treasury pp. 149-150. 
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although Burke personally was by this time convinced that the 
129 
Stamp Act would have to be repealed. 
At the beginning of December 1765 the pressure exerted 
on the administration by the merchants began to increase. At 
a general meeting of the merchants of London on Wednesday 4 
December 1765 when Trecothick took the chair a committee of 
twenty-eight merchants was formed consisting of the principle 
merchants trading to each colony. Trecothick was elected 
chairman of the committee for on 6 December he was able to 
sign himself "Chairman to the Committee of Merchants of London 
-130 to North America. " At this meeting it seems that particular 
merchants were chosen to represent each colony. l'or instance, 
131 
Nicholas Ray was chosen to represent New York. It is likely 
that this meeting had been arranged at an earlier one for on 
20 February 1766 the New York Gazette or Weekly Post Boy 
recorded that 
I'Mi 
. t"After a private meeting of some staunch friends of America, a meeting was advertised of all the merchants 
trading to it.... of whom a committee was appointed. " 132 
Pressure also appears to have been put on the London 
133 
merchants by the merchants of Bristol.. The Committee appointed 
129. Burke Correspondence Vol. l, p. 228. Edmunde Burke to Charles 0H ra 31 December 1765. Cf. Cone oM. cit. pp. 86-87. 
130. See W. W. M. R1-537 "Copy of a letter to Leed from Mr. 
Trecothick relating to the American Trade". 
(Cf. 
below App. 1) 
131. See my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 35,218 quoting New York Gazette or Weekly Post Boy 20 February 1766. For Ray see 
also above p"331 and my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 213-222. 132. See New'York Gazette or Weekly Post Boy 20 February 1766 
quoted my Barlow Trecothick etc p. 218. 
133. See W. W. M. R27 Minutes of the Stamp Act Committee p. 47 where Trecothick in his examination before the House of Commons stated "We were called on by the Bristol merchants this hastened our meeting for all the merchants trading 
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Was asked 
"to consider of the best method of application for pro- 
curing the Relief and Encouragement of the North American 
trade and to the manufacturing Citys and Towns for 
their Concurrence and Assistance. " 
134 
and the meeting then adjourned until 6 December. 
When the Committee met again on the appointed day a 
circular letter was approved and sent to 30 of the provincial 
and manufacturing towns together with a copy of the proceed- 
ings of the London merchants on 4 December. This letter stated 
that the slump in American trade had caused the meeting of 
the London merchants and noted, as this probably affected 
other merchants as well, that the London merchants desired 
the support of the other merchants in a 
"regular application to Parliament or otherwise by a 
Petition from your Body by all the Interest you can 
make. " 
The opinion of the other merchants on the matter was requested 
135 
as the London merchants intended to use their views as a guide. 
Among the Rockingham Papers there is a copy of the letter 
and proceedings which is a copy of the document sent to the 
136 
merchants and manufacturers of Leeds. There is also a draft 
in Trecothick's hand of the letter that was sent to the 
provincial towns. This document has been endorsed; 
133" cont to North America. """ Cf. Minchinton be. cit. p. 152 
see also Merchant Venturers Correspondence correspondence 
in Bundle 10, Letters 1765 - and Masters Letter Book. 
134. W. W. M. R1-537- 
135. Ibid. W. W. M. R1-537 Cf" WWM. R27 , pp. 47-48. 136"Ibid. Rl-537 Copy of Trecothick's General Letter to town 
of Leeds 6 December 1765. 
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"This letter concerted between the Marquis of R. to Mr. 
Trecothick the pr4ncipal instrument in the happy repeal 
of the Stamp Actwithout giving up the British authority 
quieted the Empire. " 137 
If this letter was drafted to be sent out to the towns 
by Rockingham and Trecothick and copies were sent out by the 
merchants committee on 6 December, it would appear that this 
letter was drafted between 4 and 6 December for on 4 December 
the committee took no such action. The Gentleman's Magazine 
after reporting the meeting of 4 December noted 
"A deputation from this committee waited on the Ministry 
to request their countenance in their intended appli- 
cation to Parliament and it is said met with great 
encouragement. " 138 
and it seems that the letter was agreed to at the meeting 
with the ministry. The precise method in which the original 
letter was drawn up is diffic*nlt to discern. If the original 
draft were Rockingham's it is reasonable to assume that it 
would be in his hand and most likely among the Rockingham 
Papers. If the document had been drawn up at a meeting of 
Rockingahm and Trecothick and Rockingham was the prime mover 
of the measure it seems likely that he would have acted 
personally as amenuensis. As, the document is in Trecothick' a ýia, tcL t 
and practically without deletions it is probably not a draft 
but a copy of the letter that the merchants committee decided 
137. Ibid R1-535 There is some doubt as to the authorship of 
this endorsement. Albemarle off. cit. Vol" l, p. 319 states that it is Burke 's hand but Smith M. cit. p. 284 contends that the writing is not that Of Burke. I believe that 
the handwriting is that of Lady Rockingham and Dr. L. S. Sutherland has assured me that my assumption is correct although the late Sir Lewis Naniier has informed me that he believes that the handwriting 
138. Vol. XXXV, p. 588 
is definitely Burke'a. 
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to send which Trecothick gave to Rockingham. 
On 6 December there was no agreement in the ministry on 
American policy and as late as 2 J)fanuary 1766 Rockingham 
wrote to Newcastle about the disagreement in the Cabinet over 
139 
the repeal of the American Stamp Act. Denys de Berdt, a London 
American merchant, the agent in London for the Massachusetts 
House of Representatives, did record, however, to an American 
correspondent on 16 December 1765 
"I have the pleasure to acquaint you the ministry are 
entirely convinced of the bad tendency of the late 
regulations and disposed to relieve you, but expect a 
warm opposition from the old ministry and what they 
call the country party.... " 140 
The weakness of the ministry had been obvious from the 
start and Rockingham probably realised by December 1765 that 
the merchants might be, useful weapon to use. Whether he had 
any idea at this time of using the petitions which the circular 
letter evoked as a means of putting preasure upon the House 
of Cormnons is difficult to say. 
As the circular letter is couched in the broadest possible 
terms it seems probable that its author was fully aware of 
the ministerial problems. It thus seems likely that Rockingham 
agreed to Trecothick's suggestion of a circular letter pro- 
vided it demanded no action that would prejudice the merchants 
against any measure the'government was likely to adopt. Thus 
139. B. M. Add. Mss" 32973 fll Rockingham to. Newcastle 2 January 1766 
140. Dennys de Berdt to Samuel, White 16, December 1765 printed 
in "Letters of DenEys de Berdt 1757-1770" loc. cit. p. 307" I have not been able to identify clearly who the "country 
party" were. Perhaps Rockingham was referring to the 
country., gentlemen who would object to the repeal of the American Stamp Act because taxation at home would be increased.. 
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the actual circular letter would be drawn up by the merchants 
committee and a copy sent to Rockingham for his approval.: The 
petitions that the committee succeeded in obtaining by this 
letter by the time that Parliament opened were of the greatest 
importance, but Trecothick and the connittee also collected 
a large number of letters from America countermanding orders 
for British goods. With other members of the merchants 
committee Trecotick had called upon the Duke of Grafton and 
141 
General Conway and presented these letters before 11 December., 
By 1 January 1766 Trecothick gras already preparing the London 
merchants petition. Among the Rockingham Papers there is a 
document in Trecothick's hand endorsed "Draft of Application 
142 
from the London merchants through Mr. Trecothick. " This docu- 
went is dated 1 January 1766 and is the same save for a few 
minor alterations as the petition that the London merchants 
presented in the House of Commons on 17 January of which there 
is a copy in the same bundle of the Rockingham Papers. It 
therefore seems that Trecothick and Rockingham either co-oper- 
ated to produce the London merchants petition or Trecothick 
drafted it and Rockingham gave the document his approval. 
With the petition Trecothick presented a series of "Proofs 
and Observations" in which he endeavoured to justify the 
allegations made in the petition. There is also. a copy of 
143 
this document among the Rockingham Papers. Copies of both 
1ý1" l____K, Di"11+1t3lL VIJiIIion ano. tine American Revolution p. 41 
see also Lloyds Evening Post and the British Chronicle 
no. 1315,11-13 December 1765, p. 575. (cf. below Appendix 1) 142. WWM"R57. 
143. W. W. M. R57. 
349 
documents also exist among the Newcastle Papers which seem to 
be copies made for Newcastle. The 'Proofs and Observations( 
are in Joseph Harrison's hand which presupposes Rockingham had 
144 
them copied for him. 
Dennys de Berdt, another member of T recothick's merchant 
committee, was also active at this time. As agent for the 
House of Representatives of Massachusetts he had shown the 
petitions sent to him from America to Lord Dartmouth before 
145 
14 December 1765. On the 27 December he wrote to an American 
correspondent : 
"As soon as the ministry who are entirely in Your 
interest think it proper for me to Act, which they will 
faithfully inform me what steps to take.... " 146 
By such means were the merchants gradually increasing 
the pressure they could bring to bear on the administration- 
In turn the administration was realising the value of mercan- 
tile pressure and Nvas beginning to organise it. 
When Parliament met after Christmas the petitions caused 
by Trecothick's letter began to come flooding in. Counting 
the London petition there were twenty-oix from English and 
Scottish manufacturing and trading towns, complaining of 
the decline in American trade. The first twenty-four of these 
petitions were presented at nine sittings of the House 
144. B. LT. Add. Mss. 33030 , ff210-11 is the petit ion and ff214-5 is the Allegations. . 145. Dennys de Berdt to Samuel White 14 December 1765 in 
"Letters of Dennys de Berdt" loc. cit. p. 307. Cf" belovi 
Appendix 1 
," 146. Ibid" p" 309 De Berdt to-Samuel White 27 December 1765. 
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of Commons, held within a-space of thirteen days. The pressure 
on Parliament was obviously increased by the arrival in so 
short a time of so many petitions. It is probable that as the 
provincial merchants arrived in London they reported to 
Trecothick and he arranged that the petitions should be present- 
ed in groups and not singly. Dennys de Berdt wrote on 16 
January 
"The London Merchants Petition is delivered, the several 
Parts of the Country will. follow.... " 148 
Journals of the House of Co ions Vol. XXX, London 1767, p. 
462 et e=c.. The petitions were read as follows; 
17 January 1766. London, Merchant Venturers of 
Bristol, Merchants of Bristol, 
Liverpool, Halifax, Leeds, Lancaster 
Manchester, Leicester, and 
Bradford (Wilts) 
20 January 1766 
21 January 1766 
22 January 1766 
23 January 1766 
24 January 1766 
28 January 1766 
29 January 1766. 
24 February 1766 
27 February 1766 
Frome, Birmingham, Coventry, 
Macclesfield, Wolverhampton, 
Stourbridge, Dudley. 
Minehe ad. i 
Taunton. 
Witney., 
Glasgow and Chippenham. 
Nottingham. 
Me lksham. i 
Worcester. 
Sheffield., 
Clark o. c. p. 42 states "On January 17th the House of Commons 
received petitions for the repeal of the Stamp Acton 20th 
seven more and by 27th February eight more - thirty-five in all" 
This total of thirty-five does not agree with the constituent 
figures which agree with mine. The source is the same and the 
final total would thus appear to be a mis-calculation. 
Rockingham appears to have begun to list the petitions and 
their dates as well. See R58-1 which is an incomplete list 
of petitions; ) 
148. De Berdt to Samuel White 16 January 1766 in "Letters of Dena de Berdt" loc. cit. p. 310. ß 
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In his examination before the Stamp Act Committee Trecothick 
stated that the merchants of London had declined to supply a draft 
149 
of a petition because they thought it "improper". Indeed had a 
draft been supplied the wh®le campaign could far too easily have 
been interpreted as a deliberate ministerial attempt to play on 
mercantile support. On 2 January 1766 Trecothick had written to 
William Reeve at Bristol: 
"I have.... to acquaint you and the rest of the worthy 
Brethren of your City, that the cause of you not having 
received a minute detail of our proceedings here, arises 
from the Consideration, that the particular distress 
of Commerce in each port and manufacturing town will be 
best expressed from their own feelings, it being the wish 
of our committee that such only as either are or soon 
expect to be aggrieved should complain - on this basis 
you will doubtless forward your complaints. " 
He went on to say that no copy of the petition would be made 
public until after it had been presented to Parliam®nt but 
150 
outlined the principal contents of the petition for Reeve. 
Thus, although he was willing to admit before the Stamp Act 
Committee that the petitions had been sought Trecothick was 
anxious to show that this did not detract from their significance 
and he stated that he believed that they would have come had 
151 
no circular letter been written. The fact ghat twenty-six towns 
petitioned and only thirty circular letters were sent out is 
some measure of the success of the movement. 
Moreover Trecothick and his colleagues were not working 
without opposition. On 1 January 1766 Sir William Meredith, 
the staunch Rockingham Whig, wrote to Edmund Burke stating 
149. W. W. M. R27 "Minutes of the Stamp Act Committee" pp. 47-48. 
150. Merchant Venturers Correspondences Bundle 10, Trecothick 
to Reeve* 2 January 1766. 
151. W. W. M. R27 '. 'Minutes of the Stamp Act Committee" p. 57. 
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that Trecothick's letter had been concealed from the Liverpool 
152 
merchants until Meredith had asked to see it. Here the Mayor, 
James Poole, seems to have consulted the Earl of Buckingham- 
shire, a supporter of Grenville, and having been advised 
against a petition, the merchants did not petition in spite of 
153 
an additional letter from Trecothick. 
It must also be acknowledged that if Trecothick was the 
leader of the pressure group in London, the London merchants 
were not the only mercantile group endeavouring to organise 
agitation. Reference has been made above to the original 
initiative of the Merchant Venturers. They also seem to have 
154 
put pressure on the merchants of Birmingham, and the merchants 
of Liverpool in their turn, apparently ignorant of the initi- 
ative taken by the Merchant Venturers, tried to persuade the 
155 
latter to produce a petition tp Parliament. Moreover minis- 
terial agents also seem to have been active in trying to 
156 
produce petitions. 
There is an interesting relationship between the places 
152. W. W. M. "Burke Letters" 1-49 Meredith to Bunte J. January 
1766. 
153. See B-111-Add-Mss-22358 Correppondence of Lord Buckingham- 
shire 1762-68 PP ckinghamshire to Mayor of Norwich which 
consists of copies of Trecothick's Circular Letter of 6 
December. Poole to Trecothick 14 December 1765, Trecothick 
to Poole 27 December 1765 Poole to Buckinghamshire 10 
February 1766, For Buckinghamshire's association with 
Grenville see The Grenville Corres ondence, passim. 
154. See above p. 344 and Merchant Venturers Correspondence 
Bundle 1O, Letters_1765, J. Twigg to the Merchant Venturers 
26 December, 1765. 
155. Ibid. American Committee at Liverpool to William Reeve 
31 December 1765. 
156. See Lloyds Evening Post and British Chronicle No-1312 
4 December 1 765 -6 December 1765 p. 551. See also W. W. M. 
Bk 1-49 William Meredith to Edmund Burke 1 January 1766" 
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from which the petitions came and the day on which they were 
presented. The petitions were presented in two main groups. 
On 17 January ten petitions were presented. These came from 
three main areas: the West Riding industrial area, the Lancas- 
hire industrial area and the Bristol area. On 20 January 
seven more petitions were presented. Five of these were from 
the Birmingham area, one from the Bristol area and another 
from Cheshire. There does not seem to be any pattern about the 
other petitions but the fact that most of the big industrial 
regions, particularly the Birmingham area, managed to present 
all their petitions on one day points to a considerable amount 
of local organisation as well as organisation by Trecothick 
157 
in London. 
Not only did the circular letter omit reference to any 
specific measures, but also none of the petitions sought the 
158 
repeal of the Stamp Act directly. This may be taken as 
evidence, as Sir George Savile believed, that the merchants 
159 
knew only that their trade was suffering, or as evidence that 
Rockingham's co-operation with Trecothick before the ministry 
had decided upon the exact policy to pursue, made it necessary 
for the merchants to demand amelioration in general terms only. 
This latter explanation is the more likely. If the merchants 
157. See above P-350' n.. 147. Cf. my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 
42-43. 
158. Cf. Corrmlons Journals Vol. XXX, p. 462 et sue. 159. See aboveýp-, 537 j W. W. M. R1-519 Sir George Savile to Rockingham 3. November. 1765. 
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had demanded repeal of the Stamp Act and the ministry had 
agreed upon this 'solution not only would it have looked as 
if they had reached too precipitate a decision but it would 
have given the Grenvilleites an excellent opportunity to 
attack the Rockingham Whigs for subservience to the merchants. 
Concerning this Newcastle wrote the following comment 
"Necessary to restore the tranquility of North America - 
(to) re-establish our commerce. 
I am against taxation. The manufacturers here (are) 
against the Stamp Act - Repeal not mentioned 
(in the 
petitions) - (because) to have begun at the Repeal and 
go OUL (with) Repeal -A plan improper to do - but 
yet the right. " 160 
Under the pervading influence of the merchants the policy 
of the administration to repeal the Stamp Act and yet to 
precede the repeal by a Declaratory Act was gradually evolved. 161 
After Rockingham' s dinneyarty on 12 November 1765, 
which Trecothick attended, there is no definite evidence of 
further meetings until 13 December. It is, however, reasonable 
to assume that there were tither meetings in the ensuing months 
In mid-December efforts were still being made to find out 
Pitt's opinion. Contact with him was maintained through his 
chief nmercantile adherent, William Beckford. Following a 
meeting at which both Beckford and Sir William Baker were 
162 
present on 15 December, Onslow wrote to Newcastle 
160. B. M. Add. Mss. 33001 f83 Memorandum of Newcastle 3 Febr 
1768. 
161. See above p. 341 
162 Grenville Papers Vol. III, p. 110. Mr. Jenkinson to Mr. 
Grenville 15 December 1765. 
355 
"I have the pleasure of telling Your Grace that I found 
Beckford all I could wish. The thing Mr. Pitt doubts 
about is nothing material. In the American matter he 
does not doubt indeed. Beckford declares he is 
thoroughly and unalterably averse to the late Peo le, 
and that he talks of coming up the first day, if he 
thought it possible for them to think of carrying a 
question against us. In short he is as friendly as we 
could possibly expect, and I make no doubt will show 
it. Beckford himself will certainly be strop in our 
favour o' Tuesday. (The opening of Parliament)-" 163 
In view of these reassuring statements which must have 
come to Rockingham's ears it would seem it was not until 
towards the end of December at least that Rockingham began 
to regard the merchants as his chief ally. Perhaps it was 
not until the repeal campaign was well under way. 
Conferences between the merchants and the administration 
appear to have been frequent at this time. George. Onslow 
stated that on Friday 13 December he was "engaged to a grebt 
169+ 
dinner at Dowdeswell's of Americans". There are records of 
other dinner parties on 27 and 31 December which were used to 
discuss the question of America. On 1 January 1766 Newcastle 
wrote to Rockingham concerning a dinner party on 27 December 
"There was a meeting at your Lordship's house of Lord 
Egmont, Mr. Conway, Lord Dartmouth, Mr. Attorney General, 
(Charles Yorke) and I am not sure, if there was not 
Sir William Baker, Mr. Dowdeswell was there, several 
163. B. M. Add, Mss. 3297Z f251 Onslow to Newcastle 15 December 
1765; "late-People" refers to the Grenville administratioxx 
and "the first day" to the first day of the session of 
Parliament. 
164. B. M. Add. Mss. 32972 f202 Onslow to Newcastle 11 December 
1765. 
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resolutions were proposed to be taken in both houses by 
Mr. Attorney General relating to the proceedings in 
Americ4nd agreed to; and one strong motion made by Ihr. 
Yorke, for an Act of Parliament declaring the right of 
the Parliament of England; and also an address to the 
King, promising to support His Majesty to the utmost 
extent the last, or the two last, I hear were strongly 
objected to by my Lord Egmont and Mr. Con; Rray. " 165 
Tentative attempts were thus being made to formulate a policy. 
Sir William Baker attended the meeting, one would suppose, as 
a government expert on trade. He had been consylted by 
Rockingham on the question of American trade as early as 
166 
October 1765. 
Rockingham replied to Newcastle's letter of 1 January 
1766 making some comment on the dinner party of 27 December 
1765 and mentioning a second one on 31 December at which 
167 
Baker, Trecothick, George Aufrere, Dowdeswell, Lord Dartmouth 
and General Conway were present and at which "much passed 
in general conversation on the subject of the Trade and the 
facilities which might be given to it and the alterAatiC( 
to some late regulations"*' He continued 
"Upon the whole what has yet passed either at the former 
or atthe-latter dinner, I think one thing seems to 
be the general opinion that is the Legislative Right 
of this country over'the colonies should be declared.... 
165. B. PSI. Add. Mss" 32973 f3 Newcastle to Rockingham 1 January ' 
.. 
1766. Cf. "ibid. fll Rockingham to Newcastle 2 January 
1766. 
166. B. M. Add. Mss. 32971 f163 "Points for Consideration with 
my Lord Rockingham tomorrow" 29 October 1765. See above 
P. 315. 
167. Another merchant Its. P. and supporter of the administra- 
tion. For him see my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 143-6" 
Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. 
II 0 p. 34. 
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I think it also seemed the general opinion that in the 
King's speech and in all the Parliamentary proceedings 
the intention of giving the colonies every possible 
relief in Trade and Commerce should go hand in hand with 
declarations of authority or censures of riots and 
tumults. The main matter in which as yet I'cannot see 
exactly where and how the different opinions can be 
brought to agree is what must finally be done upon the' 
Stamp Act. All would agree to various amendments and 
curtailings of the Act. Some as yet - not very''many to 
a suspension, very few to a repeal. Your Grace knows 
that among ourselves there are differences of opinions 
and I am sure your Grace knows that we must have but 
one opinion and stick steadily to it when this matter 
comes into parliament. 11 168 
Rockingham then mentioned a further attempt to enlist Pitt's 
169 
support and concluded "Trecothick and the merchants and 
170 
trading and manufacturing, towns go on well". The absence 
of evidence of other informal meetings does not mean that 
none were held. Indeed the existing evidence quoted above 
points to the probability of other meetings similar to that 
of 13,27 and 31 December. 
168. B. M. Add. Mss. 32973 ffll-13 Rockingham to Newcastle 2 
January 1766. Cf. B. M2. Add. Mss. 32975 f327 "Some occurrenceß 
of yesterday sent to Mr. White 28 June 1766" The 
difference of opinion referred to were probably those 
with Charles Yorke. See below pP. 361-364 " Cf. Ritcheson 
. 
22 cit. P. 51, Winstanley 
, 
off. cit. p. 256. 
169. Ibid. B. I. 2. Add. Mss" 32973 f13 Rockingham to Newcastle 2 
January 1766. For Rockingham''s attempt to obtain the 
support of Pitt before this in, December 1765 see Chatham Correspondence Vol. II. p.. 355 Shelburne t0 Pitt 21 December 
1765, ibid. p. 359 Pitt to, Shelburne December 1765 n. d. 
but obviously 'a reply to Shelburne's letter of 21 December 1765. 
170. B. M. Add. Mss. 32973 `f13 Rockingham to Newcastle 2 January 1766..: ý. 
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If Rockingham as leader of the administration was acutely 
aware of the merchants as a pressure group on the ministry and 
was becoming aware of their possible uses as a means of putting 
pressure on Parliament to obtain support for the ministerial 
policy, Newcastle seems to have perceived more clearly than the 
other ministers the importance of the commercial aspect of 
the crisis. In reply to Rockingham's explanation of the 
meetings of 27 and 31 December he wrote 
"I fear.... that the idea of authority and relief going 
hand in habil... will be found very difficult, and for the 
one, I should incline rather to be deficient, in that, 
which is only a declaration in words, than in the other, 
on which depend the most material interest of this 
country, viz, the recovery, or enjoyment of our trade, 
and commerce; for, when once that to America is lost as 
it is at present totally suspended, the other branches 
of trade to foreign countries is at present so low, 
and depends so much on the will and caprice of the power 
with whom we trade, that there is no great dependence 
to be had upon it. " 173. 
If Newcastle's statement is evaluated in relation to the 
information presented in the section of this thesis devoted to 
trade it can be seen that he made an accurate assessment of 
172 
the situation. 
The tentative plans to formulate a policy made at the 
meetings in late 1765 were made more urgent because of the 
opening of Parliament on 16 January 1766. As the Rockingham 
ministry was weak in the House of Commons it was necessary that 
a clear policy should be laid down on which its supporters 
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171. B. M. Add. Msas" 32973 f25 Newcastle to Rockingham 3 January 1766. 
172. Cf. above pp. 1B-4O especially pp. Qý, AS. 
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could vote without hesitation. Unanimity of opinion was 
essential. Repeal thus became preferable to amendment, for 
whereas bickering would arise within the ministry on the nature 
of the amendment, repeal was a clear cut issue on which the 
ministry would either succeed or fall. Modification was 
more likely to cause division within the party and Rockingham 
must have been aware that in spite of the King's predeliction 
173 
for amendment it would probably satisfy neither the merchants 
nor the Americans. In spite of the general nature of the 
merchants petitions Rockingham can have had little doubt that 
they were demanding repeal and he desperately needed their 
support for his ministry. 
The Stamp Act was not only an imperial and economic 
problem, it had now also become a bone of contention in party 
politics. Not only were the Rockingham Whigs, the Grenvilleite3 
and the King involved, Rockingham was perpetually concerned 
with the uncalculable influence of Pitt and his hold on the 
people, and he and his followers were more likely to vote for 
a measure that would win popular support such as the repeal 
4- t 174 
of the Stamp Act than for its maintenance or modification. 
Amendment thus appeared-to have less chance of success than 
repeal of the Stamp Act and when Rockingham and his colleagues 
decided on repeal these considerations must have weighed 
heavily on their minds. To carry repeal Rockingham j: 
173. See the note. on the Kings opinion on the repeal of the 
Stamp Act at - W. W. M. R2-28 c. 21 February 1766 and ibid. 
R2-29 c. 21_, February 1766. Cf. Albe/marle Vol. I, p"298 
et seg; Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-90 
Vol: III, p"455: = 
174. Cf. Steven Watson 22. cit. pp, 114-116. 
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was driven into the arms of the merchants; their support was 
a necessity. Until repeal was decided upon complete co-oper- 
ation could not begin, for Trecothick and his colleagues would 
not have unconditionally supported the administration. The 
policy of repeal thus became a political manoeuvre necessitated 
by the occurrences in America, the activities of a pressure 
group, the attitude of the opposition and the need for a 
united ministry. In spite of this the Declaratory Act had 
to be accepted as a salve to the conscience of those members 
of the administration who felt that American resistance to 
the Stamp Act challenged the authority of the British parliament.; } 
These were the facts which Rockingham and his colleagues 
bore in mind when they finally evolved their policy in January 
1766 at the time the merchants petitions were being presented. 
The King's speech at the opening of Parliament was deliberately 
175 
ambiguous. There were good reasons for this. Firstly, even 
if Rockingham and many other members of the Cabinet had 
176 
accepted the repeal of the Stamp Act as a necessity, there were 
still waverers, most notably the King and Charles Yorke, and 
177 
these had to be convinced. Secondly it was Yorke who drew up 
178 
the Ring's speech and finally there was no point in unnecess- 
176. 
177- 
178- 
See The Great Debate in the Committee of the Whole House 
of Commons on the Stamp Act 1766 as reported by Nathaniel 
Ryder" by L. H. Gipson in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and 40graphy Vol. 86, No. l, Philadelphia, January 1962 p. 10. See below p-561 andpp. 391-392. 
See above p. 357 and note 173. 
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dedicated to the Stamp Act. 
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As Sir Lewis Namier has stated the final policy to be 
adopted seems to have been evolved at two small informal meetings 180 
at Rockingham's home on 19 and 21 January 
1766. Namier goes 
on to say that of those present Charles 
Townshend was "by far., 
the ablest and best versed in American affairs" and it was 
his idea of a Declaration of Right coupled with a repeal of 
the Stamp Act first enunciated in a speech on 17 December 1765 
161 
which emerged as policy. It is to be noticed, however, that 
Townshend's attitude was somewhat ambivalent and he did not 
182 
play a leading part in the repeal campaign. Charles Yorke 
seems to have been the member of the Cabinet who was most 
concerned with the question of the right of the British 
Parliament to tax the American colonies. It seems largely to 
have been in deference to his opinion that the Declaratory 
Act was phrased in strong terms and that it was passed before 
theL3tamp Act, for Yorke wanted the power of taxation specif- 
183 
ically stated. Rockingham himself realised that repeal was 
the essential factor. He wrote to Charles Yorke 
"The Resolutions (agreed upon at the meetings of 19 
and 21 January 1766) in general exceed in spirit what 
the generality of our friends wish; but in expectation 
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179, See Gipson 
, off. . pp. 
376-377. See also W. W. M. R1-549 
Yorke to Rockingham 30 December 1765. 
180" Namier, Charles Townshend p. 23. 
181. Ibid. p. 23. Cf. Namier and Burke Charles Townshend pp. 138-139. 
182. Ibid"pp. 138-140, Namier Charles Townshend pp. 22-244. Cf. 
Smith op. cito p. 19.1 
183. See B. cri. Add" Mss" 32973 f3 Newcastle to Rockingham 1 January 
1766; Add. Mss" 35430 Political Correspondence of Charles 
Yorke 1754-1768 ff31-2, Rockingham to Yorke 17 January 1766 
f33 Rockingham to Yorke 20 January 1766; ff37-8 Rockingham 
to Yorke 25 . January 1766. See also W. W. M. R1-560 Yorke to Rockingham 25 January 1? 66. i Cf. "h--,., 
T ý; 
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that coming into them will pave the way for the actual 
repeal of the Stamp Act, I think they will be agreed to. 
In one of your alterations I dislike the expression of 
undoubted rights, and am sure, upon consideration how 
goading that word would be to a great person in the House 
of Commons, it cannot be advisable to put it in. 
The other alteration which I particularly object to, 
is the insertion of 'taxation' and I think I may say that 
it is our firm resolution in the House of Lords (I mean 
among ourselves) that the word must not be inserted. I 
see more and more the difficulties that surround us, and 
therefore feel the necessity of not temporizing. 
Convinced as I am that the confusion at home will be 
much too great (if the repeal is not obtained) for us to 
withstand either as private or publick men - my opinion 
being entirely for repeal, I shall certainly persist in 
that measure. " 184 
It is noteworthy that Yorke's objections to the policy were 
paralleled by his objections to the Treasury Minute of 15 
185 
November 1765. 
With regard to these meetings which settled policy New- 
castle wrote to Rockingham on 20 January 1766 
"I, this moment, hear that ypur Lordship has a meeting; 
tomorrow night of the Duke of Grafton, Mr90onway, Lord 
Dartmouth, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Charles 
Townshend, the Attorney General, Mr. Hussey, that Lord 
Hardwicke was spoke to, but does not go, to settle 
Parliamentary. Prodeedings upon the American affairs. 
I hear also, that you are all like to differ widely- 
among yourselves. My informer was uncertain whether 
Lord Egmont was to be there or not. " 186 
On the night of the meeting Lady Rockingham reported to 
Newcastle 
"He (Rockingham) has seen ton 
comf*ny and bids me say that 
had with them promises to be 
on well.... !y Lord is now at 
with part of-those-mentioned 
fight a pretty mixed set of 
the conversation he has 
productive of things going 
supper in the next room 
which are Lord Egmont 
184. B. M. Add. Mss. 35430 f38 
, 
Rockingham to Yorke 25 January 17667185. 
See above, pp. 31g-3tq, 
186. B. M. Acdd" Mss" 32973 f202 Newcastle to Rockingham 20 January U 
1766.. Richard Hussey (1715-1790)ßi. p. For him see Napier ; 
and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 vol. II, p" 662.1 
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Charles Yorke and Charles Townshend and who else I 
know not-" 187 
On 23 January Rockinghhm was able to send Newcastle the 
resolutions that had been agreed upon at the meetings. The 
Resolutions condemned the Colonial opposition to the Stamp 
Act, made arrangements for punitive measures and a declaration 
of the right of the British Parliament to legislate for 
America. Newcastle did not approve of these resolutions. ). " 
He expressed his sentiments to Rockingham upon them in the 
following words 
"The Repeal your Lordship knows is the great point with 
me; that is the only thing that can set things right, 
and I am afraid, that such a number of resolutions and 
some of them in such strong terms, will prevent even 
the Repeal from having its effect, and leave the 
Colonies in the same confusion and distraction as it 
is at present. " 188 
Similar resolutions had previously been proposed and rejected 
at meeting at Lord Northington's for on ?A January 
Newcastle wrote again 
"That my Id. R. always knew that my great point was the 
Repeal, and that I thought, that ought to precede any 
other resolutions; and am not less of that opinion 
from having seen, and perused those resolutions 
proposed, which I apprehend, are pretty much the same, 
with those laid before us, at nit Ld. Chancellor' s 
by Gen'1 Conway and were unanimously agreed there to 
be laid aside. " 189 
There does not appear to be any other reference to the 
meeting at Northington's., 
187. B" M. d. Mss" 32973 f224 Lady Rockingham to Newcastle 
21 January 1766" 
188. B" bi. Add. Mss" 32973 f260 Newcastle to Rockingham 24 January 1766. 
189. B. M. Add. Mss" 33001 f56 Items for Ld. Rockingham 24 January 1766. 
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Newcastle was also trying to use his influence with 
190 
Charles Yorke at this time. His views on the repeal of the 
Stamp Act and the motives which moved him to support it are 
admirably summarised in a letter he wrote to the Archbishop 
of . Canterbury on, 2 February 1766. In this he said 
"I am most thoroughly of the opinion, that the interest, 
and the very being of this country, as a trading nation 
depends upon the immediate repeal of the Stamp Act; not 
as an illegal Act, but as the most imprudent, and 
pernicious one, that ever was made, and that was, as is 
very well known, my opinion when it passed.... 
I have been bred up to think that the trade of 
this nation is the sole support of it. I have the 
mortification to see, that our trade is declining in 
every part of the world, but in America, and in many 
places quite gone.... If this should continue, and I 
know of no ether means of preventing it, but a total 
and immediate repeal of the Act, we shall undoubtedly 
have riots, mobbs and insurrections in all the great 
trading towns in the Kingdom; and numbers of our 
manufacturers turned a starving.... 
It is said on the other side, Don't yield, persevere 
and they must come back.... But what I fear most is, 
they will fling themselves into the hands of France or 
Spain, who will gladly take up their cause; and we may 
have a war in America sooner than we imagine. 
The total cession by France of all their possess- 
ions in America, I always thought and said was a most 
valuable acquisition to this country, that cession is 
now complete; we are now beginning to receive the 
benefit of it, when by this unfortunate Stamp Act, we 
are not only deprived of that additional advantage, but 
also of the real and solid ones, which this country 
has long enjoyed from our own plantations. " 191 
Newcastle thus favoured repeal because of the commercial 
crisis that the Stamp Act had created but he was also influenced 
190. See B. M" Add. Mss. 32973 f275 Newcastle to Rockingham 25 
January 1766. 
191. B. IL Add. Mss" 32973 ff342-3 Newcastle to the Archbishop 
of Canterbury. 2, February 1766. The opinions expressed 
in the third paragraph of this extract which emphasize 
the strategic argument for repeal form an interesting 
parallel with Pittts views.: 
a 
e 
F 
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by strategic reasons and in these reasons can be seen the 
influence of his long years of political power. 
Agreement to repeal the Stamp Act and to precede the 
repeal by a Declaratory Act had been reached at the meetings 
of the leading members of the ministry. Rockingham was now 
in a position to co-operate fully with the merchants as 
repeal must have been a policy that was highly satisfactory 
to them. I have discovered no evidence on the merchants' 
attitude to the Declaratory Act. Rockingham probably tried 
to explain it away to the merchants as a necessity because 
the rights of the British Parliament had been challenged and 
endeavoured to play down its importance. Possibly the 
merchants were so preoccupied in obtaining repeal that they 
overlooked the importance of this measure. In any case 
Rockingham now needed the support of the merchants more than 
ever before because the policy formulated had to be executed. 
Rockingham knew he had to pass the Declaratory Act to hold 
the ministry together; he also knew by this time that Pitt 192 
would oppose it just as Grenville would oppose the repeal. 
The merchants now represented his only hope of survival. He 
had to use them, together with the other evidence before the 
Stamp Act Coinnittee, to secure repeal, just as he had used 
the merchants petitions during the period the policy of 
192. B. M. Add. Mss" 32973 ff237-40 "Lord Rockingham s Account of H 
his conversation with Mr. Pitt on Tuesday last the 21st 
inst. " 23 January 1766. 
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repeal was being formulated, to prepare the way for measures 
which would relieve the slump in the American trade. The 
merchants had now ceased to be a pressure group and had 
become his chief allies. How far they influenced Rockingham's 
personal decision in favour of repeal is difficult to say. 
They are not mentioned in his correspondence as exercising 
pressure upon him, but one must suspect their activities 
cannot have been without influence. 
Isi 
rý 
ý iýý. 
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4. The Parliamentary Campaign. 
The Committee of the Whole House to examine the American 
193 
Papers sat for the first time on 28 January 1766. On 24 
February 1766 the resolutions from the committee which were to 
form the basis of the repeal of the Stamp Act and the Declar- 
atory Act, were reported to the HouSe of Commons by Rose Fuller, 
196 
the chairman of the committee. These resolutions were based 
on the policy which had been formulated by Rockingham and his 
colleagues in January 1766. During the sixteen parliamentary 
meetings between 28 January and 24 February 1766 the committee 
195 196 
sat on thirteen occasions and examined twenty-six witnesses. 
Mr. Smith states 
Over half of the witnesses had most definite connections 
with the ministry, and many of the others had probable 
connections. In all nineteen of the twenty-two witnesses 
were probably known to the ministry in one way or another. 
197 
Of the twenty-two witnesses Smith considers, fourteen were 
196 
British merchants or manufacturers. 
Between 28 January and 24 February fifty-four witnesses 
were ordered to attend the committee according to the Journals 
199 
of the House of Commons. This means that in this period the 
committee heard only half of the available witnesses, and of 
the twenty-six witnesses who gave evidence the names of only 
iy3. commons Journals Vol. , p. 5Qi. 194. Ibide pp. 601-2. 
195. Smith cit. p. 9. 
196. Cf. Smith op. cit., pp. 2, n. I and 36 n. 3, 
197. Smith 2p. cit. p. 280. In my total of witnesses I have 
included the extra four witnesses to which Smith refers ýýº in p. 2, n" 1. 
198. I include John Masterman the goldsmith in this total. 
199.: Commons Journals Vol. =, pp. 513-602* 
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fifteen appear in the Comnons Journals. The witnesses not 
mentioned in the Journals are the provincial and 
lesser 
201 
manufacturers and merchants. It 
is difficult to understand 
why the names of these men who gave evidence on 
12,13, and 
17 February are omitted from the Coons Journals and whether 
it has any significance. Another question 
that may be asked 
is did the other men who were called fail 
to give evidence 
before the committee before 24 February 
1766 ?. 
Further consideration of these problems seems necessary. 
Smith lists and classifies the witnesses who gave evidence 
according to the Minutes of the Committee in the Rockingham 
Papers, and I have marked with an asterisk in the list below 
those whose names appear in the Commons Journals and added 
further detail where necessary. 
Name of Witness Commons Classification Detail Date of 
Journal Evidence 
Dr. Thomas Moffatt * Refugee 31 January 176 
Martin Howard * Refugee 31 January. 1766 
Major Thomas James * Refugee 31 January 1766 
Colonel George Mercer * Refugee 31 January 1766 
Barlow Trecothick * Merchant (London) 
London Merchants' 
Committee 
Capel Hanbury * Merchant (London) 
11 February 1766 
London Merchants' 
Committee 11 February 1766 
Daniel Mildred * Merchant (London) 
London Merchants j 
Committee 11 February 1786, 
200. The names of Morris, Crafton, Bunney, Dawson, Elam, Farrar, `,. - Halliday, Hamilton, Glassford, Hose, Irwin definitely do 
not appear: ) John Masterman Commons Journals Vol. XXX, p. 513 may be the George Masterman who gave evidence. Smith 
pp"232-5. James Kerr Commons Journals Vol. XXX, p. 530 may be the James Carr whose evidence is in B. M. Add. MMss" 33030 ff182-203. 
201. Cf. Smith M" cit. pp. 36-37. 
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James Balfour 
William Kelly 
Thomas Morris 
Robert Crafton 
Joseph Bunney 
Obadiah Dawson 
Emanuel Elam 
Benjamin Farrar 
William Halliday 
George Masterman 
William Reeve 
Robert Hamilton 
John Glassford 
Benjamin Franklin 
* American 12 February 1766 
* American 12 February 1766 
Frameworkknitter 
(Nottingham) 12 February 1766 
Hosier (London)12 February 1766 
Hosier (Leicester) 12 February 1766 
Woollen and worsted 
manufacturer (Leeds) 12 February 1766 
Woollen manufacturer 
(Leeds) 12 February 1766 
Unidentified 
(Halifax) 12 February 1766 
Merchant (Liverpool) 12 February 1766 
* Goldsmith (London) 13 February 1766 
* Merchant (Bristol) 13 February 1766 
Fustian and Check 
Manufacturer 
(Manchester) 13 February 1766 
Merchant (Glasgow) 13 February 1766 
* Agent 13 February 1766 
John Hose Shoemaker (London) 13 February 1766 
To these may be added the names of the other four men who gave 
evidence on 17 February 1766.202. j 
James Carr Merchant 17 February 1766 
James Irwin Planter 17 February 1766 
Beeston Long * Merchant 17 February 1766 
Richard Oswald * Retired Merchant 17 February 1766 
Of these four, three were concerned with the West Indies, the 
203 
fourth, Oswald, was obviously a Grenvilleite witness. 
The Commons Journals gives the names of individuals 
ordered to attend the committee as witnesses. In the list 
below I have bracketed the names as given by Smith and marked 
with an asterisk the men who are actually known to have given 
204 
evidence before the Stamp Act Committee. 
202. B. M. Add. Mss. -33030 ff182-203 "Minutes of the Stamp Act 
Committee". Cf. Smith o?, " . 2i-topp-2-3 n. 
1. 
203" Cf. Smith M" cit. pp. 2-3, ppn. 1. For Oswald (1705-1784) see 
also Dictionary of National Biography Vo1. RIV, p. 122b. He 
was possibly a relative of ll8w. rd Oswald (1715-63) ibid 
p. 122d who spoke and voted against the Stamp Act Repeal 
For him see also Namier and Brooke The House of Commons op. cit. Vol. IIIpp. 237--40. For the use of the term 
refugee see above A. 102. 
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15 January 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee. 
Dr. Thomas Moffatt 
Martin Howard 
Major Thomas Jones (James) * 
29 January 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee. 
Colonel George Mercer 
3 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee on Mr. 
Nugent's motion. 205 
Dennys de Berdt 
Joseph Sherwood 
Thomas Life 
Benjamin Franklin * 
Henry Wilmot 
George Walker 
Stephen Fuller 
William Knox 
Edward Montague 
206 
3 February 1766 - On Sir Robert Ladbroke's motion.. 
Barlow Trecothick 
James Crockatt 
Brook Watson 
John Stewart 
George Hayley 
Gilbert Franklyn 
Edward Athawes 
Capel Hanbury 
Daniel Mildred * 
William Kelly * 
Stephen Sayer 
William Bollan 
John Smith 
John Powell 
John Wentworth 
James Balfour 
William Davies 
(George) John Masterman 
John Bland 
Nicholas Ray 
7 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee. 
Lieutenant Balfour 
Captain Rooke 
Matthew French 
Captain Drummond 
ý`ýý 
. 
Captain Partridge 
Mr. Young 
Mr. Hosfall 
Captain Dillon 
Daniel Perreau 
William Reeve 
11 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee. 
James Kerr (Carr) 
Colonel Robert Spragge 
John Morgan 
12 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee on Mr. 
Nugent's motion. 
Robert Hale 
13 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee on 
Thomas Whateley's motion. 207 
Beeston Long 
Richard Maitland 
13 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee on 
Mr. Nugent' s mot ion. 
Captain Turner 
Mr. Jackson 
- Williams 
15 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee. 
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Richard Oswald 
17 February 1766 - Ordered to attend Committee on Lord 
Frederick Campbell's motion. 208 
James Glen 
This list is compiled from Commons Journals Vol"XXX, pp. 513- 
602. I am assuming that the only men who gave evidence 
before 24 February are those whose evidence is recorded in 
the copies of the minutes of the evidence in the Newcastle 
and Rockingham Papers. I do not include in this list Daniel 
Race of the Bank of England who was ordered to attend the 
Committee on 24 January with an account of bullion from 
America 1748-1765. See Commons Journals Vol. XXX, p. 500. There 
is a record of Race's evidence in a letter from Grey Cooper 
to Rockingham 'Tuesday 9. -O'clock'. The document can be 
dated from internal evidence to 15 or 14. February 1766. It 
is misplaced in a bundle of papers on the bullion trade. 
;H 
ýý, 
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The first four men ordered to attend the Committee 
appear to have been American refugees. The argument that these 
men had every reason to do as the ministry wished has been 
209 
presented elsewhere. Then on 3 February on Mr. Nugent' s motion 
nine more witnesses were ordered to attend the Committee. This 
Mr. Nugent must have been either Robert Nugent or hue son 
Edmund Nugent. Robert Nugent was member for Bristol and he was 
considered to be the first member for that city who truly 
represented the commercial interests there. But he voted 
against the repeal of the Stamp Act and seems to have consid - 
ently opposed the Rockinghams. Like his father, Edmund Nugent 
210 
was connected with the Grenvilleites and it is. therefore 
immaterial which of these two proposed the witnesses; neither 
would have been working for Rockingham. Indeed as all! these 
men were colonial agents and Grenville had consulted the 
agents when considering the Stamp Act he possibly hoped 
to use them to prove that the Stamp Act was. practicable 
and no other form of - taxation in America was 
205. See below p" 3 2. 
206. See below p. 3 
207. See below p" 375" 
208. See below p. 376. 
209. See Smith M. cit. pp. 39-84. For. the use of the term 
refugees see above, -* - 
102. 
210. See Nailer Structure of Politics pp. 90,356 n. l and The 
Chatham Administration 1766-68 by, John Brooke, London 1956, 
p. 19. For his representation of Bristol see B" M. Add. biss. 
35692 ffl30-133, Dean Tucker to Hardwicke 13 March 1765. 
See also' Judd or. cit. p. 163, ' Morgan off. cit. p. 267. For 
Robert Nugent'sopposition. to the. repeal of the Stamp Act 
see-the Parliamentary History pp. 90-97. See also Save4gý 
off. cit* p. 137 et assim. i .-,. a 
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211 
possible. The men whom Nugent called on 12 and 13 February 
were probably opposition witnesses also and Mr. Jackson was 
probably Richard Jackson the Connecticut coloniää agent who 
212 
was a friend of the Grenvilleites. Indeed the only men mentioned 
who seem to have any connection with the ministry were Dennys 
de Berdt whose connection does not appear to have been very 
close, and who was never called to give evidence, the brother 
of Rose Fuller, Stephen, who as a West Indian Colonial agent 
was probably expected to be antipathetic to the American 
interests and Benjamin Franklin, who did turn out to be a 
star ministerial witness, had co-operated with Grenville 
before and appears to have been unpopular in the colonies 
213 
for supporting the Stamp Act. 
211. Morgan op. cit.; pp. 64-65. De Berdt was agent for the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives in London, November 
1765 to April 1770. See Letters of Dennys de Berdt p. 294. 
Franklin was agent with Richard Jackson for Pennsylvania 
See Benjamin Franklin by C. C. Van Doren, New York 1939, 
pp-314-315. Edward Montague was agent for Virginia 1761-1772 
but more especially the representative of the House of 
Representatives. William Knox was agent for Georgia 1763- 
1765. See The Colonial Agents of the Southern Colonies 
by Ella Lonn, Chapel Hill 1945, appendix 1 p. 393. Life 
appears to have acted for Jackson the agent for Massachu- 
setts Bay at times and a Mr. Walker was agent for Barbados 
in 1767. Stephen Fuller was agent for Jamaica. See 
Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
January 1764- December 1767, London 1936, pp. 331,359,22 
and 28. Sherwood was agent for New Jersey in 1763 and 
Wilmot for the Leeward Islands in 1762, he also appears 
to have been agent for the "Proprietors of the East Division 
of New Jersey" January 1759 to December 1763, pp. 252,409. 
212. See The Jenkinson Papers 1? 60-17664 Ducker p. 358 Charles 
Jenkinson to George Grenville 11 April 1765 quoting B. M. 
Add. Mss. 38304+ f134; Smith .. ZJt. p. 270., 
213. See Morgan 9p. . 
Sit. pp. 64-65; Smith op. _. 
p. 
269, "Benjamin 
F anklin and the Stamp Act" by V. W. Crane in Proceedings 
of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts Vo1. XXXII, Transa- 
ctions 1933-37, Boston 1937, p. 66. 
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The motion of Sir Robert Ladbroke, by which twenty more 
witnesses were called, is of a different nature. Ladbroke was 
a supporter of the Rockingham Whigs during the first Rockingham 
214 
administration and he was also one of their City allies. Of 3 
these twenty witnesses, Trecothick, John Stewart, George Hayley, 
Capel Hanbury, Daniel Mildred and Nicholas Ray were definitely 
members of Trecothick's merchants committee. The Charles 
Crockatt on the London merchants committee may be a relative 
of the James Crockatt mentioned in the Commons Journals or a 
member of a family mercantile house, as may be Edward Athawes-. 
as there is a Samuel Athawes mentioned in the London Merchants 
215 
Committee. Nicholas Ray's other connection with Rockingham 
216 
has already been noted.. William Bollan and John Wentworth 
were also associates of Rockingham at the time of the Stamp 
216 
Act Crisis. William Kelly and James Balfour were Americans 
who seem to have been ministerial witnesses and John Masterman 
218 
may be George Masterman the goldsmith who gave evidence. Of 
these twenty witnesses, ten had some definite connections with 
219 
the ministry and three more were possibly connected and ten 
were also definitely London merchants. It seems likely that 
Rockingham was marshalling the mercantile evidence. 
215. 
216. 
217. 
218. 
See my Barlow Trecothicic etc p. lö. ý 
Cf. my list above with W W. l7 . L; lpt of Committee of London North American Merchan ä"/i'Bee-also A Complete Guide 
to all Persons who have any trade or concern with the 
City of LondOn and Parts Adjacent, London 1765 List of 
Merchants p"136 where both Charles and James Crockatt are 
mentioned and p-123 where Edward Athawes alone of the 
Athawes appears in this list. + See Appel p. 415. See above P"p_332. 
See above pp. 
See Smith , oR" 
cit. PP. 36,155-193. 
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No names appear in the Commons Journals to indicate who 
took the initiative to put forward the witnesses proposed on 
7 and 11 February. No claim can therefore be made that these 
were ministerial attempts to organise the evidence but William 
Reeve, a Bristol merchant and valuable ministerial witness 
220 
was proposed on 7 February. 
221 
Thomas Whately, Grenville's close friend, proposed two 
other mercantile witnesses on 13 February, presumably to support 
Grenville. These were Beeston Long and Richard Maitland. 
Beeston Long was leader of the West India merchants, and in a 
sppech in the House of Commons as early as 14 January 1766 
Grenville had requested that Long should give evidence that 
as First Lord of the Treasury Grenville had done everything 
222 
in his power to foster trade with America. When Long came to 
give evidence he was very cautious and confined his evidence 
to the West Indies and it would seem that Grenville, who hoped 
to play on the antipathy between the North American and the 
West Indian merchants, failed, because for once the hostility 
223 
between the two groups had broken down. Maitland possibly had 
connections with the ministry and this may be the reason why 
he never gave evidence. Thus Grenville's plan to produce 
219. See London Guide 1765 List of merchants where the names of 
Trecothick, -Crockatt, Watson, Stewart, Athawes, Hanbury, 
Mildred, Powell, Bland and Ray appear. John Smith is 
listed and there is a William Davy. 
220. See Smith. op. cit. pp. 236-245. 
221. Jucker op" cit. pp. 414-416. 
222. Anecdotes of the Life Of-the Right Honourable William Pitt, Earl of Chatham by John Almton, LOndon l793, Vol. II, pp. 42-43. 223. 
, 
See Sutherland loc. cit. pp. 60-66. For Beeston Long see The-, Minute Book of the West India Merchants Vol" Y, April 
}i, 
ýiý 
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mercantile evidence seems to have miscarried. He appears to 
have been unable to produce a series of mercantile witnesses 
as the ministry did. Richard Oswald was probably ordered to 
224 
attend the committee as a "last hope" on 15 February 1766. 
The last proposal was that of Lord Frederick Campbell who 
proposed James Glen. Campbelliwas Conway's brother-in-law but 
Glen did not give evidence and it is impossible to draw any 
225 
conclusion from this proposal. 
The evidence thus points to a considerable amount of 
marshalling of mercantile witnesses by the ministry. Perhaps 
some witnesses were not heard because the ministry felt it had 
proved its case sufficiently well or their witnesses may not 
have been as satisfactcny as that of the witnesses who were 
heard. Moreover among the Harrowby Papers is the record of 
further evidence given by Kelly, Brooke Watson, John Wentworth 
and Robert Hale on 27 March 1766 when the committee was sitting 
226 
on the question of the general reform of the laws of trade. 
Thus some of the witnesses may have been called for the 
continuation of the committee. A further relevant fact is 
that when Henry Cruger wrote to his father in New York he 
stated 
"The debate in Parliament lasting so long on the Stamp 
Act determined me to return to my business ere it was 
223. contd 1769 to April 1779. I am grateful to the West 
India Committee for allowing me to use this source. ! ßý 
224. See Richard-Maitland-to Charles Townshend 20 March 1767, 
Townshend Papers, William L. Clements Library. ý$ 
225. See Brooke. op. cit. p. 138 n. 2. 
226. Harrowby Manuscripts, Document 63 
of the 9 
Ryder' s Shorthand Diary Proceedings House of Commons 27 March 1766. +i 
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terminated. I was three weeks in London and every day 
with some member of Parliament, talking as it were for 
my own life. It is surprising how ignorant some of them 
are of trade and America. The House at last came to a 
resolution to examine only one person from each place 
that brought petitions. Mr. William Reeve being the 
senior of us who went from Bristol was put in the votes. 
227 
There was always the time factor to be considered for this 
committee constantly complained of the large amount of work 
to be done, and the ministry must have been well aware pf the 
urgency of the situation. 
One can only hazard a guess why the names of some of the 
men who gave evidence do not appear in'the Commons Journals"ý 
Perhaps Rockingham felt the need to "fit in" some evidence 
from provincial and smaller manufacturers at the last moment 
to prove that it was not only the great, well-known London 
manufacturers that were affected, or perhaps it was purely an 
error on the part of the clerk. It does appear significant 
that it is the names of one class of witness in particular 
that are omitted and that the majority of these witnesses were 
textile manufactarers who especially felt the depression caused 
by the Stamp Act as they carried on a substantial trade with 
America. 
Before going an to survey the evidence itself it is 
finally necessary°tö consider the chairmanship of the committee. 
There were two chairmen, Rose Fuller who was chosen and acted 
for eight days and George Cooke who held the position for 
Henry cruger -01r- ', v nervy uruger 4 February 1766 in "The 
Commerce of Rhode Island" 1726-1780, Vol. I, 1726-1774 in 
Massachusetts Historical Society Collections 7th Series, 
. o, Boston 19199p. 13 
t1 11 
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five days while Fuller was ill. Fuller was a close associate 
of Newcastle and as a West India planter and English iron 
manufacturer was definitely biased against the Stamp Act. He 
voted with the Rockingham ministry on questions connected with 
the Stamp Act, his views were well known in Parliament and his 
management of the committee was criticised. Horace Walpole 
wrote in his Memoirs 
"Many speakers had not been attended to, others, forced 
to sit down without being heard. Homething of this was 
imputed to the partiality of Rose Fuller, the Chairman; 
and before he could make his report, Mr. 8hiffner 
ironically proposed to thank him for his great impartial- 
ity; Onslow defended, and moved to thank him seriously. 
This provoked so much, that Fuller was accused of not 
doing his duty by suppressing the riots and insults 
offered to several members who had voted against the 
repeal. " 228 
and in January 1775 when the merchants were again petitioning 
Parliament on America, Burke-wrote to Rockingham with reference 
to the Stamp Act 
"But I showed Ellis the journals yesterday morning, 
where Rose Fuller was in the chair for repealing that 
Act, one of the tellers-in'the division, and a principal 
actor and zealous manager on the whole. " 229 
A search of Fuller's papers has 
228., See Walpole Memoirs Vol. II, p. 300 quoted Smith off. c it. p. 16" 
229. Burke to Rockingham 12 January. 1775 printed Burke Corres- 
pondence Vol. III, p. 98 quoted Smith OP. cit. P. 15" See 
also Gipson .., op" 
cit. p. 396 quoting Harrowby Manuscripts, 
Ryder's Diaries, document 63.. 
1 
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however revealed no new material on the Stamp Act Corrmiittee. 
The other chairman, George Cooke, also appears to have favoured 
the repeal of the Stamp Act but his impartiality was not 
231 
questioned. 
It may thus be concluded with reasonable certainty that 
Newcastle, Rockingham and their colleagues made sure that the 
evidence, particularly the mercantile evidence which was to 
be produced before the committee, came from sources that were 
favour&ble to ministerial policy and was heard in the most 
favourable circumstances possible. There is also clear indica- 
tion that the actual evidence, questions and answers were 
prepared. Among the Newcastle Papers is a memorandum headed 
232 
"Questions for Mr. Trecothick" and in the Rockingham Papers 
is a document endorsed "Minutes of the Evidence of Effect of 233 
Duties on Trade sent by Sir W Meredith and Sir G. Savile. " 
This document appears to be a record of the preparation of 
some of the ministerial evidence placed before the House of 
Commons and contains questions about the American trade put 
to Capel Hanbury, James Balfour, Emanuel Elam, Obadiah Dawson, 
234 
and other witnesses before the Stamp Act Committee. Moreover 
Mr. Smith has shown that the ministry prepared the evidence of 
some witnesses, in particular that given by Benjamin Franklin 
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230. I am indebted to the Archivist of the Sussex Archwo logical 
Society for allowing me to study these papers. 
231. See Smith 
, op. 
cit. pp. 16-17.. 
232. B. M. Add- I. Iss" 33001 f94 Memorandum, no date. 
233" Vl. W M. R42" 
234. For this see my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 228-229. 
235 
and William Kelly and on 2 January 1766 Trecothick urrote to 
William Reeve 
380 
" We are endeavouring to obtain an exact account of the 
balance of export from hence to each colony for three 
or four years past as also of the sum now due to this 
city and it is much to be wished that you could furnish 
a like estimate as the Customs keepers account can 
little be depended upon and it seems to me very material 
that the politicians should be told as nearest as may 
be. I hope to have ours ready for the first day. " 236 
Such efforts by Trecothick to obtain statistics point to the 
preparation of evidence in conjunction with the ministry: ) 
Mr. B. R. Smith has already discussed in detail the evidence 
given before the Stamp Act Committee. He states that excluding 
Franklin and the refugees "the witnesses were almost all 
237 
concerned in the trade with the colonies"* He continues 
"Trade was considered to be the foundation of the 
British Empire, and no doubt it was for that reason that 
the enquiry concentrated on the boycott and its effects. 
. Thus the majority of witnesses were merchants and manufacturers quite different from Franklin, for they 
had gained their experience of the colonies at second- 
hand through their trade with North America. Many of 
them had visited the colonies in connection with their 
business affairs, but their evidence concerned the 
depleted condition of their trade and not the Colonies 
themselves-" 238 
The first mercantile witness to give evidence was Barlow 
Trecoth. ick on Friday 11 February 1766. During his evidence 
235. See Smith M. cit. pp. 25-33; Benjamin Franklin Autobiographic; 
Writings ed. C. C. Van Doren, New York 1946, pp. 151-152; 
"Benjamin Franklin, Englishman and American" by V. W. Crane, 
Maryland Historical Society Proceedings Vol. XIX, Baltimore 
1936, pp-108-109; W. W. M. R96, "Papers relating to the 
Questions that Mr. Jackson asked dir. Kelly about the exports 
of Great Britain to the Colonies 1766" quoted Smith op. cit 
pp. 25-32., 
236. Merchant Venturers Correspondence, Bundle 10, Barlow 
Trecothick to William Reeve 2 January 1766, 
237. Smith off. cit.. p. 283. For the use of the term refugee see above 
238. Ibide p. 283.71-102. 
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Trecothick as Chairman of the London Merchants' Committee 
was also questioned about and explained the work of that 
239 
Committee. Smith states that Trecothick 
"Dealt with all the aspects of the trade with the Northern 
Colonies and the effect of the boycott on trade and man- 
ufactures. He demonstrated the threat of unemployment 
in the growing manufacturing centres and discussed the 
effect of the Stamp Act on the New England Colonies. He 
showed that the Colonies would abandon (what he considered) 
their natural interests and establish their own industries 
rather than buy British goods. In all he displayed such 
an immense knowledge of the trade and of the New England 
Colonies that even if much of it had been prepared in 
advance, he reveals that he is an expert on the matterl'240 
Trecothick's evidence was supported on the same day by 
that of two other London merchants, Capel Hanbury and. Daniel 
Mildred. Hanbury gave proof that the Stamp Act was harmful to 
the Virginia tobacco trade with which he was particularly 
concerned. Mildred's brief evidence again bore out what 
241 
Trecothick had said. 
After the examination James West wrote to Newcastle 
"The witnesses were called in. Trecothick was examined 
four hours and gave a full clear and satisfactory account 
of the distress at home and abroad and stated everything 
as he did to Your Grace this morning. Hanbury and 
Mildred confirmed him in everything. Hanbury added that 
Virginia had a large well disciplined militia, who with 
the country, if force was used to establish the Acts 
would rescind it by force. " 242 
This seems to be an indication of the extent to which these 
witnesses were prepared. Prior to this in the same letter West 
had noted that whereas Sir William Meredith only wanted the 
witnesses examined on the effects and consequences of the Stamp 
Act, Charles To: vnshend had opposed him and stated that he would 
1 
'ti 
not repeal the Act on "questions of right or violence" but only 
239. See above pp. 350-351Cf. Smith 22. cit. p. 96. 
240.97-98.241. For them see Smith =. cit. PP- 130-157. 
242. B. M. Add" Tviss" 32973 f411 West to Newcastle 11 February 1766. 
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on grounds 
/ of expediency, and therefore the witnesses must be examined 
243 
abiut the whole state of America. The detailed nature of the 
questions put to the witnesses seems to show that Townshend's 
view was adopted. 
On the following day Wednesday 12 February 1766, after the 
244 
examination of three more witnesses the questioning of the 
provincial manufacturers and merchants was commenced. Thomas 
Morris was the first of these and he seems to have been a 
hosier of some consequence for he stated that he had dismissed 
100 hands in six months. His evidence was short and concerned 
245 
solely with the decline in the stocking trade. The next 
246 
witnesses were Robert Crafton, a hosier of London and Joseph 
247 
Bunny, a Leicester hosier. Both stated that the orders they 
had received from America were conditional on the repeal of the 
Stamp Act and Bunney also dealt with the decline of the 
stocking manufacturing industry in Leicester as a result of 
the Stamp Act. They were followed by the Yorkshire woollen 
manufacturers Obadiah Dawson and Benjamin Farrar, who spoke 
248 
of the decline of the Yorkshire woollen industry while Emanuel 
Elam also from the West Riding gave evidence Anmrican 
243. it ia. rs,. l. L west to Newcastle 11 i'earuary 1766. 
244. James Balfour of Virginia, Colonel George Mercer of 
Virginia and William Kelly of New York. Cf. Smith 2E. Q 
pp"154-193" 
245. Ibid. pp. 194-5. 
246. Ibid. pp. 196-199.247. Ibid. pp. 200-205. 
248. Smith oP" cit. pp. 206-2l5,221-225. Farrar appears to have 
been a brother-in-law of Sir George Armytage (1734-1783) 
M. P. for York and friend of Rockingham. See B. M. Ad. d. Mss. 
3293 ff5l-3 Rockingham to Newcastle 14 November 1761; 
B. M. Add" Mss" 32989 f175 Lady Rockingham to Newcastle 
"Tuesday morning" (15 March 1768) This may account for 
his appearance as a witness and may be his link with the 
Rockingham administration. Smith off. cam. pp. 221-222 
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attempts to manufacture woollen goods that he had noticed 
249 
during a recent visit to the colonies. 
On the final day of examination of witnesses another 
seven witnesses were examined. Six of these were concerned 
2 50 
with trade and industry, the seventh was Benjamin Franklin. 
The first of the mercantile witnesses was William Halliday, 
a Liverpool merchant who gave evidence of the decline of the 
251 
Liverpool American trade. He was followed by George biasterman. 
a London goldsmith, who gave an account of the bullion handled 
2 52 
in the trade with the American colonies. William Reeve, the 
Master of the Merchant Venturers whose business handled about 
one fifth of the total trade of Bristol, gave evidence next 
and gave an account of the effect of the Stamp Act on the 
253 
trade of Bristol and the Gloucestershire nail industry. Robert 
Hamilton a textile manufacturer then represented Manchester, 
and John Glassford, a tobacco merchant, Glasgow. The latter 
was concerned mainly with the debts owing the Glasgow merchants 
254+ 
which were imperilled because of the Stamp Act. The final 
mercantile witness on that day after Benjamin Franklin had 
given his evidence was John Hose, a London shoemaker. He seems 
to have carried on an extensive business for he stated that he 
normally employed over 300 men but the Stamp Act had reduced 
this to forty-five. lie was solely concerned with the effect 
248. (contd) seems to have found difficulty in identifying h 249. Ibid. pp. 216-220. For later association between Elam and the Rockinghamites see Burke to Rockingham 22-23 August 1775. Burke Correspondence Vol. 
250. Smith op. cit. pp. 268-275.251. Ibid pp-225-231. 252. Ibid. pp. 232-236.253. Ibdd. pp. 237-245. 254. Ibid. pp. 246-275. 
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255 
of the Stamp Act on his own business. The mercantile witnesses 
represented almost all of the manufacturing areas in England 
and Scotland and nearly all of the important branches of the 
export trade to America. To incur the expenses of a lengthy 
stay in London and leave their businesses, even in a time of 
depression, shows how important these merchants must have 
felt their task to be. Indeed Reeve had been in London five 
weeks, Glassford was especially appointed by the Glasgow 
uh-and Hamilton was sent back again to London after the 
256 
Stamp Act Repeal. 
It was the task of the merchants to overcome Parliament'S 
resistance to the repeal of the Stamp Act on grounds of 
principle, and to convince members that this was a first-rate 
economic crisis and that the Stamp Act had to be repealed on 
grounds of expediency. The merchants had to convert Parliament 
to the opinion of men like Newcastle who pressed for the 
257 
repeal of the Stamp Act for economic reasons. 
Although the repeal of the Stamp Act was a victory for 
the merchants, for the ministerial witnesses, for Trecothick 
and the Rockingham Whigs, it was above all a victory for 
those who placed the economic importance of the colonies first. 
It was a mark of the growing political power of the commercial 
classesjbut the fact that the Declaratory Act was passed 
255. Ibid., pp. 276-79" 
256. Smith op. cit. pp. 23-24 quoting W. W. M. Burke Letters 1-48 
Archibald Henderson to Burke 9 February 1766; W. W. M. R58 
Robert Hamilton to Rockingham 16 May 1766. 
257. B. M. Add. Mss. 32973 f342 Newcastle to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury 2 February 1766. See also above p. 364. 
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shows that the right of Parliament to tax the colonies, if it 
was contested, would be upheld in England. 
The fact that many of the witnesses before the Stamp Act 
Committee had connections with the Rockingham administration 
258 
has been noted above. For the mercantile witnesses this is 
worth considering in a little more detail. Trecothick's 
connection with the ministry has already been considered in 
detail. Hanbury and Mildred were his colleagues on the 
London Merchants Committee. Moreover Hanbury and Trecothick 
were connected in business and the Hanbury family had been 259 
associated with Newcastle. previouely in electoral affairs. 
Both Hanbury and Mildred were Quakers and there was a close 
link between the Quakers and the ministry through Doctor John 
260 
Fothergill. Evidence exists of contact between Dawson and 
261 
Rockingham and Farrar with Rockingham, and if no definite 
connection between Rockingham and Elam can be proved in 1766 
either Dawson or Farrar could have suggested him as a witness. 
Sir William Meredith helped to organise the merchants in 
Liverpool and William Halliday's connection was probably gained 
262 
through him. Likewise Rockingham had close contact with the 
Manchester merchants either through Sir William Meredith or 
Lord Strange who early on in the ministry was helping Rocking- 
263 
ham to get into contact with merchants. 
258. See above pp-674-376.259. See Smith , 
o2. cit. p. 135. 
260. See above pp-330-332 and my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 184-186.1 
261. See above - pp= 382-383 and Smith oP. cit. p. 206. 
262. See above pp. ' 351-352 and Smith off. cit. p. 227. 
263. Ibid., pp-247-248. 
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The link with George Masterman again appears to have been 
through Trecothick. In his "Proofs and Observations on the 
London Merchants Stamp Act Petition" Trecothick mentions 
264 
Masterman. Hose was linked directly with Trdcothick through 
a contract to supply the latter with shoes to the value of 
£22,000 a year for export to the American colonies. William 
Reeve already knew Newcastle and the Lord Chancellor, 
Northington. Moreover he had already had dealings with the 
ministry as Master of the Merchant Venturers. He had written 
265 
to the Lords of the Treasury on 21 November 1765 thanktng them 
for the Minute on the Bullion Trade and to Charles Yorke on 
23 December 1765 asking assistance in opposing the new duty 
266 
on the Irish trade. Finally Glassford was linked to the 
administration through another Glasgow merchant, Archibald 
267 
Henderson, who was a friend of Burke- 
Thus of the fifteen English mercantile witnesses eight 
seem to have been known to the inner core of the administration 
before the committee sat. These were Trecothick, Hanbury, 
Dawson, Farrar, Halliday, Reeve, Hamilton and Glassford. 
Trecothick seems to have introduced Masterman and Hose and 
he probably introduced Mildred as well. Dawson or Farrar 
may have formed the link with Elam and possibly some of the 
264. Ibid* p. 227; W. W. M. R57 "Extract of the Allegations in the 
Petition to, the House of Commons of the London Merchants 
trading to North America.... with Mr. Trecothick's Proofs 
and Allegations. " 
265. Smith 
, 
off. cit. p. 276, W. W. M. R27 Minutes of the Stamp Aßt Committee p. 70. 
266. Smith 
, 
2j2" cit. pp. 237_8, W. W. M. R56 Reeve to Rockingham, 
Dowdeswell, and other Lords Commissioners of the Treasury 21 November 1765, B. M. Adcd. Mss. 35637 Reeve to Charles Yorke 23 December 1765.267. Smith o2. cit. p. 261. 
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other merchants introduced Morris, Crafton and Burney. Of 
supreme importance was Trecothick's circular letter which 
could be used to enlist support for the administration and 
it must have been a very powerful force. 
The close link of these mercantile witnesses with the 
administration is very important. The pressure brought to 
bear upon Parliament by a number of merchants working in close 
contact with the administration must have been far greater 
than the pressure unco-ordinated mercantile agitation would 
have exerted. Indeed it is doubtful whether isolated sponta- 
neous petitions and unprepared evidence could have secured a 
repeal, for the Rockingham administration needed a political i. 
weapon as well as public support. Concerted agitation gave 
them this political weapon. 
The Stamp Act Committee appears to have examined its 
last witnesses on the Stamp Act on 17 February 1766. It met 
again on 18 February but there is no record of evidence for 
that date in the Newcastle and Rockingham Papers and on 19 
February George Onslow wrote to Pitt 
"I have been unable to get that (the evidence) of 
yesterday, which was indeed not very essential to 
the present question, being chiefly produced for 
facts relative to the Spanish trade. " 268 
268. Smith op. cit. pp. 8,9 13. Comm. ons Journals Vol. XXXjp. 589. 
Neither the copy of the evidence in WWM. R27 or B. M. 
Add"Tviss"33030 ff182-203 possesses any record-of evidence 
for 18 February 1766. Also in the Commons Journals it 
is generally noted where a witness who has given evidence 
1 
is no longer. needed. Cf. Vo1. XXX, p. 586. George Onslow to 
Pitt-19 February 1766 printed Chatham Correspondence 
Vol. II, p. 387. 
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The Committee sat again on 21 February and reached a 
conclusion - the report from the Committee being ordered to 
269 
be heard on 24 February 1766. On 21 February the Committee 
270 
had asked permission to sit again and this permission was 
granted for 4 March. On that date the meeting of the Committee 
was postponed and further postponements resulted in it not 
assembling again until 24 March 1766, when it was ordered to 
271 
consider a review of the North American Trade in general. On 
27 March and on seven fmrther occasions the Committee considered 
272 
this and it was from these sittings that the Free Ports, Act 
and other commercial measures of the First Rockingham adminis- 
273 
tration relating to America were evolved. 
The evidence before the Stamp Act Committee had occupied 
more time apparently than Rockingham and his colleagues had 
11 
wished, for on 14 February Sergeant Hewitt had written to 
Newcastle with respect to the proceedings in the committee 
on 13 February, 
"It was intended to go so far `into the American affair 
as to close the evidence so as to be able when the house 
meets again to go into the great question. " 274 
269. Commons Journals Vol. . p-598. 
270. Ibid. p. 598. 
271. Ibid. pp. 626,646,663,673,688. Cf. Smith 2, p. cit. p. 8. 
272. Smith 22. cit: p. 8. "_ 
273. See below pp. 416-447. ` 
274. B. PMT. Add. hiss. 32973 f432.. Sergeant Hewitt to Newcastle 14 
February :, 
_1766" -: 
This is.. James Hewitt(1709-89)M. P. for 
Coventry °1761-66 . subsequently Justice of the Kings Bench 
and Lord'Chancellor of Ireland""_. See Namier Structure of 
Politics . p. 22.: The-great question referred to is-whether to repeal the 'Stamp Act'or'not. 
_ ý, 
1 
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On the same day Newcastle wrote to Rose Fuller, the chairman 
275 
of the Stamp Act Committee who had been ill 
It I understand that the great question of the Repeal 
comes on in the House of Commons on Monday; and that 
Mr. Pitt comes to town on Sunday evening, to be present 
in the House on Monday. " 276 
The Monday referred to would seem to be 17 February and in 
fact the actual crisis concerning repeal did not begin until 
after the last witnesses were heard on Tuesday 18 February. 
Onslow wrote to Newcastle (to correct him) on Saturday 
15 February 1766 saying that the question of repeal could not 
begin until 18 February at the earliest as George Grenville had 
"his evidence to examine" and late on 14 February Onslow had 
written to Pitt 
"I also wrote to inform you, Sir, that we have just now 
finished all the papers and evidence, which has been 
lengthened out to this time, I won't say by a useless, 
but by a worse than useless, by the most artful, 
premeditated string of questions, calculated for a 
particular purpose, which I trust in God will be defeated, 
notwithstanding the combined force which is to act in 
support of it. Of that combination we have had proof 
today, if any was wanting after what you saw the other 
day, by a thorough union between the late administration 
and those who call themselves Lord Butets friends.... " 
278 
The first real test of the weight and use of the mercantile 
275. See above p. 378. 
276. B. M. Add. Mss 32973 f440 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 14 February 
1766. 
277. B. M. Add. Mss" 32974 f9 Onslow to Newcastle 15 February 1766 
For Grenville' s evidence see above p. 375. Cf" Smith o2. cit. 
p. 13 and above p. 376. 
278. George Onslow to Pitt 14 February 1766 "Friday night 12 
o'clock" printed Chatham Papers Vo1. II, p. 378. There is no 
record of evidence for 14 February in either B. M. Add. Mss. 
33030 or in W. W. M. R27. Perhaps the day was spent in 
discussing the papers after the witnesses had been heard. 
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evidence came on 21 February when in the concluding stages of 
the Stamp Act Committee the administration knew it would have 
to force the resolution to repeal the Stamp Act on to the 
reports that were to be given to the House of Commons. Concer- 
ning this debate, William Baker, the son of Sir William Baker 
wrote to a correspondent: 
"Mr. Conway began by summing up the evidence which had 
appeared before them relative to the decay of the 
Commerce between (1. Britain and America, and the 
deplorable state of our manufactures. G. Grenville 
interrupted him with setting forth the impropriety of 
entering so precipitately into an affair of such 
importance as the repeal of an act, to which reports 
had that morning been circulated of many of the 
Southern Colonies having submitted. Mr. Conway replied 
that he had heard of no such reports; that no advices 
of that kind had arrived at his office, that the Board 
of Trade had received none - that no resolutions of a 
Committee were so final as to be charged with precipi- 
tation, since upon the Report they might be altered, 
amended, or totally cancelled as to the House might 
seem most convenient. Baffled in the introduction of 
this dilatory finesse, the objector was silent and 
Mr. Conway was suffered to proceed in his speech, 
which was not less sensible or less spirited for the 
little artful obstructions thrown in his way. Conway 
has a candour in his manner peculiar to himself, and a 
manliness of expression in which, on provocation, he 
shews himself superior to most. His arguments were 
founded entirely on the state of our manufactures, and 
the Decay of trade. He was clear and concise and 
concluded with his motion "that leave be given to bring 
in an Act for the Repeal of the Stamp Act, and for 
regulating Trade and Commerce &c. as may be seen more 
fully in the Votes. The Motion was seconded by Grey 
Cooper - He was too flowery not to convince every one 
that he had studied his speech, and too full of Latin 
quotations to have that weight which many of his arguments 
deserved.... A debate-arose upon this, very dull and 
. 
tedious, a mere. repetition of what had been so often 
canvassed before.... Mr. Burke was the only man who 
could keep up the attention of the House on a subject 
already threadbare, -and received such compliments on his performance from Mr. Pitt, as, to any other man 
would have been fulsome, but applied to him were literally true and just. " 279 
391 
Even though the petitions had been dealt with and the 
mercantile evidence had been heard, Newcastle, Rockingham and 
their colleagues were still evdeavouring to use mercantile 
pressure on the House "of Commons, and the merchants who were 
in London for the repeal campaign during the debates dined 
together at the hing' a Arm Tavern then went en assn to hear 
280 
the debates. During the course of the debate in the evening 
of 21 February a running commentary was provided by James 
West's reports to the Duke of Newcastle. In the first report 
West wrote 
"It is said thyy will not divide -I think we should, 
and if a list of those that are against the question 
be handed about, it will effectively do the business 
of the opposition in the City and in the manufacturing 
towns.... The lobby and stairs are crowded with 
merchants. " 281 
At 2.15 am. on the morning of 22 February it was event- 
decided by a majority of 275 to 167 to include the ually 
282 
repeal resolution in the report of the committee. Rockingham 
reported to the King 
"The joy in the Lobby of the House of Commons which was 
full of Considerable Llerchants both of London and from 
different manufacturing parts of the country was 
extreme. " 283" 
279. Baker Letters, Hertford County Record Office, William 
Baker to Mr. Talbot 25 February 1766. I am indebted to 
the Hertfordshire County Archivist for allowing me to 
use these-letters. William Baker (1743-1824) (M. P. 1768- 
1774,1777-1784,1790-1802,1805-7) was to succeed 
Trecothick as the City representative of the Rockingham 
Whigs. For him see Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-90 Vol. II, pp. 42-43 and my Barlow Trecothicketc pp. 138-142. - 
280. Clark, British Opinionetc p. 43. 
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and to Newcastle 
"I also told him (the King) of the immediate joy in the 
Lobby and of what sort of persons it was composed. " 284 
Rockingham was thus attempting to use mercantile opinion 
as a lever with George III, prejudiced as he was in favour of 
285 
modification of the Act. Indeed the rejoicings in the City 
of London must have been a powerful force, for even this 
preliminary decision, which really amounted to no more than 
a contemplation of repeal, was the signal for widespread 
286 
rejoicing among the trading people and merchants of London. 
Horace Walpole commented 
"In reality it was the clamour of trade, of the merchants, 
and of the manufacturing towns that had borne down all 
opposition. A general insurrection was apprehended as 
the immediate consequence of upholding the bill, the 
revolt of America and the destruction of trade was the 
prospect for the future. A nod from the Ministers would 
have let loose all the manufacturers of Bristol, 
Liverpool, Manchester and such populous and discontented 
towns who threatened to send to Westminster to back their 
demand of repeal. As it was, the lobby of the house, the 
Court of Requests, and the avenues were beset with 
American merchants. As Mr. Conway went away they huzzard 
him thrice, stopped him to thank and compliment him, 
and made a lane for his passage. When Mr. Pitt appeared 
the whole crowd puled off their hats, huzzaed, and 
281. B. M. Add. Mss. 32974 ff45-46 West to Newcastle 21 February 
1766. West's other letters are at ibid. f47 same to same 
21 February 1766 ("20 past 12 ") and ibid. f49 same to 
same ("4 past 2 ") i. e. 22 February 1766. 
282. Ibid. f49 West to Newcastle 21 February 1766 rz past 2 ") 
(! 
I) 
See also Gipson loc. cit. p. 10 et seg. ` 
283. Rockingham to George III 22 February 1766 printed Fortescue 
, 
off. cit. Vo1" I, p" 275 no, 9260. 
284. B. M. Add. Mss"32974 f67 Rockingham to Newcastle 22 February 
1766. See also Chatham Correspondence Vol. II, p. 393 Pitt 
to Lady Chatham 22 February 1766. 
285. See Winstanley og. cit. pp. 267-269. See also the notes in ~. j 
W. W. M. R2-28 R2-29- Cf. Henry Cruger Jnr to Henry Cruger 
Snr 14 February 1766 in "The Commerce of Rhode Island" 
1726-1780 Vol. i, loc. cit. p. 141. 
286. B. M. Add- Mss- 32974 f71 Onslow to Newcastle 23 February 1766.. (C' 
1ý 
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many followed his chair home with shouts and benedictions. 
The scene changed on the sight of Grenville. The crowd 
pressed on him with scorn and hisses. He swelling with 
rage and mortification, seized the nearest man to him by 
the collar. Providentially the fellow had more humour 
than spleen 'Well, if I may not hiss' said he 'at least 
I may laugh' and laughed in his face. The jest-°caught - 
had the fellow been surly and resisted, a trace r had 
probably ensued. " 287 
This gives indication of the strength of mercantile pressure 
and it is not surprising that mob violence was feared consid- 
ering how fresh the riots over the North Briton No-45 and the 
proposed cider tax were in men's minds. That Walpole was 
not exaggerating the situation is shown by a letter William 
Baker, the son of Sir William Baker, wrote to a correspondent 
when he stated 
"No one who was not present can have an Idea of the 
exultation in the crowded Lobby, on the declaration of 
the majority. The members of the ministry, as they 
came out of the house were deified with applause, the 
others were hardly secure from violence. And the line 
in their conduct between the justifiable and the 
licentious would have been as difficult to draw, as it 
was impossible to repress the extravagance of it. " 288 
In his speech on American Taxation Burke said 
"I remember, Sir, with a melancholy pleasure, thej 
; 1. 
287. Walpole Memoirs Vol. II, pp" 211-212. - , 
288. Baker Letters, William Baker to Mr. Talbot 25 February 
1766. ' 
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situation of the honourable gentleman (General Conway) 
who made the motion for the repeal, in that crisis, when 
the whole trading interest of the empire, cramming into 
your lobbies, with a trembling and anxious, expectation 
waited almost to a winter's return of light, their fate 
from your resolutions. When at length you had determined 
in their favour, and your doors, thrown open, shewed them 
the figure of their delivered in the well-earned triumph 
of his important victory, from the whole of that grave 
multitude there arose an involuntary burst of gratitude 
and transport. They jumped upon him like children on a 
long absent father. They clung about him as captives, 
about their redeemer. All England, all America joined 
to his applause. Nor did he seem insensible to the best 
of all earthly rewards, the love and admiration of his 
fellow citizens. Hope elevated and joy)4ightened his 
crest. I stood near him, and his face, to use the express 
ion of the scripture of the first martyr "his face was 
if it had been the face of an angel.!. 289 
Ritcheson notes that the division of the 22 February shows 
the effect of mercantile pressure and concludes 
The merchants responded solidly to the petitions of 
the commercial cities and representatives from the 
large urban constituences had felt the pressure also. " 
He also states that independent and unattached members were 
290 
persuaded by the mercantile arguments. 
Sir Lewis Namier notes that only six merchants out of 
about fifty-two who sat in Parliament on February 1766 voted 
against the repeal of the Stamp Act. He continues in a foot- 
note 
" The only two merchants representing Scottish consti- 
tuences, James Coutts, the banker ai. P. for Edinburgh, 
Sir Alexander Grant, IM. P. for Inverness Burghs, voted 
against the repeal, so did Robert Jones and John 
Stephenson, who were followers of Lord Sandwich and 
connected with the East India Co mparýy, but had no 
289. Burke ]forks " Vol. II, pp. 40? -408 
290. Ritcheson op. cit. pp. 60-62. 
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interests in America; George Prescott, originally a 
Leghorn merchant-banker helped to a seat in Parliament 
by Henry Fox; and Henry Shiffner - he was connected with 
the Grenvilles in 1760, had become very nearly bankrupt 
and was given a secret service pension of £500 p. a. by 
Newcastle's successor in 1763 or 1764.... " 291 
According to the list of the minority given in the 
Newcastle Papers and. Judd's Members of Parliament 1734-1832 
of the 78 members of Parliament sitting in 1766 who had 
mercantile associations only 16 voted against the repeal of 
the Stamp Act and according to Namier only eight of the six- 
292 
teen were supporters of Grenville. I list those sixteen below 
Name. Classification Party according 
according to Judd. to Newcastle. 
William Matthew Burt 
George Prescott 
James Colleton 
William Hussey 
Chauncey Townsend 
\1 :r Shiffner 
Bartholomew Burton 
Lord Robert Clive 
Sir Lawrence Dundas 
Thomas Erle Drax 
Robert Jones 
John Stephenson 
James Coutts 
Sir Alexander Grant 
Thomas Harley 
Sir Thomas Stapleton 
West Indies Interest 
It It ft 
It tI it 
Merchant 
it 
it 
Banker 
Nabob 
Merchant 
West Indies Interest 
Nabob 
it 
It 
West Indies Merchant 
Merchant 
West Indies Interest 
Grenville 
ff 
It 
to 
if 
It 
to 
Bedford. 293 
It 
it 
ff 
Bute 
ft 
Tory 
n 
2 91. Namier, England in the Age etc p. 254 and n. 5. Cf. Sutherland 
loc. cite p. 65 n" 2., 
292. See B. M. Add. Mss. 32974 f154 "2nd Division on the Repeal of 
the Stamp Act" being read for the first time" where the 
minority is given as 167 as it is in ibid f49 West to 
Newcastle 21 February 1766 ("1past 2")(i. e. 22 February 
1766) I have analysed these figures by comparing them with 
Members of Parliament 1734-1832 by aerritt P. Judd, New 
Haven, 1955. I have for this analysis counted the follo*ng 
classifications of Judd as having mercantile associations ; -. Merchants, Bankers, Nabobs, India Interest, West Indies 
Interest, West Indies Merchants, Manufacturers. See Judd ibid. pp. 90-94. See also Namier, Structure of Politics etc p. 154.. 
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None of the merchants in the above list except Chauncyy 
Townsend who supported Grenville seem to have been active in 294 
the American trade in 1766, and Sir Alexander Grant is the only 
West Indies merchant who voted against repeal. His loyalty to 
295 
Bute was presumably stronger than to his fellow merchants. In 
the case of the West Indies Interest members there was always 
a division of opinion between those who had plantation interests, 
particularly absentees, and those whose interest was purely 
296 
commercial. Sir Lewis Namier considers the presence of 
297 
Bartholomew Burton's name on the list a mistake. 
The resolutions of the Stamp Act Committee which were 
introduced into a formal sitting of the House of Co=ons on 
24 February 1766 were thus basically the same as the resolutions 
that had been agreed upon by the leaders of the administration 
298 
at the meetingsat Rockingham's house on 19 and 21 January 1766. 
LT, is pernaps a iittie oaa tnat Dungas votea against repeal 
for he was related to Rockingham by marriage"See("Lord 
North and the Speakership 1780" by J. E. Tyler in Parliamen- 
tary Affairs The Journal of tthe Hansard Society Vol" VIII `: , London 1954-55 p-676 n"7. See also Namier and Brooke 
The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol" II'p" 359. 
294. See Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, 
pp"163-4,225-8,238-9,263-4,3 0,857-361,528-9,586-7,691-! j 
Vol. III, 324-5,434 6,476,474. See also for Chauneyy 
Townsend in particular Namier England in the Age etc pp. 
244-246. 
295. See Armytage, o2. c&t. pp. 26-29 passim. 
296. Ibid. p. 39 n-3- See also Capitalism and Slavery by 
Williams, Chapel Hill, 1944, pp. 76-7,92. See also "The 
London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century" by 
L. M. Penson, English Historical Review Vol. XXXVI, 1921, 
PP-373-383- 
297. Namier, Structure of Politics p. 154 n. 2. The presence of Burton s name on }ii list considerIn his close association 
with Newcastle in. opposition befor onflict5 with the teü- dency of, thegreat chartered companies like the Bank of England and the East India Company to support the admin- istratiori in power. See. above pp. f1-., t See also Namier and Brooke The House of CoMMons 1754_ 1790 Vol. lI, p. 164. 
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The merchants petitions and their evidence before the Stamp 
Act Committee had not after the 21 January altered or amended 
the policy of the administration. It had been used by Rockingham 
and his colleagues to secure the acceptance of a policy already 
decided upon. 
On 24 February the resolution to bring in a Bill to 
repeal the Stamp Act was carried by 240 votes to 133. On 26 
February the Repeal Bill and the Declaratory Bill were given 
their first reading; on 27 February they were given their 
second and finally on 4 March the Declaratory and Repeal 
299 
Bills were passed; the latter by 250 votes to 122. The third 
reading was marked by Bamber Gascoyne reading a letter which 
Sir William Meredith had written to the Mayor of LiverQ&l 
which stated 
"Lord Bute's friends Mr. Grenville's party and the rank 
tories voted for this bloody question and considering 
we had been twice beaten in the House of Lords, we were 
surprised to find our numbers were 275 to 167; I hope 
soon to send you word of the repeal. P. S. Mr. Pitt 
will soon be at the head of affairs-" 300 
Gascoyne, no doubt, hoped to discredit the ministry by bringing 
to light one of the more extreme methods they had used to 
gain mercantile support and ensue hostility to Grenville. 
There is no evidence that I have discovered as to any 
part played by the merchants in the proceedings after 24 
February. Indeed it is difficult 
298. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, p. 601. Cf. above p. 361.1' 
299. Commons Journals Vo1. XXX, pp. 602,608ý612,621,626. For an 
account of the debate on the bills see B. MM. Add. Mss" 32974 
f79 Onslow to Newcastle 24 February 1766, ibid. f91 same 
to same, 26 February 1766, flOl Newcastle to Earl of Hopetown 27 February 1766, ibid. f134-Onslow to Newcastle 
4 March 1766. 
300. Walpole op. cit. Vol. II, p. 216. Cf. Harrowby Mss, Ryder' s Shorthand Notes, Document 63. 
R 
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to see what they could have done. They had made their effort. 
Now they had to wait for the results while the1; easures they 
had worked for went through the normal process to become law. 
In this interval, however, it is logical to assume that they 
kept up their pressure in the lobl4ea of the House of Commons 
as they had during the Stamp Act Committee stage of repeal. 
When the King gave his placemen his approval to vote against 
the repeal the merchants could do little for they had no 
301 
influence on the King's placemen. The merchants had played 
their part in procuring a majority in the House of Commons 
for the repeal and there can be little doubt that they were 
of vital importance to the Rockingham administration at this 
critical juncture. 
The activities of the merchants in the lobbies of the 
House of Commons at this time is interesting and important. 
Mr. J. M. jlorris claims that in the 1760's lobbying techniques 
were haphazard and that it was not until after the War of 
American Independence that lobbying by major industries became 
highly developed. He goes on to say that when 
" an emergency demanded association on a national scale 
manufacturers would sometimes agree to frame their 
petitions to the government according to a standard 
form. They might even allow a particular group - 
usually the merchants of London, because they were handy 
to Parliament and the government offices - to speak 
for industrial and commercial opinion as a whole. " 302 
301. For this see above note 286. For an account which suspect 
the influence of the Dowager Princess of Wales in the 
matter see Richard Champion to Caleb Lloyd (n"d. ) quoted 
Two Centuries of Ceramic Art in Bristol by H. Owen, London 
1873 p. 47. 
302. See "Samuel Garbett and the Early Development of Industrial Lobbying in Great Brit ain" by J. M.: Morris, Economic History Review Second Series, Vol. X, London 1957-58 
. 45Q1. 
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The Stamp Act Crisis shows the characteristics which 
Mr. Norris mentions and on this occasion a further development 
had taken place because there were local organisations in 
towns like Bristol and Liverpool which were co-ordinated by 
the merchants of London, and because the London Merchants' 
Committee were endeavouring to seek out petitions and almost 
303 
outline their form. However, a retrogressive step occurred 
as well, as the Rockingham administration was able to use the 
mercantile pressure group for its own ends to secure a majority 
for the repeal of the Stamp Act in the House of Commons. 
Another interesting fact is that Samuel Garbett7 the 
Birmingham iron manufacturer, whom Mr. Norris regards as the 
father of the lobbying technique had been in contact with 
William Burke who was working closely with Edmund Burke on 
304 
the Stamp Act. In these circa stances it may be asked why, 
with all the other organisations for the repeal so complicated, 
the activities of the merchants in the lobbies seems to be so 
haphazard and undirected? Mr. Norris also offers a reason 
for this. Firstly, as so many of the new industrial towns 
were not represented in Parliament they usually had to 
preseiitrtheir case through a county member who did not speak 
for them alone. Secondly, he says that the government disliked 
lobbying as it took the initiative out of their hands. 
"When ministers felt it necessary or advisable to have the 
opinion of manufacturers on economic legislation, they 
took it in the form of expert advice from individuals be ore a Parliamentary or Council Committee. " 305 
i 
303. See above p"351 et se q. 
304. See Calendar of Rome Office Papers of the Reign of George 
III 1760 - 25 October 1766 ed. Joseph Pedington, London, 
- _-- i 
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The Stamp Act Crisis appears to exemplify this point also. 
On 4 March the Repeal Bill was introduced into the House 
of Lords. Here the ministry seems to have had some intention 
I 
of repeating the tactics used in the House of Commons. On 11 
February Newcastle had written to John White to see if, and when, 
it was proper for the London merchants to petition the House 
of Lords. He stated 
"The merchants 'of London and of several other great towns 
in England, intend to petition the House of Lords upon 
the Inconvenience of the Stamp Act concluding I suppose 
with their wishes, that it should be repealed. The 
petitions have been some time in the House of Commons 
and the merchants are to be heard this day, upon them. 
I wish you would let me know, at what time, these 
petitions should be presented in the House of. Lords; 
whether they may not be presented before the Bill of 
Repeal comes from the House of Commons, (which as itJia a 
money bill, must arise there) for if that can't be cone 
before such a Bill comes up to us, if such a Bill does 
not come at all, the merchants will have no opportunity 
of being heard before the House of Lords-" 306 
Trecothick seems to have been aware that the ministry was 
trying to organise the repeal tamphign in the House of Lords. 
On 3 March 1766 he wrote to Newcastle returning a copy of the 
evidence giiren before the Stamp Act Committee in the House of 
Commons and saying "as yet I have not heard in what manner the 
307 
business is to be conducted in the House of Lords". 
304. contd) 1878, p. 637, no. 2064-Samuel Garbett to William Burke 
14 December 1765, - Cf. Norris 
loc. cit. p. 452. William Burke 
was in Parliament-and acting as secretary to General 
Conway at 'this time. 
305. Norris loc.. p. 451: 
306. B. M. Add. Mss. 32973 f415 Newcastle to White 11 February 1766. 
307. B. M. Add. Pdss. 32974 f133 Trecothick to Newcastle 3 March 1766. 
fý 
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Further evidence of attempted mercantile pressure on the 
House of Lords is a. memorandum among the Newcastle Papers 
dated 1 March 1766 and headed " Questions to be asked Alderman 
Trecothick. '" It consists of a series of questions very similar 
to those asked Trecothick in his examination before the 
House of Commons but the ddte of the paper makes it "igppossible 
for it to be connected with an examination of Trecothick in 
that House. One is therefore led to assume that Newcastle 
was contemplating an examination of evidence of some sort in 
the House of Lords. All the questions on the paper bear a 
relationship to the London merchants petition and it seems 
f 
1 
i 
most likely that Newcastle intended to have the questions 
i 
asked Trecothick when he presented the London Merchants' 
308 
petition. There is another memoranda of Newcastle's dated 16 
March 1766 entitled "Further Considerations on the Stamp Act" 
in which he writes, 
"The cause of the total stagnation the Stamp Act - 
The Remedy the Repeal 
This fact proved by the papers and by evidence, 
Sorry they were not heard. " 309 
Perhaps it is now necessary to enquire exactly how much 
evidence there is of organisation of the repeal campaign in 
the House of Lords. It should be noted that four witnesses 
308. B. M. Add. Mss"33001 l4S"6" 'Questions to be asked Alderman 
Trecothick" 1 March 1766. Cf. my Barlow Trecothick etc 
pp. 46-48. Cf. also The. London Merchants Petition at B. M. 
Add. Mss" 32973 f421. This petition is dated 12 February 
1766 and is the copy of the one presented to the House of 
Lords. 
309. B. M. Add. Mss" 33001 f163. 
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were called before the House of Lords Committee on the American 
Papers. These witnesses were Major Thomas James, Dr. Thomas Moffat, 
310 
Martin Howard and Colonel George Mercer. There is no evidence 
in the Lords Journals as to who arranged for the calling of 
witnesses. They were examined on 31 January 1766, the same day 
311 
as their examination before the House of Commons. I have been 
unable to trace any record of the evidence they gave. That the 
ministry considered further witnesses for the House of Lords is 
proved by a letter from Grey Cooper to Rockingham in which he 
described the evidence Masterman gave in the House of Commons and 
concluded 
"I do not advise your Lordship to call this gentleman to 
give the same evidence in the House of Peers. I think 
the tendency of it is not so favourable as was at first 
imagined-" 312 
The resolutions reached by the House of Lords' Committee 
on 10 February included a Declaratory resolution but no resolution 
on the repeal of the Stamp Act, probably because the Repeal Bill 
313 
had to start in the House of Commons. It should be noted that 
in the House of Lords the resolutions were reached a fortnoght 
before those in the Commons. This may possibly have been because 
it was easier to settle business in the House of Lords and 
Rockingham and Newcastle then hoped to give some direction to 
policy in the Commons, or more likely because the House of Lords 
310. Journals of the House of Lords Vol. XXXI, 1765-67 (London 1768) iýj 
pp. 246,247,253. , These four men were the refugees. Seý above p. 
J 
311. Lords' Journals `Vo1"XXXI, p. 253. 'ý5 n. 102. 
i 
a 
312. W. W. M. R34 Grey Cooper to Rockingham "Tuesday 9 o'clock" (can 
be dated from internal evidence as 18 February 1766) 
313. Lordd Journals Vol. 7DcXI, p. $58. 
-ýJ 
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did not have to spend time on mercantile evidence. 
On 5 March the Repeal Bill and the Declaratory Bill were 
read for the first time in the House of Lords. Three petitions 
from mercantile towns were presented to the House of Lords, the 
first two from London and Bristol, on the same day as the first 
314 
reading of the Bill. These petitions, it is interesting to note, 
316 
asked that the Repeäl Bill should pass into a law. This has the 
appearance of organised pressure but on 7 March the third petition 
from Glasgow, was presented and this asked for relief in much 
316 
more general terms. 
There would thus seem to have been tentative plans by the 
administration to organise mercantile pressure on the House of 
Lords. This pressure was not used again and Newcastle, at least, 
seems to have regretted it. It is difficult to explain wby the 
pressure was never used. Possibly it was not necessary, 
While 
Newcastle may have felt that the case for the repeal of the 
Stamp Act would have been stronger had such pressure been used, 
Rockingham and other leaders of the administration may not 
have felt that it was wise to repeat a campaign so successfully 
organised the first time, fearing that it would give the mercan- 
tile pressure too artificial an appearance. 
The real crisis of the Repeal debate in the Lords seems 
317 
to have been on 11 March on the second reading of the Bill- 
314. Ibid" pp. 291-2. 
315. Ibid. p. 291 et Seq. 
316. Ibid. 
. 
p. 296" 
317. Ibid" p" 303. See also Parliamentary History Vol. XVI? pp. 
166.187. 
t 
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It was Newcastle, during the debate, who moved that the petitions 
318 
of the London merchants should be read. During the debate he 
spoke as follows 
"Have never taried my opini(o)n during the progress of this Bill and shall upon the pres(en)t occas(io)n give Y(our) L(ordships) my reasons for wishing the repeal of this Bill. 
With regard to the commercial interests of this country from best intelligence I can receive the trade of this Country is declining in every other part of the w(orld) but America - The Turkey trade our rivals the French have taken a great part from us our 2 trade is much lessened. 
Our Portugal not withstand(in)g the immense suns we have 
expended on their acc(ount) has been diminishing for 
several y(ea)rs past'\and is now in a state I(m) sorry to 
see it in. 
Alludes to the Lords Petitions and other Petitions to the 
H(ouse) of C(ommons) and the general state of American 
trade w(hi)ch £if nothi else were involved wo(ul)d be 
sufficient to shew the neXpediency of cont(i)n(ui)ng 
the Stamp Act in Am(eric)a. " 319 
The importance of commercial considerations to Newcastle is 
obvious from this part of his speech. 
The famous protest of thirty-three peers followed. According 
to the Lords Journals 136 peers were present-'on that day in the 
320 
Lords and the Bill was carried by a majority of thirty-four. 
The Repeal Bill finally passed the House of Lords on 17 
321 
March 1766. 
Newcastle seems to have feared that the Repeal Bill might 
be rejected in the House of Lords. On 15 February he had written 
to the Archbishop of Canterbury 
"We think it (the repeal of the Stamp Act) is sure in the 
House of Commons, and we hope that the House of Lords will 
not venture to reject it afterwards, the consequences may 
318. B. M. Add. L ss. 35912 f82. In this volume of the Hardwicke 
Papers'there are thirty folios commencing at f76 which are 
a report of the debate in the House of Lords on the repeal 
of the Stamp Act. It is difficult to decide who was the 
author but the hand is possibly Rockingham's. He did not 
apparently speak in the debate. 
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be so alarming; which consequences will be so strongly 
supported by the testimony of the first merchants in the 
City of London. " 322 
Newcastle had good grounds for fearing that the passage of the 
Stamp Act through the House of Lords would be difficult for the 
administration had already met with rebuffs there, and in the 
debate on the Declaratory Resolution the Rockingham Whigs had 
323 
apparently found themselves in a minority on two minor matters. 
However, even at this date there was something of a tradition 
024 
that the House of Lords did not reject money bills. Newcastle 
might even have feared a constitutional crisis of some sort if 
the House of Lords rejected the Bill, and he did his utmost to 
persuade various members of the House of Lords to support the 
325 
repeal of the Stamp Act. Lord Northington, in his speech during; 
326 
the debate in the House of Lords, hinted at the same fear. 
On 18 March 1766 the Repeal Bill having passed the House 
of Lords, the King went down to Parliament to give the royal 
assent to the measure and the Declaratory Act. On this occasion 
Thomas Farr, a Bristol merchant who had been in London to work 
for the repeal of the Stamp Ant, wrote to his brother, another 
Bristol merchant 
319. Ibid. ff82-3. I have supplied the letters in the round 
brackets. The square brackets exist in the mss. The 
question mark. replaces a word which is illegible. 
320. Lords' Journals Vol. XXXI, p. 308. 
321. Ibid. p. 308. 
322" B. M. Add. Mss. 82974 f6 Newcastle to the Archbishop of Canter 
15 February 1766. 
323. Ritcheson op. cit. pp. 58-9 (no authority cited) See also 
Gipson op. cit. Vol. X, p. 404. Cf. W. W. M. R1-577 Newcastle to 
Rockingham 11 February 1766 quoted Albemafle 2-2"cit. Vol. I p. 302. 
324. See A Constitutional History of England 1642-1801 by L. A. 
Thomson, London 1938, pp"263-50343-4. 
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"All the North American merchants propose going in ca]ctcdcade to attend him, amongst whom I am summoned and believe I shall go in the procession. " 327. 
Thus the merchants were active up to the very last moment 
in the repeal campaign and were ready to demoflstrate their 
feelings even to the King. 
5. The Acceptance of Repeal. 
It was not only in the colonies that the news of the repeal 
of the Stamp Act was greeted with widespread jubilation but 
in England also. Barlow Trecothick_was chosen Sheriff of London 
15 April 1766 and on 23 April he presided over a great dinner to 
celebrate the repeal of the Stamp Act. This dinner was one of 
"the most brilliant ever seen in the City". It was attended 
by nine dukes. Trecothick with considerable difficulty persuaded 
328 
the Duke of Newcastle to attend. Far more important than this 
329 
was the immediate revival in trade that took place. This did 
far more to cement the alliance between the Rockingham Whigs 
and the merchants than any dinner or celebration could do. 
When it became fairly certain that the Stamp Act would be 
repealed Trecothick co-operated with Rockingham to see that the 
repeal received a satisfactory reception in the colonies. 
825. B. EZ. Add. Mss" 32974 f6 Newcastle to the Archbishop of Canter- 
bury 15 February 1766. ibid. f101 Newcastle to the Earl of 
Hopetown 27 February 1766; ibid. f127 Newcastle to the 
Archbishop of York 2 March 1766. 
326. B. M. Add. Pdss. 35912 f90 Report of the repeal debate in the 
House of Lords. 
327. Merchant VenturerSRecords, Letters 1754, Bundle 10, Thomas 
Parr to Richard Parr 17 March 1766. 
328. See my Barlow Trecothick etc p. -52. See also Albemarle 22-cit. 
Vol. I, p" 320" B. Pd. Add. Tess. 32974 f453 Newcastle to 
Rockingham 22 April 1766. 
329. See above pp. 29-30, 
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On 22 February 1766 Sir George Savile wrote to Rockingham. The 
letter is endorsed "Considerations on the Repeal of the Stamp 
Act and Recommending a Suitable Behaviour to the Americans on 
330 
that Occasion by Sir George Savile. " In these considerations 
Savile stated that the chief argument that could be put forward 
against the repeal of the Stamp Act was that the colonists would 
regard it as a triumph and justification of their violent opposi- 
tion and the Declaratory Act would thus become valueless. If, 
however, the colonists received the repeal with "submission and 
gratitude" the , policy of 
the ministry would be justified. Savile 
therefore suggested that the merchants should write to their 
correspondents in the colonies and advise them to behave in a pro- 
per manner on receiving the news of the repeal of the Stamp Act. 
The date of Savile's letter is interesting. On 22 February 1766 
more than 3000 letters were apparently despatched to America by 
mere ants 
aa 
nd their correspondents noting the Stamp Act would 
33 
be repealed. Even if this figure is an exaggeration the knowledge 
that many letters had been sent to America with news of the 
critical division could well have inspiredSavile to write to 
Rockingham with his scheme. Savile's idea seem to have been 
extensively adopted by the Rockingham administration; Trecothick's 
merchant committee was active in writing these letters and letters 
of this nature bearing. the signature of the committee of merchants 
were sent to America. It seems probable that Trecothick and 
330. W. W. M"R1-3.40 Sir George Savile to Rockingham 22 February 176 
331. See England and America 1763to 1783 - The History of a 
Reaction by Mary A. Psi. Marks, London 1907, Vol. 1, p. 58. 
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his committee sent a copy of the letter to the merchants in each 
colony and many other of the individuals considered in this work 
wrote to their own private friends in the same manner. Trecothick 
332 
wrote similar letters also on the passing of the Free Ports Act 
and apparently the London merchants hired a special ship to 
333 
take the news of the repeal to Boston. There is also evidence 
that Doctor Thomas Moffat, the refugee who had given evidence 
before the Stamp Act Committee composed a letter of this nature 
to a correspondent in the colonies and that Rockingham and 
334 
Savile corrected the draft of this letter. 
This policy seems to have met with only limited success. 
There is a small bundle of letters among the Rockingham Papers 
concerned with the reception of repeal which points to the fact 
that Rockingham attempted to collect such letters. It contains, 
however, only four documents which Rockingham can have regarded 
as reports of a favourable reception of repeal and three which 
he must have regarded as unfavourable35' William Reeve attempted 
to send Robert Nugent, the member of Parliament for Bristol, news 
of the satisfactory reception of repeal which was communicated 
332. See the letter from the London merchants in "London Rierchants 
on the Stamp Act Repeal", Mass. Hist Soc Proc. 1921-23 Vol. LV, 
Boston 1923, pp-215-223 (Printed Documents) W. W. M. R35 letter 
endorsed "Letter from New York'"; London merchants to the 
merchants of Connecticut 18 March 1766, Conn. Hist. Soc. Coll 
Vol. XIX, The Pitkin Papers New Haven 1920, p"279; see also 
Guttridge American Correspondence etc p. 14 Richadd Champion 
to Caleb and John Lloyd 23 February 1766. 
333. Letters of Denys de Berdt p. 314. De Berdt to Samuel White 
rdarchl766, ibid., p. 315, De Berdt to Samuel White 17 March 1766. 
See also Morgan op. cit. pp. 282-283. 
334. See The Grenville Papers Vol- III, pp-237-8 n. 3. Thomas 
Moffatt to Dr. Styles a Physician at Newport Rhode Island 
18 
Pear h 1766. For Moffatt see Smith . cit. pp. 39-54 and above 
p. 368. 
336 
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to George Grenville, but on 14 March 1767 William Samuel Johnson 
wrote to Jonathan Trumbull 
"The merchants are grown very cool in their regard towards 
us, partly because they have not received the remittances 
they expected since the repeal of the Stamp Act, and 
because they think we did not, as they say, express the 
proper gratitude to them for the service they did upon 
that occasion. Mr. Ray told me the other day, that for 
most of the Provinces, and particularly Connecticut they 
had not received answers to their letters; though I assured 
him I know such letters were prepared, and I believe 
forwarded.... " 337 
6. Conclusion. 
I have in the foregoing section endeavoured to provide a 
true assessment of the part played by the English commercial 
interest in securing the repeal of the Stamp Act. The opinions 
of authorities differ. As long ago as 1904 Miss Helen 1.3 Hodges 
wrote 
"The hostility of the British manufacturers, merchants 
and workmen and the decrease of British trade was 
probably even more influential in effecting the repeal 
than the disturbances in America. " 338 
and in her article "Edmund Burke and the First Rockingham 
339 
Ministry" in 1932 Dr. Sutherland fully acknowledged the part 
played by the merchants. More recent authorities, particularly 
American, tend to minimise the importance of the part played 
335. W. W. M. R55. The bundle contains seven documents one of which 
(55-2) is a draft reply of Rockingham's. Letters which 
Rockingham probably answered as favourable are R55-1 Letter 
from New York to Barlow Trecothick and the merchants 
trading to North America 6 May 1766, R55-7 Vote of Thanks 
of House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay 20 June 1766; 
R55-7 Thomas Cushing to Rockingham 21 June 1766(covering 
letter to R55-7); R55-5 Samuel Cary to Rockingham 21 May 1766. 
Letters which Rockingham must have regarded as unfavourable 
are R55-3 extract of a letter from "Charleston to Mr. Shoe- 
brake" 16 May 1766 and R55-5 "Memorandums relating to the 
manner of Sir H. IIoore's introducing Repeal of the Stamp Act to the General Assmbly &c 1766" 
336. Grenville papers iyo1. III, p. 248 Yr. Nugent to T/Ir. Grenville 
3.7 June . 
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by the merchants. Professor Morgan in The Stam Act Crisis 
makes little more than a passing reference to their activities, 
and Professor Ritcheson, while acknowledging that the Rockingham 
Whigs capitalised on mercantile dissent states that it was far 
more the faulty parliamentary tactics of Grenville in not adopting 
the policy of amendment which secured the repeal of the Stamp Act 
341 
rather than the pressure of the merchants. Professor Gipson's 
opinion seems to have altered somewhat in recent years. In 
The Coming of the Revolution he was prepared to concede a certain 
342 . 
amount of influence to the merchants but in "The Great Debate on 
the Committee of the Whole House of Commons on the Stamp Act 1766 
as Reported by Nathaniel Ryder" he writes 
"In following these secret debates one is led to deduce 
that the economic consideration was not the leading cause 
for the resolution repealing the Stamp Act - despite the 
effectiveness of the pressure of public opinion upon the 
members in open session, especially on Edmund Burke, 
created by the unhappy situation of the British merchants. 
A review of the details of the debates on the Committee 
of the Whole House reveals that one of the considerations 
having great influence not only upon the ministry but also 
upon the members of the House of Commons was the military 
factor. It became clear that the relatively small number 
of British regulars deployed over a vast area of North 
America as compared to the potential strength of the 
colonies, now possessing many thousands of men trained 
in the use of arms, the military position of Great Britain 
in the thirteen colonies was a weak one. With this 
revelation came the conviEtion that should action be taken 
against the colonials to enforce the Stamp Act, they would 
turn to France and Spain for help, which would be granted. 
337. W. S. Johnson to Jonathan Trumbull 14 March 1767 The Trumbull 
Pa ers loc. cit. p. 487. 
338. "The Repeal of the Stamp Act" by Helen M. Hodges, Political 
Science Quarterly Vol. XVIII, Lancaster Penn41904, p. 263. 
339. Sutherland off. cit. pp. 46-72 passim. 
340. Horgan off. cit. pp. 261,271-272- 
341. Ritcheson 22. cit. pp. 46-47,61- 
, 342. The Coming of 
the Revolution by I H. Gipson, New 
York 1954 
106 et seg" 
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The mother country thus had to face the probability, which 
subsequent events were to substantiate in 1777, that any 
attempt to subdue a colonial revolt under these disadvcant- 
ageous conditions, would lead to the outbreak of a new 
European war, a war of revenge.... In the secret parliamentary 
debates.... certain members not only saw the serious threat 
to the mercantile system but, what is even more important, 
they also saw the seriousness of potential military involve- 
ment. Undoubtedly, the deep apprehension of European 
participation in a war resulting from any attempt to 
enforce the Stamp-Act, which General Conway, leader in the 
House of Commons, ßaä-: voiced so clearly in his major 
speech, had continued to 1S in the edr. $ of members and 
to swing the final vote forepeal. " 
There can be little doubt that tliis difference of opinion 
reflects, -a cleavage in the views of supporters of repeal which 
is reflected even today. It is true that the debates which 
followed the evidence given before the Committee of the Whole 
House did not reflect so great a pre-occupation with mercantile 
evidence. But the ministry had justified/the repeal on economic 
grounds in the Committee. They had now to justify it on other 
grounds. Support for the policy of the Rockingham Whigs could 
not be won only on the grounds of a trade depression. 
The continued pressure kept up by the merchants through the 
repeal campaign must, however, not be underestimated. The pressure 
344 
was relentless even if unco-ordinated. That the campaign was 
sufficiently important for the Parliamentary opposition to try 
345 
to counter and discredit it, is some mmasure of its success, 
as is the fact that Newcastle at least had the idea of organising 
346. 
a mercantile campaign to put pressure on the House of Lords. 
343. Glpson, "The Great Debate etc" loc. cit. pp. 
344. See above, p. 353 
345. See above p. P- 375-376. 
346" See above p4.400-402. 
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Perhaps it was only fear of a constitutional crisis that made 
the passage of the Repeal Bill through the House of Lords 
relatively easy. Moreover, the prs3gsii. in the lobbies which 
could easily have developed into riots and the extension in 
lobbying technique which took place emphasise the intensity 
of pressure and its unusual nature. 
Above all this, however, is the influence that the activities 
of the merchants had upon the Rockingham Whigs. Starting perhaps 
as a source of information the merchants became a pressure group 
agitating for repeal and the ministry's chief ally in securing 
repeal. Yet while they were the ministryä' "trump card" in 
securing repeal they were still putting pressure on the ministry 
to secure that measure. Once Rockingham had decided on co-oper- 
ation with the merchants he could not have worked for less 
without forfeiting their support. 
One must also distinguish between the merchants inside and 
outside Parliament. Whereas the chief pressure on the ministry 
came from the merchants outside Parliament, the merchants in 
Parliament were almost unanimous in favour of repeal. There 
was a solid American merchant vote for repeal and an almost 
347 
united West Indian merchant vote. This was the value of the 
merchants in Parliament and no doubt they co-operated with their 
colleagues outside Parliament. Yet it was perhaps the merchants 
outside Parliament who were more influential in settling policy 
than those inside Parliament, and it was to these chiefly that 
347. See above ipp. 394-396. 
:I 
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Rockingham turned to try to ensure that his policy received a 
348 
satisfactory reception in the American colonies. 
The Stamp Act Crisis was also important for the Rockingham 
Whigs becayse it marked the and of one era and the inauguration 
of a new one. Before 1765, although the Newcastle Whigs were 
traditionally the party of the mercantile element, co-operation 
with the merchants was for Rege the most part limited to the 
contact of individual merchants with Newcastle or other party 
leaders. The advice of merchants was sought on occasions and 
there was spasmodic co-operation at an elemBntary level but 
little more. The Stamp Act Crisis, however, forced the first 
Rockingham administration into close co-operation with the 
American merchants. Never before had they assisted or worked 
together in so highly organised a manner. Once begun, this co- 
operation could not be stopped. In future the Rockingham Whigs 
represented far more than any other political group the interests 
of the mercantile element, and the legacy survived in spite of 
the party's long period in opposition, and the difficulties 
which were to ensue in the years immediately following the 
party's fall from power. 
This development also marked a change in the mercantile 
associates of the Rockingham Whigs in that they were no longer 
the representatives of the Bank of England and the great 
chartered companies - the 'City interest' that administration 
would turn to when in need of assistance. Rockingham's mercan- 
the associates were for the most part outside Parliament, 
348. See above gip. 406-409. 
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less wealthy men more directly concerned with trade. It cabnot 
be denied that the development was associated with the change 
in leadership, a change fuom the ways of Newcastle to the ways 
of Rockingham. It also marke an alteration in the nature of 
support. Rockingham's mercantile associates were not those 
who supported a party traditionally in power but those who 
supported a party usually in opposition. 
I have discovered no evidence that Rockingham began to forge 
349 
the traditional links of administration with the City financiers. 
Perhaps his stay in power was too short for him to do this, and 
perhaps finance was not a sufficiently pressing problem during 
his stay in office, but his alliance with a group which was 
traditionally opposed to the influence of the City financiers 
must have worked against him forging links which were important 
for an administration that was to survive for a long period. 
9 See above pool, 
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APPENDIX. 
Membership of The London Ivlerchants' Committee formed on 4 
December 1765. 
The following are listed as members of the London Merchants' 
Committee according to W. W. M. R1-537, Copy of general letter from 
the Merchants' Committee to the town of Leeds. 
Mr. John Strettel Mr. Nicholas Ray 
Mr. Antony Vialars (Junr) Mr. David Barclay (Junr) 
Mr. Grey Olive Mr. Daniel Mildred 
Mr. Antony Merry Mr. John Buchanan 
Mr. Jonathan Barnard Mr. John Stewart 
Mr. Dennis Deberdt Mr. Samuel Athaives 
Mr. George Haley Mr. Capel Hanbury 
Mr. Thomas Lane Mr. Gilbert Franklyn 
Mr. Gilbert Harrison Mr. Edward Bridger 
Bar low Trecothick Esq. Mr. William Greenwood 
Mr. William Neate Mr. Charles Crokatt 
Mr. Richard Neave Iir. Charles Ogilvie 
Mr. Harris Mr. Clark 
Mr. Chambers Nkr. Alexander Hanna 
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On 14 February 1766 Henry rruger had written to his 
father 
"The Parliament have not yet done anything about the 
Sugar Act and other destructive restraints on your 
trade. It will come as soon as the Stamp Act is 
settled. I imagine they will rescind all the restrictive 
clauses, and grant you everything you ask. Their eyes 
are at last opened and they seem convinc'd what Cast 
-Benefit will accrue to this Kingdom by giving you 
almost an unlimited trade, so far as doth not 
interfere with British' Manufacturers4 The West Indies 
are collecting all the Force to oppose us; I have 
reason to say they will at length be defeated. 'Tis said French sugars, Coffee, Cotton etc the 
Produce of foreign Islands will have the Indulgence of 
being imported into our Colonies duty free, but must 
be put in King's warehouses and the Proprietors 
constrained to ship them off again (to any part of the 
world they please) in a stipulated time., 
The Duty on Molasses will be reduced to ld. per 
gallon. " 350 
and on March 1766 after the repeal of the Stamp Act Denys 
de Berdt wrote to Willi= Smith; 
"There is yet much to be done. Thy M i1raity Courts 
must be restrained, the exorbitant duty on molasses 
lowered and the restraints on Trade removed and these 
we hope to effect through the favour of the present 
ministry who justly think the Interest of England 
and her Colonies one. " 351 
But if contemporaries viewed the passing of the Free Ports 
Act and its related measures as part of the programme for 
the reform of the laws of trade no such concensus of opinion 
exists among modern historians. 
350. Henry Zruger Junior to Henry huger Senior 14 February 
1766 printed "Co=erce of Rhode Island 1726-1780" Vol-1, 
loc, 2 it. p. 143. 
351. "Letters of Denys de Berdt" loc. cit p. 314. For the 
Admiralty Courts see Morgan oj. cit. pp. 23-24. 
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As already pointed out Doctor Sutherland interprets the 
coming of the Stamp Act Crisis as an interruption in the 
orderly development of the commercial policy of the first 
3 52 
Rockingham administration. She sees the passing of the 
Free Ports Act as an example of the unrestrained power of the 
merchants over the Rockingham Whigs, in which the merchants 
capitalising on the power they had gained during the Stamp 
3 53 
Act Crisis sought a general reform in the laws of trade. 
Another authority contends 
"The decision to establish a free port in the British 
Empire represented a significant modification of the 
principle of 1650. As a landmark in the history of 
British colonial policy, the innovation may be compared 
with the decision of the British government to keep 
Canada rather than Guadeloupe in 1762. The first West 
Indies Free Port Act of 1766 was intended as a means 
of obtaining wider markets for British goods, and it 
demonstrated as did the c}oice of Canada in 1762, that 
English industry had outgrown the bounds of the old 
colonial empire and must henceforth rely on the acqui- 
sition of new markets and of fresh sources of raw 
materials-" 354 
Moreover, Mrs. Armytage points out that if an outlet fDT 
manufactured goods was obtained by the Free Ports Act there 
was no real breach of the Navigation Laws, for the goods to 
be imported were goods that did not compete with those 
produced in either Britain or the colonies. The authors of 
the Act viere trying to revive a trade that formerly existed 
352" See above p. 525* 
353. Sutherland. "Edmund Burke and the First Rockingham Ministry" 
loc. cit. p. 66. 
354. "The Origins of Bree Ports in British North America" by 
G. S. Graham, Canadian Historical Review, Vol. XXII, 
Toronto 1942, p. 265. 
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in the Spanish Indies. Both Mrs. Armytage and Dr. Sutherland 
see the passing of the Act as the culmination of the co-oper- 
355 
ation between the North American and West Indian merchants. 
It should therefore be emphasised that the passing of 
the Free Ports Act and the other measures connected with it 
were in no sense to complete a process statted by the repeal 
of the Stamp Act as is sometimes implied in histories of the 
356 
American Revolution. These measures were, in their own right, 
an important part of the commercial policy of the first 
Rockingham administration. 
On 21 February when the Committee of the Whole House 
to Consider the American Papers reported it was continued 
in session on general trade affairs. On this date it was 
357 1766 
agreed that it should meet next on 4 March/but the meeting 
of the Committee was postponed several times. The next 
time it met was on 24 March 1766 when it was ordered "to 
358 
consider the Laws relating to the trade of Americag. After 
this the Committee met eight times on 27 March, 4,24,30 
359 
April 5,6,7, and 8 May. From these meetings emerged the 
Free Ports Act and related commercial measures of the 
Rockingham administration. 
X55" Arrnyzage oP. cit. pp. 2,13. Sutfterlana loc. cit. p. t 
356. Miller off. al-It. p. 235. 
357. SQe above p. 388. Cf. Commons Journal Vol. =, p. 586. 
358. Commons Journals Vo1. XX}:, p" 688. 
359. Ibid. pp. 697-808 aasss_im. 
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The Committee had finished with the Stamp Act on 24 
February and the order of 24 March entailed taking into 
consideration "what virtually amounted to a review of the 
360 
North American trade in general. " Early in March 1766 Burke 
wrote to Charles O'Hara 
"We now prepare for a complett revision of all the 
Commercial Laws which regard our own or the foreign 
plantations from the Act of Navigation downwards; It 
is an extensive plan. The North Americans and West 
Indians are now in treaty upon it, and as soon as they 
have settled some preliminaries (and they are better 
disposed, than anyone could think, to practicability 
and concord) the whole arrangement will be ordered, 
between them and some of the Board people and detached 
members and will be brought into the House a regular 
and digested scheme. " 361 
Although a "regular and digested scheme" never appears to 
have been'brought into the House, Burke's letter makes obvious 
the important part the merchants were to play in the forth+ 
coming legislation. Discussion in the. House of Commons was 
4 
not begun until the North American and West Indian merchants 
362 
had reached some sort of agreement. This fact, together with 
the amount of other business that had accumulated during the 
lengthy debates on the repeal of the Stamp Act, and the 
attempts to coQordinate ministerial policy with the merchants 
" accounts for the lengthy postponement of the meeting of the 
Committee until'thc 24 March and the change of function of the 
Committee of the Whole House on that 
Wä 
r. 
360. Smith 
.2p. 
cit. p. 8. 
361. Burke to Charles O'Hara 14 March 1766 printed Burke 
Corres- 
Qondence Vol"l, pp"239-240" 
362. B. M. Add. I.. ss. 33030 f206 Agreement of West Indian and 
North 
American merchants 19 March 1766. 
363. See above p" 418. 
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The central problem responsible for the delay in the 
sitting of the Committee and the further delay in securing 
the passage of legislation through Parliament was the difference, 
among the mercantile elemlents" North American and West Indian 
interests had seldom been in agreement until the time of the 
364 
Stamp Act Crisis, but they had been able to unite at the time 
of the Stamp Act Crisis to secure the repeal of legislation 
which both considered detrimental to their trade. Once the 
repeal of the Stamp Act was obtained and other legislation 
was involved the differing interests reasserted themselves. 
Moreover the conflict became more complicated than a struggle 
between the North American and West Indian interests. There 
was a conflict between West Indian planter interests, West 
Indian merchant interests, the sugar refiners of London, and 
British merchants trading to the continental North American 
colonies who partially represented another interest involved, 
the New England merchants trading with the West Indies. 
The New England merchants were dependent on the foreign 
West Indies to market their lumber and provisions because 
the British West Indies were too small a market for all of 
this. In return for these goods the New England merchants 
obtained molasses and the specie to trade with Great Britain. 
The New England merchants were thus represented and supported 
by the British merchants trading to North America in the 
364. Sutherland loc. cit. p. 50" 
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demand for a reduction of the duty on foreign molasses 
imported into North America and the opening of Free Ports in 
the British West Indies. They also wanted a reduction in the 
duty on foreign sugars imported into Great Britain. These 
demands were opposed by British West India planters intent 
on buying supplies at rock-bottom prices and maintaining 
monopoly prices on their produce. The British West India 
merchants who were chiefly carriers of goods were interested 
in increasing the amount of goods available for British and 
colonial markets and thus tended to support the reduction 
of the molasses duty and the duties on other commodities but 
not the opening of Free Ports which threatened their trade 
monopoly. The London sugar refiners were interested only 
in increasing the amount of sugar available for home and 
overseas markets for existing legislation tended to restrict 
the amount of raw materials available to them. This division 
of West India interest explains why William Beckford and 
Rose Fuller appearedcion opposite sides in the forthcoming 
controversy. ' 
This complicated controversy became further confused by 
two ether facjors" There were differences between London and 
the provincial merchants over what particular measures were 
best to secure their ends, and various political factions 
vied for support of the different mercantile groups to assist 
their rise to power as the Rockingham administration disin- 
tegrated5 
365. See Vtlar and Trade in the West Indies by R"Pares, oxford /ya 
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Burke reported the negotiations between the North 
American and the West Indian merchants in a letter to Charles 
O'Hara on 1 and 4 March 1766 but minimised their differences 
366 
of opinion. On 12 March Rockingham mentioned the dissensions 
between the groups when he reported to the King the preliminary 
367 
agreement that had been reached on 10 March 1766. 
In this preliminary agreement negotiated at the King's 
Arms Tavern the West Indian and North American merchants' 
committees agreed to the reduction of the duty on foreign 
molasses imported into North America to one penny per gallon, 
to allow the import of certain foreign commodities, sugar, 
coffeeland cotton duty free provided they were re-exported 
as legally allowed to Britain and Europe, and the lowering of 
the duties on certain foreign commodities entering North 
America. In the draft of the document in the Rockingham and 
Newcastle Papers there is no specific mention of the opening 
of a Free Port in Dominica, but in marginal notes on one 
copy in the Rockingham Papers the idea is introduced and the 
Free Port at Dominica appears in what seems to be a final 368 
version of the paper to the Board of Trade Papers. This 
365" (contd) Chapter IX passim and Merchants and Planters 
by R" Pares, Economic History Review Supplement No- 4,,, 
Cambridge 1960, pp-32-37; Armytage 
. 
2p-. Sit-, p., 39 n. 8, 
Williams op" cit. pp. 76,92; Sav&dge a. 
. 
Sit. pp. 250-253. 
366. Burke Correspondence Vol. I, pp" 239-240 quoted above p. 419, 
367. Rockingham to George III 12 March 1766 printed Fortescue 
op. cit. Vol. I, p. 281. 
368. W. W. M. R60 Documents headed "At a meeting of the Committee 
of the West Indian and North American merchants at the 
King's Arms Tavern" 10 March 1766; Cf. document with 
similar heading at P. P.. O, B. %6/75 ff539-42. Arinytage 2" 
cit. p. 39. Sutherland loc. cit. pp. 63-66; Cf. Sosin 22-cit. 
pp-81-82. 
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indicates the willingness of the West Indian merchants to 
compromise on the 'molasses duty, but not initially on the 
Feee Ports and that the North Americans had compromised by 
not insisting on the reduction o: C the duty on foreign sugar 
importiOd into Great Britain. 
The Gentleman's Magazine commented on the settlement of 
10 March as follows; 
"In settling these important poin$s the interest of the North American Colonies, of the West Indian islands, of the public revenue, and the general system of British 
commerce were maturely considered. The parties concerned 
were not directed by partial regards, but the public 
good: To conciliate opposing interests was no easy task; but the good sense and moderation of those to whom these affairs were committed, at length happily effected that conciliation of jarring interests, which hitherto had been considered impossible-" 
It reported that the proof of the knowledge and integrity 
given by the North American merchants forced the West Indian 
merchants to negotiate with an interest that they had previously 
derided. Now it had become an influence on government to be 
reckoned with, and although the North American merchants were 
suspicious at first, remembering the treatrpent they had 
received previously, when they discovered that the West Indians 
369 
were in earnest, a successful compromise was reached. On 
11 March 1766 the West Indian and North American Merchants 
Committee met again but their deliberations were inconclusive 
especially about the problem of ships laden with French sugars. 
stopping at Channel ports on their way from America and again 
on their return. It was agreed to defer a decision until 370 
the advice of more American merchants could be obtained. 
369. Gentleman's Magazine Vol. XXXVI 1766 . 231 "A short 
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Before the merchants could. meet again, however, a deep 
rift had appeared between the groups represented. This to a 
large extent was the responsibility of the ]UjVajpj; Merchant 
Venturers. They had met on 10 March 1766 and drawn up a set 
of resolutions similai in essentials to those drawn up by the 
West Indian and North American MerchantsýCommittees on the 
same day. The Bristol merchants had, however, sent represent- 
atives to London who had also pressed for the reduction of 
the duty on foreign sugars importedel into Great Britain and 
who supported by the North American merchants in London, 
Liverpool and Lancaster made the opening of a Free Port at 
371 
Dominica the prime objective of their campaign. Thus although 
on tJ1, e 3 April 1766 the London West India and North American 
Merchants' Committee had agreed to press the administration to 
allow the re-exportation of certain British manufactures and 
372 
North American provisions from Jamaica and Pensacola, Florida, 
no agreement had been reached over the question of the duty 
on foreign sugars and the opening of the Dominica Free Port 
and there was a definite breach between the North American 
and West India groups. Beckford led the powerful section of 
the West Indians opposed to the more extreme demands of the 
373 
merchants, the Fullers, however, still supported the alliance 
369. ccontci) sxetcn or the Transactions tnat iea to the new 
Regulation of Commerce'that have lately been agitated in 
favour of the Colonies". 
370. Savadge 2p" cit. pp. 261-262. 
371. Savadge og. cit. p. 260 et sec. 
372. W. W. M. RF-60 Document commencing "At a meeting of the 
joint Committees of the West Indian and North American 
Merchants" 3 April 1766. 
373. Chatham Papers P. R. 0.30/8 Beckford to Pitt 18 April 1766 
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with the North American group and Newcastle. was still using 
374 
Rose Fuller as an adviser on America. It should also be remem- 
bered that Fuller was Chairman of the Stamp Act Co=ittee. 
On 7 and 8 April 1766 the agitation for a Dominica Free 
Port reached a climax with the presantation of concerted 
petitions by the merchants of Bristol, Liverpool, Lancaster, 
375 
Manchester and London. At this stage Rockingham hastily 
called a Cabinet meeting on 12 April 1766 to try to settle 
376 
policy. As at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis there was 
no unanimity of opinion in the Chbinbt. Rockingham and 
Dowdeswell were prepared to support the North Americans 
against the West Indians, but Newcastle was luke-warm in 
support of the Free Ports Act in the face of West Indian 
opposition. Northington, Egmont and Grafton seem to have been 
377 
hesitant to support the measure if not actually against it. 
076" ( contd) Cf. Sutherland loc. cit. p. 66. 
374. Cf. But.? herfand: '_ it. p. 66. See B. U. Add. Mss. 32974 f185 
Rose Fuller to ewcastle 15 March 1766, f189 Newcastle 
to Rose Fuller 18 March 1766, f196 Fuller to Newcastle 
20 March 1766. 
375. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, pp. 704-750. It is not clear 
why these five towns should have petitioned. They do 
represent the three major ports trading to America with 
the addition of Manchester and Lancaster. Abraham 
Rawlinson perhaps the chief protagonist of the Free Ports 
Act was a Lancaster merchant (see below p. 427. ) and he 
appears to have been working closely with Manchester 
merchants. See my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 252-255. In 
London, Trecothick's committee was probably active, and 
the correspondence in the Merchant Venturers Papers, 
Bundle 9 shows how closely Rawlinson, the London merchantra 
and the Bristol merchants co-operated. Co-ordination of 
activity with the Liverpool merchants was probably 
maintained through Sir. William Meredith. 
376. B. M. Add. Mss. 32974 f348 Rockingham to Newcastle 11 April 
1766. Cf. Sutherland loc. cit. p. 66. 
377. B. ". Aý; ý1" Liss. 32974 f349 Rockingham to Newca t1 e1 pril 1766;, ßf350 Newcastle to Rockingham 11 April 1766370 
A Rockingham to Newcastle 13 April 1766. Cf. Armytage 22. 
cit. 13-39. Sutherland loc. cit. PP-66-69. 
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At the meeting it was decided to lower the duty on molasses 
and allow the warehousing of foreign sugars in America but 
consideration of the Dominica Free Port was put off until the 
378 
next session of Parliament. As well as the lack of unanimity 
another factor that must have weighed heavily with the ministry 
in taking the decision was the influence of Pitt. He now 
appears to have supported the West Indians ggainst the Free 
Ports. A deputation of London merchants, Barlow Trecothick, 
David Barclay and Capel Hanbury appear to have visited him 
in early April concerning this and the visit appears to have 
been followed by one from Burke and Abraham Ravrlinson the 
Lancaster merchant, who was so active in working for the 
379 
Free Ports Act. 
Pitt sensed danger, realising that if he supported the 
North Americans against the West Indians he would lose popu- 
larity. Accordingly he gracefuuly retired from the fray and 
did not accede to the entreaties of either of the deputations 
380 
that visited him. 
The position of the ministry was now becoming weaker. It 
378. See B. 2J. Ada., J, 1ss" 32974 f370 Rockingham to Newcastle 13 
April 1766ýf372 Newcastle to Rockingham 13 April 1766. 
379. Ibid. f389 "Items for the King" Ibid. f421 "An account of 
Mr. yialpole' s Conversation with Mr. Pitt" 17 April 1766, 
Burke Correspondence Vol. I,. p. 251 Burke to O'Hara 23,24 
April 1766. For Abraham Rawlinson see my Barlow Trecot r 
etc pp. 252-255 and below p. and also Merchant Venturers 
respondence, Bundle IX, Abraham Rawlinson to William 
Reeve 12 April 1766. Cf. Savadge or. ci . pp. 262-266. 380. Chatham Correspondence off. cit. Vol. II, p. 419 Thomas Nuthall 
to Pitt 8 May 1766, Sutherland loc. cit. p. 68. Cf Savodge 
22. cit. pp. 277-282. 
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was divided among itself. 
Grenville remained hostile. 
Pitt would not support it and 
Moreover, mercantile support 
which had helped it through the Stamp Act Crisis was no longer 
unanimous. Much credit must therefore go to Rose and Stephen 
381 
Fuller who eccured conciliation between the mercantile groups. 
This was especially the case because the demands for particular 
legislation had become increasingly confused among different 
political factions and different mercantile groups. After the 
inconclusive meeting of 11 March the demands of the Bristol 
merchants hadhfurther modified. Three pepresentatives seem 
to have been at w6rk on their behalf and each had a different 
p1iority. Abraham Rawlinson the Lancaster merchant was one 
of the. Bristol agents in London and he was preoccupied with 
the demand for the opening of Free Ports and the reduction 
of the duty on imported foreign raw cotton. Thomas Parr the 
Bristöl merchant was particularly concerned to secure the 
modification of the Sugar Act desired by the Merchant Venturers 
and Robert Nugent the member of Parliament for Bristol, no 
doubt trying to regain some of the prestige he had lost because 
of his behaviour during the Stamp Act Crisis, sought the 
measures demanded by the North American merchants. He 
concentrated on getting as much sugar as possible-for the home 
See B. M. - Add. Mss. 33030 f247 rough notes. B. M. Add. Mss- 3297) 
ff62-63 "A Copy of a Letter from Stephen puller Esq. 
Agent for the Island of Jamaica to the Rt. Hon. ºilliam 
Dowdestivell Esq.... " ibid. f114 Onslow to Newcastle 8 May 
1766; ibid. f147 Rose Fuller to Newcastle 10 May 1766; ibid 
f149 "Mr-Fuller's remarks relating to the Free Ports" 8 
May 1866. See also rough notes made by Fuller - Fuller 
Papers, Sussex Archaeological Society, Bundle IX; Cf. 
Sutherland loc. cit. p. 69. Armytage 22. cit. pp. 40,41" 
_, 
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market and wanted Free Ports at Dominica, Kingston, Jamaica 
and Pensacola, Florida together with direct export of foreign 
382 
sugar from these ports to great Britain. 
OBI 22 March 1766. the London North American merchants had 
accepted in essentials the proposal of the Merchant Venturers 
represented to them by Thomas Parr. This involved the landing 
in England of foreign sugars from the West Indies to protect 
the sugar refiners from foreign competition and ships sailing 
to America from continental Europe stopping in England to 
protect the British merchants trade with the colonies. To 
these proposals was added the demand for Dominica as a Free 
383 
Port. 
After this meeting Nugent became the chief Bristol 
representative in London and the Bristol viewpoint was modi- 
fied accordingly, Vn early April 1766gNugent was aware, 
however, that the House of Commons was only willing to agree 
to the opening of a Free Port in Dominica and this would be 
with important limitations on the importation of sugars from 
thence. It was probable that British planters on the island 
would be debarred from producing sugar and all sugars from 
Dominica would be regarded as foreign. The demand for a 
Free Port became supreme over other demands when Nugent 
became Bristol's chief representative in Loudon. Moreover 
382. Savadge op. -pit-pp-262-264. 
Cf. Merchant Venturers 
Correspondence Bundle 10 Letters 1754 - 
383. Savedge op" cit. 267-268. 
384. SavQdge off?. cit. 268 et sue. 
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the Bristol merchants made little attempt to restrain Nugent 
38 
from pressing for the reduction of the sugar dut y. The rift 
between the North American and West Indian merchants grew 
wider and the London North American merchants complained that 
386 
their Bristol allies had deserted them. 
Meetings at the Exchequer between Dovrdeswell, Nugent and 
the London merchant George Hayley about 10 and 17 April 
produced no conclusive result, primarily it would seem because 
387 
the West Indian interest was not sufficiently represented. 
These meetings were followed by a petition from the London 
sugar refiners to the House of Commons demanding more sugar 
for re-export and one from the "Manufacturers Dealers and 
Carriers of Sugar in Bristol" demanding more sugar for home 
388 
consumption .. presented on 14 April 
1766. 
The final agreement secured by the Pullers on 8 May 1766 
was essentially a compromise. in return for a reduction of 
the molasses duty and allowing the import of foreign sugars 
into North America the West Indians secured safeguards for 
the home markets all sugars coming from Morth America to Great 
Britain were to be deemed foreign and the import of foreign 
sugar only permitted as long as the high rate of duty then 
in force continued. The fourth resolution reads "that relief 
385. Savwlge 
. 
2p. 
. 
Sit. P. 274. 
386. Sav1ge 22. cit. pp. 275-276. 
387. Savwlge op. cit. pp. 278-279. 
388. Commons Journals Vol. CCC, p. 759; Savodge og. cit. p. 280. 
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be given to the Spanish trade by a 
_species 
of Free port in 
Jamaica for Spanish bottoms (To be proposed this year)" and the 
tenth "The Free port off Dominica to be carried into execution 
this year" has been crossed out. It has been replaced by 
"The Free port off Dominica for goods of foreign American 
growth to be proposed for consideration but not absolutely 
determined-this session" in a draft copy of the Resolutions 
among the Newcastle Papers. In addition to this there are 
resolutions dealing with the duties on brandy and rum and 
it was agreed to abolish the duty on foreign cotton. The 
document is docketed "House of Commons May 8th 1766 Agreement 
389 
of the West India Committee". It thus seems that the Pullers 
secured the agreement of members of the West India Committee 
first and then reported their agreement to the North American 
Merchants' Committee. The deletion of the Free Ports clause 
indicates that the North American group had been forced to 
moderate still further their proposals on the Free Ports 
question after the document was drawn up and safeguards given 
for the home sugar market. 
I have found no evidence that there was a separate 
West India coruaittee among West Indian members of Parliament 
other thar{those members who represented the West India 
Committee which had been negotiating with the North American 
Merchants' Co. =nittee. The document was probably agreed in 
389. B. M. Aa. ci. hisse i53Q Q f243 (draft) f245 and f247 Agreement 
of the West India Committee 8 May 1766 printed Sutherland 
loc. cit. pp. 70-72. Cf. Sutherland loc. cit. p. 69. Arnytage 
off. cit. pp. 41-42. 
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the House of Commons because it was the most convenient place 
for the Pullers to meet West Indians who would be both members 
and witnesses before the Committee of the Whole House which 
sat on that day. The last sentence of the document indicates 
that the West India Committee would inform the North American 
Committee of their agreement. 
It is not clear how the Fullers managed to bring the 
conflicting interests together but the nature of the compromise 
suggests that all realised that unless some sacrifice was 
made no interest would achieve anything. This idea is confirmed 
by a letter from Grey Cooper to Rockingham on 29 April 1766 
before agreement had been reached in which he wrote 
"Some of the merchants are most anxious and desirous 
of taking advantage of this necessary delay and recom- 
mend it to the consideration of your Lordship whether 
the main question had not better be brought on upon 
the free ports. I told them I thought that was impossible 
at this period of the session, but they do not seem 
satisfied with a general answer -I can find no other. " 
390 
Once co-operation between the two groups had been achieved 
it seems to have been possible to continue it for some months 
for on 13 June 1766 the London North America Merchants were 
able to write to their mercantile correspondents in the 
colonies; 
"It is incumbent on us to mention the happy union 
between the West Indian and North American merchants 
which has proved a great advantage in combating the 
opposition. It took place early in this session (of 
Parliament) and for the general good, we sincerely 
wish it always to subsist in its present cordiality. " 393. 
390. Pl. 17. P12. R1-603 Grey Cooper to Rockingham 29 April 1766. 
391. London Merchants to John Hancock and other American 
merchants 13 June 1766 printed "London Merchants and 
the Stamp Act Repeal" loc. cit. p. 220. 
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In Parliament the passing of the Free Ports Bill and 
related measures was conducted in much the same way as the 
campaign for the repeal of the Stamp Act had been. initially 
Burke, at least, hoped to obtain a "Compleat revision of all 
Commercial Laws". He requested Charles O'Hara to send him 
some proposals so that Treland could be included in the scheme. 
392 
However, these proved unsatisfactoryr because, as Burke explained 
to O'Hara, a prejudiced interest opposed almost all the 
proposals. When Burke tried to secure the free export of sopp 
from Ireland to the West Indies the proposal received some 
support from provincial merchants at first but eventually the 
393 
measure was defeated, and it became obvious that the measures 
to be passed would have to be confined to those upon which the 
great commercial interests were intent. The procedure followed 
by the Committee of the Whole House was repeated. Witnesses 
who had not been heard, although ordered to attend the Stamp 
Act Committee, were ordered to attend again. On 27 Larch the 
merchants of London were examined on their petition of 17 
394 
January 1766 and other witnesses were questioned on that day. 
Among the Harrowby Papers there is a record of the evidence 
of 27 March including the information given by William Kelly, 
395 
Brooke Watson, John, Wentworth and Benjamin Hales. 
As mentioned: above concerted petitions from Lancaster, 
392. Burke Corres ondence Vol-lip-239, Burke to. 0 Hara 1,4 
March 176 . 246 Burke to O'Hara 27 March 1766, ibid. 
p. 246 Burke to O'Hara 29 March 1766. 
393. Ibid. p. 249 Burke to O'Hara 8 April' 1766 ßp. 254 Burke to ÖHra24May1766. 
394. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, pp. 686,702. 
395. Harroývby Manuscripts, Nathanial Ryder' s Diary, Document 63. For Kelly and Wentworth see above pp4b4,36q Brooke Watson 
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Liverpool, Bristol, London and Manchester were presented to 
396 
the House of Commons on 7 and 8 April. Further witnesses were 
ordered to attend the Committee and examined in much the same 
397 
way as the witnesses before the Stamp Act Committee. As might 
be expected a significant number of these witnesses were West 
398 
Indian agents and merchants. In all, a further twenty seven 
witnesses were called by the Coxnittee. It is not clear 
whether they were all examined but judging by the Commons 
399 
Journals a reasonable proportion were. 
On 8 April 1766 Burke wrote to Charles O'Hara; 
"Last night we closed the examination of our witnesses 
to the propriety of opening Dominica as a Free Port 
which concludes the enquiry previous to the resolutions 
that are to be the foundation of the new American Trade 
Act. These resolutions will be proposed in the Committee 
for America next Mondays " 400 
Burke did not mention Jamaica or Pensacola. presumably because 
the House was not willing to consider these, as Nugent stated, 
or because they were not a point at issue between the different 
901 
mercantile groups. 
No resolutions were introduced into the Committee of the 
Whole House on Monday 14 April as Burke suggested. Indeed on 
402 
that day its sitting was postponed fora week. The resolutions 
395. (contd) was a London merchant and Benjamin Hales was 
Collector of Customs at Boston. 
396. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, pp. 704-708. See above p. 425- 
397. Cf. Ibid. pp. 750,790,797. 
398. E. g. eeston Long, Chairman of the West India Committee, 
Richard Maitland, James, Irvin, James Carr. 
399. Ibid. pp. 739,797,801,808. 
400. Burke Correspondence Vol. I, p. 248 Burke to O'Hara 8 April 
1766. 
401. See above p"42Qletrse . 402. Comnons Journals Vo . =, p. 794. 
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were not introduced until 9 May when the ; Vest India and North 
9- 403 
American Merchants Comm- itteeShad reached agreement. The 
dissension at the Cabinet meeting on 11 April may have also 40 
been responsible for this delay for on 23,24 April Burke 
wrote to O'Hara; 
"When the Free Port come to be debated in full cabinet 
the old stagers frittered it down to an address to the 
King for the opinion of the board on the matter &c. 
so we came hopping into the house with half a measure; 
the most odious thing, I am sure to my temper and 
opinions that can be conceived. However this miserable 
remnant is better than nothing. " 4045 
There does not appear to be any trace in the Commons 
Journals of the "half a measure" referred to and it is perhaps 
significant that the additional witnesses nentioned above 
were ordered to attend the Committee on and after 17 Aril 1766. 
From this evidence one can only make tentative suggestions 
as to what was happening. With lack of support IMk from the. 
merchants and dissension within the Cabinet it would seem that 
it was decided at first to make a discreet withdrawal from 
the Free Port measure but then when agreement seemed possible 
among the merchants the measure was revived. The additional 
twenty seven witnesses called before the Committee may also 
point to this conclusion. Perhaps they were used to convert 
hesitant government supporters as well as unattached members 
to the , scheme. . 
It, is also possible that the administration 
403. See above p" 42-9- . Commons 
Journals Vol. , p. 811. 
404. See -above: p"'. 
425. 
405. Burke Correspondence Vol-lop-251. Burke to O'Hara 23,24 
April 1766. The Board, referred to was probably the Board 
of Trdde but possibly the Treasury Board. Cf. P. R. 
0. 
Treasury Minute Books T-29 Vol. X= , p-20 
(f10) for 
business of this week before the Treasury Board. 
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may have been playing for time while the merchants reached 
agreement. 
It seems probable that many of the witnesses were not 
ministerial witnesses at all for on 8 May 1766 Thomas Nuthall 
wrote to Pitt 
"Mr. Beckford has treated the House of Commons every 
day this week, and I may say, until night too, with 
his evidence relative to the alterations of the duties, 
free ports etc. I should tell you that Ihr. Nugent 
insists in bringing the question of a free port before 
the House novr, whatever inclination the Treasury Bench 
may have to defer it till another session, so that 
matter may probably come to be decided before the 
House rises- it 406 
Perhaps it was this pressure from Nugent that kept the 
question of the Free Ports alive. On 21 April 1766 seven 
407 
witnesses were ordered to attend the Committee by his motion. 
A number of the remaining twenty witnesses may have been 
proposed by Beckford to resist the Free Ports Act. Indeed 
it would seem at this time that the struggle between the two 
rival mercantile factions was being fought out, both inside 
and outside Parliament. But it is ce1tain that now the time 
of crisis'was passed members were becoming uninterested in 
evidence on trade. Nuthall continued his letter to Pitt on 
406. Chatham Correspondence Vol. 11, pp. 417-418. Thomas 
Nuthall to Pitt 8 May 1766. Cf. B. Tos. Add. Mss. 32975 f56 
Onslovr to Nevicastle, 30 April 1766, ibid. f58 West to 
Newcastle 30 April 1766. 
407. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, p. 750. 
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8 May remarking 
"It seems a ghastly appearance, on the part of the directors of the political machine, when, in a question 
of such importance as that now before the House, 
concerning the American duties, free port &c only 
seventy members could be found to attend their duty. " 408 
In reply Pitt wrote 
"American evidence will have sweated the House, finel-y, 
though the cool attendance will have mitigated the 
sultry hours of investigation. " 409 
There is other evidence on the presentation of witnesses 
and the fierce controversy over the Free Ports measure. On 
24 April 1766 tames West wrote to Newcastle 
"By various delays we did not get into the examination 
of witnesses till 6 o'clock, so that will certainly 
employ us tonight, and we shall not proceed to the 
Resolution till tomorrow, and even then I fancy no 
great matter will happen. " 410 
No resolutions, however, appear to have been introduced on 
411 
25 April. On 30 April George Onslow reported to Newcastle 
with regard to American affairs and the Free Ports 
"It has been agreed on all sides to put off the matter 
till Monday to hear evidence from West India Planters. " 
412 
Grenville Aas at this time attacking the ministry because 
they dared to interfere with the Navigation Acts and were 
4O$. --Chatham Correspondence Vol. ll, p" blrs, Nutnail to ritt is 
May 1766. 
409. Ibid. p. 420 Pitt to Nuthall 11 May 1766. Cf. B" M" Add" Mss. 
32975 f98 Onslow to Newcastle 7 May 1766. Cf. Armytage 
op. cit. x. 40" 
410. B" M2" Add. M2ss" 32975 f13 Viest to Newcastle 26 April 1766. 
411. Cf. Corm: ons Journals Vol" XXX, p. 762. 
412. B. M. Add. Ivlss" 32975 f56 Onslow to Newcastle 30 Apri1 1766. 
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allowing themselves to become subservient to mercantile 413 
influence. Horace Walpole recorded that towards the end of 
April when Rose Fuller moved to have the merchants' petitions 
referred to the Committee of the Whole House he was opposed 
414 
by Grenville and on 30 April West wrote to Newcastle 
"Mr. Grenville spoke strongly against every part of the 
American measures and particularly the first question 
to be proposed for lowering the Duties on molasses, whaLnh 
he said was a fine end of what administration promised 
with regard to the colonies, in taking off tax after tax 
upon evidence at the Bar ex harte only, and the overbear- 
ing and delegation of administration to a club of North 
American merchants at the King's Arms Tavern, who he 
hoped would never be suffered to give law to G. B. " 415 
On 6 May Grenville appears to have attacked the influence of 
416 
the American merchants again. 
On 7 May even the ministry appears to have felt that the 
evidence was going to be too long. On that day West wrote to 
Newcastle 
"Nothing has happened today worth your Grace's notice. 
No division has passed. The examination going on. Mr. 
Maitland now at the Bar, is the only evidence of the day. 
Captain Collett took up all yesterday. Every person 
seems uneasy that some end is not put to an examination 
which is threatened to be prolonged which can give no 
information and which is very ill attended. " 417 
Onslow wrote on the same day 
"The same poor miserable evidence is still on his legs 
(Maitland) and giving answers to a thousand nonsensical 
413" Armytage 22-. alt-P-41- B. M. Add. Pass. 32975 f58 West to 
Newcastle 30 April 1766. For the Grenvilleites opinion 
on the Free Port Bill see Grenville Papers Vol. IV, p. 239 
Thomas Whately to George Grenville 24 May 1766. 
414. Walpole 2. cit. Vo1" II, p. 224. 
415. B. r. 2. Add. RZss" 32975 f58 West to Newcastle 30 April 1766- 
416. Ibid. f83 Onslow to Newcastle 6 May 1766. (Letter not dated 
but can be dated from internal evidence) 
417. Ibid. f97 West to Newcastle 7 May 1766. Maitland and 
Collett were both concerned with the trade to the West 
Tndies. 
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questions to about twenty of us which is the utmost 
of our numbers-" 418 
The worst was now over, however, for on the following day 
West was able to report that the evidence was finished and 
all Dowdeswell's resolutions including the Free Ports one 
419 
had been passed. Onslow wrote to Newcastle 
"I wish you joy of my being able to tell you I think 
we shall finish our American matters tonight and move 
all our resolutions. I send you the agreement of the 
West India Committee which Rose and Stephen Fuller have 
had infinite merit in procuring. If the Free Port is 
talked of tonight we shall be late. " 420 
In exultant mood Rockingham wrote to Newcastle 
"Lord Rockingham presents his compliments to the Duke 
of Newcastle and returns his Graces'_congratulations 
on the very pleasing appearance in the House of Commons 
on the American and West Indian Regulations and partic- 
ularly on the general approbation with which the resol- 
ution on the Free Ports was received. " 421 
On 9 May 1766 the Resolutions of the Committee of the Whole 
House were presented to the House of Commons and two bills 
brought intone for the establishment of Kingston in Jamaica 
and the Island of Dominica as free portstand the other 
including the reduction of duties agreed to including,, Molasses 
Duty and the duty on cotton. The third contested point the 
reduction of the sugar duty was added the next day 10 May 1766. 422 
The bills now passed rapidly through both houses. 
In the middle of May Newcastle began to fear that the 
41W. i-sts Onslow to Newcastle 7 May 1766. 'L 
419. Ibid. f110 West to Newcastle 8 May 1766 o' clocIf112 
West to Newcastle 8 May 1766 '2 past 9. 
420. Iid" f114 Onslow to Newcastle 8 May 1766. 
421. Ibid"f116 Rockingham to Newcastle 8 May 1766. 
422. Commons Journals Vol. XXX, pp. 808-843 passi Cf"Savodge 
a. ,i ct. 
p. 282. 
`i' 
k 
"I 
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Free Ports Act might be defeated in the House of Lords and 
he began to marshall support there in much the same way as 
he had done for the repeal of the Stamp Act. Burke wrote to 
Abraham Rawlinson about this and Rawlinson replied to Burke 
"Last night I recd. the favor of your letter of the 19th inst. which has a little alarmed me, yet I hope there is no fear of the (Free Ports) Bill failing in 
the House of Lords. A journey to London will be the 
most inconvenient thing that can possibly happen to 
me at this time. " 424 
The Acts finally received the Royal Assent on 6 June 
425 
1766, and regarded as a triumph even by the West Indian 
merchants for they invited Newcastle to a dinner to celebrate 
426 
the event. 
It is important to distinguish between the Dominica 
Freeport and the freeports on the island of Jamaica. The 
Jamaica freeports of Kingston, Savannah la Mar, Montego Bay 
and Santa Lucea were opened for the Spanish trade. To safe- 
guard planter interests the importation of goods which they 
produced on the island was prohibited and to safeguard 
British markets in the colonies for British merchants no 
foreign manufactures could be imported. Exports from the 
Free Ports allowed were negroes and all British commodities 
legally imported except naval stores and certain enumerated 
articles. For Dominica in which Freeports were opened for 
French trade any produce of the foreign West Indies could 
be admitted. Enumerated goods had to be exported 
direct 
to Great Britain as in Jamaica and the Act involved elaborate 
423. B. M. ADD4 SS "f 189 Newcastle to the Bishop of Worcester 
15 1 gay 
1766" Cf" above p. 400 et sec . 
424. W. 71.1% Burke Letters 1-55 Rawlinson to Burke 23 pMMay 1766" 
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precautions to stop the smuggling of French sugars from 
Dominica into other British West India Islands or British North 
America, and to safeguard the planter interest in Dominica. 
The Acts thus tried to harmonise all the interests of those 
427 
who had sought them and thus they proved unworkable. 
It is difficult to assess the precise role played by the 
merchants in obtaining this legislation. Dr. Sutherland 
suggests that following the repeal of the Stamp Act the 
situation got out of hand as far as the Rockingham Whigs were 
concerned and that the negotiations between the American and 
West Indian groups became more important in the formulation 
of policy than parliamentary proceedings and ministerial 
428 
discussion. 
Neither Rockingham's nor Newcastle's correspondence at 
this time, however, betrays evidence that they were being 
driven unwillingly into commercial legislation by mercantile 
agitation. Nor does the power of the merchants over the 
administration seem obvious to all contemporary observers. 
On 17 march 1766 Denys de Berdt wrote to Samuel White in 
America 
"You will have the molasses duty reduced to ld. and a 
new regulation of the Admiralty Courts, a Bill being 
soon brought into the House for that purpose, and some 
other advantages to trade which will be supported by 
the body of merchants and should be attended to by yours., 
429 
4250 Commons Journals Vo1. XXX, p. E343. 
426. B. b2. Add. Piiss" 32975 f400 Stephen Fuller to Newcastle 15 
June 1766. 
427. Armytage op. cit. pp. 42-43. 
428. Sutherland loc. cit. pp. 65-66. 
429. "Letters of Derbys de Berdt" loc. cit. p. 315. 
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De Berdt was in close contact with the mercantile element and 
it is reasonable to suppose that he would have corunented if 
he felt they were dominating the administration. On the 
other hand Grenville and other opponents of the administration 
were likely to seize on mercantile influence and use it as a 430 
weapon to discredit the ministry. As Rockingham and his collea, 
had decided to try and revise the laws of trade they were 
likely to turn to the merchants as the most useful experts to 
advise them on what measures they should take, and it is 
understartable that the merchants became more than detached 
advisers because of the part they had played in helping the 
ministry to obtain the repeal of the Stamp Act. It must be 
noted, however, that the idea of a Free Ports Act was not 
new in the spring of 1766. Mrs. Armytage has, for instance, 
traced the origin of the Act back to as early as February 
431 
1763 in a letter from Colonel Dalrymple to Lord Bute, and 
both Rockingham and Newcastle had advisers who were not 
merchants. There is ample evidence among their papers of ideas 
432 
and information being sent to them from non-mercantile sources. 
An interesting light is thrown on the problem of mercan- 
tile influence by the three agreements between the two merca4 
tile groups. The earliest document, the Agreement of 10 March 
1766, is a series of , resolutions 
each cormnencing with the 
430. See for instance B. PSI. Add. Ylss" 32975 f58 West to Newcastle 
30 April 1766, quoted above p. 437. 
431. Cf. Armytage . 212-Pit-P-36. 432. See' W. 17.1, T R37r39; B. M. Add. Mss. 32974 f340 John Roberts to 
Newcastle 10 April 1766; Add. IIss. 33030 ff243-318. 
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word "Agreed" and merely states that the agreement "shall have 
the general concurrence and assistance of the whole trade, 
433 
on both sides, to carry them into execution". The second 
agreement of 3 April 1766 again drafted at the King's Arms 
Tavern, starts with a proposal which begins "that it be recom- 
mended to administration" and concludes 
"The Committee agreed that the said proposal be laid 
before the administration in order to its being brought 
into Parliament in such form as shall be judged most 
expedient for the benefit of the trades being of opinion 
that the intended purpose would be arrived thereby. " 434 
Neither document shows any hint of dictating policy to the 
ministry. The third document is, howsver, different. Drawn 
up on 8 May 1766 in the House of Commons by the West India 435 
Committee, it consists of eleven resolutions being used 
diredtly as the basis of legislation and indeed on that day 
the resolutions leading to the Free Ports Act were introduced 
436 
into the House of Commons. This may well be taken as evidence 
that the ministry had become subservient to the demands of 
the merchants. On the other hand the ministry could not 
hope to act until the two great mercantile interests had 
reached an agreement, for any precipitate measure would be 
found unsatisfactory by one, if not both, of the factions. 
In the matter of the Free Ports no political principle was 
at stake and the Rockingham Whigs were genuinely seeking to 
433. B. tk. Add. t: 2ss. 33030 f'2O6 Agreement of West Indian and Nort 
American Merchants 10 March 1766. 
434. w. vI. M. R60 Agreement of the Committee' of the West Indian 
and North-American Merchants 3 April 1766. 
435. B. M. Add.; Mss. 33030 f243 Agreement of the West India Merchants 8 May 17.66. 
436. See above p. 438. 
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pass wise con ercial legislation. It was not vital, as it 
had been with the Stamp Act, to settle the measures immediately. 
With the evidence coming to an end it was essential on 8 
May that resolutions sho'ald be introduced into the Co.. ittee 
of the Whole House. The form of the agreement may thus 
reflect only the hurried nature in which the resolutions 
were introduced in a form capable of irmediate use. There 
was, however, no time for leisurely discussion by Rockingham 
and his colleagues and in this way perhaps there is a degree 
of truth in the statement that the merchants were calling the 
tune of ministerial policy. 
19 The part played by individual merchants at the time 
interesting. On 30 September 1766 Dr. J©hn Pothergill wrote 
to an American Quaker correspondent, James Pemberton of 
Philadelphia 
"Lord Chatham opposed many measures the Free Ports 
scheme especially. Abraham Rawlinson of Lancaster was 
the projector of this scheme, he convinced the North 
American committee of its utility, they obliged the 
West Indian committee to be of the same sentiment by 
clear reasoning and the chief opposition arose through 
William Beckford and through his connection with W. B. t' 
437 
The key to an understanding of Rarrlinson's position seems 
to be that as a Lancaster merchant he was interested in 
increasing the supply of cotton available for the Lancashire 
cotton industry. A Free Port would make'more cotton avail- 
able as ; could, the reduction of the duty on foreign cotton 
which he secured. In 1765 the cotton manufacturers had 
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complained about the difficulty of getting raw materials 
under the existing laws, and it was thus presumably for his 
438 own ends that Rawlinson agreed to represent the Bristol m erchants. 
Yet by turning the discussion on to other matters besides 
sugar he probably eased the passage of the measures he desired. 
Rawlinson seems to have been consulted by Rockingham and Dowdes- 
well on matters connected with American trade at this time. 
On 14 April 1766 Dowdescrell wrote to Rockingham 
"On the proposal made by Messrs Rawlinson and Heywood, 
if foreign cotton is admitted duty free there will be 
no necessity of warehousing it. The propriety of the thing speaks itself. " 439 
There is also a paper among the Rockingham Papers referring 
to this docketed "Mr. Rawlinson and Mr. Heywood' s proposals 
440 
about Cotton and Coffee 1766". Rawlinson appears also to 
have given evidence on American trade before the Corruittee 
of the Whole House although his name is not recorded in the 
441 
Commons Journals as among the witnesses. He drafted the 
Lancaster merchanna2petition for the Free Ports Act and was 
the first signatory. At this time he was cooperating very 
443 
closely with Burke and appears to have been active in the. 
campaign to conciliate Pitt. He was the "very respectable 
member of Lancaster" who went with Burke to visit Pitt at 
444 
Hayes. It would thus seem that Trecothick's part at the 
438. See The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793 
Vol. II, by Vincent T"Harlow, London 1964 pp. 281-282. 
Sav&dge 2- cit. p. 262 et -sea and above p. 427. 
439. See W. 1Y" 1"" R1-599 Dowdeswell, to Rockingham 14 April 1766. 
Heywood was a Manchester merchant who was cooperating 
closely with Rawlinson. These proposals appear to have 
been incorporated in the agreement of the West Indian acid North American merchants of 10 March 1766. Cf. B. 11. Add. -. ' Mss. 33030 f200. 
440. Y'W. W . M. R39-3. 
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time of the Stamp Act Crisis had now been taken over by 
Rawlinson. Ravilinson, in much the same way as Trecothick, 
445 
became a loyal adherent of the Rockingham Whigs. If, as 
Fothergill suggested, the Free Ports scheme was almost a 
personal plan of Rawlinson's much weight is lent to Dr. 
Sutherland's contentions on the strength of the mercantile 
influence in the latter months of the Rockingham administration. 
However, as Mrs. Armytage makes clear the Free Ports scheme 
446 
was no new idea in 1766. 
Rawlinson does not seem to have been entirely satisfied 
with what was achieved and on 23 March 1767 he wrote to 
Burke a long letter criticising in detail the measures he 
had helped to achieve. As a criticism of the measures of 
the first Rockingham administration by a merchant this letter 
is significant. Rawlinson wrote 
"I am highly obliged by your kind letter of the 31st 
Jan(uar)y last; and you should not have been all this 
time without my feeble reply, for your consideration, 
had not our friends been out of power, and thro' no 
other channel do I expect much regard to cormnerce, which 
makes me the more desirous to see them in administration 
again. 
It was not the taking off the duties on all foreign 
cotton that I particularly dissented from, although I 
might think and do still, that it would have been better 
had the Duties remained on Levant cotton.... in order 
441. Public Record Office, Treasury Papers, Ti, Bundle 435 f55 
rough notes of evidence. 
442. Ibid. Bundle 443, f50. 
/ý 443. W. W. M. Burke Letters 1-54 Rawlinson to Burke 11 May 1766,5G-c 
1-55 Rawlinson to Burke 23 May 1766. 
444. Burke Correspondence Vol. I, p. 251, Burke to O'Hara 23,24 
April 1766; Merchant Venturers Correspondence Bundle 
marked Letters 1754 - Bundle 10 Abraham Rawlinson to 
William Reeve 12 April 1766. Cf. above p. 426. 
445. See Ifl Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 254-255. 
446. Cf" Arrßytage off. cit. pp. 35-38. 
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to have enhanced the price here, and thereby prevented its tolgeneral use in Lancashire manufactures, where it has done a deal of harm, and will in future very likely do more as the Law now stands.... Had the duty 
continued, and a bounty on English plantation cotton been granted out of the Duty only, it would I think have had a good effect - these are my private sentiments only. 
What I principally dissented from and what worried 
me was taking off the prohibition that lay on all foreign 
cotton, from France, Holland &c which you know could 
not, by the Act of Navigation be imported on any terms 
before the first of July last and so far am I from being 
able to alter my sentiments that I can assure you the 
more I think of it, the more I am confirmed in my opinion 
that it will be found a very injudicious and pernicious 
clause, and probably the time is not very remote when 
you may be anxious to have it amended or repealed, as 
you were in the last session to procure this expected 
acquisitiorn, however this may be, I have the satisfaction 
to agree entirely with you in this principle that the 
supply of manufactures is the Same and that we ought 
not by any means to hazard the leading point; but here 
my dear Burke I fear your zeal for manufactures has 
carried you into a dangerous and unconstitutional 
importation wherein no Safety dwells.... " 
Rawlinson went on to point out the loss to colonial cotton 
growers as a result of cheap foreign cotton coming In and 447 
the loss to colonial merchants this involved. Rawlinson seems 
have been really concerned with gaining a good supply of 
cheap cotton for Lancashire and the Lancaster merchants. 
The letter shows the loyalty of Ravrlinson to the Rocking- 
ham Whigs but also the luke-warm nature of his support now 
the party was out of power. It acknowledges the debt of the 
commercial interest to the Rockingham administration and does 
448 
something to support Burke's claim on this score. it aloe 
shows that Rawlinson was a traditional mercantilist at heart 
447. W. W M. BKl-6J Kati'711nSOn TO burKe ; &3 riarcn 
448. See above p"3. 
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concerned with the position of the colonies as producers of 
raw material and the welfare of manufacturers and merchants 
in the mother country. Burke endorsed the letter 
"The narrow notions of a merchant - but praising the 
liberal and enlightened notions of the Rockingham 
administration on commercial matters in general. " 449 
Richard %Saitland was another merchant who . was active at the 
time. In a letter to Charles Tovrnshend he claimed that he 
had succeeded in obtaining the incorporation of a clause 
reducing the duty on foreign coffee and cocoa in the Act 450 
repealing certain duties in the American colonies. This 
provides another example of the personal influence of one 
merchant on legislation if it was only Maitland's 
influence 
which made the ministry incorporate the clause concerned. 
The methods and tactics used by the first Rockingham 
administration at the time of the passing of the Free Ports 
Act were comparable to those of the Stamp Act Crisis. In 
the later months of the ministry, however, there would seem 
to be some justification for the claim that the merchants had 
ceased to be the agents of the ministry and Igad become more 
responsible for the formulation of policy than the ministers 
themselves. 
449. VI. W. M. Bkl-69 Rawlinson to Burke 23 March 1767. 
450. See Townshend Papers William L. Clements Library, Richard 
Maitland to Charles Townshend 20 March 1767. 
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E. OTHER MEASURES. 
I have found little evidence to suggest that the merchants 
were active in pressing for the other major measures carried out 
by the first Rockingham administration or that there was any 
co-operation between the merchants and the ministry on these 
measures. There is, for instance, no evidence which I have 
discovered, suggesting that the merchants were active in workigg 
for the repeal of the Cider Duty, and there is little reason to 
suppose that they would have become involved in this measure 
since they were not really concerned when it was enacted. 
On 13 May 27666Rose Puller and. Sir William Baker acted as 
451 
intermediaries between the administration and John Wilkes at the 
time that the ministry wa'a taking up the question of general 
warrants. In view of Baker's previous advocacy of Wilkes he was 
an obvious choice for a mediator between Wilkes and the adminis- 
tration. Fuller seems to have adopted a similar attitude to Baker 
43 
on this question and this is perhaps why he was the other 
intermediary. Both seem to have acted for the administration 
rather than the mercantile classes. There is no particular reason 
why merchants should have been interested in this controversy nor 
in other measues besides those already discussed. Having faced 
4 dl. Almon, Anecdotes of the Life of the Right Honourable William 
f 
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Pitt etc. Vol IIj P. 67. 
460. See ' above pp-214-235. 
465. Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754 . 17900 Vol. II 
p. 479. 
449 
accusations of excessive mercantile pressure the administration 
would probably be anxious not to use their mercantile allies, 
if 
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further, and the merchants having achieved their aim were probably 
unwilling to meddle in political affairs which did not really 
concern them. r 
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CHAPTER X. 450 
THE END OP THE FIRST ROCXINGHAb2 ADMINISTRATION. 
Even while the Free Ports Bill was ubder consideration 
the Rockingham a dministration was tottering to its end. It 
had suffered its death-blow with the resignation of the Duke 
1 
of Grafton at the end of April 1766. When this resignation 
occurred Newcastle suggested a ministerial reshuffle whereby 
Conway would become Secretary of State for the Northern 
Department, Hardwicke Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department and Charles Townshend should be created a third 
2 
Secretary of State for America and the West Indies. Newcastle's 
idea seems to have been primarily tp placate the merchants 
for he wrote to Rockingham 
"No man in England understands it (America) so well, and 
consequently nobody would be so agreeable to those, 
who are particularly interested, in what relates 
either to the West Indies, or North America. " 3 
but he was also interested in gaining the support of the 
4 
brilliant Townshend for a weak administration. 
From the ministerial reshuffle, however, Townshend did 
not emerge as a third Secretary of State. He either declined 
the position when it was offered to him, or Rockingham, who 
does not appear to have been a strong supporter of the 
appointment, offered him the position in a half-hearted manner, 
ýý 
ýý 
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1. Brooke 22. . 
Lit. p. 1. 
2. See B. 1JI. Add. Mss. 32975 f89 Newcastle to Rockingham 6 May 1766 
Cf. Namier Charles Townshend p. 25, Namier and Brooke Charlees 
Townshend pp. 143-14493. 
B. M. Add. M ss. 32975 f89 Newcastle to Rockingham 6 May 1766 
quoted Namier and Brooke Charles Torwnshend p. 143. 4. B. M. Add" Mss, 32975 f104 Newcastle to Conway 7 May 1766. 
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5 
if at all. 
Newcastle, however, still seems to have been intent on 
shoring up the administration with mercantile support. On 26 
May 1766 he was suggesting a post for Rose Fuller at the Board 
6 
of Trade. It would seem that Newcastle was now endeavouring 
to use mercantile influence in any possible way to prop up a 
tottering ministry. If the merchants savr further commercial 
reforms in the offing as a result of such an appointment 
Newcastle no doubt believed they would use all their influence 
to help preserve the Rockingham administration in power. Yet 
Newcastle declined the invitation of Beeston Long and Rose 
Fuller to dine in the City on 19 June 1766 on the pretext of a 
prior engagement. The Rockingham Whigs do seem, however,. to 
have been well represented at the dinner by Admiral Keppel 
and Newcastle's absence does not seem to have created any 
7 
ill-feeling, his reluctance to attend functions of this nature 
8 
probably being known. 
After the fall of the administration Newcastle endeavoured 
to maintain the alliance with the mercantile class. Being 
absent from home when a deputation of London merchants 
trading to North America and the West Indies called on him 
to thank him for the commercial measures of the Rockingham 
5. See B. M. Add. rdss. 32975 f164 Rockingham to Newcastle 12 May 
1766. ibid. f207 Rockingham to Newcastle 18 May 1766, ibid. 
f225 Newcastle to the Bishop of Oxford 20 May 1766; 
Namier Charles Townshend p. 26 Namier and Brooke Charles 
Townshend pp. 143-144. 
6. B. M. Add. Biss. 32975 f276 Newcastle to Rockingham 26 May 1766. 
7" See B. A7. Add. biss. 32975 f400 Stephen Fuller to Newcastle 13 
June 1766, ibid. f416 Newcastle to Beeston Long 15 June 1766. ibid. f414 Albemarle to Newcastle 15 June 1766 
452 
administration on 16 August 1766 he wrote an apologetic letter 
to their leader, Barlow Trecothick, inviting them to come at 
9 
any time that was convenient to them. 
Perhaps the reception given to Newcastle and Rockingham 
when they returned to the provinces is indicative of the 
favourable attitude of the mercantile classes to the commercial 
measures of the first Rockingham administration. Firstly it 
should be noted that Newcastle made an almost triumphal entry 
10 
into Lewes, and Rockingham appears to have been received in 
a similar viay in Yorkshire. Two hundred citizens of York 
rode out to meet him and welcome him home and when he visited 
11 
York the bells were rung. It must be acknowledged that 
nUther York nor Lewes are good examples of eighteenth century 
mercantile towns and that both were the "home centres" for 
the respective leaders of the Rockingham Whigs- Such a 
reception was, however, exceptional and must be taken as 
evidence that the measures that the administration had taken 
ewer, Popular. 
There is however, more convincing evidence. Rockingham 
also received an address of thanks from the deputation of 
112 
London merchants which had called on him on 14 August 1766. 
7. (contd) ibid. f430 Beeston Long to Newcastle 17 June 1766, 
f462 Newcastle to Admiral Keppel 20 June 1766, 
8. See above p.: 406. 
9. B. M. Add" Mss" 32976 f417 Newcastle to Trecothick 14 August 
1766. The other merchants with Trecothick were Beeston 
Long, Capel Hanbury, John Moore, Samuel Vaughan and James Stuart. 
10. B. MI. Add. Mss. 32976 f460 Poalard to Newcastle 25 August 1766. 11. B. M. Add. - biss. 32976 f464 Newcastle to Grantham 26 August 1766. ibid. f466 Grantham to Newcastle 26 August 1766. Cf. Clark 
o],. cit. p. 46. Lloyds Evening Post August 20-22,27-29, Sept 1, Sept 3-5,8-10 1766. 
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Rockingham also received addresses of thanks from Hull, York, 
Halifax, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, Wakefield, Lancaster, 
13 
Bristol (Merchant Venturers) and Liverpool. 
These addresses are significant showing the popularity of 
the commercial rieasures of the first Rockingham administration. 
They point to the success the administration had achieved in 
co-operating with the merchants and the fact that the commer- 
cial interest, at least, felt that the legislation passed by 
Rockingham and his colleagues was successful in alleviating 
the slump in trade they had been suffering when the adminis- 
tration came to power. Although the considerable disillus- 
14 
ionment with Pitt for accepting a peerage at the time that 
the addresses were presented must be borne in mind and it 
must be acknowledged that the merchants, feeling that they 
had lost their influence, with one group might have been 
trying to consolidate it with another, the fact remains that 
as the administration was out of power there was little point 
in currying favour. The addresses must be interpreted, 
partly at least, as an expression of the spontaneous feeling 
of the commercial classes. Concerning this Hardwicke 
wrote to Mockingfamon 24 August 1766 
"I was much edified by the account in the papers of 
your reception in Yorkshire, with the address of the 
12. VMA, R59-244 Address of thanks of London merchants. On the 
address Rockingham has written" Barlow Trecothick, Capel 
Hanbury, Beeston Long, James Stuart, John Moore, Samuel 
Vaughan' as if they were the men who presented the address. See also p. 8. 
13.1 VLI. R58 and 59 B. M. Add. Mss. 32976 f490-5 Copies of the 
addresses with Rockingham'sreplies. 
14. Ibid. f488 Rockingham to Newcastle 29 August 1766. 
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manufacturers, &c. and had before read with pleasure 
the . hondsommv. e And well-merited compliment to your Lordship by the Committee of Merchants mit town upon 
your dismission from office. You are really beating the 
late Great Commoner at his own weapons, and receiving 
the eulogisms which his puffs have hitherto supposed 
that nobody was entitled to but himself. " 15 
Among the addresses there is a notable difference between 
those of the manufacturing and those of the more commercial, 
towns. It appears that in the manufacturing towns the 
Rockingham administration measures were. most appreciated for 
here a large proportion of the population had suffered from 
the slump caused by the Stamp Act Crisis, even if the merchants 
from the commercial towns were more vociferous and more influ- 
16 
ential. It is interesting to note that Rockingham wrote in 
a "Sketch of an answer to the Manchester Letter" 
"One of the most pleasing circumstances which attended 
my late situation was, that it brought me acquainted 
with many of the Gentlemen, for the Credit and their 
knowledge in Trade I shall always remember that 
circumstance with the highest satisfaction; and I hope 
I have had some advantage from it. " 17 
He also wrote 
"The advantages which in my former situation I enjoyed 
along with many others then in His Majesty's Service 
from the information on all commercial points which 
were brought or sent to us by gentlemen merchants from 
the differing i anufacturing parts of England. Our 
inclination for the welfare of our country would have 
been equally warm, but we might not have judged so well 
without those informations and I hope that all the 
gentlemen who so freely gave their attendance in London, 
15. WWM. R1-679 Hardwicke to Rockingham 24 August 1766 quoted 
Albemarle op. cit. Vol. II, p" 10. 
16. Cf. the addresses in B. M. Add. MMss. 32976 f490-5- 
17- WWMT. R59-27. 
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do not regret their trouble either from their reception 
there or the consequennes of their journey. " 18 
It would thus seem that Rockingham valued the support of the 
merchants and he was fully aware of this valuable, even if 
incalculable, force which had been introduced into his partyQ 
Moreover the alliance between the merchants and the 
Rockingham Whigs during the first Rockingham administration 
was producing its effect on the party, which had changed 
since the resignation of Newcastle in 1761. At first, under 
the leadership of Newcastle, unsure and hesitating steps had 
been taken to secure an alliance with the merchants but with 
Rockingham's rise to 'power and the coming of the Stamp Act 
Crisis the mercantile element had reached a position of impor- 
tance in the party. Newcastle and the older leaders still 
placed more emphasis on negotiation and manovre between 
political groups with influence in Parliament and the years 
until 1768 were to see a rearguard action fought to maintain 
Newcastle's system. Nor was the path of more popular support 
an easy one. It necessitated many years in the political 
wilderness and even to Rockingham the choice of support outside 
Parliament rather than alliance within cannot have been delib- 
erate. It was Rockingham's adherence to principle and his 
unwillingness to compromise with other political groups that 
forced him to look for a support that was more widely based 
19 
than alliance with another political faction. 
18. VWfM. R60 Draft of answer to the Manchester Merchant s" CF. WWM. Rl-674 Rockingham's answer to thelTanchestx ddress 
1766. 
19. Cf. Ritcheson off. cit. pp. 82-83,103-105. 
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CHAPTER XI. 
CT LE INTEREST; 
CT0I3PER 1768. 
A) JULY - NOVEMBER 1766 - THE BEGIrR: ING OF OPPOSITION. 
The first Rockingham administration had been seriously 
weakened at the end of April 1766 by the resignation of the 
1 
Duke of Grafton. In July 1766 when Northington resigned the 
Great Seal it received its death-blow and Rockingham felt 
that he would prefer to be out of office rather than continue 
12 as leader of the administration in its weakened state. 
His wishes were to be granted. On 12 July 1766 George 
3 
III began negotiating with Pitt to form a new administration 
and although at first it seemed that Pitt hoped to use the 
Rockingham administration as the basis of his own, and 
Newcastle hoped that Rockingham would be able to retain 
4 
office, it soon become clear that this was not to be the 
case. Although there were only three resignations within 
5 
the Cabinet there were six outside it and more significant 
still was the return to power of men who had served Grenville 
6 
but had opposed Rockingham 
The new administration was indutitably Pitts and not 
a strengthened Rockingham administration. 
I. See above P-450., , 
2" B. bi. Add. Mss" 32976 f19 Rockingham to Newcastle 6 July 1766. 
3. See Brooke off,. cit. pp. 4,7. 
4. B. M. Add" Tdss" 32975 f175 Newcastle to Rockingham 18 July 
1766, ibid. f175 Newcastle to Onslow 18 July 1766. 
5. Brooke op. cit. pp. 16-18. 
6. Ibid. pp" 18-19. 
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It had just sufficient of Rockingham's supporters in 
it to stop the old ministry going initially into opposition 
but the real planners of the policy of the Rockingham 
administration, Rockingham himself, Newcastle, Dowdeswell, 
Charles Yorke and Burke were without office and amongst 
these were the men who had chiefly been in control and 
co-operated with the merchants to secure the repeal of the 
Stamp Act, and the passing of the Free Ports Act and its 
corollaries. 
In spite of the small amount of real power remaining 
Nk 
to the Rockinghamites in the new administration, resignations 
were discouraged and no opposition to the ministry was 
planned. As early as 12 July 1766 Newcastle had mentioned 7 
to Rockingham the imprudence of a formal opposition, and 
on 3 August at a meeting of the leading Rockingham Whigs 
Newcastle urged that the party should remain closely united 8 
but not forwardly oppose the new administration. Rockingham 
7" W. w. M. R1-645 Newcastle to Rockingham 12 July 1766. Brooke 
22. cit. pp. 20-21; W. W. M. R1-685 Albemarle to Rockingham 31 
August 1766; Ibid. Rl-686 Newcastle to Rockingham 31 
August 1766. 
8. B. M. Add. Piss. 32976 f96 "A Narrative of what passed relating 
to the present change in the administration from the time 
His Majesty first acquainted His Ministers that he had 
sent for Mr. Pitt in several letters to Mr. John Vihite 
of Walling Wtlls Nottinghamshire" 11 July -4 August 1766. 
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.,, 
himself was anxious that his party should maintain "a good 
humoured correspondence" with their allies in the Chatham 
administration. He believed that Chatham would have to 
9 
lean on the Rockinghams for support in Parliament and that 
the real threat to the Rockingham Whigs and victory for 
10 
Chatham would come if divisions appeared in the party. 
Mr. Brooke states that the idea behind this policy of 
Rockingham and Newcastle was to maintain, within the Chatham 
administration, a group of Rockinghamites on which the 
ministry would be forced to'lean and who would enjoy all 
the advantages of office under Chatham whilst paying 
ýý 
i 
i 
i 
allegiance to Rockingham. He continues by observing that 1 
a call for resignations in July 1766 would have met with 
little response because Newcastle's friends had no desire to 
wander in the political wilderness again. Brooke criticizes 
Rockingham for not realising that because of self-interest 
when they were in power, the allegiance of those Rockinghamites 
9. Ibid. f489 Rockingham to Newcastle 29 August 1766. 
10. W. W. hi. Rl-682 Rockingham to Albermarle 29 August 1766, 
quoted Alheymarle pp. cit. Vo1. II, p. 13. 
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holding office in the Chatham administration would be given 
for the most part to Chatham and the King rather than to 
Rockingham, and the latter's policy was a sure way of 
11 
weakening his party. 
.a 
Winstanley, however, sees Rockingham's policy in pore 
favourable light. He questions whether opposition was 
opportune for on many issues the Rockinghamites agreed with 
the Chatham administration: systematic antagonism would lead 
to a charge of factious opposition, and they could not hope 
to prevail, outnumbered as they were, by supporters of the 
government. Any chance of success against the administration, 
Winstanley states, was dependent on an alliance with the 
Bedford Whigs and the supporters of George Grenville. On 
the basic issue of America the Rockinghamites had marked 
differences of opinion with these two groups for they had 
been responsible for the policy that led to the American 
Stamp Act and if in their desire for office the Bedford 
Whigs might be willing to relinquish their American policy 
12 
the Grenvilleites would certainly not. 
11. Brooke op. cit. pp. 21-23. 
12. See Lord Chatham and the'Whig Opposition by D. A. Winstanlejr 
Cambridge 1912 , pp-58-60. 
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It might also be added that there seems a strong possibility 
that his alliance with the mercantile classes prejudiced 
Rockingham in favour of support for the administration rather 
than opposition. He had gained mercantile support by reversing 
Grenville's policy and the merchants would be sure to look at 
alliance with the Redfords and Grenvilleites with suspicion 
if not with hostility. Moreover it had only been very recently 
that the Rockinghamites had weaned the merchants away from 
their adulation of Chatham, and Rockingham and his friends 
could not have been sure in August 1766 how the merchants were 
going to receive the new administration. As far as their 
alliance with the mercantile classes was concerned their 
support of the administration must have seemed a far better 
proposition than opposition and we cannot doubt that this 
was of influence. 
As Rockingham had retired to Wentworth in August 1766 
it was somewhat difficult for him to keep in touch with the 
leaders of the mercantile faction but he was still in touch 
13 
with provincial merchants and manufacturers. Newcastle, 
during the late summer and autumn of 1766 was in close contact 
with Trecothick and he was also endeavouring to cultivate the 
Rockinghamites other mercantile associates. Newcastle re- 
opened his correspondence with Trecothick by an enquiry about 
a letter of thanks for the commercial policy of the first 
Rockingham administration he had received from the Massachusetts 
13. See above p. ý 47). 
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Assembly, and through Trecothick he tried to make contact 
with Capel Hanbury. Newcastle was also trying to arrange that 
the North American and West Indian merchants committees should 
14 
visit hire. This correspondence between Trecothick and Newcastle 
is important for with the correspondence on the corn shortage 
15 
in September and November 1766 it provides practically the 
only evidence of the existence and work of the London American 
merchants committee after the end of the first Rockingham 
administration. 
On 17 and 18 September Newcastle wrote to Rockingham 
"I hear. the Ministers are puzzled about the exportation 
of Corn. If some method cannot be found to prevent it, 
before the Parliament meet, the consequences may be bad. " 
16 
In the same letter Newcastle requested that Rockingham send 
him a copy of his answer to the Address of the Liverpool 
merchants, and when Newcastle was summoned to a Privy Council 
meeting to discuss the shortage of corn on 24 September 1766 
he seems to have made some efforts to co-operate with Trecothick 
who with some other London merchants, was active in dealing 
17 
with this problem. The Cabinet Council laid an embargo on the 
14. See B. M. Add. Mss" 32977 f77 Newcastle to Trecothick 13 September 
1766; f83 Trecothick to Newcastle 15 September 1766; fill 
Newcastle to Trecothick 20 September 1766; f126 Trecothick 
to Newcastle 21 Se temhir 1766; f147 Trecothick to Newcastle 
'Tuesday evening' 
(23 
September 1766); f238 Newcastle to 
Trecothick 11 October 1766. 
15. See below PP. 461-2nd n. 17. 
16. W. W. M. R1-694 Newcastle to Rockingham 17 and 18 September 1766. 
17. B. b7. Add. Mss. 32977 fill Newcastle to Trecothick 20 September 
1766; f147 Trecothick to Newcastle 'Tuesday Evening' (23 
September 1766); f169 Newcastle to White 27 September 1766. 
The London merchants trading to North America came to an 
agreement to import corn cheaply from North America. See 
P. R. 0.30/8 Chatham Papers Bundle 54 Trecothick to Chatham 
11 November 1766. Cf. my Barlow Trecothick etc p. 55. 
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18 
exportation of corn to alleviate t---e shortage, and this measure 
met with the approval of the various morcantile bodies 
19 
including the London merchants who had petitioned for it. 
Newcastle's assiduity in preserving contact with the 
mercantile element was seen again early in October 1766. On 
11 October 1766 he wrote to Trecothick asking him to come to 
see him on Sunday 12 October in order to discuss a candidate 
who would stand for Shoreham in the next Parliamentary 
election. Newcastle's motive in writing to Tracothick was 
that he wanted a wealthy merchant to stand for the borough and 
Trecothick'had been offered the seat in September 1765 but 
20 
had declined it. Trecothick, by this time, one may assume, was 
regarded by Newcastle at least, as the leader of the mercantile 
supporters of the Rockingham Whigs and this was probably a 
tactic to strengthen the mercantile support of the party. 
Perhaps Newcastle hoped that Trecothick would now consent to 
stand for Shoreham and enter Parliament for a Newcastle borough, 
thus cementing the alliance between him and Trecothick. 
Although there is no evidence that the proposed conference 
with Trecothick took place, there is no evidence to the 
contrary and one may assume it did. Eventually the merchant 
Peregrine Cust was elected for New Shoreham in 1768 and he 
was possibly Trecothick's recommendation, but he never appears 
18. B. I. E. Add" Pdss. 32977 f160 Newcastle to Grantham 25 September 
1766. 
19. Ibid. f169 Newcastle to White 27 September 1766. 
20. Ibid. f238 Newcastle to Trecothick 11 October 1766. For 
Trecothick and the Shoreham election in September 1765 
see above P. 304. 
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21 
to have been a great supporter of the Rockingham Whigs. 
Following this at the beginning of November 1766 Newcastle 
appears to have seized on some temporary distress in the 
hosiery trade at Nottingham and to have been seeking as much 
information about it as he could. He endeavoured to interview 
22 
a Nottingham hosiery manufacturer, Abel Smith, on the matter. 
Whether Newcastle was genuinely interested in the hosiery 
trade or strv in this merchant a further opportunity to extend 
the commercial and industrial contacts of the Rockingham Whigs 
is not clear. 
Another member of the first Rockingham administration 
who was in contact with the industrial element at this time 
was William Dowdeswell. He appears to have written to Charles 
Townshend in October 1766 introducing some glass manufacturers 
to the new Chancellor of the Exchequer who expressed his 
23 
willingness to see them. 17hether Townshend ever saw the glass 
manufacturers and whether this introduction bears any relation- 
ship to the fact that glass imported into the American Colonies 
was one of the articles taxed in the Townshend Revenue Act 
of 1767 I have been unable to discover. 
The spirit of opposition was now, however, beginning to 
rise among Rockingham' s followers. There was some movement 
for a revival of Wildman's club for in a letter to Rockingham 
24 
on 9 November, Newcastle enclosed a letter to himself from 
21. Ibid. f388 Newcastle to Sir Samuel Cornish 14 November 1766. 
Cr. Namier, England in the Ade etc pp. l? 4,193,252,305" 
Cf. Namier and Brooke The House of Com pons, Vol. II, p" 292. 
22" B. t'. Add. Mss" 32977 f327 Sir Edward {ilmot to Newcastle 5 
November 1767 and X329 enclosure on hosiery trade; 
B. PM. Add. Mss. 3307 f91 Abel Smith to Newcastle 27 November 1766 
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George Onslow written on 7 November in which Onslow wrote 
"I dined yesterday at our new club where we had a very 
good company, Geo and John Cavendish, Sir G"Colebrooke, 
Tom Walpole (who bye the bye toasted Lord Rockingham) 
Gilmore, T. Townshend, Baker, Rose Fuller, who will be 
with us, Fitzroy and 2 or 3 more. " 25 
It is to be noted that four of the members present had strong 
connections with finance and trade. 
On 6 November Albe/marle had written to Newcastle 
"I know nothing of the Marquis's notions, I saw him for 
a day or two at Newmarket but I don't know what his 
politics are. I hope and believe he means to be quiet, 
as to opposition it is a most ridiculous thought if it 
is in the head of anybody. I am so strongly averse to 
it myself, that I have long determined never to oppose 
again. " 26 
But by the middle of November 1766 Rockingham seems to have 
begun to think. that the policy of supporting the Chatham 
administration was not paying many dividends. When on 17 
November Lord Edgcpmbe was dismissed from his post of Treasurer 
of the Household and Conway disagreed with Chatham over the 
dismissal, Rockingham either perceived his opportunity or felt 
sufficiently strongly about the dismissal of Edgcombe to 
believe that action, was necessary. 
On 19 November a meeting of the most important Rockingham 
22. (contd) Although Newcastle had local interests there is no 
reason to suppose that his interest was influenced by 
these on this occasion. 
23. See Charles Townshend to Dowdeswell 25 October 1766, 
Dowdeswell Papers, William L. Clements Library. The letter 
gives no indication where these glass manufacturers worked. 
24. See W. W M" R1-702 Newcastle to Rockingham 9 November 1766. 
25. Ibid. Rl-704 George Onslovr to Newcastle 7 November 1766. I 
have found no further evidence on the revival of Wildman' S. 
26. B. Id. Add. Uss" 32977 f332 Albermarle to Newcastle 6 November 
1766. 
27. Brooke 21!. cit. pp. 51-55. For Conway' s disapproval of the dismissal see tiff. W. M. R1-709 Rockingham to Scarborough 20 
November 1766. 
!.! 
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28 
Whigs was held at Rockingham's house in Grosvenor Square. At 
this meeting it was decided 
"That something must be done to show spirit, to keep our 
friends together, and to encourage dir. Conway to persist 
in the good disposition he was in at present, that if 
nothing was done the party and all the friends of the 
late administration would be weeded out by degrees, our 
friends angry and discouraged and everything left to 
the arbitrary dispositions of my Lord Chatham. " 
As a result of this it was decided that the Duke of 
Portland, the Earl of Scarboroughi Lord Bessborough and Lord 
Monson should resign Thom the administration and " further 
29 
resignations in-the House of Commons might follow afterwards". 
Rockingham explained the idea to Scarborough in these words 
"My reasoning was that we could not in honour to our 
Friends suffer them to be removed one by one - without 
showing resentment - that those in and those already 
removed and all standers by would say in truth that we 
abandoned the Party to Ld. Chatham's mercy - who from 
this and the preceeding circumstances did not show the 
least favourable intention. That the Corps must keep 
together and that all our struggles for the last four 
or five years would be thrown away in regard to the 
material object of being the check to Ld. Bute. 
That I thought all interested or necessitous men 
would fly more and more to (en)list in Ld. Bute' s corps 
under a protection that stood all the various changes 
of administration and that perhaps some who were niether 
interested nor necessitous - but irritated by Ld. 
Chatham would from their resentment to him adopt any- 
thing which might lead to satisfy their revenge. " 30 
The general idea behind this plan was to force Coirvay to 
28. For the precise place where this meeting was held see 
Brooke op. cit. p. 55, n. 1. Rockingham says the meeting took 
place in George Onslow's house in Curzon Street. See 
WW. M. RL GO Rockingham to Scarborough 20 November 1766. 
29. B. Tai. Add. lass. 32978 ffl-5 "A Short Narrative of what passed 
at my Lord Rockingham's on Wednesday the 19th of November 
1766" Cf" Brooke 21.2-Pit-PP-55-56. 
30. V'd. W. M. R1-709 Rockingham to Lord Scarborough 20 November 1766 
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resign out of loyalty to the Rockinghams, and it was thought 
that if he did the administration would fall immediately as 
31 
Chatham would be left without a leader in the Commons. 
Rockingham thus hoped tp preserve the party and its loyalty 
to himself and possibly to get himself back into power again. 
In fact only three Commoners, Sir William Meredith, Sir Charles 
Saunders and Admiral Keppel resigned and Conway after vacillating 
32 
for some time did not. Newcastle was not in favour of this 
policy as he thought that it would not force Chatham to resign 
nor would Rockingham be able to provide an alternative admin- 
33 
istration with the forces at his disposal if Chatham did. 
Ritcheson sees in this incident an attempt by Chatham, 
(who was annoyed because Dowdeswell and Burke had supported 
Grenville's plan for the necessity of a bill of indemnity to 
excuse those involved in the grain embargo)to break old Whig 
cohesion and drive them out of power. He states 
"The mass exit of the Old Whigs, binding its members in 
common adversary, saved that party from dis Mution. 
They were to wait long in the wilderness but they would 
live to fight another day. " 34 
it is nowhere recorded that either Rockingham or Newcastle 
gave any consideration to their mercantile adherents while 
31. Ibid. pp. 54-61 Winstanley o2" cit. 75-86" Cf. W. W. M. R1-709 
Rockingham to Scarborough 20 November 1766. 
32. Brooke op. cit. pp. 57-61. For the resignations see also 
Albe/marle op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 19-29. 
33. B. Mq. Add. lese. 32978 f35 Newcastle to Bcssborough 22 November 
1766; f52 Newcastle to Portland 24 November 1766; By 5 
December 1766 Newcastle had, however, changed his mind 
about the policy see ibid f185 Newcastle to Rockingham 5 
December 1766, although this may have been purely to 
preserve the uns. n3btityfo%the= päyty. 
34. Ritcheson 
. 
92. cit.. p. 77. 
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executing the policy of resignation. Yet this was an important 
event as far as the mercantile supporters of the Rockingham 
party were concerned for Mr. Brooke writes 
"On November 25,1766 on the motion for a committee to 
inquire into the state of the East India Company, the 
Rockinghams voted for the first time against Chathan's 
Administration, and thus began a period of opposition 
which ended only with the fall of Lord North in 1782"" 
35 
This statement needs qualification. The Newcastle Correspon- 
dence shows that there was no definite intention on 25 November 
36 
of organising opposition to a government measure. Indeed, many 
of the Rockinghams either abstained or voted with the adminis- 
tration. Onslow reported the debate to Newcastle as follows; 
"Burke openly and roundly opened the opposition and 
was supported by G. Grenville and the Bedford people 
equally. Charles Yorke was warm and thorough in his 
oppositions. Lord John (Cavendish) spoke and Dorrdeswell 
strongly against the question, the former with infinite 
respect to Conway and indeed to all of his old friends 
he was likely to differ with. Conway and Charles 
Townshend took their part as strongly in favour of the 
question. The Butes acted exactly as they did last 
year. There went with Dowdeswell only the Cavendishes, 
Beauclerk, VYalsingham, Plvmer, F. Montague and Jack White. 
Sir VI" M eredith went away, I hear disapproving of the 
opposition. Fitzherbert, Rose Fuller and everybody else 
with us. So the opposition your Grace observes consists 
of the Grenvilles, the Bedfords and to any real sorrow 
those old friends I have mentioned, assisted by Mr. 
Yorke-" 37 
35. Brooke op. cit. p. 61. 
36. B. M. Add. Mss" 32978 f62 Newcastle to Rockingham 25 November 
1766; ibid f74 Rockingham to Newcastle 26 November 1766; 
ibid. f76 Newcastle to Rockingham 26 November 1766; ibid 
f84 Albe/marle to Newcastle 26 November 1766. 
37. Ibid. f86 Onslow to Newcastle 26 November 1766. Onslow a 
faithful adherent of Newcastle held office in the admin- 
istration, voted for the motion and appeared very sorrowful 
about voting against the Rockingham Whigs. 
468 
Even if, however, the opposition by the Rockinghamites 
to the Chatham administration cannot be dated specifically 
from 25 November, from this time it began to crystallise and 
by the end of the year it was quite clear that the Rockinghar: - 
ites were in opposition to the Chatham administration. 
This event was of supreme importance to the mercantile 
section of the party. For the first time they were faced 
with the choice of supporting opposition or administration, 
and that administration was led at the end of 1766 nominally 
by Chatham, the former idol of the merchants. The Rockinghams 
had gained their mercantile following when they had been in 
power, now they had lost all semblance of power could they 
maintain it ? The merchant's natural proclivity was to 
support administration for he obtained government contracts. 
Moreover petitions from industrial towns were more likely to 
get a sympathic hearing if the men who bore them supported 
administration. It would thus seem that the events of 
more 
November 1766 were of/profound importance to the Rockingham 
Whigs and their mercantile supporters than the fall of the 
first Rockingham administration had been. For the first 
time the merchants' loyalty was being tested. For the first 
time they were faced with a choice. Was the alleglince 
of Rockinghams mercantile following stronger to administration 
and the'"plums" it could offer than its allegiance to a 
political party ? The test that this mercantile following 
was to undergo was to be long and hard for the Rockinghams 
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did not again achieve office until 1782. In these fifteen 
years its personnel varied considerably. Many merchants, 
38 
including Trecothick the leader in 1766 
,q 
had died before 1782. 
Some remained loyal but many despaired and defected to admin- 
istration particu' rly in the hard years on the eve of the 
War of American Independence when the Rockingham Whigs 
appeared to have no chance of returning to power. When, 
however, the Rockinghams seemed near success in overthrowing 
the ministry and as disaster followed disaster during the 
war, many merchants came over to the Rockinghams. 
The death of Newcastle in 1768 was a real dividing line 
in this process. It ended finally the image of the Rockinghams 
as a party with a tradition of power. It also ended the link 
of the party with government financiers and Rockingham was 
left with p nn]. jt_tbbl; imjje mercantile support he had 
gained during the Stamp Act Crisis. The_years 1766-68 saw 
also the weakening of Newcastle's link with government finance 
and Rockingham's continued apprenticeship as a party leader. 
During the last two years of Newcastle's life, Rockingham 
learned much from him in patience and assiduity that was to 
make it possible for him to develop the Rockingham Whigs 
as a coherent political party in the years after Newcastle's 
39 
death. 
38. Trecothick who died in 1774 had continued to lead the 
mercantile section of the Rockingham Whigs, particularly in the City of London until that time. 
39. Guttridge off. cit. p. 25 et passim. 
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(B) NOVEMBER 1766 - JULY 1767 - THE EAST IIIDIA COT: 'IPANY& 
FNODUT_RY. DOV)D] SWELL S MOTION FOR T1U REDUCTION OP T 
During the Parliamentary session 1766-1767 there were 
': ý 
three main issues, which affected the Rockingham Vhigs and 
their relations with their mercantile associates. These 
issues were the enquiry into the affairs of the East India 
Company, Dowdeswell's motion for the reduction of the Land 
Tax to three shillings in the pound on 27 February 1767, and 
America, which came to the forefront of politics again with 
New York's resistance to the Mutiny and Quartering Acts and 
the passing of the Townshend Duties in May and June 1767. 
Although these topics were interwoven and were to some extent 
being debated in Parliament concurrently, for the cake of 
clarity it is easier to deal with the Parliamentary session 
1766-67 by topic rather than chronologically. 
By 25 November 1766 when the Rockinghams had for the most 
part voted against Beckf'ord's motion to enquire into the East 
India Company, Parliament was becoming preoccupied with that 
40 
subject. The lack of complete unanimity among the Rockingham- 
ites on this occasion may be explained by their differing 
interests in the East India Company. Few of the leading 
Rockinghamites had strong links with the Company at this time 
although some were in the process of acquiring týým" That 
40. For a detailed examination of this enquiry see Sutherland 
FZ4t India Comparýy pp-147-176. See also Brooke 
, 
op. cit. pp 
72-79,87-91 et assim ; Vinstanley op. cit. pp. 92-105,125-127. 
41. See Sutherland op. cit. p. 143, Brooke ýF-cit. p. 75. 
.. 1 
471 
the path they were to follow was not a clear cut one is 
demonstrated by a letter Newcastle wrote to Rockingham on 22 
November 1766 enquiring why line the Rockingharnites intended 
42 
to adopt towards Beckford's motion. At this stage it was not 
obvious that the motion was likely to challenge any Whig 
principle or arouse any question of consistency with their 
former actions. 
Rockingham at first seemed chiefly concerned with 
Parliamentary tactics and opportunities to harass the Chatham 
administration. On 8 December he wrote to Newcastle 
"The East India affairs come on tomorrow, the list of 
papers which Beckford will call for is expected to 
contain many improper to be laid before the public. I 
saw Mr. Yorke this morning, Mr. Dowdeswell dined with me 
and I am clear (if the administration persist to back 
Beckford)that good matter for debate and division will 
arise-" 43 
Newcastle, who seems to have been more aware of the importance 
of mercantile support wrote in his reply 
"As far as relates to publick measures, and behaviour in 
Parliament, I am persuaded that will be such, as will 
be agreeable to the best part of the motion; but what I 
mean, is, more particular attention to connections and 
,, 
, ý`' 
42. B. M. Add. Mss" 32978 f62 Newcastle to Rockingham 25 November 
1766. Mr. Bnnoke (op. cit. p. 75) accounts for Newcastle's 
enquiry by saying that as Newcastle's supporters had de- 
clined in numbers and influence in the House of Commons 
he was not always consulted by Rockingham on questions of 
policy. This does not, however, seem to have been the 
case ofl this occasion not have I discovered any example 
of Rockingham organising measures in the House of Commons 
without consulting Newcastle up to this time. When, 
Rockingham did not inform or consult Newcastle it was 
because he himself had not done anything about the measure. 
See for instance the question of resignations of the 
Rockingham Whigs towards the end of 1766. B. M. Add" hiss. 
32978 ff152-192 assim. 
43. Ibid"f222 Rockingham to Newcastle 8 December 1766. 
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interests, in the several parts of the United Kingdom. ' 
That, I think, more material to the permanent interest 
of the country, and the real support of the Whig cause 
than any immediate Act that can possibly be undertaken 
at present. " 44 
None of the merchants who figured so prominently at the time 
of the Stamp Act Crisis appear in the Rockingham and Newcastle 
correspondence at this time except Rose Fuller, who had voted 
45 
with the administration on 25 November 1766. Newcastle wrote 
to Fuller on 12 December and re$uested to see him, and although 
East India affairs were not mentioned one cannot doubt that 
this would be one of the topics Newcastle would have liked 
46 
to discuss. Fuller, however, could not or did not wish to 
47 
see Newcastle, who had by this time become convinced that the 
enquiry into the East India Company was not a good thing for 
he wrote 
"I am fully convinced upon the most mature' consideration 
that the general enquiry into the present state of a 
great Company, acting under a legal charter, without 
any fact alledged, or the least complaint made, is of 
most dangerous consequence, and will greatly offend 
credit in general, and the legal property of all 
concerned in the funds. " 48 
When Beckford continued the enquiry on 9 December 1766 by 
calling for various papers, however, there was still little 
unanimity among the Rockingham Whigs and very few of them 
49 
appear to have voted against the measure. 
44. Ibid. f241 Newcastle to Rockingham 9 December 1766. 
45. Ibid. f86 Onslow to Newcastle 26 November 1766. See above 
P. 467-puller had apparently fairly strong affiliations 
with Grafton and the administration as well as with 
46. Newcastle. 
46. Ibid. f370 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 16 December 1766- 
47. Ibid. f394 Fuller to Newcastle 17 December 1766. 
48. Ibid. f244 Newcastle to Lord Viscount Gage 9 December 1766. 
49. Ibid. f264 Onslow to Newcastle "Wednesday morning" (10 
December 1766) 
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On 17 December 1766 Newcastle had a discussion with 
Rockingham and found that by this time Rockingham was whole- 
heartedly against the measure. Newcastle also at this time 
seems to have expressed considerable surprise at the behaviour 
of some of his mercantile contacts for he wrote after the 
meeting 
"I found My Lord Rockingham very clearly of opinion 
against this enquiry into the affairs of the East India 
Company; and indeed nobody can be more so (especially 
as to the manner of doing it) than myself; as I think, 
publick credit, (especially in Companies, acting under 
the law, and Legal Charters) must be affected by it, 
and I an, amazed to see some of the principal persons 
in the City - who are so good judges of Trade and Credit 
and are themselves such honest and discerning men,. 
should have hitherto -- concurred in the measure taken 
for this enquiry. But I am persuaded they will soon see 
the great inconvenience of going farther. But the 
conduct of our friends, upon this point, must depend 
upon the particular measures which shall be proposed 
by the administration. " 50 
The key to the reaction of the mercantile supporters of the 
Rockingham Whigs probably lies in this last sentence. Receiving 
no leadership from Rockingham or Newcastle the various merchants 
responded as each particular measure affected their interests, 
for as Dr. Sutherland has stated the Rockingham Whigs had no 
established links with the East India Company. Although they 
had contact with men on both sides of the party war within the 
Company they were more closely connected with the opposition 
to the Directors than with the Director 
51 
Dr. Sutherland 
50. Ibid. f401-402. "A Short Account of what passed yesterday 
with the Marquis of Rockingham, Lord Bessborough and Myself" 
18 December 1766. 
51. Sutherland oD. cit. p. 135. At this time the struggle within 
the East India Company was a struggle between Clive and the 
Directors and Lawrence Sulivan who was opposing Clive's 
474 
concludes 
"Their intervention is significant not because of any- 
thing which it achieved at the time, but because the 
line they took in these years determined their East 
India policy in the future, and because such men as 
Burke and the Duke of Richmoa4 gained their first 
interest in East India affairs while opposing the 
Government's intervention at this time. " 52 
Just as the American policy of the Rockingham Whigs had 
emerged in a pragmatic way at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis 
now another aspect of their policy was emerging. The mercan- 
tile following of the party now knew the "party line" on 
Eatt India affairs just as they knew it on American- affairs, 
and this was to have considerable influence later on the 
strength and membership of their mercantile following- 
The first real intervention of the government in the 
eighteenth century into the affairs of the East India Company 
had another important result as far as the mercantile following 
of the Rockingham Whigs was concerned. It created a third 
pressure group among the merchants for now, as well as the 
, West India group and the American group, 
there was a group 
of merchants whose interests could run directly counter to 
the other two and had to be recioned with. Prior to 
1767 this group had hardly existed at all but Rockingham 
51. contd administration of the affairs of the Company in India. ! 
Although Rockingham had no friendship for Sulivan, through 
the Burkes and their patron Lord VejAey, the Rockingham 
Whigs came in contact with the speculative interests 
supporting Sulivan and through George Dempster M. P. a 
staunch Rockingham Whig they carte into contact with John 
Johnstone and his supporters who were also supporting 
Sul"i, van. This-support was not unqualified, however, for i. 
ý 
in-the Company elections of 1767 the Rockinghams supported theNDirectors. (Sutherland op. cit. P. 155) 52. Sutherland 
, 
o_. cit. pp. 155-6. 
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and his colleagues tigere to find increasingly in the succeeding 
years that they were a force to be reckoned with. From 1767 
the East India Group could rival the powerful West India Group 
and the "more loosely related group of persons with interest, 
53 
direct or indirect, in the American trade 
If Rockingham and his colleagues could not secure any 
real agreement as to the policy to be pursued towards the 
East India Company neither could the administration, and 
not 
having called for the papers(which would/involve either those 
for the Company or those against in any difficulty)the enquiry 
54 
was adjourned until 22 January 1767. In late November and 
December 1766 for the first time, the Rockingham Whigs appear 
to have begun a negotiation with the groups supporting the 
Duke of Bedford and George Grenville in an attempt to make 
55 
an alliance, to overthrow the administration. The negotiation 
appears to have been opened by Lord Lyttleton, a supporter 
of Grenville. The Earl of Bessborough and Newcastle became 
particular advocates of the scheme after it was known that 
Chatham's negotiations with the Bedford Whigs had broken down 
56 
early in December 1766. Lyttleton, however, had apparently 
57 
negotiated without his chief's consent and when it looked as 
'N 
if the Rockinghamites would have to make the first real approach 
so nary of the other leading Rockingham Whigs were against the 
53. "The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics 
by L. S. Sutherland, Economic History Review Vol. XVII, No. l, " 
London 1947 , p-23- 
54. Brooke op. c it. pp. 76-79. 
55. Ibid. pp"79-87.56. Ibid. pp. 81-84.57. Ibid. p. 82. 
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58 
alliance that nothing further came of the negotiations-No 
thought of the effect of an alliance with the Bedford and 
Grenville Whigs upon the mercantile following whose support 
they had deemed so invaluable at the time of the Stamp Act 
Crisis appears to have occurred to any of the leaders of the 
Rockingham Whigs at this time. Rockingham's chief objection 
to the alliance was that when Lord Lyttleton had approacYjiä 
him he had stipulated the Treasury for either Earl Temple or 
Grenville. This would be contrary to Rockingham's principles, 
as his first administration had acted in direct opposition 
59 
to Grenville' s measures when he was at the Treasury. The 
only merchant who appears to have been in contact with the 
Rockingham Whigs at this time was Rose Fuller, who was in 
contact with Newcastle purely on Sussex election business 
more in the role of a country gentleman than as a mercantile 
60 
supporters 
On 1 February 1767 Newcastle ýý , ýaý: t '"ýriý: :^t. one 
of his merchnfiile supporters in Parliament with the death of 
61 
John Thomlinson. (Junior). 
bä. Ib 1ci. PP. ä6-b'(- 
59. Ibid. pp. 82,85. Cf. B. U. Add. Liss. 32978 ff398-402. "A Short 
Account of what passed yesterday with the Marquis of 
Rockingham, Lord Bessborough and Myself" 18 December 1766. 
For Rockingham's handling of these negotiations see 
W. 7W. Psi. Rl-743 Rockingham to Dowdeswell 8 January 1767. 
60. See B. M. Add" Ialss" 32978 f370 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 16 
December 1766; f394 Rose Fuller to Newcastle 17 December 
1766; f414 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 19 December 1766; f426 
Rose Puller to Newcastle 19 December 1766; f500 Newcastle 
to Rose Fuller 28 December 1766; B. 1d. Add. Mss" 32979 f156 
John Norris to Newcastle 9 January 1767; f176 Rose Fuller 
to Newcastleý10 January -1767; f329 Newcastle to Rose Fuller 25 January 1767. Cf W'Y. W. M. R1-734 Newcastle to 
Rockingham 16 December 1766. 
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Although Thomlinson' s father had been an influential American 
merchant and partner of Trecothick, dig son never seems to 
have been a, 9 influential and does not appear to have been 
62 
consulted by Newcastle who wished William Baker's son to take 
63 
up Thomlinson's position as member for Steyning when he died. 
Sir William Baker dined with Newcastle on 3 February 1767. 
Burke also seems to have been present at the meeting and it 
64 
is probable that East India Company affairs were discussed. 
Newcastle had in any case discussed the affairs of the East 
India Company with Baker by 31 January 1767. 
With Chatham's withdrawal from politics at the beginning 
of 1767 thegnquiry into the affairs of the East India Company 
became a "damp squib" and after long and protracted negotia- 
tions between the company and administration a temporary 
settlement, for two years, was reached; in May and June 17671 
by which the Company was to pay the government the sum of 
X00,000 annually and a statutory limitation to shareholders 
65 
dividends at 10% was declared. 
: _ý. . "-_*h 
By, the end of December 1766 the Rockingham Whigs 
61" B. M. Add. Mss"32980 f5 Newcastle to John Butler 1 February 176%1 
62. For the Thomlonsons see my Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 23-24, 
35; See also Namier England in the Age etc passim. Judd 
oa. cit. p. 356 has omitted John Thomlinson senior) from 
his list of members. 
63. B. M. Add" Mss. 32980 fl2 Newcastle to Thomas Pelham 2 February 
1767. 
64. B. ). 2. Add. Mss" 32979 f411 Newcastle to Sir Matthew Fea-ther- 
stonhaugh 31 January 1767; B. M. Add. Biss. 32980 f16 John 
White to Newcastle 2 February 1767. Baker was probably 
reckoned by Newcastle to be an expert on East India 
Company affairs for he had possessed in the past much influence in the company. See Sutherland off. cit. p. 19 n. 2. 65. See Brooke or. cit. p. 133; Sutherland op. cit. pp. 157-176; 
Winst nley op. cit. pp. 125-127. 
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66 
had evolved a general policy of opposition to the enquiry. 
When, however, steps were taken by administration early in 
1767 to pursue the enquiry in the House of Commons the opposi- 
tion made by the Rockingham Whigs was very desultory and half- 
hearted even though this was a topic on. which the Chatham 
administration, by no means united, could be acutely embar- 
67 
rassed. On 5 March 1767 the Rockingham Whigs did not even 
force the House of Commons to a division on the issue of the 
68 
printing of the papers already presented to the House. 
Awakening too late to their error on 9 March 1767 they 
tried to organise a strong opposition and ran the administra- 
tion close on the motion for the adjournment after the 
Company had presented a petition against the printing of 
69 
the Papers. On 14 April as a last effort Sir 17illiam Meredith 
moved to dissolve the committee and after a long debate the 
70 
motion was rejected by 213 votes to 157. After the Easter 
adjournment the Rockinghamites were unable in this session to 
press the administration hard in the House of Commons. 
66. See above pp" 471-475- 
67. See Brooke 2p. -pit-pp-99-133. 
. 68. Ibid. P. 
113. 
, 69. Ibid. p. 115" For the attempt, to organise opposition see B. M. Add. Liss"32980 f220 Rockingham to Newcastle 7 March 1767; 
ibid. f226 Newcastle to Rockingham 
.8 March 1767; ibid. f228 same to same 8 March 1767; ibid. f230 Newcastle to Lord 
Gage 8 March 1767; ibid. f232 Newcastle to Bartholomew 
Burton 8 March 1767; ibid. f234 Newcastle to James West 8 
March 1767; ibid. f236 Newcastle'to Thomas Pelham 8 March 
1767; ibid. f244 Newcastle to Matthew Fetherstonhaugh 8 
March 1767. 
70. Brooke op" cit. p. 136; Winstanley 22. cit. pp. 123-4" 
ý: 5 
f 
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The desultory nature of the opposition can be partly 
accounted for by Rockingham' s wooing of Conway and Tovwnshend 
to make them defect from the administration and thus bring it 
down. Their known opposition to the enquiry into the East 
India Company and the fact that they seemed likely to resign 
must have seemed a more hopeful possibility to Rockingham 
than organised parliamentary opposition, which necessitated 71 
co-ordination with the Bedford and Grenville Whigs. 
Other factors must, however, be taken into consideration. 
At the beginning of January 1767, Newcastle, although against 
72 
the enquiry thought that Charles Townshend= whom he still 
regarded as an ally, had the matter well under control. He 
wrote 
"I think I know enough myself to judge that the method 
the administration took, to bring it (the affairs of 
the East India Compare ) abruptly into the House of 
Commons without any plan laid, or any complaints made, 
or, as appeared without having had any intercourse, 
previously with the directors, either, as to the state 
of their affairs, or their ability or inclination, to 
assist the government, but only by way of menace, and 
force, was a most imprudent and offensive measure; and 
did give just alarm to trade, and trading companies. 
I hear now they have altered their method; and the 
friends of Lord Chatham give out, that they shall agree 
with the Company, get a million for the public, and 
carry all before them.... But what I want to know is, the 
real state of the fact, and what is right to be done, 
the power given to the Company by their Charter; the 
nature, and value of their acquaintance, and the right 
there may be in the public, to apply part of them to 
their advantage, and to make future regulations with 
regard to them. " 73 
71. Brooke off. cit. pp. 112-118.72., 
For Charles Townshend and this enquiry see Namier and Brooke 
Charles Townshend p. 160 et pea. 
73. B. M. Add. LZss" 32979 ff151-2 Newcastle to the Archbishop of 
York 9 January 1767. 
L 
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Thus Neti^rcastle, although bearing the trading interest in 
mind still felt that the government had a possible claim on 
what would without doubt be a useful revenue. Although this 
point of vied was not expressed by any of Newcastle's colleagues 
it might possibly have had some weight with them. Under 
74 
pressure, however, from Sir Matthew Fee'therstonhaugh and Sir 
William Baker whom he consulted on East India affairs, 
Newcastle seems, by the end of the month to have come round to 
accepting what was inevitably the point of view of those 
financially interested in the Company and there can be little 
doubt about it that he was at this time fSO111a 'ng,, '-, the 
opinions of the merchants. Newcastle had always stood for 
the great trading interests of Vito- kingdom and from them in 
the past he had gained much of his support. It was unlikely 
that he would change sides now and turn against them. By 8 
March 1767 Newcastle was echoing the sentiment of Sir Matthew 
75 
Feftherstonhaugh who was very much against the printing of the 
East India Company papers, remarking that the administration 
"had committed folly enough by calling for them. The 
contents of them will-be known full well as it is, both 
by the French and the Dutch, and we may live to see some 
fatal consequences arise as well to the Publick as 
private property from this intelligence: Commercial 
affairs should not thus be exposed; especially those 
of-so great moment as the E. India Company which the 
French and Dutch look upon with so much jealously. " 76 
74. Sir Matthew Feytherstonhaugh (1714-1774) M. P. 1755-1774, 
a large holder of East India shares. For him see Namier 
and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, pp. 422-423. 
75. B. M. Add. riss. 32979 f335 Matthew Fetherstonhaugh to 
Newcastle 25 January 1767. 
76. B. M. Add. Mss. 32980 f232 Newcastle to Bartholomew Burton 8 
March 1767. In correspondence about the division on 9 March 
against the printing of the papers, Newcastle almost 
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and Newcastle wrote to Bartholomew Burton 
"When this question comes to be debated, it is impossible 
for the House to be for it. To expose the state of 
the Company to our rivals there, the French and the 
Dutch, who will not fail to take their advantage of it; 
to make such a precedent, which, if it is carried will 
sooner or later, go thro' all the moneyed companies in 
the kingdom; and particularly the Bank, for the minister 
of the House of Commons (Beckford) it is well known, 
is an enemy to all companies, and for laying all trade 
open. I dread for the sake of the publick, all such 
bold proceedings, the consequence of which must be 
fatal to trade and commerce and to our credit. " 
If Newcastle thought all his mercantile followers would oppose 
the enquiry he was not entirely accurate in his assessment of 
mercantile opinion for some merchants voted against the 
Rockinghams on 9 March 1767, the most notable being Newcastle'o 
77 ... 
old ally Bartholomew Burton. 
,., 
After this Newcastle tried to 
78 
use Sir William Baker to win over Bartholomew Burton, at the 
same time keeping his finger on the pulse of mercantile feeling 
both in the House of Commons and at the meetings which the 
79 
East India Company were holding.. 
76" (contd) copied the words of Sir Matthew Fetherstonhaugh. 
See B. IVi. Add. L2ss" 32980 f226 Newcastle to Rockingham 8 March 
1767; f230 Newcastle to Lord Gage 8 March 1767; f232 
Newcastle to Bartholomew Burton 8 March 1767; f244 Newcastle 
to Sir Matthew Fetherstonhaugh 8 March 1767. 
77. B. M. Add. Mss 32980 f246 Portland to- Nevrcastle 9 March 1767; 
T248 West to Newcastle 9 March-1767 in which West writes 
"Ryder Burton Fonne'taux &c against us. Dundaßcs Major 
Henniker with us-" Although West appears to have been 
surprised that Burton voted against the Rockinghams, 
Newcastle had been suspicious of him formerly. (see above 
p. 169 ) and his allegiance to the government was probably 
strong as he was, a. Director of the Bank of England. For 
Burton see Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 
Vol-II,, P-164. Major and Henniker were merchants with 
affiliations to Grenville, the Ponnereaux as government financiers supported the administration in power. See Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, 
pp. 44x7-448.. 
78. B. 2JI. Add.. Iss" 32980 f137 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 1.2 
April 1767., 
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The defection of some mercantile allies is possibly the 
reason why, after spasmodic opposition in the House of Commons 
the Rockingham Whigs towards the end of the Parliamentary 
session carried on a relentless opposition in the House of 
80 
Lords to the proposed settlement of the Company's affairs. 
The need to tread warily because of Townshend,, jand Conway was 
now gone. What was now essential was a show of strength to 
rally the party supporters and to make quite clear the official 
policy or party line on this question. 
It would thus seem that the factors which influenced the 
behaviour of the Rockingham Whigs towards the East India 
Company in 1767 were threefold. Firstly, their opposition 
to the attempt by the government to deprive the Company of 
revenues conflicted with the Whig principle of the sanctity 
of property. The Charter of the East India Company was to 
them inuiölb'51efas it had been legally granted by Parliament. 
When in 1783 Burke supported Foxts India Bill he was at pains 
to distinguish between an attack on the actual charter and 
an attack on the East India Company which had abused the 
obligations and trust imposed on it, because the Charter by 
81 
conferring privileges also implied duties. Secondly it was 
79. B-11-Add-Mss-32980 f280 West to Newcastle 13 March 1767; 
f310 West to Newcastle 16 Larch 1767; f315 John Woodhouse 
to Portland 16 March 1767; (copy). At the general court oft 
the Company on 13 March 1767 West wrote (f280) of "a Mr. 
Baker a young lawyer of the Temple who spoke vehemently 
against the tyranny of an invisible minister, whom neither 
King, Parliament nor E"India Directors could obtain a 
sight of" This Mr. Baker was William Baker, Sir William 
Baker's son. See my Barlow Trecothick etc pp138-142 Ihro 80. Brooke op. cit. pp. 142-145. See also Rockinghamb Correspon- 
dence at the time W. i7. M. Rl-797 Richmond to Rockingham 12 June 1767; ibid R1-798 Hardwicke to Rockingham 16 June 1767; 
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convenient for t're Rockinghams to oppose the enquiry from 
the point of view of political tactics. They were moving more 
and more into opposition to Chatham, "fhe East India question 
was a convenient matter on which to oppose the administration 
and with which possibly to secure more resignations of their 
supporters. Finally any of their supporters, especially the 
mercantile element, who had any financial interest in the 
East India Company were bound to oppose the enqutty. It must, 
however, be admitted that this factor was of secondary import- 
ance judging from the evidence presented above. 
Having failed to capitalise on the dissension within the 
Ministry or the East India Company in late January and early 
February 1767 the Rockingham Whigs turned to the Land Tax as 
a subject which was likely to embarrass the administration. 
This topic appeared to be particularly useful as a motion 
for the reduction of the Land Tax could cause little differ- 
ence of opinion between the. Rockinghams3 the Bedfords and 
82 
the Grenvilles. 
The idea of taking one shilling off the Land Tax was 
83 
William Dowrdeswell's " 'Heo put it forward at a meeting on 11 
February 1767 with Rockingham, Hardvricke, Burke and Sir William 
84 
Baker. Baker's presence, at a meeting of this kind is unusual. 
60"(contd) Ibid. Rl-799 same to same 22'June 1767; ibid E1-800 
same to same 25 June 1767; ibid, R1-801 draft of a speech 
on the East India Bill by Rockingham (undated) 
81" Burke Works Vol. IV, p" 6 et sea. 
82. Brooke off. cit. pp. 103-16-5.. 
83" V7. Y1. M. Rl-747 Savile to Rockingham(undated) positively 
identifies Dovwdeswell as the author of the scheme. 
64. B. Li. Add" Mss" 35362 ff6l-62 Hardwicke to Yorke 11 February 
1767. Cf. Brooke Cit. pp. 105-106. 
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He was not normally present at meetings of the Rockingham 
Wigs where policy was formulated but this meeting may have 
85 
been to discuss the East India Company as well. Rockingham 
was an advocate of the scheme and corresponded with Sir George 
86 
Savile about it. Dowdeswell feared that if he did not trove 
the motion, George Grenville would and the former would lose 
too. The plans for the reduction of the Land Tax were perfected 
popularity. This argument seems to have affected Rockingham 
87 
at a further meeting at Rockingham's on 21 February 1767 at 88 
which Sir William Baker was again present. This suggests 
that he was representing that section of the party anxious 
for opposition. Newcastle's aid was obtained to secure his 
adherents votes for the measure and Rockingham also was 
89 
active in mustering support. 
Tax should be reduced to three shillings in the pound was 
90 
carried by 206 votes to 188. Mr. Brooke states that of the 
eighty English knights of the shire fifty voted for the 
91 
reduction of the Land Tax and only nine ggainst. It was this 
class that stood to benefit most from the reduction of the 
Land Tax and from whom the Rockinghamites could expect most 
On 27 February 1767 Dowdeswell's amendment that the Land 
support, and Dowdeswell seems to have been under considerable 
85. 
86. 
87. 
B. M. Add. Mss. 32980 f82 Newcastle to Rockingham 14 February 67. 
W. W. M. R1-747 Savile to Rockingham undated. In the Handbook 
of Correspondence of Charles 2nd tr'arguis of Rockingham 
National Register of Archives, 1959 p. 63 this letter is 
dated as January 1767. There is no evidence that the 
reduction of the Land Tax was planned in January 1767 and 
it would seem more likely to be about the middle of February. ' 
B. M. Add. t? ss" 35362 ff6l-62 Hardvricke to Yorke 11 February 
1767; , B. M. Add" Mss" 32980 ffl38-9 Rockingham to Newcastle 
21 February 1767. 
485 
local pressure from the Worcestershire country gentlemen he 
92 
represented. This measure was not likely to receive much 
mercantile support for a land tax that did not fall on property 
was most likely to fall on trade and in the City the financiers 
viewed the measure with suspicion and regarded it as against 
93 
the public interest. 
For the first time since the repeal of the Stamp Act the 
Rockingham Whigs had won an important division in the House of 
Commons and it is particularly interesting to note the way the 
merchants had voted, considering that this was not likely to 
be a measure of great popularity with them. In the Division 
List in the Newcastle Papers under the heading "Friends of the 
Late Administration" it is recorded that two of Newcastle's 
mercantile adherents, Arnpld Nesbit and Bartholomew Burton, 
voted against the measure. There are twenty nine names under 
t"-. is heading. Under the title "rings Friends" the names of 
nine merchants appears, three under the heading "Lord Bute's 
Friends". "Lord Chatham' s Friends" include tthe names of 
Reckford, Nichol1a Calvert and Rose Fuller, the former 
94 
Chairman of the Stamp Act Committee. In the list of "Friends 
88. Ibid. ff138-9 Rockingham to Newcastle 21 February 1767. 
89. Ibid. f147 Newcastle to Portland 22 February 1767; f149 
Newcastle to Thomas Pelham 22 February 1767; fl, 51 Newcastle 
to Albemarle 22 February 1767; f153 Newcastle to John 
Norris 
42 
February 1767. F1. W. M. P. 81-189 Division List dated 
in error'Saturday night February the 13th 1767' Cf. Brooke 
p. cit. p. 109 and n. 2. 
90. B. M. Add. Mss. 32980 f176 West to Newcastle 27 February 1767; 
Brooke 
, 
off. cit. pp. 107-108. 
91. Ibid. p. 107 n. 4. 
92. See The E lish Land Tax in the Ei hteenth Century by V1.2.42 
Ward, London 1953, p. 76 n. 3. 
93. Walpole. 1. emoirs Vol. II, p. 392. 
94. B. M. Add. Mss" 33037 f377-8 "Members of the House of Conanons 
who voted against taking off one shilling Land Tax in 
their p rticularlclasses" The merchants who are classified 
.ý Rý 
;ý 
:lI 
i:, F" 
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to the Late Administration" who voted for the measure, sixty- 
seven names occur. The merchants among these are George 
Aufrere, Sir William Baker, Sir George Colebrooke and John 95 
Hanbury. 
it would thus seem that by February 1767 much of the 
mercantile support which had flocked to the aid of the first 
Rockingham administration to secure the Repeal of the Stamp 
Act had disintegrated when it came to measures in which the 
Rockinghams were not avowedly supporting the mercantile 
interest. Other allegiances were stronger. The two men who 
were most well known as American merchants, George Aufrere 
and Sir William Baker, had voted for the reduction of the 
Land Tax but either political interest, for both were staunch 
supporters of the Rockingham Whigs, or their interest as 
landowners, may have been stronger than their allegiance to 
96 
trade and finance. 
The reduction of the Land Tax was not regarded by the 
97 
administration as a major defeat, and ngether Rockingham 
himself nor his supporters seem to have regarded it as a 
major triumph or overestimated the importance of their victory. 
Sir George Savile pointed out to Rockingham that they were 
E 
i 
i 
i 
no nearer coming to power on their own terms, if they wished 
94. (contd) as "hinds Friends" are Anthony Bacon, Sir Ellis 
Cunliffe, Peregrine Cust, Chauncy Towns tend, Sir Samuel 
Fludyer, Thomas Fonneceau, Zachary Ponne'reau, John Henniker, 
and Nicholas Lirwood" As "Ld Butes" friends are James 
Coutts, Adam Drummond and Samuel Touchet. 
95. Ibid. ff380-381 "Members of the House of Cori eons who voted 
for three shillings Land Tax in their particular classes" 96. For Baker and Aufrere's political careers see Namier and. 
Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. II, pp. 34,39-41.1, ;' 
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to accept office they would still have to accept Chatham's 
terms, and if they overestimated their success they would 
probably become incautious and eventually be totally defeated. 
He continued 
"This triumph or victory or whatever it may be, seems 
rather to call for extreme caution and reserve than for 
hot pursuit.... But I should rather incline to think as 
Your Lordship does that it is far-from decisive, every 
reason that made it perhaps generalship to shape this 
question, is an argument for its not being decisive. 
Popular, county members, county Gentlemen, a near election. 
You tell me the 206 consisted chiefly of us G(eorge) G 
(renville) B(edford) C(ounty M(embers) and Tories - 
Pretty well; I beg you will let me know who it consistdd 
of wholly. I do not see who you will add unless one 
or two might vote by mistake and men who might perhaps 
have voted for 3d-6d for any other puny way you will 
imagine-" 98 
and Rockingham wrote to Newcastle 
"I saw Charles Yorke and Lord Mansfield last night, they 
were both well pleased with the defeat of the adminis- 
tration, for tho' in truth it is not quite a serious 
defeat, it is a very unpleasant event. " 99 
It has been stated that the victory of the Rockinghamites might 
have had the effect they least desired for by depriving the 
government of f'evenue it may have hastened the passing of the 
Townshend Duties but a more recent authority contends that 
Towj'nshend's plans for the American Duties were completed by 
this time. 
Americän affairs began to come into importance again in 
January 1767. On 26 January in the Committee of Supply on 
96. (contd) For them as property owners see my Barlow Trecothick 
etc pp. 129-137,143-146. 
97. Brooke off. cit. p. 108. 
98. w. wN. M. R1-760 Sir George Savile to Rockingham (undated) bitt 
dated in Rockingham handlist as 3 March 
1767. 
99. B. I, ". Add. Mss" 32980 f194 Rockingham to Hetivcastle 1 March 1767. 
100. Cf. Narlier and Brooke Charles Tovrnshend p. 175 and "Charles 
the Array estimates Grenville moved an amendment that the488 
expenses of the troops stationed in America should be met by 
101 
the colonies themselves. This motion was easily defeated but 
was made notable by the fact that Charles Townshend in a 
speech against the amendment, pledged himself to produce a 
102 
revenue from America. Mr. Brooke states that Grenville found 
103 
no support outside his own group but if the Rockingham Whigs 
did not vote for the motion neither did they vote against it. 
Onslory reported the debate to Newcastle in these words 
"The House is just up and we have had a debate on G. 
Grenville's iiotion for the troops employed in the 
service of America, by the Colonys where they served. 
You see the mischief and the intent of it. They were 
foolishly divided and were 33 to 106. The Bedfords and 
I think, all the Cavendishes &c. Trent away; except Dick 
Vernon, so there were none but Grenville's own People. 
C"Townshend and Conway did exceedingly well. Beckford 
also spoke. G. Grenville and Id. G. Sackville were the 
only speakers on their side. " 104 
It would seem that the Rockingham Whigs realised the 
intention of Grenville to reintroduce the principle on which 
the Stamp Act had been based, that of making the American 
colonies contribute at least part of the cost of their own 
defence, and it is strange that they did not whole-heartedly 
challenge Grenville by voting against him One can only 
explain their behaviour as a disinclination to vote for the 
administration or an attempt to preserve some sort of friend- 
ship with Grenville by not voting against him. It must be 
remembered 
100" contd Townshend and American Taxation in 1767" by P. D. 
ä as- in English Historical Review Vol" L OCcIII, 1968 pp. 
42-43. 
101" Brooke 2p" citp" 93. 
102. Ibid. pp. 93-94. Namier and Brooke Charles Townshend p-173. 
103. Brooke 
, 
off. cit. p. 93. 
104. B. hi" Add" Mss. 32979 f343 Onslotir to Newcastle 'Monday Evening' 
(26 January 1767) Richard Vernon (1726-1800) H. P. for 
Bedford a staunch Bedford Whig supporter, see Namier and Brooke The 
-House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol" III, pp" 584-586" 
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that at the end of 1766 the Rockinghamites had been negotia- 
105 
ting with the Grenvilleites and that less than a month after 
this incident they were working with them, to secure the 
reduction of the Land Tax. 
Mr. Brooke criticizes the Rockingham Whigs for not 
opposing Grenville and states 
"The Rockinghams were silent on January 26. Dowdeswell 
was in the House and Burke was well within handy distance 
but neither spoke against a policy which threatened to 
undo all the good achieved by the repeal of the Stamp 
Act. In truth, the pro-Americanism of the Rockinghams 
was rather accidental thancanscious a shibboleth in 
British party politics rather than a serious factor in 
imperial affairs. " 106 
He goes on to say that the Rockinghamites policy of "consistency" 
107 
meant only consistent opposition to Grenville and that 
'consistency' required that they should defend the Declaratory 
107 
Act against Chatham. 
In fact on this occasion neither Grenville nor Townshend 
can be said to have conflicted with the American policy of the 
Rockingham Whigs as proclaimed in the Repeal of the Stamp Acts 
and the Declaratory Act. If the Rockinghamites were to 
criticize either Grenville or Townshend they would have to do 
so on grounds of expediency and neither of the speakers gave 108 
sufficient details to alloy Rockingham's supporters to do this. 
Moreover on such dubious ground they would probably be unwill- 
ing to endanger their friendship with Charles Townshend. 
+[ 
105. See above p. 475. 
106. Brooke op. cit, p. 96. Cf. Thomas loc. cit. p. 50. 
107. Ibid. pp. 96-98. 
108. Ibid. pp. 93-94. 
Iti' 
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Perhaps the Rockingham Whigs went away because they could vote 
neither with the administration for which Townshend spoke on 
this occasion, nor for Grenville. If they voted for either, 
men like Trecothick would have been bound to question thd&r 
action. 
Shelburne, at least, was alarmed by Townshend's speech, 
although when he reported to Chatham, Chatham did not seem 
109 
unduly perturbed. Newcastle also may have been slightly per- 
turbed when Tovwnshend's words were reported to him for on 30 
January he wrote to a Cambridge correspondent complaining that 
he had not seen Townshend all the winter and requesting that 
110 
this mutual friend brought them together when he was in London. 
hr. Brooke, however, takes the absence of reference to the 
debate in the correspondence of Rockingham and Newcastle as 
111 
evidence of lack of concern with the issue. 
Other American issues now began to gain the attention of 
the Rockingham Whigs. In February 1767 a petition signed by 
more than 250 New York merchants challenging the Navigation 
Acts and do3idemningtth commercial: lbgislaticniof bo 
, 
h: 1QCktng- 
hämcand Grexrvil3e:: ninistrie. sii: tdiserimatOly because it "severely 
clogged and restricted" colonial trade wad pretented to Parlia" 
112 
me nt. 
109. Chatham Correspondence Vo1. III, pp. 182-8 Shelburne to 
Chatham 1 February 1767, pp. 188-90 Chatham to Shelburne 
3 February 1767, Brooke off,. cit. p. 95. 
110. B. M. Add. Mss. 32979 f405 Newcastle to Dr. Powell 30 January 
1767. 
111. Brooke 22. cit. p. 94. 
112. Sosin op. cit. pp. 97-98, Winstanley off. Cit. P. 108. Cf Commons Journal Vol. XCIXI, pp. 158-160. 
Iij 
f. 
' 
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On 16 February Rockingham wrote to Newcastle 
"Today the New York petition is expected to be presented. It will occasion some conversation. I understand the administration mean to have it lie upon the table and to which we shall consent. Charles Townshend, Conway, Dowdeswell and Burke talked about it yesterday and agreed much in opinion. " 113 
With reference to this petition Shelburne had written to 
Chatham on 6 February 
"? Merchants have unanimously disavowed the New York petition and say that a Mr. Kelly has been the Pemon who has handled this fire and who is the sole author 
of it: 114 
The yir. Kelly referred to would seem to be William Kelly 
the New York merchant who had been a witness before the Stamp 
Act Committee. Kelly seems to have known Rockingham, Portland 
and Newcastle well. He had returned to America after the 
115 
repeal of the Stamp Act. 
Unfortunately there is no record of the discussion among 
the Rockingham Whigs about the New York petition. As the 
petition challenged their policy when in power and Burke did 
116 
not support the petition one must suspect that they agreed 
with Shelburne about it even though Kelly had been one of 
their associates during the Stamp Act Crisis. Moreover as 
English merchants viewed the petition with disfavour there 
was little prospect of it gaining the support of the Rockingham 
113. B. IT. Add. Liss. 32980 f108IRockingham to Newcastle 16 February 
1767. 
114. Chatham Correspondence Vo1" III, p. 191 Shelburne to Chatham 
6 February 1767. 
115. Smith off. cit. pp. 174-175, Cf. Sosin op. cit. P. 97 n. 13. 
116. Hoffman op. cit. p. 49. 
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Whigs. At this time Trecothick, together with other merchants 
interested in the American trade, and colonial agents were 
putting pressure on the government for the repeal of Grenville's 
Currency Act of 1764 which was 
English trade with America and 
seem to have been successful i: 
118 
Duty. Trecothick and the rest 
regarded as prejudical to both 
117 
colonial commerce and they 
n opposing the American Salt 
of the merchants and agents 
working with him must have been appalled by the extreme opinions 
put forward in the New York petition and by arousing public 
indignation against the coloniate the petition can only have 
handicapped their work. There is no evidence that they were 
concerting measures with the Rockingham Whigs at this time 
but this is-scarcely surprising for the work they were engaged 
upon necessitated putting pressure on ministers outside 
Parliament rather than a full scale political attack on 
119 
ministers in the House. 
In February 1767 the question of the resistance of the 
120 
colonies, particularly New York, to Grenville's Mutiny Act 
came under consideration and in the House of Lords the Duke 
121 
of Bedford called for the American Papers. Newcastle was 
afraid that the discussion of America might lead to a breach 1 
117. Sosin 2p. cit. p. 93 et AM. 
118. Trumbull Papers loc. cit. p. 229 William Samuel Johnson to 
William Pitkin 16 Hay 1767. See also rry Barlow Trecothick 
etc p-55 and Barlow Trecothick loc. cit. Part2, p. 31. 
119. ee Sosin 22. cit. pp. 93-98.120. Miller op. cit. pp. 237-241. 
121. Lords Journal Vol. XXXI, pp. 493-496 24 and sB ebruary 1767 
appear to be the only dates towards the end of February 
when the Duke of Bedford was present in the House of 
Lords and 25 February is the only day when there is any 
mention of American business there in the Journal. 
ýý 
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of the alliance that was being built up with Grenville and the 
Bedford Whigs which had been strengthened by common action to 
secure the reduction of the Land Tax on 27 February 1767. He 
wrote to Rockingham on 28 February 
"I wish my Ld. Mansfield and my Lord Hardwicke's thoughts 
were known upon this motion-of the Duke of Bedford's 
for the American Papers. It would be unlucky, if just 
at this time when we, by our united strength have 
carried such a victory in the House of Commons,. anything 
should now be proposed in the House of Lords, in which 
we could not concur, which I am afraid must be the case. " 
122 
Newcastle hoped to get information from-the American merchants 
on the American situation and also possibly wanted their opinion. 
He continued his letter 
"I wish your Lordship would enquire of Trecothick or 
some of our American friends, what the fact is, that 
is complained of; how far they have refused to comply 
with the resolutions of the House of Lords or the 
directions of Parliament. " 123 
Neither the Rockingham nor Newcastle correspondence 2 at 
this time, contains any further reference to consultation of 
the merchants or enquiry into American affairs but at the end 
of March when the Rockingham Whigs had been negotiating an 
alliance with the Grenville and Bedford Whigs for about a 
124 
fortnight Newcastle wrote 
"Lord Rockingham has three points on which he will insist 
To have a majority of Friends in the Cabinet. 
To give the whole care of West Indies and North 
America to my Lord Dartmouth, with the Seals as 
third Secretary of State. 
To insist that dir. Grenville should have nothing 
to do with North America. 
That the measures which were taken by His Lordship 
in the Treasury with regard to the trade and 
commerce in America and the laying taxes there, 
should be maintained and pursued. " 125 
122. B. M. Add. T, Sss" 32980 f187 Newcastle to 
1767. 
28 Fe 
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It would thus seem that any discussion that Rockingham 
had pursued with the American merchants in March 1767 with 
regard to American affairs had only strengthened his belief 
that the American measures enacted by the first Rockinghhm 
administration were right and correct and the best policy was 
to continue on that course if possible. In this way Rockingham 
no doubt hoped to strengthen the mercantile support of his 
party. Itir. Brooke contends that each of the conditions above 
were laid down almost entirely as a barrier to Grenville's 
126 
influence in any new joint administration, but bearing in 
mind the relationship of the Rockingham Whigs with the merchants 
this would not seem to be the sole reason for the conditions 
and even though the negotiations proved abortive, Grenville's 
supporters did not seem to regard the conditions as unreason- 
327 
able or improper. 
In spite of this there was no unanimity of opinion among 
the leaders of the Rockingham Whigs upon American affairs at 
this time, for. *c? clo -) pr ^,., qO', vtherl the Duke of Bedford 
moved in the House of Lords for an address to the King to take 
into consideration an Act of the province of Massachusetts 
Bay for pardoning the rioters in the Stamp Act disturbances 
123" Ibid. f187 Newcastle to Rockingham 28 February 1767.1 
124. For these negotiations see Brooke o1? " cit. pp. 121-6" Winstanley . cit. pp. 119-121.125. B. 1M. Add. Mss.. 32980 f450 "Persons named by My Lord Rockingham 
ii 
to be the Friends without whom he would take no steps" Quoted Brooke op. cit. p. 126. 126. bid. p. 126. 
127. See B. M. Add. Mss. 32981 ffl-2 `Substance of a Conversation this day with Mr. Rigby" 1 April. 1767l, -a, -'`ff27-28 "Substance of a Conversation with Lord Mansfield" 4 April 1767. 
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Rockingham, Dartmouth,. Monson and Edgcumbe voted against it, 
Hardwicke and Grentham voted with the Bedfords and Newcastle 
Portland, Albe/narle, Scarborough and Bessborough abstained, 
128 
primarily it would seem to avoid voting against Rockingham. 
129 
Rockingham explained his ideas in a letter to his wife, 
"Yesterday the Duke of Bedford made a motion in the 
House of Lords - the matter proper and what we might 
have concurred in, but upon the whole it rather appeared 
to be somewhat unfair or uncandid to the Administration. 
Many of our friends were desirous of joining in the 
question against the Administration, and yet I felt as 
if our joining in it might have the appearance of 
pevishness and want of candour - of course I determined 
to vote with Administration. Many of our friends staid 
and voted with me and many went away not to vote against. 
There was no tye upon us to vote with the Duke of 
Bedford for in fact they did not communicate with us 
on the matter. If they had and, the question in all 
parts had been made suitable to our opinions we and 
they should have joined and I believe the consequences 
would have been a majority against administration. " 
In taking his action Rockingham seems to have paid 
little or no attention to mercantile opinion. Newcastle, 
however, paid more attention and endeavoured to explain his 
own and his colleagues actions and opinion in a letter to 
his leading mercantile supporter Sir William Baker on Sunday 
12 April 1767 
"Mr, Grenville will make the same motion tomorrow, in 
the House of Commons, that the Duke of Bedford did in 
the House of Lords, on Friday last, upon the Assembly 
of New England taking upon them to pardon the rioters, 
without the inter#ention of the Crown. I own, I never 
was clearer in niy life, in opinion, for any question, 
128. See Brooke' op. cit. p. 127. There is a division list in 
B. PST. Add" Mss. 32981 ff102-103 For the abstention of 
Newcastle, Portland, Albelmarle, Scarborough and Bess- borough see-ibid. ff137-8 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 
12 April 1767. 
129. W. W. TAI. R156-13 misdated April 10 1767 should be April 11 
1767 quoted Brooke op. cit. pp. 12798. 
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than I was for that. I thought it would have had all 
the good consequences imaginable and no one bad one. 
As nothing was said against, but that it was an imputation 
of neglect of Duty in the administration. If it was so, 
I don't see any great inconvenience in that; it would 
have show'd my Lord Bute and my Lord Chatham (and tigere 
is gy point) that with the Duke of Bedford &c. we were 
masters of the House of Lords. It would be showing a 
spirit upon a point, that concerned no other colony, but 
this, and was entirely separate from all other consider- 
ations and disputes, relating to North America, and by 
taking this easy step we might be enabled perhaps the 
better to resist other violent measures, that might be 
proposed in the course of the affair.... I could not 
convince icy Lord Rockingham of this; and out of regard 
singly to him I did not vote, as I hear, nine or ten 
others did-" 130 
Probably Newcastle was sufficiently interested to endea- 
your to justify his actions to the mercantile section of his 
supporters, and to endeavour to reassure them that there was 
no radical change in his opinion on American affairs for he 
was taking the line that events in Massachusetts had been 
exceptional and the Rockingham ministry had never condoned 
violence. 
The most crucial issues of America became important 
during May 1767. The Committee to examine the American Papers 
seems to have been postponed from 30 April 1767 until 8 May. 
On 5 May 1767 it was further postponed until 13 May because 
131 
Charles Toanshend could not attend. Before 5 May Rockingham 
and his supporters were quite active and Rockingham appears to 
have been trying to organise opposition to a government bill 
that would have prevented all the American governors giving 
their assent to measures from the provincial legislatures 
" B. M. Add. Mss. 32981 f137-ß Newcastle to Sir William Baker 
12 April 1767 quoted Brooke 
, 
op. cit. p. 128 but an important part of the letter is omitted without any mark of omission. 
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until the colonies had complied with the Quartering Act. He 
132 
hoped for Conway's support on this and Newcastle seems to have 
approved of the action. Rockingham appears to have discussed 
the opposition with the leading Rockingham Whigs, the Duke of 
Richmond, William Dowdes`rell, Sir George Savile and Sir V1illiakt 
Mredith and Newcastle tried to sound the opinion of John 
133 
White. Mr. Brooke states that Rockingham's plan was to 
embarrass the cabinet rather than to demonstrate in favour of 
134 
the colonies or dive support to Conway, but it must be borne 
in mind, that opposition to the type of bill proposed by the 
government would have been regarded with a favourable eye by 
the mercantile element. By 13 May 1767 when the committee 
actually sat the opposition was fully ready for the government 
measure and Dowdeswell was to offer an alternative scheme, 
by which the Mutiny and Quartering Acts were to be enforced 
135 
and the loyal colonies rewarded. 
When the American Co. unittee actually opened on 13 May 1767 
it is interesting to note that Rose Fuller the former chairman 
136 
of the Stamp Act Committee was in the chair. Townshend 
proposed three resolutions, firstly one declaring that New York 
had disobeyed the Mutiny Act, secondly one condemning as 
131. Burke Correspondence -Vol. I, ed. Copeland p. 309 Edmund Burke 
to Marchioness of Rockingham 28 April 1767, Brooke 21. cit 
p. 13 6. 
132. B. M. Add. I. Iss. 32981""f287 `Rockinghari to Newcastle 4 May 1767. ', '- 133. Ibid"f289 Newcaslte to Rockingham 4 May 1767; f295 
Rockingham to Newcastle 5 May 1767; f326 Newcastle to 
White 8 May 1767. 
134. Brooke 92. cit. p. 136. 
135. B. M. Add. Mss" 32981 f365 Rockingham to Newcastle 12 May 17671 ibid. f385 Newcastle to Rockingham 13 May 1767. 
136. Ibid. f375 West to Newcastle 13 May 1767. 
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inadequate the provision that New York had made for the 
Mutiny Act and thirdly the one attempting to penalise the 
colonies until they had complied with the Mutiny Act of which 
the Rockinghams had prior knowledge. Conway contested the 
first resolution but the Rockinghams concentrated on the 
third, as planned, and their opposition was concerned more 
with the legality of the measure than with expediency. Rock- 
ingham had, before this, taken the advice of Lord Mansfield 
137 
and Charles Yorke. If, however, Rockingham's opposition was 
mainly on the issue of legality, opposition to the third 
measure was most in accord with the attitude the Rockingham 
Whigs had adopted when in power and therefore, for the 
Rockinghams the one best calculated to win mercantile support. 
Following the three resolutions Townshend went on to say 
that he had always been unable to distinguish between external 
and internal taxation and went on to "mention some taxes not 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer but as a private man for the 
future opinion of the House in a Comrlittee of Ways and Pdeans. " 
138 
He then outlined the famous Townshend Duties. In the debate 
that followed the issue of the taxation or non-taxation of 
America took second place to the indignation aroused by 
colonial resistance to the Mutiny and Quartering Acts. 
137. See Brooke oo. cit. pp. 136-137; B. M. Add. Mss. 32981 f297 
Mansfield to Newcastle 5 May 1767; B. r3. Add. Mss" 35430 ff73-7, 
Rockingham to Charles Yorke 3 May 1767; Autobiography and 
Political Correspondence of Augustus Henry 3rd Duke of 
Grafton ed. Sir W. Anson, London 1898, ppl76-8 Thomas 
Bradshaw to Grafton Thursday morning (14 May 1767)- 
138. B. 2u. Add. Mss" 32981 f373 West to Newcastle 13 May 1767. 
Townshend appears to have had the advice of Adam Smith in 
drawing up these duties. See "Adam Smith in Downing Street 1766-67"by W. R. Scott in Economic History Review Vol- VI- 
499 
1 
West reported to Newcastle 
"Mr-Grenville seconded Mr. Townshend's taxes and pro- 
posed a tax on paper currency which Mr. To, wrnshend at last agreed to add to his others. Mr. Grenville pro- 
posed that no person should have any office whatsoever that did not swear and subscribe to the superiority of Great Britain, as he took the oath of allegiancearr. C. 
Yorke who was heard with difficulty thought the measures 
could scarce be too strong.... Sir G. Savile thought strong 
measures were necessary as we were only carrying an Act 
of Assembly and making paper war. Lord John Cavendish 
is just cone and seems in the same way of thinking. " 139 
It would have been extremely difficult for the Rockinghams 
to raise the issue of the expediency of taxing America when 
the government could prove by reference to the Mutiny and 
Quartering Acts that the Rockingham policy of repeal of the 
Stamp Act and Declaratory Act had not really quietened America. 
They might have been misled by the distinction between internal 
and external taxation which Townshend drew even if he did not 
believe in it, and opposition could easily lead them into the 
dangerous ground of challenging Parliamentary authority over 
America, and they were as firm supporters of this as Grenville, 
as the Declaratory Act showed. 
Besides the fact that the issues were not clear cut there 
was also the fact that this was the end of the Parliamentary 
session. I=ediately after the debate on 13 May 1767 West 
reported to Newcastle that two of the staunchest Rockingham 
Whigs, George Aufrere and. Sir William Meredith, would not 
attend Parliament further that sAmmer. George Aufrere was an 
influential-=merchant who had been 'active at the time of the 
Stamp Act Crisis and-Meredith had important, mercantile 
138 (contd) No. 1, London 1935, pp. 79-89. For these duties see Namier and Brooke Charles Torwnshend p. 174 t se$. 
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connections for he was member for Liverpool. Burke also a 
1= 
stated in his speech on American taxation that to satisfy the 
English merchants the duties were deliberately trivial and 
except the tea duty laid on none of the "grand objects of 
141 
commerce". These reasons may account for the lack of interest 
in the duties among Rockingham's mercantile supporters and 
suggest; that they were only moderates in the American cause. 
Attendance in the House continued to decline and on 16 June 
West reported to Newcastle that there were not more than fifty 
142 
members present. Indded by 15 May 1767 when Charles Garth, 
Rose Fuller and William Dowdeswell endeavoured to have 
Townshend's measures recor iltted there was a noticeable decline 
in enthusiasm in the House compared to 13 May 1767, and it 
would also seem that the Rockinghamites voted with the admin- 
143 
istration on this occasion. One is led to the conclusion that 
the mercantile supporters of the Rockingham Whigs were not 
sufficiently worried by the Townshend Duties to oppose them. 
Sir William Baker, their leader, was more concerned with New 
York's disobedience to the Mutiny and quartering Act and was 
strongly in favour of Grenville's idea of a test whereby any- 
body holding office in the colonies should swear to the 
144 
superiority of Great Britain. Again this presents the 
moderate view adopted by Rockingham's mercantile supporters. 
139. B. I. I. Add. IIss" 32981 f378 West to Newcastle 13 May 1767. 
140. Ibid. f380 West, to Newcastle 13 May 1767. For Meredith see 
Napier and, Brooke The House of Conmons 1754-1790 Vol" III , 
pp. 130-2.33. 
141. Burke Works Vo1. II, p. 360. 
142. B. IT. Add. Liss. 32982 f346 West to Newcastle 16 June 1767. 
143. B. N. Add. Mss. 32981 f391 West to Newcastle 18 May 1767. 
Sle6e 
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He was not, however, 
145 
1767. Newcastle was 
Pragmatic as ever he 
confusion again. Bu 
in the House of Commons on 13 and-15 May 
against Grenville's idea of a test. 
feared that it would throw America into 
146 
rke and Dovideswell opposed the measure. 
When the Townshend Duties were introduced into the 
Committee of Ways and Means and drawn up into a bill some 
opposition seems to have come from William Dowdeswell and Sir 
147 
William Baker, but the leaders of the Rockingham WYjigs made 
no attempt to organise this opposition and it was left to the 
effort of individual members. The lack of interest of the 
Rockinghamite leaders in the Townshend Duties was probably 
due to the fact that at this time they were preoccupied with 
the parliamentary tactic of attempting to defeat the adminis- 
tration in the House of Lords during May and June 1767. Here 
the issues were American and East Indian but in no instance 
do the leaders of the Rockingham Whigs appear to have 
consulted their mercantile associates or asked their opinions. 
The merchants were still merely a subordinate body, to be 
consulted only on questions directly affebting them, and only 
when Rockingham and Newcastle felt that they were to be useful. 
Thus while the leaders of t he Rockingham Whigs were 
preoccupied with affairs in the House of Lords, the end of the 
Anson op. 'cit. p. 190 Thomas Bradshaw to Grafton 16 IIay 1767. 
See also '}3. MM. Add. Mss" 32982 - f51 Newcastle to Rockingham 
17 May 1767. ', ') 
145. Ibid. f51 Newcastle to Rockingham 17 May 1767.. 
146. Ibid" f51, Newcastle to Rockingham 17 May 1767. 
147. Ibid. f317 Frederick Montague to Newcastle 12 June 1767; 
ibid. f327 Newcastle, to West 13 June 1767. 
144. See above ibid. f378 West, to Newcastle 13 May 1767. Cf. 
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parliamentary session came, many members retired to the country 
and in the confusion over New York's resistance to the Mutiny 
Act the Towrnshend Duties became law and were almost overlooked 
by the leaders of the Rockingham Whigs and their mercantile 
associates. Yet the merchants still valued the connection 
with the Rockingham Whigs for on 10 May 1767 Abraham Rarwlinson 
had approached Burke asking him to stand for Lancaster in the 
148 
forthcoming Parliamentary election. 
The Parliamentary session 1766-1767 exemplifies the way in 
which the relationship between the Rockingham Whigs and the 
mercantile classes was to develop after the end of the first 
Rockingham administration. The Rockinghamites lost the close 
contacts with the merchants, which they had while in offices 
partly because the merchants were more accustomed to secure 
the policy they desired by putting pressure on administration 
rather than co-operating with an opposition group) and partly 
because the Rockinghams did not cultivate the friendship of 
the merchants because they were not accustomed to do so. The 
loyalty of certain individual leaders of the merchants from 
1765-66 seems to have endured and been maintained. Trecothick 
and Rawlinson are examples of this but Trecothick did not 
concert the pressure he was putting on the ministry in 1767 
with the group to which he owed political loyalty* 
49 
148. W. W. Li. R1-76 Rawlinson to Burke 10 1fay 1767; Burke 
Correspondence Voll, ed Copeland p. 325 Tlilliam Burke to 
Edmund Burke 4 September 1767. See below p. 529. 
149. See above pp. 491_2Sosin. cit. p. 103 states that Trecothick 
was in Parliament during the debate on the Townshend Duties but this is not the case. He was not elected 
until 1768.1 
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Newcastle persisted in trying to maintain the loyalty of 
the financiers who had aided him when in office, but it is to 
be suspected, mainly because he was looking forward to their 
usefulness when the party was again in office cß7: 1. , arty 
politics and Whig principles took first place rather than 
mercantile support. It was only when the former coincided 
with mercantile opinion that any real use could be made of 
mercantile support. 
Yet in general the Rockingham Whigs were pursuing a policy 
which was bound to gain the sympathy of the British mercantile 
classes. This was not purely accidental. The policy pursued 
by the Rockinghams during the parliamentary session 1766-1767 
was based. on the policy evolved during the Stamp Act Crisis 
under pressure from and in co-operation with the merchants. 
There is some justification for Rockingham's claim to 
"consistency" in that one policy was the logical outcome of 
the other and Mr. Brooke's criticism of Rockingham, his 
supporters and their policy is perhaps too harsh. With the 
background of the party, their recent experience of office 
and the political conditions of the mid-eighteenth century 
it is difficult to see how they could have behaved differently. 
The policy they had adopted whilst in office had never whole- 
heartedly espoused the American cause. They did not claim 
to be the unqualified champions of the colonists on all issues. 
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In opposition as in office they sought and listened to advice 
and opinions and then determined their policy in the light of 
what they heard and read in conformity with their Whig principles; 
It may also be pointed out that the period shows clearly 
how far the change in leadership from Newcastle to Rockingham 
had progressed in the party. Rockingham was not whole-heartedly 
endeavouring to forge alliances with other political groups 
in order to return to power: he politics of an opposition 
party were emerging. As Professor Ritcheson has pointed out 
had Newcastle still been in control of the party he"would 
have made a coalition with Lucifer to maintain or achieve 150 
power. 11 
son , 
o?. cit. pp. 82-83. 
I. ' 
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C) THE NEGOTIATIONS OF JULY 1767. 
The month after Parliament had gone into recess was 
occupied by negotiations to strengthen the administration. 
A detailed account of these negotiations forms no part of this 
thesis but certain aspects of them are significant and worthy 
151 
of notice. These show how little direct impact mercantile 
influence had on political measures when the Rockinghams were 
out of power but how unconscious influence still existed. 
The King gave the Duke of Grafton the task of strength- 
ening the administration and the Duke approached Rockingham 
first. Rockingham aimed to form an administration from his 
own group, his allies in the Chatham administration and the 
Bedford Whigs. Assuming from the start that he had been 
given full power to negotiate to form a new ministry under 
152 
his leadership, he therefore approached the Duke of Bedford, 
153 
and also through Richard Rigby, George Grenville. At first 
it seemed as if the negotiations were going to be successful 
and Rockingham would achieve his aim, but when on 20 and 21 
July 1767 the Bedfords and Rockinghams met to discuss detiled 
arrangements the negotiations broke down. The King now made 
it clear that he had never given Rockingham the power to form 
154 
a completely new administration. 
The two critical meetings in the negotiations on 20 and 
21 July took place at Newcastle House. At the first meeting 
151. A full account of these negotiations is contained in 
Brooke off. cit. pp. 162-217, See also Winstanley 22-it- 
pp-152-177. 
152. Brooke og. cit. pp. 163-5. 
153. Ibid. pp. 17-182. 
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Rockingham, Newcastle, Richmond, Portland, Keppel and Dovrdes- 
well of the Rockinghams and Bedford, Vleymouth, Sandwich and 
Richard Rigby of the Bedford Whigs were present. The second 
meeting was somewhat smaller. Rockingham and Dovidesvrell of 
the Rockinghams attended and Bedford and Rigby with Newcastle 
155 
acting as "chairman". Richard Rigby represented Grenville's 
point of view at the conference and sought a de&laration 
from Rockingham that he "would assert and establish the 
superiority of this country over its colonies". Rockingham 
grew angry when asked for such a declaration . He later 
urrote to Newcastle 
"Your Grace will remember that at the meeting at Your 
Grace's House u on our being called upon for a declar- 
ation on N(orth) A(merican) matters in consequence of 
G. Grenville and L(ord) Temple's desire that I grew 
warm and did say that I considered it a Trap and that 
whatever answer we gave - it would probably be laid 
before the Publick with whatever colour was thought 
proper - in order to throw an odium upon us. " 156 
Rockingham also felt ghat as Grenville sought a declaration 
from him on North America the latter suspected that Rocking- 
ham was going to give up Great Britain's superiority over 
her colonies. Rockingham also felt that the terms of the 
declaration implied a "consent for doing something" to 
"assert and establish" British authority over the colonies 
157 
immediately. The Duke of Bedford, however, endeavoured to 
154. Ibid- pp. 174-211. For the King's interview with Roos. 
ham at the conclusion of the negotiations see 111.17- IT. 
R1-845 Rockingham to Hardwicke 26 July 1767. 
155. Brooke off. cit. pp. 203-210. 
156. VW. W. M. R9-18 erroneously docketed Rockingham to Bedford 
but from internal evidence obviously to Newcastle 
undated but probably September 1767. For the "private 
account" mentioned in the document see B. H. Add. Eiaa. 
32983 f392 Narrative of the negotiations by.... 
... 
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allay the hostility caused by this declaration. He interpreted 
the declaration as follows 
"That with regard to the American Colonies no new 
measures should be understood to be agreed upon at this 
meeting, unless new matter arises, but if new matter 
should arise.. the sovereignity of this country should 
be asserted and established with firmness and temper. " 
This declaration by Bedford and the fact that Dowdeswell 
changed the words "asserted and maintained" to "supported and 
established" at the second meeting eventually solved the 
158 
problem of the policy to be adopted towards America satisfact- 
159 
orily as Newcastle later admitted. 
The negotiations eventually broke down because Rockingham 
insisted that Conway should lead any administration in the 
House of Commons of which he was to be First Lord of the 
Treasury. The Duke of Bedford was adamant that Conway should 
serve the new administration in no other way than in a 
military capacity and suggested Dowdeswell as a leader for the 
administration in the lower house, but when Dowdeswell declined 
the Rockinghams fell back on their insistence on Conway and 
160 
the negotiations broke down. 
157" Ibid. t'f351-55 "Narrative or what passest nere last nl. gnti- 
21 July 1767. Cf. Vt. W. !. R1-845 Rockingham to Hardwicke 
26 July 1767 and copy at W. W. M. R9-31. 
158. W. W. M. R9-7. Cf. Brooke a. cit. pp. 207-8. B. tai. Add. U. Uss. 
32983 ff351-4 "Narrative of what passed here last night" 
31 July 1767; ibid. f392 Narrative of the negotiations by.. 
159. B. M. ADD. MSS" 32985 f74 Newcastle to Rockinghb 11 
September 1767. 
160. W. W. M. Rl-838 Report of the meeting of 20 July 1767, ibid 
Rl-845 Rockingham to Hardwicke 26 July 1767 quoted 
Albe/mrle 22. cit. Vo1. II, p. 52 but wrongly dated 2 July 
1767. Cf. Brooke 
. 
2k. cit. pp. 209-210. 
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Dowdeswell declined the office suggested 
"for many reasons which he then gave(at the meeting), 
and for many more which he kept in his own breast. " 
Foremost among these reasons seems to be that Dowdeowell was 
not Rockingham' s first choice and he was put forward by Bedford, 
and that Dowdesrrell was not satisfied with the basis of the 
negotiations of July 1767 believing that the Rockinghamites 
should not accept any orders unless they came directly from 
the King and that they ought to be more firm with the Bedford 
161 
Whigs. 
Rockingham's insistence on Conway was because he felt 
that he must have a strong man, in whom he could confide, to 
lead the proposed administration in the House of Commons and 
that Conway was the only man who could preserve the close links 
162 
with the present administration. The Bedfords objected to 
Conway ostensibly because he was connected with the present 
163 
administration which was supposed to be at an end- It has, 
however, been suggested that the real reason why the Bcdfords 
broke off the negotiations over Conway was because they wanted 
164 
his post for themselves. 
The fact that an eventual solution to the American 
declaration was reached and then the negotiations broke down 
161. See W. W. L. R1-835 Report of meeting of 20 July 1767; 1b1a 
Rl-842 "Thoughts on the present state of publick affairs 
and the propriety of accepting or declining administration" 
23-24 July 1767; Cf. Brooke 22. cit. p. 205 n-3- 10 
162. W. W. M. Rl-838 Report of meeting of 20 July 1767. 
163. Ibid"R1-838 Report of meeting of 20 July 1767. 
164. Pares, King George III and the Politicians p. 85, n- 1. IM 
support of this Pares cites as evidence the fact that-after..,: 
the Bedfords entered the ministry Shelburne was gradually 
edged out of the other Secretary of State's office. 
F- 
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over Conway must be related to American policy. If Rockingham 
was suspicious over Bedford and Grenville's attitude towards 
America he was hardly likely to allow a member of the Bedford 
clique to lead the administration in the House of Commons. 
Having vetoed Conway, and because Dowdesvrell declineds the 
Rockinghams had no ether candidate who could lead the adminis- 
tration in the House. Moreover, Bedford made it clearrthat 
he wanted a member of his party leading the House of Commons 
with Dowdeswell as Chancellor Df the Exchequer as chief repre- 
165 
sentative of the Rockinghams there. Thus the failure of the 
negotiations over Conway was not in fact a breakdown over a 
trivial point. Without Comray to lead, Rockingham would have 
little hope of having his policy adequately explained and 
directed in the House of Commons. 
After the negotiations had failed Rockingham wrote to 
Newcastle 
"I hear that Lord Temple and G" Grenville' s friends give 
out that the three corps are not at all broken by what 
has passed, attribute the going off the negotiations 
entirely to the subject of General Conway and say 
nothing about the North) A(merican) affair, or the 
honourable and becoming portion of office which was to 
be allocated undefined to them, and in short taking no 
notice that their conduct gave any umbrage. " 166 
Burke explained the whole episode to Newcastle, when he 
discussed it with him, as a question of principle, in which 
165. B. M. Add. Mss" 32983 f351 "Narrative of what passed here 
last night" 21 July 1767. 
166. B. M" Add. biss. 32984 fg Býkii jlämtto-P7eývcas e 15 August 
1767. 
f., 
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Rockingham was deeply involved, for Burke believed that unless 
Rockingham insisted on high office for Conway he would have 
167 
betrayed Conway who was his friend. There also seems to have 
been some idea that Conway was the only man who could possibly 
168 
hold Grenville in check. Indeed, Newcastle appears to have 
put Rockingham's insistance of, Conway down to a fit of pique 
and this attitude was spread by him to his friends, thus soon 
after the negotiations broke down, Albefmarle, who had been 
present, twice expressed the feeling that it would have been 
better had the negotiations broke down on the American question 
169 
rather than over Conway. Although in this Albemarle shows 
ignorance of the precise course that the negotiations took, 
his idea seems to show that the Rockingham leaders were begin- 
ning to realise how important a plank of their platform 
170 
American policy had become. 
Mr. Brooke criticises the attitude of the Rockinghams to 
the American question during the negotiations and states that 
the MW form of the declaration evolved shows 
"how far the Rockinghams were from appreciating the 
nature of the dispute with the colonies, and indicates 
how little they would have been able tp prevent a 
separation had they returned to office. " 171 
167. Ibid. f358 Newcastle to Albefmarle 29 August 1767. 
168. B. M. Add. Mes" 32985 f253 Newcastle to Albeymarle 28 September 
1767. 
169. Vt. W. M Rl-839 Albemarle to Rockingham 23 July 1767 copyaat 
B. M. Add. Mss. 32983 f383; i bid. f387 Albelmarle to Ne icastle 
5 August 1767. 
170. See above P-'509- 
171. Brooke 22--pit-p-208. 
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This is not strictly true. To Rockingham any fresh difficul- 
ties with the colonies which had arisen in the year since he 
had left office could still be solved in terms of the formula 
he had accepted when in office. The Declaratory Act had 
asserted Britain's authority over the colonies but the exped- 
iency of asserting that authority was still questionable. 
Looking at the American problem in this light Rockingham was 
not bound to have an altered appreciation of it. Moreover 
Rockingham was more concerned in the negotiations with 
resisting Grenville than solving the American problem. In 
September 1767 he wrote to Dowdeswell 
"I desire to establish the two fundamental principles 
on which vie set out and as I can not believe that any 
of our Friends will depart from these lines our only 
difference can arise from Variety of opinion in regard 
to the most probable means of accomplishing these 
objects. 
our first principle was that Lord Bute's Power 
was dangerous and therefore to be restricted. 
Our second arose from 11r. Grenville's conduct as a 
Ministerp whose measures and opinions we opposed and 
afterwards corrected* and therefore consistency requires 
that we never should aid to throw Government into his 
hands much less act the part of assistants in an admin- 
isttation so formed* 
To enter into any more discussion on these principles 
is needlessp but it may be right occasionally to resort 
to revise and to fix these acknotledged principles in 
the minds of our Friendsp lest from other more immediate 
motives of passion and resentment they may lose sight of 
the original good foundation and adopt and pursue a 
conduct on a line in which the publick may not be so 
ready to go along with themp and may attribute the motive 
not to be of publick service but of private interest-" 
172 
173. W. W. h7. RL-857 Rockingham to Dowdeswell 9 September 1767. 
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It is obvious that the wishes of his mercantile followers 
were not uppermost in Rockingham's mind during the negotiations 
with the Bedford Whigs neither does Dowdeswell mention the 
mercfa, ' s in his correspondence at this time and his chief 
pre-occupation throughout the negotiations was to see the 
173 
Rockingham Whigs back in office. One of the Rockingham Whig 
leaders was concerned with principle, the other with political 
manoeuvre. Neither was concerned with the allies they had 
found so useful when they were in power a short time before. 
It must, however, be remembered that both in his insistence 
upon Conway and in his actions with regard to the proposed 
declaration on American policy Rockingham was defending a 
policy which had been evolved under mercantile pressure and 
with mercantile co-operation. If Rockingham was to come to 
power agairand his American policy was to be tested he would 
again need mercantile support and this fact may well have 
been at the back of his mind. The merchanth would be warmed 
if Rockingham relinquished the authority of Great Britain 
over the colonies, for they would gear losing the benefits 
of the Navigation System. I have found no evidence that any 
of Rockingham's mercantile supporters had considered colonial 
autonomy at this date. 
They would also feel that fresh measures to "assert" the 
173. See for instance the comments Newcastle makes in B. II. Addd. 
Mss"32983 ff351-362 "Narrative of what passed here last 
night" 21 July 1767; see also ibid. f367 Newcastle to 
Rockingham 25 July 1767; B. M. Add" b: ss" 32984 ff195-6 
Newcastle to Portland 7 August 1767. Newcastle felt it 
was impossible for Rockingham to form an administration 
without the support of Bid OM. See B. LI. Add. Riss. 32986 
f214 Newcastle to Lord Frederick Cavendish 23 September 
17 67. 
r 
a 
ýh 
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authority of Great Britain over the colonies could easily 
repeat the turmoil that the Stamp Act had causeEL The mer- 
chants thus had as much a vested interest in the maintenance 
of the status quo as did Rockingham. Moreover, it should 
be noted that during the negotiations Rockingham did not give 
way on the American issue. It was chiefly Bedford who 
reinterpreted, or moderatedt the declaration that Grenville 
desired and Rockingham had good reason to fear Grenville's 
attitude on America. Finally it must be noted that Rocking- 
ham must have realised that the merchants were not likely to 
support an administration that the Bedfords led in the House 
of Commons because they had passed the Stamp Act. 
A very apt comment on these negotiations was made by 
Dowdesivell in a paper he wrote a few days after the negotia- 
tions had failed. In this he wrote 
then 
"What carVbe done Nothing but to finish with honour. 
We have hitherto acted with the strictest honour. If 
our friends will not joyn us it is impossible for us 
to joyn them.... 
I confess that I see no fair prospect before us. 
This may possibly weaken us as a party# it depends 
upon the virtue of our friends whether it will or not# 
but I am sure it will do us honour as individuals. 
In these unhappy times when we find ourselves 
well in the opinion of mankind the wisest thing vie 
can do is to stand still and enjoy the reputation 
which vie havep not risque if for something newt the 
chances of which are so much against us-" 174 
174.1, V. W. M. Rl-842 "Thoughts on the present state of public 
affairs and the propriety of accepting qr declining 
admi istratiorP 23-24 July 1767, copy in Lady Rockinghamlr3 =Atsee 
covering letter ibid. Rl-841 Dowdeswell to 
Rockingham 24, July 1767) Tuoted Brooke 9p.. ZLt. pp.! 3l3-6. 
'h 
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It can be concluded that if the negotiations of July 
1767 foundered on matters of principle the unconscious 
pressure of mercantile opinion was at least important in main- 
taining the principles it had helped to evolve. 
. r. 
Ih 
515 
D) THE BREACH WITH BEDPORD AND GRE NVILLE. 
The-sequel to the failure of the negotiations with the 
Bedford Whigs was their entry into the administration in 
December 1767 and a definite rupture between them and the 
Rockinghams and also between the Rockinghams and Grenville. 
With the failure of the negotiations of July 1767 Rockingham 
left London for Yorkshire and remained there for most of the 
time during the Bu=er and autumn of 1767. During this time 
relations between him and Newcastle were not close. Newcastle 
felt that Rockingham had needlessly broken off the negotiations 
with the Bedford Whigs because of Conway and that it would be 
impossible for Rockingham to form an administration, in the 
circumstances then existingg without the support of Bedford 
175 
and Grenville. Newcastle saw Lord Frederick Cavendish on 27 
September 1767 *ho agreed with him that Rockingham could form 
no administration without an alliance with the Bedford Whigs 
but who also believed that Conway was essential to such an 
administration as "the only man that can keep dpwn George 
Grenville and prevent him being minister". Upon this matter 
176 
Newcastle violently disagreed with hin6 Prior to this on 
?--I. - A- 
29 Augustj,, Newcastle had seen Burke who had explained to him 
176-See above p-510 and also B-ILMd. ). Tss-32985 : rf2jZ-5 Newcastle 
to Lord Prederick. Cavendish 25 September 1767; ibid-f253 
Newcastle to Albe/marle 28 September 1767. Cf. Brooke 
a.. Sit. pp. 295-6. 
176. Ibid. f253 Newcastle to Albey'marle 26 September 1767. Contact 
between the Cavendishes and Conway was very-close(at this 
time. See ibid f136 Prederick Cavendish to Newcastle 19 
September 1767 where Cavendish records going to visit 
Goodwood with Conway. The Cavendishes were also at Wentworth 
during October and probably in September too. See B-M. Add- 
Mss-32986 f63 Portland to Newcastle 20 October 1767, thils 
Rockingham had closer contact with Conway than Newcastle. 
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that Rockingham was "in honour" committed to-see that Conway 
177 
had an important share of office. 
On 1 October, Rockingham, back in London temporarity, wrote 
to Newcastle discussing their difference of opinion. He stated 
"I should think the first step among ourselves is to fix 
firmly in our minds, what were and what I hope and trust 
arej the fundamental principles on which we have actedf 
I must beg to lay stress on Principles in the plural 
number because I think the ýU-TURI-Ick are very near equally 
interested in our adherence to the same line of conduct 
we have always held against the power of Lord Bute$ and 
also in the prevention of the return of power into the 
hands of one who when minister, had his measures opposed 
by usp and when vie were ministers those measures were 
corrected much to the publick security and iRdIrantet9d. 11 178 
A meeting between Rockingham and Newcastle to compose their 
differences followed this letter but it does not appear to have 
been very successful. Albeytaarle visited Bedford at Woburn 
179 
again about this time but all that could be agreed upon was 
"opposition upon proper points to this Bute administration 
and no sort of connection or correspondence with the present 
180 
miniBters. 
Professor Ritcheson notes the growing division in the 
ranks of the Old Whigs at this time. He states 
177. See above p,. 509 and also B. M. Add-hes-32984, f358 Newcas-tflfe--ý"-] 
to Albeymzirle 29 August 1767. ýj 
178. B. M. Add-Iles-32985 f-307 Rockingham to Newcastle I October 
1767. Rockingham also stated these principles to Dowdeswel: L. Ij 
See W. W. 11-Rl-857 Rockingham to Dowdeswell 9 September 1767 
(copy at R9-1) He had come south for the two race meetings 
at Newmarket and visited London between them. See Brooke 
a, @ cite pp* 315-316- 179. B. M. Add. llss. 32985 f343 tt sea Newcastle to Bessborough 4 
October 1767. 
180. Ibid. f358 Newcastle to Albe/marle 5 October 3.767. 
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"The old corpsp Neweastle#Portland and AlbeAmrle looked 
nostalgically to the days when a united Whig party held 
sway. They strongly desired an alliance with Bedford 
and with Grenville should that be possible. Control of 
the group had however passed from their hands and now 
rested with the "boys" led by Rockingham, Burke and 
Dowdeswell. Rockingham was not sanguine for an alliance 
built on so negative a ground as mere hatred of Bute. 
Indeed he declared himself unwilling to treat the Kingte 
Friends harshlyt and in fabt he coveted their support 
should he come again to power. Underlying the reluctance 
to draw nearer to the opposition groupsphoweverp was a 
consideration which the old corps could not be expected 
to understand. The "boys" feared that a Bedford allianee 
would draw them closer to Grenville whom they detested-" 
180 
and concludes 
"It was Rockingham's insistence - quixotic to the old 
corps - upon viewing his party as founded on principle 
and a community of interest which todk precedence over 
the love of office*" 181 
Yet Rockingham's statement of principles at this time and his 
adherence to the policy initiated by the first Rockingham 
administration shows that he was, at this time, far more aware 
of and far more susceptible to the presence of outside influence 
on the party than Newcastle wasq and the bulk of this external 
pressure# as Rockingham mast have realiseds was mercantile. 
Newcastlet as during the negotiations, appears to have been 
preoccupied with the desire to gain power againt and early in 
182 
October he was trying to negotiate with Grenville. However# 
he was not the only member of the Rockingham who was discontente 
with their leader's policy. Albqylmarle and Charles Yorke 
t83 
supported Newcastle's point of view but Richmond supported an 
180. Ritcheson op. cit. p. 103 
181. Ibid. pp. l0Z--6-'- 
182. B-M-Add-Mss. 32986 fl Newcastle to Mansfield 15 October 1767* 
183. Brooke on. cit. p. 297e. 
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alliance with Grafton and the existing administration. In a 
letter to Rockingham on 4 October 1767 he put forward, in a 
series of rhetorical questions, his reasons for doing this, 
asking among other things; 
"Have the present ministry any favourite measures in view 
to which they require your compliance? Have the Bedfords 
none as to Americay and are their notions of trade and 
foreign affairs likely to be submitted to your Lordship 
particularly Mr. Grenville's.... I come now (and it is time) 
to my last question which I think is a very material one. 
Will you be most likely to carry with you your friends 
in the City and those who are attached to you from 
principle and opinion when you joyn with the Bedfords 
and Grenvillesf or with the Duke of Grafton and Conway? It 
184 
Rockingham was thus n6t the only one of the party's leaders 
to consider the value of mercantile support. Richmond hads 
however, reached different conclusions from Rockingham. The 
latter saw him on 9 October but could not satisfy him and 
185 
Richmond promptly withdrew from poliitcs until 1769. Rockingham 
held back from Richmondts solution partly because of his 
suspicion of the influence of Bute in the existing administratiorl 
and becausep while wary of Grenvillep he did not wish to lose 
touch with Conway. Rockingham would not join the administration 
186 
without the Bedfords, and this policy prevailed. He had at 
least reached a rational and consistent conclusion, and would 
not purchase the support of the Bedfordso by giving the lead 
I in a new administration to Grenville; he would not sacrifice 
14, 
187 
all he had fought for in the pasty for power. 
184. W. W. 11. Rl-863 Richmond to Rockingham 4 October V-W7 quoted 
Brooke 22-cit. pp. 297-9. 
185. W. W. LLRI-869 Rockingham to Dowdesivell 9 Fovember 1767; see 
Brooke 2p-cit-p. 301- 
186. lbid. p. 307. 
187. Winstanley a. cit. pp. 181-182. 
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Until November 1767 tentative efforts continued to be 
made particularly by Newcastle, Albe/harle and the Keppels, 
188 
to cement an alliance with the Bedford Whigs. By 20 October 
1767 Portland was able to tell Newcastle that after a meeting 
of a number of"'his supporters at Wentworth., Rockingham no 
longer insisted on Conway holding high office and was willing 
3.89 
to give Grenville cabinet rank. When Conway attempted to 
enlist Lord Edgcunbels support for the administration and the 
Rockinghams eventually learned of this Conway definitely ceased 
190 
to be an obstacle to an alliance with the Bedford Whigs. 
Rockinghamphoviever, still refused to be drawn into an alliance 
with the Bedford Whigs and join in a ministry in which Grenville 
191 
might have a major part. 
Rockingham. was still making the same mistake that he had 
been making all the time in believing that it was Grenville 
who initiated the 
r 
policies of the Bedford Whigs. No small part 
of Rockingham's suspicion of Grenville must be attributed to 
his recognition of the value of the support of the merchants 
and their declared hostility to Grenville's policies. Strangely 
enough when Keppel complained to Newcastle that Grenville 
was the chief stumbling block to an alliance with the Bedford 
188. Broolce 2p., ciz- Pp. =d-7 9 010-010e 
189. B-M-Add-Mý`s--32986 f63 Portland to Newcastle 20 October 1767. 
For the meeting at Wentworth see Brooke 22-cit. p. 318 who 
Bays. it took place in September.. Dowdeswelf-qLord John 
Cavendishy Portland and Burke attended the meeting. ' 
Dartmouth was invited but did not'come. Newcastle was 
not invited. See Brooke op. cit. P. 315, n. I. 
190. B. M. Add-Ilss-32986 f244 Newcastle to Princess Amelia 4 
November 1767. Cf-Brooke op-cit. pp. 310,513.. 
191. Ritcheson op-cit-P-106- Cf-W-W-M-Rl-861 Rockingham to 
. Luoted 
Albqýmarle 2p-. Si_t- Portland jý56`eptenber 1767 q 
V01- II tpp. 57-59. 
tI 
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Whigs, Newcastle stated that he was as averse to Grenville 
193 
holding high office as any member of the Rockingham Whigs. 
It was thus perhaps, in no small measure, due to the 
influence of the merchants that when Parliament met on 24 
November 1767 all that was agreed upon between the Bedfords 
and the Rockinghams was "opposition upon proper points to the 
present administration! '. Bedford and the leaders of the 
Rockingham party did not even meet in London on the eve of the 
194 
session. Newcastle was hoping at this time to discuss the 
American situation with Rockingham for in a memorandum 
docketed "Heads for Lord Rockingham" he writes 
"The conduct of the colonies upon the last Act of 
Parliament, to take from them the power of passing any 
Act, until they had complied with the last Act of 
Parliament about quartering the troops. " 195 
When Parliament opened Dowdeswell attempted to amend the 
Address regretting there was no mention in the King's speech 
of measures to increase trade. The Rockinghams thus hoped to 
demonstrate that they meant opposition and they hoped that 
this was a topic 6n which all opposition groups could unites 
beem 196 
Bedford havin&(given prior information of the motion. 
. 
232. c it.; p. 2 17. 192. Brooke 
193. B. M. Add. M6-s. -32987 f37 Admiral Keppel to Newcastle 19 
November 1767; ibid-f49 Newcastle to Keppel 19 November 
1767. In all his efforts to make Rockingham compose his 
differences with Bedfordp Newcastle had often during the 
summer and autumn concealed or reinterpreted Bedford's 
words. See for instance Winstanley a-6it. p. 163 n-4. 
194. B-M-Add. Mss-82987 f49 Newcastle to Keppel 19 November 
1767. Winstanley 
. 
2p.. 2it. pp. 186-7187. 
195. B. M. Add-liss-32987 f55 Heads for Lord Rockingham 20 
November 1767. For this Act see Miller op. cit. p. 248- 
196. Brooke pR. citopo3=. Cf. W,. W. M. Rl-865 Newcastle to 
Albejlmýrle--Fcopy) 24 November 1767o 
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Dowdeswell was vehemently attacked by Grenville who stated thit, 
it was necessary to enforce the superiority of Great Britain 
over the coloniesp and said "turning his eyes towards Mr. 
Dowdeswell" that some people thought otherwise and he could 
197 
never support them in power or co-operate with them. The 
reason for Grenville'B full-blooded attack would seem to be 
that Bedford had passed on to him a rumour that he had heard# 
that Rockingham had told the Duke of Bridgewater that he 
198 
would never sit in the same cabinet as George Grenville. 
Onslow in reporting the debate to Newcastle tried to play down 
Grenvillets attack for he merely stated that whereas Burke 
and Wedderburn had supported Dowdeswell warmlyi, Grenville 
199 
"said little or nothing for him". Rockingham was., however., 
more perturbed. He wrote to Newcastle 
"It is remarkable that Mr. Dowdeswell confining himself 
to the exact line on N(orth) A(meriem) affairs which had 
been approved of by those who met at your Grace's on the 
memorable Tuesday night should find no friend of the D uke) 
of Bedford's willing to rise to check the ardour of Mr. 
G(eorge) G(renville). Mr. Grenville's expressions were 
strong indeed and he lamented that any man must move (that) a member of Parliament should hold such doctrines 
as Mr. Dowdeswell had held and(he)declared that he never 
had nor never would concur in any system or arrangement 
of administration formed with such ideas-ft 
197. B. M. Add. Mss-32987 f113 "The substance of what it is 
supposed Mr. Grenville said in his two speeches" 2q 
November 1767. 
198. See Winstanley a-cit-p-321. Cf-The Grenville Papers Vol. 
IV. 9p. 234. Brooke pp-cit-p-321 n-4 quoting iffemoirs and , Correspondence of George LordLyttleton ed-R. J. Phillimore., 
London 1865j pp-734-741. 
199. B. M. Add. Mss-32987 f103 Onslow to Newcastle 24 November 1767. 
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He continued by saying that now the Bedfords must be called 
upon to explain their conduct and there must be either a 
thorough-going alliance or a complete breach with them as a 
200 
result. 
Newcastle was therefore instructed at a meeting of the 
Rockingham-Whig leaders on 25 November 1767 to ask Bedford 
for an explanation of Grenville's conduct and wby his supporters 
201 
had failed to support Dowdeswell's motion. The day after this 
meeting Newcastle wrote to Sir William Baker, explaining that 
he was unable to see him the previous day because of the 
meeting of the Rockingham Whigs, indicating what the meeting 
202 
had decided and despairing of any alliance with the Bedfords. 
This letter makes it clear that Newcasiltle had previously 
discussed the Bedford alliance with Baker, but it is nowhere 
recorded what Baker's sentiments on the matter were. 
Rockingham hoped that the meeting would produce "a final 
and decisive issue" to the attempted alliance with the Bedford 
203 
Whigs "rather than-a superficial healing". It did. In spite 
200.. Ibid. f87, Rockingham to Newcastle 24 November 1767. This 
lett6r was written in the early hours of 25 November. The 
Tuesday mentioned is Tuesday 21 July. 17,6.7. See above P-505, 
201. Brooke op ., )-_cit: -pp-320-32l- Winstanley 92-Rit p-321 n-4- 202. B. M. Add. Mss-32987 f125 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 
25 Noveidber 1767. 
203. Ibid-flOg Rockinghjm to Newcastle 25 November 1767. 
ý. 
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of Newcastle's efforts to pour oil on troubled waters$ Rockingham 
after Newcastle's meeting with Bedfordp regarded any proppect 
of an alliance with the Bedfords at an end. By 29 November 1767 
the 13edfords were negotiating with the Chatham administration 
2046 
and by*17 December they had joined the government. 
Rockingham may be blamed for causing the final break-down 
of the negotiations because he refused to give an explanation 
205 
of his rumoured remark to the Duke of Bridgewater. He seems to 
have despaired long before this time. 9 as the evidence presented 
above showss of making an effective alliance with the Bedford 
Whigs. Grenville's attack on the Rockinghams American policy 
must only have confirmed his opinionp thbLtttlfeeallibne-e-? witlfr-t 
the Bedfords was hopeless. He must have realised that the 
merchants who had been so valuable a support to him when in 
power would not support such an alliance, particularly after 
Grenvillets declaration in the House of Commons which no doubt 
would soon have become well-known among them. Perhaps this 
accounts for the fact that he made virtually no attempt to 
patch up the quarrel after 24 November 1767 and the evidence 
suggests that the reconciliation meeting on 26 November was not 
206 
pressed for by Rockingham.. Thus mercantile pressure and 
204. Fr-ooke p. 324 P Winstanley 2p. cit. pp. 191-19,3. 
205. Winstanley 2E.. 2itopp-189-191. Newcastle did attempt to 
explain away as rumours or said in temperf Rockingham's 
supposed words about not consenting to serve with Grenville 
at his meeting with Bedford on 26 November. Bedfordf however# 
called for a personal explanation from Rockingham. See B. M. 
Add-Mes. 32931 f289 et. Ujq (misplaced document in a volume for 1761) "Substanc7e-of what passed this morning with the Duke of Bedford" 26 November 1767 where it is stated that Bedford said Grenville made a second attack on the Rockingham American policy on 25 November., far worse than the first. 
I 
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influence must indirectly bear some responsibility for the 
failure of the Rockinghams to join the administration in July 
1767 and to form an alliance with the Bedfords from July until 
November 1767. The mercantile alliance of the first Rockingham 
administration was still affecting Rockingham and the Rockingham 
Whigs. It appears to have had very little effect on Newcastle 
buts as shown above, his ideas and influence were of little 
significance in the development of the policy of the party 
at this time. 
Yet for the Rockinghams the failure of the negotiations 
had a sting in its tail. On 3 December 1767 West reported to 
Newcastle that Camden had said that it was impossible for 
207 
"Stamp Men! ' and "No Stamp Men! ' to agree. Because they did not 
agree the "Stamp Men! ' had joined the administration and the 
failure of the Rockinghams to join the administration meant 
that even though Charles Townshend was by this time dead# the 
opposition to his duties met a sterner resistance than the 
opposition to the Stamp Act did during the first Rockingham 
administration. It may be asked whether Rockingham realised 
that by refusing to join the administration and by refusing to 
make an alliance with the Bedford Whigs he was indirectly 
208 
forcing the government into a sterner policy towards America. 
206. See B. M. Add. hlss-32987 ff87-88 Rockingham to Newcastle 24 
November 1767 (written in early hours of 25 November). Ibid 
f109-110 Rockingham to Newcastle 25 November 1767; ibid 
f119 Rockingham to Newcastle 26 November 1767. Rocking am 
wanted to call on Bedford for an explanation of his conduct 
he did however draw up with the other Whig leaders the 
Paper that Newcastle showed to Bedford on 26 November 1787. 
See B-LI-Add*Mss*32931 f289 (misplaced document) "Substance 
of what passed this morning with the Duke of Bedford 26 
November 1767. fl 
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On the other hand as the Rockingham Whigs failed to make 
an alliance with another political party and were becomimg 
condemned to opposition they were gradually forced to seek a 
wider basis for their political support. This ledp in succeed- 
ing yearss to the strengthening of some of the mercantile ties 
formed during the first Rockingham administration and as 
Professor Ritcheson states 
"Rockingham's conception of party was thus taking on a 
surprisingly modern tone. jVhile the old corps poured 
out a stream of advices threats and entreaties he was 
writing to Dowdeswell, of Newcastle's hurries and 
Impatience and want of Steadiness to adhere strictly 
to.... one of the Fundamental Principles on which we 
have acted. " 209 
He continues by saying that although Rockingham's policy 
condemned the party to long years in opposition, he saved the 
it 
party as an independent unit, and allowed/to develop in a 
210 
modern style, seeking a far wider base for its support. The 
inspiration for this wider support was the merchants, the 
allies that the administration had found during the Stamp 
Act Crisis. 
207. B-M-ADD. Mss-32987 M49-150 West to Newcastle 3 Decemb-er-----ýý, ', 
1767. - 208. Cf. Brooke-op-cit-pp-332-333. 
209. W. WI. M. Rl-860 Rockingham to Dowdeawell 14 September 1767. 
2" 00 CIhIAd-RIdt&@! aro*A06: 'ý. cit. pp. 106 - T* 
210. Ibido'-ppo' 106 - 79 
.. 
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(E) THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1768., 
Prom the point of view of this thesis the Parliamentary 
business that was transacted after November 1767 and before 
the general election of March 1768 is of little importance. 
In this period Newcastle seems to have made only one effort to 
muster his mercantile following for a parliamentary division 
211" 
and this was on a purely local affair of a Surrey toanpike road. 
When the East India Company came under discussion again in 
Parliament the Rockingham Whigs made no attempt to rally their 
212 
mercantilez,. ' following. Most of the party leaders were now 
becoming preoccupied with preparations for the forthcoming 
general election. 
Rockingham had retired to Yorkshire following the failure :, 1 
of the negotiations of July 1767 and on his travels through the 
county one would suspect that he met his mercantile friends and 
that politics were discussed. There arej, among his papers., two 
letterspone from a merchant in Manchester and another from 
Lancaster, thanking Rockingham for gifts of venison for the 
213 
entertainment of the town corporations. In making these gifts 
Rockingham must have had in mind the support he had received 
from these places during the first Rockingham administration, 
the need for continued mercantile support, and the forthcoming 
212. 
213. 
B-M-Add-Mss-32987 f266 Newcastle to Thomas Pelham 1.3 
December 1767. ibidlof278 "Letters wrote this day" 3.4 
December 1767. 
Ibid. f296 Rockingham to Newcastle 16 December 1767; B. IL 
Addeliss., 32988 f2i West to Hurdis 15 January 1768. 
W-W-M-R1853 Robert Hyde to Rockingham 2 September 1767; ibid. 
Rl-865 John Bowes to Rocki ý- 21 October 3: IbY. 
Lancaster can be placed in a special category at this 
time 
as preparations for the impending election had already 
commenced there. r 
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general electionp in which for Rockingham., Lancaster was to 
figure so Btrongly. 
Another merchant with whom Rockingham was in contact at 
t1is time was John Milnes, the Wakefield woollen manufacturerp 
who had been important at the time of the Stamp Act Crisisip, 
At this time Milnes seems to have been consulting Rockingham 
concerning a debt that Milne8 had owing to him through trade 
with Portugal# and for which he was unable to secure repayment. 
Rockingham seems to have taken a personal interest in the 
problem for there are endorsements in his hand on the documents 
214 
concerned. As Rockingham had been in contact with Milnes on 
political affairs at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis and there 
is no letter from Milnes to Rockingham extant explaining the 
Portugese debt affair it is logival to assume that the two met 
and it is likely that politics were discussed if the state of 
Milnesstrade was under consideration. Rockingham may have 
contemplated taking some political action with regard to Milneet 
trade later in the year, for on 21 December he wrote to 
Newcastle 
"Lord Hardwicke dined with me today and says he will pay 
you a visit in the holidays* I think he approves that 
some notice should be Uken after the meeting of Parliament 
both of the augmentation of the army in Ireland and also 
some enquiry into the state of the Portugal trade. 
Charles Yorke called after dinner and means to see 
Mr. Dowdeswell and Burke on these subjects again during 
the recess. " 215. 
For this affair see rrZr Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 230-232. The document3referred there as W. W. M. R27-30 have since been re-arranged and are now W. W. ILR1-794. There is no 
personal letter from Milnes to Rockingham but the first 
d6cument is a letter from Edward Hay in Portugal to John 
Milnes dated 31 May 1767. From the date of this document 
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Burke and Newcastle appear to have been more active than 
Rockingham during the summer months. As early as 10 May 1767 
Abraham Rawlinson had approached Burke with the suggestion 
that the latter should stand for Lancaster in the next general 216 
election and Burke must have spent some time considering the 
situation and talking the matter over with Rockingham and 
possibly with Rawlinson too although he does not appear to have 
gone to Lancaster during the summer of 1767 and there is no 
record that Rawlinson visited Burke. 
After the Rockingham administration fell from power in 
July 17ý6 correspondence and contact between Rawlinson and 
Burke lapsed. It was re-opened by Burke who wrote to Rawlinson 
217 
on 31 January 1767. Rawlinson replied in March 1767 with 
a letter which made it quite clear that he regarded the 
Rockingham Whigs as the only party who could pay regard to 
commercial affairs and entered into a detailed criticism of the 
218 
commercial measures of the first Rockingham administration. 
Burke was thus maintaining contact with a merchant with 
whom he had been associated during the firgt Rockingham 
administration. That this contact was worthwhile was shown by 
214. keontd)it is logical to,, assume that Rockingham. was dealing---'-- 
with the affair in the summer of 1767. 
215-B. M. Add. Mss-32987 f374 Rockingham to Newca8tle, 21 December 
1767. There is no evidence in the Commons Journals or 
, Lords Journal that Parliament devot7e-d any time to trade 
with Portugal after Christmas 1767 and before the general 
.. election of '1768. 
216-W. W. M. Bk 1-76. Rawlinson, to Burke 10 May 1767; See above PZ02, 
217-This-, letter, is missing see Copeland and Smith'22. citop*375 
but is-, referred-to in the"letter, from Rawlinson to Burke 
23 March 1767 (W. W. M. Bk 1-69. ) 
218. W. W. M. Bk 1-69 Rawlinson to Burke 23 March 1767 quoted 
above 31; 6,445-446. 
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Rawlinson's words; the merchants were coming to rely on the 
Rockingham Whigs. By March 1767 at least one. important merchant 
was regarding the Rockingham Whigs as the onjy party that 
represented the mercantile interestsp and when Rawlinson asked 
Burke to stand for Lancaster in May 1767 it may have seemed 
a triumph for Burke'B political ideas for it looked as if the 
claim that the Rockingham Whigs represent6d trade put forward 
219 
in A Short Account of a Late Short Administration was being 
justified and accepted by the merchants. 
When Rawlinson approached Burke he said that the Lancaster 
merchants wanted a representative who understood commercial 
problems and who would promote the interest of the merchants 
and the manufacturers. Burke was gaining a reputation for 
being able to speak for the commercial classes. Yet he did 
not stand. Burke seems to have withdrawn because at Wendover 
he had a safe seat but at Lancaster, * a thriving commercial 
centrep he would have to undergo an expensive contest with 
220 
Sir George Warrenp the governmeýnt candidate# who spent lavishly. 
Loyalty to his party also seems to have been a factor, probably 
the chiefy in dissuading Burke from standingý for when Burke 
visited Rockingham at Wentworth' and discussed his 
candidacy he found., Rockingbam antago - nistic. Rockingham 
219. Burke Works Vol-IIop-4. 
220. Cone pp-Rit. -pp-153-160. Cf. Burke to Charles OtHara 27 
October 1767: printed Burke-Correspondence Vol-I., eGi 
Copeland p! 
_330.. 
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appeared to feel that Burke's candidacy at Lancaster would be 
resented by the Cavendishes who might look on this as their 
province and expressed the wish that the party should be spared 
221 
a struggle in the north-west. Burke's decision not to stand 
was clinched when he visited the borough although he never 
222 
specified his reasons. 
Perhaps this incident is an apt commentary on the relations 
between the Rockingham Whigs and the merchants in 1767. The 
preferences of the merchants were still subordinate to claims 
of leadership by birth# politicalýexpediencyjp and questions 
of party discipline. Although they were willing to encourage 
and use mercantile support to perform a task set before them 
the Rockingham Whigs were not willing to go out of their way 
to cultivate mercantile support. ý- 
Newcastle was the most active of the three statesmen in 
keeping in contact with the American-mercantile interest upon 
election affairs for he reg'arded the general election as being 
of the utmost importance. On 12 November 1767 he wrote to 
Admiral Keppel 
"Our plan., in ýy humble opinionp both in and out of parlia, 
ment., ought to be that which may best carry the publick 
with usp andp consequentlys be the more likely to be of 
service to our friends in the choice of the next parlia- 
ment, q for there must ultiinately end all our endeavours. It is from the next parliament that this country must be 
saveds and the cause of those who wish it best supportedV2 
223 
221. Cone op-cit-p-158. The Cavendish interest was based on the 
estates that the family had inherited from Sir William 
Lowther. 
222. See Cone 92.. Sit. p. 158. 
223. B-M. Add-Mss-32986 f391 Newcastle to Admiral Keppel 12 
November 1767 quoted Winstanley cit. p. 184 n. 1. Cf. 
Brooke 92- cit- Po 339,1 
ii' 
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The new Parliament was indeed to take many important 
decisions particularly with regard to America and in view of 
Newcastle's opinion of the importance of the election it is 
not surprising that he was in contact with his mercantile 
associat, esp especially those who had been of assistance at 
the time of the Stamp Act Crisis. He kept in contact with 
Rockingham throughout the course of the election and discussed 
the candidature of the party's mercantile adherents with him. 
On 20 November 1767 in a memorandum headed 
"To consult my Lord Rockingham upon the f ollowing persons 
whom I should wish to bring into Parliament if I had 
room. " 
Newcaptle included the names of-Sir William Baker., his son# 
224 
and Bartholomew Burton. 
Newcastle was in touch with Rose Fuller, mainly over 
election affairs in Sussex. The two seem to have met-on 16 
August 1767 and although Sussex election affairs appear to 
224. B. M. Add. Mss-32987 f53-Memorandum 20 November 1767* 
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have been the main topic of conversation., co=ercial affairs 
may have been discussed# for when Newcastle wrote to Fuller 
asking him to attend him he stated that he wanted his opinion 
225 
on other topics besides the Sussex elections# bilt by September 
1767 Newcastle was suspicious of Rose Fuller and described 
him as "the Duke of Grafton's friend". This was possibly 
because Fuller had voted against the reduction of the Land 
Tax and seemed to be supporting the Chatham administration 
even if he had assumed a pro-Rockinghamite attitude over the 
Townshend Duties. These suspicionso however, do seem eventually 
226 
to have been allayed. Another "City friend" with whom 
Newcastle was in contqct over Sussex election affairs was 
227 
Bartholomew Burton. Newcastle was 'also trying 
225- B. M. Add. Mss. 32984 f 120 Newcastle to, Rose Fuller 30 July 
1767 
' . 
-Ibid f137 Rose. Fuller', to. N4icastle, -1 August 1767. 226. B. M. Ad7d-. Mss-32985 M"Newdastle, to. Mansfield 4 September 
1767., 'See also ibid-f94. Newcastle-, tolohn Norris 14 
Septemberý1767j, ibid. f353,, Newcastle to Thomas Pelham 5 
October 1767; B. M. Add. Mss* f428 Newcastle to Norris 
14, November l767--'--Cf-'above-, p. 46T--. -,., and, p. 485 - See also Namier and Brooke The-House-of . C6ýmons 1754-1790 Vol-II9 
p-479.. For a more favourable,, view, see Bom-,, -Add-. -Mss. 32989 
f202'John Norris to. Neweastle-18, March 176& 
227. B M-ýAdd-lfssý32984 f126 Bartholomew, Burton-to Newcastle, 
31 July 1767. Newcastle wasýin-contict with Burton again in 
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unsuccessfully to procure a living for the son of John Bristow 
228 
one of his old City associatesp and was depending upon the 
help of the merchants Peter Burrell and Sir George Colebrooke 
229 
in the Sussex elections. Newcastle met Sir George Colebrooke 
and Arnpld Nesbit on 30 August and election affairs appear to 
have 'been again discussed although Newcastle was again suspi- 
230 
cious of their allegiance. In Sussex alsoo at Shoreham, Newcastle 
was endeavouring to assist the East India merchants Peregrine 
231 
Cust. 
Newcastle was also in touch with Sir William Baker who 
was incapacitated and recovering(from the effects of a paralytic 
Btroke)at Bath. There was some discussion between Newcastle 
and John White whether Sir William Baker' a sonp William Baker. * 232 
should stand for Parliament at Retford in the 1768 election. 
227. (contN September. See B-M-Add-Mss-32985 f88 Newcastle 
to Mansfield 14 September 1767* 
228. Ibid-f189 Newcastle to the Dean of Lincoln 6 August 1767; 
ibia. f223 Dean of Lincoln to Newcastle 15 August 1767. 
John Bristow M-P. (1701-68) a merchant chiefly interested 
in the Portugal trade and the South Sea Company had been 
consulted by Newcastle on financial affairs and was 
regarded as a Newcastle supporter. See Nanier and Brooke 
The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. Il., pp-118-119. 
229. B. M. Add. Mss-32984 f210 Richard Turner to Newcastle 7 
August 1767; ibid-f218 Newcastle to the Duke of Dorset 8 
August 1757. Peter Burrell (1723-1775) was a London 
merchant and an erratic Newcastle supporter. For him see 
Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1780 Vol-IIP 
pp. 160-163. For Colebrooke see above, p., 133. RicHard Turner 
in his letter of 7 August 1767 mentions a mr. Amyand in 
the same sentence as Burrell. This cannot be Sir George 
Amyand the City financier upon whom Newcastle had relied 
so often (see Namier Structure of Politic8pp, 55-56) for 
he died in 1766 and is son John was o sixteen years 
old at this time (see Judd 22. cit. p 104) and could be 
either Claudius Amyand (1718-177M) 
; ýo 
had left Parliament 
in 1756 (ibid-p-104)uZb whom I have been unable to trace 
any co=16-Mion: s- or George Amyand (1748-1819) son of Sir Geawge who changed his name to Cornewall. on marriage in 1771. See Judd 22-. Si-t-P-160 also The CoM21ete Baronetage 
} 
y 
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Eventually at this election Sir William Baker retired and his 
son William Baker replaced him as the member for Plympton Erle. 
4% 233 
Newcastle arranged this with Lord Mount Edgeumbeo 
As on earlier occasions Newcastle regarded the Dissenters 
as important and was intent on gaining their support. After 
a Sussex elect ion finee t-in&, -: -h6,, wfote tb. lohn White 
"I knew you would like I should have the approbation of 
everybody and not less of the Honest Protestant Dissenters 
The Presbyterian Minister, after I had spake turned to 
our first man amongst the dissenters and sAidt My Lord 
Chatham could not have spoke better. The other replied 
not from the heart as this man does. " 234 
22V* kContd) Vol*V. *I! (O'(-l800 p-1 under Amyand. 230* B. M. AddoMBS. 32985 f5 Newcastle to Thomas Pelham 3 September 
IlbY* Arnold Nesbit (3: f2l-17119)-was a London merchant who 
owned plantations in the west Indies. See Namier and 
Brooke The. House of Commons 11154-11190 Vol. II # pp. 194-195* 2.31, B. M. Add. Mss-329b6 f362 Newcastle to Richard Tonson 11 
November l7bli., See also B. M. Add*Mss-329ts5 f391 Newcastle 
to Admiral Keppel 12 November VbYe Cust was eventually 
elected see B. M-Add-Mss*ý529tj9 f201 Henry Robinson to 
Newcastle 18 March 1*tbdo For Gust see Namier and Brooke 
The House of Commons 11154-1790 Vol,, II,, pp-291-294* 
2; 52.13-M-Add. Mss. 32985 Y-202 Sir William Baker to ]Newcastle 23 
September IýIb7; ibidof278 Newcastle to Sir William Baker 
29 September Ifo, r; ibidef2dts Newcastle to White 3 October 
IfoY- William Bakeir-junior (lot43-1824) was eventuduy to 
enter Parliament as member for Plympton. Erle in I-to8,, the 
borough for which his father had sat until that time and 
to become a staunch supporter of the Rockingham Whigs. 
For him see my Barlow Trecothick, etc pp. 1; 58-142. For 
Burton and Baker see also B. M. Add. mss. 32987 fb3 Memoranda 
"To consult my Lord Rockingham upon the following Persons 
whom I should wish to bring into Parliament if I had room! ' 
20 November VoY. For Baker's political career see Vamier 
and Brooke The House of Commons, Vb4, -1-t9o Vol., II, pp-42-" 233, See B. M. Add*Mss-32988 f411 Sir William Baker to Newcastle 
29 February 1768; B. M. Add-Mes. 32989 V Newcastle to Lord 
Mount E4gcunbe 1 March 1768; - ibid, f227 Newcastle to thra George Cavendish 20 March 17E78-. Cf. Judd M.. 2. ite p. 110* 
2349 B. M. Add*MSS*32984 f330'. Newcastle to John White 25 August 
1767. For 6ther occasions when Newcastle regarded the 
Dissenters as important see above pp. 48-52. 
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2t this tire also the Duke of Portland was endeavouring 
to persuade Newcastle to use influence with the dissenters to 
gain the support of John Cooksons a dissenting London linen 
draper who possessed considerable influence in Lancashire and F., 235 i i., Westmoreland, and on 5 October 1767 Newcastle recorded enter- 
236 
taining some dissenting ministers to dinner. 
In March 1768 Newcastle again became concerned with the 
Dissenters. On 5 March he wrote to William Dowdeswell asking 
him to write to a dissenting ministerp Dr-Stennet) in order to 
237 
gain the assistance of the dissenters in Gloucestershire. It 
is not clear why Newcastle wanted I)owdeswell to write to Stennet 
238 
for he already knew Stennet, himself. In the same month Newcastle 
was trying to gain support of the dissenters at Lewes in order 
to win the election there. He endeavoured to get the London 
239 
dissenters to put pressure on the Sussex dissenters. 
In November 1767 both Rockingham and Newcastle became 
235. B. M. Add. Mss-32985 ff3--4 Portland to Newcastle 2 SepteRb--e-r-ý- 
1767. For Cookson see The Universal Directo London, 11163 
Part IIIp p-118 where John Cookson of Poultney is listed 
under the heading Warehousemen and Shopkeepers. According 
to Portlandf Cookson had influence over the dissenters 
in the north-west through the marriage of his niece to a 
member of the Torr family of Br6%ýght6n Towersy Lanes. 
236. B-M, -Add-Mss-32985 f358 Newcastle to Albeimarle 5 October 
V67. For the Dissenters see above Part Ip Chapter Ije 
237. B-M-Add-Mss-32989 f35 Newcastle to Dowdeswell (no date but 
probably 5 March 1768) ibid-fl53 Thomas Gibbon to Newcastle 
12 March 1768. Dowdeswell was anxious to assist George 
Augustus Selwyn (1719-1791) who was opposed at Gloucester. 
238. See Above p. 41 and note 239 below, Newcastle wrote to 
Stennet about the Sussex dissenters on 12 March 1768. 
239. B. M. Add. Mss-32989 f63 Newcastle to Ridge 6 Larch 1768; 
ibid-f143 Newcastle to Bailey 10 March 1768; ibid-f-1,3Q- 
1= Newcastle to Drs. Stenneto Longfords, Gib'Eo-ns and Toller 10 March 1768; ibid--flft Newcastle to Michell 12 March 1768,; ibid. f145 Newei'se to Dr. Stennet 12 March 1768. 
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involved in election affairs at Lancaster* When Burke refused 
to stand there the Lancaster merchants pressed Lord John 
Cavendish to stand. on 10 November Rockingham wrote to Fewcastle 
"The gentlemen and merchants of Lancaster have prevailed 
upon Lord John Cavendish to stand there. The zeal and 
spirit not only in the merchants but even in the much of 
the majority of the gentlemen who have estates around 
Lancaster on behalf of Lord Johns will I trust ensure 
success. They mean it as a compliment and a mark of the 
continuance of that favour and opinion which they 
considered that administration wherein your Grace and 
we all acted. " 240 
and on 9 November to Dowdeawell 
'IL(or)d John Cavendish is statted-at Lancaster. The 
Neighbouring Gentlemen and Tbree parts in ZmtfoZ-. the 
1.1'erchant8 have, at length prevailed and made him siande 
By the delay he has lost some advantage but the zeal 
and spirit of the Commercial interest will bear down 
all diffinulties and I hope it is safe-" PA 1 
Rockinghampal leasts seems to have regarded this event as a 
result of the first Rockingham administration and its commer- 
cial legislation. 
This influence of the Lancaster merchants is made clearer 
by a letter that Lord George Cavendish wrote to Newcastle on 
the following day in which he said 
A great number of the principal merchants and of the 
gentlemen of the greatest weight in the neighbourhood 
of Lancaster would propose John as a candidate for that 
town ... I take the liberty to enclose to Your Grace the 
names of those at whose advice it wast' that John was 
proposed as candidate. Many of your friends in the City 
will know many of them to be persons of great weight-" 
240- B-M-Add-1,188o32986 f330 Rockingham to Newcastle jo Nove=er 
1767. For this election see Namier and Brooke The Eouse 
of Conmons 11154, -1790 Vol., 1. *pp- 316-317* 
241. W. W. M. Rl-869 RockiHiham to Dowdeswell 9 November 17670ý 
242. B, -M. Add--Msso32986 f355 Lord George. Cavendish to Newcastle 
11 November 1767. Unfortunately the list mentioned Is 
missing. It appears to have been given to James West. See 
ibid-f418 Newcastle to Lord John Cavendish 14 November V67s 
The 'list is9howevers, not to be found in the West Paperso 
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On receipt of this letter Newcastle used the list to organise 
support for Lord John Cavendish. James West was sent with it 
to Newcastle's City friends to put pressure on any one with 
243 
any influence in Lancaster and the news that Cavendish was 
standing for Lancaster appears to have created a considerable 
244, 
stir among the supporters of the Rockingham Whigs. 
At first things looked most hopeful for Cavendish at 
Lancaster. On 16 November 1767 James West reported to Newcastle 
that Lord John Cavendish was sure of a victory and would possibly 
take Burke in with him as the other member. West also noted 
that the Quakers, a very influential body at Lancaster# were 
solidly behind Lord John Cavendish. ThiBj one would suspect# 
was due to the influence of Abraham Rawlinson. West had gone 
to the extent of sending to the Customs House to find out which 
merchants had the largest consigmments of goods in London for 
Lancaster in order that they could be encouraged to influence 
245 
their correspondents. In a letter to Lord John Cavendish on 
the following day Newcastle acknowledged the great part that 
246 
Abraham Rawlinson was playing in these events. He wrote to 
Rockingham on the same day 
I'My friendq my good Lord George# has sent me a full account 
of the Lancaster affair: I most sincerely congratulate 
your Lordship upon it: for it is the greatest proof of 
243. Ibid. M8 Newcastle to Lord George Cavendish 14November 
1767; B. M. Add. Mss. 32987 ff5-6 Newcastle to Portland 16 
November 1767. 
244* Ibid-f425 John Norris to Newcastle 'Saturday night'(14 
November 1767) 1 
245. Ibid-fl West to Newcastle 16 November 1767. 
246. Ibid-f19 Newcastle to Lord John Cavendish 17 November 11167. 
:ý 
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the sense of the principal merchantsp and traders of 
that part of the kingdom, that can be given and must and 
ought to show everybody in town and country., how mach the 
mercantile part of the nationg (and that is a great and 
most valuable part of it) approves the conduct of your 
Lordship's administration-" 247 
Newcastle as well as Rockingham was now ascribing events at 
Lancaster to the success of the commercial legislation of the 
first Rockingham administration. 
When Lord John Cavendish wrote to Newcastle on 24 November 
he was not so optimistic as Newcastle had been. Although he 
admitted that he was likely to win the election at Lancaster 
and acknowledged the great help that Abraham Rawlinson had been 
Cavendish pointed out that his opponentsq who had four months 
start on hims had "engaged all the lower sort of people and 
248 
spared no expense to keep them firm to them-" Burke was ell'.. 
active on behalf of Cavendish; Y* obtained the support of 
William Reeve, the Bristol merchant who had co-operated with 
the Rockingham Whigs at the'time of the Stamp Act Crisis# to 
249 
engage all the votes he could for Cavendish. Rockingham also 
was active on behalf of Cavendishlendeavouring to persuade 
the Manchaster merchant Robert Hamilton to help Cavendish and 
250 
in return soliciting patronage on behalf of Hamilton. 
247* Ibideffl5-16 Newcastle to Rockingham 17 November 
f19 Newcastle to Lord John Cavendish 17 November 1767. 
248* lbid*fIO3 Lord John Cavendish to Newcastle 24 November 17b? 
The Court candidate at this election was Sir George Warren js 
He received support from Lord Strange. See ibid. fl West 
to Newcastle 16 November 1767; B. U. Add., Hss., 332-9-86 f329 
Rockingham to Newcastle 10 November 1767* For this election' 
see The Parliamentary Rel2resentation of the Six Northern 
Counties of England 1603-1886 by W-W-Bean#Hulltl89O p-27'6. 
249* B. 1-I. Add,, MSS*32987 f173 castle to Rockingham 5 December 
1767; ibid-f198 George Wearet Mayor of Bristol to Newcastle 
7 December 1767; ibid. f2O2 Newcastle to George Weare 8 
December 1767 (67--copies at W-W-M-RI904, -5) Reevep who 
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In spite of all the efforts on his behalfpin the middle 
of March 1767 Lord John Cavendish withdrew from the election 
at Lancastery finding that he was bottom of the poll and that 
251 
an enormous amount of expense was inevitable. He was eventuallY 
252 
elected for Yorkp where# after his failure at Lancaster# Rock- 
ingham, persuaded him to stand and put pressure on the Rockingham 
253 
Club and the corporation to receive his election. Benjamin 
Farrar, q one of the Yorkshire mercantile witnesses before the 
Stamp Act Committee appears to have been used by Rockingham 
254 
as an agent in this election. 
Following Cavendish's failure at Lancaster# Rockingham 
received a letter signed by twenty-three Lancaster merchants 
among whom was Abraham Rawlinsong regretting the loss of Lord 
255 
John Cavendish as Parliamentary candidate for the borough. 
The other election involving merchants and trade in which 
Rockingham seems to have been particularly interested was at 
Liverpool. Here the staunch Rockingham Whig Sir William 
Meredith had, at a bye-election in 1767p succeeded in bringing 
in another pro-Rockingham We_g: t! -jndiaj%jjMTth ' -t-IjL7Vý rplIM, %b! ýt ah 
249. (contd)was at this time in London# was pressing Newcastleý6 
to go to Bristol to receive the Freedom of the City when 
he next visited Bath. -Newcastle., however,, declined I 
pleading ill-health. ;i 250. W. W. M. Rl-881 Robert Hamilton to Rockingham 23 November 
1767; ibid. Rl-896 Rockingham, to Thomas PA&s 4 December 17G7.,. 
251. B. M. Add. Mss-32989 fl9l Lord John Cavendish to Newcastle 
15 March 1763*) 
252. See Namier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 
Vol. IIpp. 204. 
253. W. W. M. Rl-983 a and b. 2 draftst Rockingham to Charles 
Turner nd. ibid. Rl-1000 Lord John Cavendish to Rockingham 9/10 March 1768; ibid. Rl-1004, Lady Rockingham to Newcastle 18 March 1768; ib TdRl-1013 James RoWe (Lord Mayor of York) to Rockingham. For the Rockingham club see above p. 
4 
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Richard Pett nt., as his fellow member and Rockingham was con- pa 257 
sulted during the bye-election. In 1768 Meredith and PeýMnt 
258 
again successfulýy contested Liverpool. In 1768 Barlow 
Trecothick was also standing for election for the City of 
London. Newcastle 8eems to have taken an intereBt in Trecothick's 
election and on 18 December 1767 James West reported to Newcastle 
that "there was a most numerous meeting at the King's Arms 
259' 
for Mro Trecothick-11 By 17 January., howeverp West was more 
pessimistics, reporting to Newcastle that Trecothicks Joseph 
Mellish and Bartholomew Burton were unlikely to be in the next 
Parliament. When this occurred Newcastle wrote to Rockingham 
260 
urging him to help these candidates as much as he could. On 
19 January West wrote to Newcastle's amanuensis Hurdis., explain- 
ing Trecothick's unpopularity 
r 
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254. B. M. Add. Mss-32989 f187 Rockingham to Newcastle 16 March 
1768;, ibid. flgl Lord John Cavendish to Newcastle 16 March 
l'168I*'_Ib__id-fl75 Lady Rockingham to Newcastle "Tuesday 
morning' 15 March 1763) in which Farrar is mentioned as a 
brother-in-law to Sir George Armytage (1734-1783) M. P. 
for Yorkp a friend of Rockingham's; ibid-fl, 77 Newcastle to 
Lady Rockingham 15 March 1768 in which Newcastle states 
he knew Farrar (presumably through the Stamp Act Committee) 
See above p-382. For the election at York see Brooke cit. 
pp-347-350* 
255. W. W. M. Rl-1015 John Bowes and 22 other signatories-71all took- 
ingham 20 March 1768., 
256. See Ijamier and Brooke The House of Commons 1754-1790 Vol. I 
I., p. 318 Vol. IILp. 262. 
257., W. W. M. Rl-876 Sir William Meredith to Rookingham, 21'*November 
1767; ibid. Rl-894 Sir William Meredith to Rockingham 2 
December 1767. 
258. Namier and Brooke M-Rit-Vol-IIjp-2629ý 
259. B. M. Add-Uss-32987 f325 West to Newcastle 3.8 December 17611. 
260. B. M. Add. Mss-32983 f33 West to Newcastle 17 January 1768; 
ibid. ff35-36 Newcastle to Rockingham 18 January 1768. 
Joseph Mellish was another City friend of Newcastle. Burton seems to have retired in Irma. See below P-543 and n. 266. 
i 
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I am sorry to tell him (Newcastle) that the opposition 
to Alderman Trecothick gains great strength from his 
actions as a friend to the Colonies# in opposition to 
the trade of Great Britain# which however untrue His 
Grace too well knows, has the weight in popular 
elections-" 261 
On the same topic William Samuel Johnson wrote to William 
Pitktn 
"Experience has shown the utility of moderate measures 
and every deviation from the former system will# I am 
persuadedp be found prejudical. to both countries. Some 
there are who have the same right notions of these matteraq 
amongst whom I may name the worthy Mr. Trecothickp who 
has very just and clear opinions of the true interest of 
Britain and her Coloniesp and is a friend to America 
upon principle# as well as by education# though unfortu- 
nately for himp those. bpinions and this friendship are 
now turned warmly against him. He has offered himself 
a candidate for the City of London at the approaching 
elections and is almost every day violently abused in 
the papers as an enemy to this countryp and unfit to 
represent his fellow citizenspbecause he received his 
education at Bostonp and-hasp upon many occasions# 
espoused the interests of the Colonies. Strange 
objections thesef you will say! especially in the mouths 
of those whop at the same time insist that members of 
Parliament which they elect are also the representatives 
of America-. "'It hast-II know; been long the labour of 
our enemies to render-the case of the Colonies unpopular$ 
and they would now,. it seems have a-frienaship for 
America'constitute an odious character in,, Wity of London 
and render emity to that country a necessary qualifi- 
cation for a member of Parliamento, e*ý. Surprising as these 
objections must appear to all unprejudiced observerep 
yet seconded as they are with warm declarations upon 
the inimical nature and tendency of the'Boston resolveB 
and proceedings with respect to the trade and manufact- 
ures--of this countryp'--they seem to make unhappy impres- 
sions and wills I fearp, endanger this gentleman's 
election-" 262 
261. Ibid. f49 James West to Thomas . Hurdis 19 January -I! rb8. 262. William Samuel Johnson to William'Pitkin 12 March 1768, 
"The T2mbull Pppers" loc- cit-PP-267-268. - 
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Trecothick's actions on behalf of America had not met with 
unanimous approval; the interests of the merchants and the 
colonists were not always synonymous. in spite of this 
Trecothick was eventually elected for the City and on 24 March 
Newcastle commented to Richmond 
"My Friendj, Mr. Alderman Trecothick was with me this 
-evening to notify his election for the City. This is a great point and he will be a very useful man. " 263 
and in April William Samuel Johnson observed to William Pitkin 
264 
that Trecothick would be "a useful and very worthy member-" 
Indeed the Rockingham Whigs had gained an important victory. 
They had now secured a mercantile leader with distinct American 
connections in the House of Co=onsy a mercantile leader of 
very different characteristics to Sir William Baker who always 
had close affiliations with finance and administration. 
In the same letter in which he recorded Trecothick's 
unpopularity James West also recorded another example of how 
he was working on behalf of the mercantile interest of the 
Rockingham Whigs and strengthening their position. He wrote 
"I am sure that he (Newcastle) Will be glad to hear 
that on Sir Samuel Pludyer's death who was to be govr. 
of the Bank (of. 'England) next yearp I have prevailed on 
his good friend'Mr. Burton to take that most Important 
office a second timep the'next, year; and my friends among 
the directors and--proprietors will support him thereim 
265 
263. B. M. Add-Uss 32989 f25Z Newcastle to Ichmond 24 
264. William Samuel Johnson to William Pitkin 29 April 1768, 
"The Trumbull Papers", loc. cit.. P. 271; ''-' 
265. B. M. Add. I. Iss-32988 f49 Ty_est7, to,. Rurdis.: L9 January 1768. 
Sir Samuel Fludyer-'was an American, merdhant, and government 
contractor. Apparently, he did not die until 21 January 1768. *See Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution p-242on-2. 
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This manoeuvre appears to have 'been unsuccessful for 
Burton was never governor of the Bank after 1762 and he seems 
266 
to have retired from politics at the general election of 1768. 
In view of the illustrations given above it can be con- 
cluded that Newcastle was very active on behalf of the mercan- 
tile supporters of his party during the general election of 
1768. This is specially noteworthy as he had supposedly 
retired from p6litics in December 1767 after his serious illness 
267 
in that month. It is also significant that'a great number of 
individuals on whose behalf Keweastle was active had been his 
close associates during the Stamp Act Crisis. Rose Pullers 
Barlow Rrecothick and Sir William Baker are probably the most 
outstanding'of these. The attempt to support Trecothick and 
thus gain a City leader for the Rockingham Whigs is particularly 
important. One should not underestimate Newcastle's influence 
and importance in 1767 and 1768 as Mr. Brooke seems to do 
when he writes 
"By July 1767 the number of Newcastle's followers had 
dimished to six; these were the only votes he could 
cot=nd in the House of Commons chosen while he was head 
of the Treasury and the Crown's chief election agent* 
Only one remained of his numerous City friends on whom 
he had depended for, advice on commercial and financial 
business Sir William Baker-"-- 
and 
"'Newcastle, - I suffered badly at the General Election of 1768.268 
Newcastle appears to have been reasonab3, v satisfied with 
the results of the general election of 1768. On 30 March he 
wrote to the Duke of Portland 
266. See Namier and Brooke p cit. Vol. If qp. 164. 
J67 See below p. W. 268. Brooke op-cit-pp. 283p342. 
M. Add* Mss. 32; 389 f276 He"ficas-tie-7to Portland 30 March 1768 
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"The appearance hitherto of the new Parliament pleases 
me extremely. There are now above an hundred new members 
and I thinky by the best judgement I can form at present# 
we sLiall have a good chance of having 6 great# if not 
the greatest part of them. " 269 
and on 22 March he had written to Rockingham 
"The new Parliaments which in generals will be composed 
of Persons pretty much unknown# willphoweverl have a 
very great number of blembers of the first Consequence 
Family and Fortune, entirely attached, where I wish them 
to bet to my Friend the Marquis of Rockingham. And I 
think when the Elections are all over, Your Lordship 
will appear to have such a number of Friends as will 
give you the greatest weight in Parliament-" 270 
It may be concluded that the 1768 election was of great 
importance to the Rockingham Whigs arA an election in which 
they consolidated their position with the mercantile influence. 
The events that had occurred during the first Rockingh= 
ad-7-inistration were clearly of lasting significance. 
269. (contd) quoted Brooke 22-citep-360. For an analysis of 
how the new members voted7on particular occasions see 
Brooke a-cit-pp-351-353- 
270. W. W. M. Rl-1018 Newcastle to Rockingham 22 March 1768. 
. ý. 
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(F) TER RETIREMENT AND DEATH OP NMVCASTLF,. 
271 
After his serious illness in December 1767 and even while 
the preparations for the General Election of 1768 were coming 
to a climaxp Newcastle made up his mind to f6tjj"jrfj57ajj9. frOm 
politics. He seems to have first announced his intention in 
a letter to Lord Mansfield on 20 December 1767. In this letter 
Newcastle stated that because of his health and age he had 
long wished to retire from politics but had not been able to 
see the way he could do this because it would have meant 
"abandoning quite the interest of the publick and the cause 
of my friends-" Nowphowever, he felt that 
the great reputation he (Rock6mgham) has gained# both 
during his short administration and sincep the high 
esteem he certainly is in with the --most considerable 
people and bodies of men in this countryt the great 
number of them who will certainly follow hims have 
made me choosep MY Lord Rockinghamp as the person upon 
whom I could most safely depend, for the support of the 
true interest of this country and the most unparalleld 
Priendshipp regard and confidence which he has show'd 
me a, &** OPCý 
Newcastle therefore had determined to retire from politics 
272 
and allow Rockingham to manage his political affairs. 
In tvro letters after this Newcastle endeavoured to make 
his supporters aware of his retirement. The first of these 
271. Cf. Brooke a. cit. p. 34.5; Winstanley 2p.. Sit. p. 202. 
272. B. M. Add. Hss-32987 f363 Newcastle to Mansf ield 30 December 
1767. It is interesting to note that Newcastle states in 
this letter that he had received a private undertaking 
from Rockingham that he would consult Mansfield if necessary 
Mansfield was Rockingham's uncle and he had often advised 
him in his youth. See Collyer "The Rockinghams and 
Yorkshire Politics r142-176111 loc-citop-352* 
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letters was to James West, whom Newcastle instructed to inforia 
his City friends and those members of the House of Lords who 
supported himf of his decision and to ask them to give their 
support to Rockingham. It is interesting to note that Barlow 
Trecothick was mentioned specifically together with Bartholomew 
Burton and Joseph Mellish even though Trecothick was not yet 
273 
in Parliament. The second letter was to Thomas Pelham and 
gave him the same instructions with regard to Newcastle's 
274 
Sussex supporters. In two letters shortly after this West 
275 
beported his compliance with Newcast2etB instruztions* 
in" spite of his decision to retire'from Politics 
Newcastle, as noted above, played a full part In the 1768 IA 
election campaign and as late as 8 February 1768 he was 
engaged in marshalling votes to supportAGeorge Savile's 
276 
Nullum Tempus Bill. Althougli Newcastle scarcely ever attended 
the House of Lords after December 1767 he does seem to have 
continued to be quite activepolitically, and'aldo acted as 
an elder statesman givin In August 1768 
.g 
the party advice. 
he was concerned with questions of patronaget for on 23 August 
he wrote to Sir George Colebrooke asking him to secure a friend 
277 
ý' ' of Thomas Pelham a positioi ifi the East India Company. Indeed 
273. -B-M-Addellss-32988 f23 liewcastle to West 16 January 1768. 
274. Ibid-f25 Newcast: Le', t, o Thcjnas Pe: Lh=,:: L6 January 1768. 
275. Ibid 
, 
f33-West to Newcastle 17 January'1768;, ibide f48 
Wes t to Hurdis -19 January, 1768,,; 
,_ , 276. lbid-f232'Newcastleýtio West-8 February 1768. ' The Nullum 
' Tempus Bill'was'OCCaBioned by'the controversy bet, ý een the 
Duke of Portland-and'Sir James Lowther"'over-Inglewood 
2 Cit. Forest. ' See Winstanley . 205 209j'Brooke . pp. 243-247. ' 
277. See'List of Lords present-, in I L6rdn journals. VOI-XXXII 
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in January 1ý68'Newcastle wrote to Rockingham that he had been 
rpproached for his interference in public affairs after he had 
278 ' 
declared that h6 had resigned. In fact he was very anxious 
that Rockingham should come to power again, and saw Sir George 
Savile as a potential leader for the administration in the 
27P 
House of Commonse 
Newcastle regretted the hostility of Rockingham to the 
Grenvilleites for he felt that no administration could be 
280 
formed without their assistance. He had debates reported to 
him and seems to have been particularly interested in the 
speeches of his former mercantile associateal men like William 
Baker and Barlow Trecothick, although it is not vlear whether 
he was more interested in the subject matter than the speaker. 
on 19 May 1768 West reported to Newcastle that when the riots 
in London associated with Wilkes were being discussed# William 
Baker had spoken and that 
"Alderman Tresothick gave an account of the state of the 
seamen and the fear and dread of the merchants on that 
account-" 281 
Newcastle also entertained the relativea of his former 
City associatep Sir Joshua Vannecks who were now becoming 
277. (contd)1768-1770 pp-3-162. Newcastle attended the Hou-se 
of Lords on 24 November 1767. After that he only attenddd 
once more on 13 September, 1768 to take the oaths for the 
new session of Parliament., For, the patronage question 
see B. M. Add-Ilss-32991A f2l Newcastle to'Bir George 
Colebrooke 23 August 1768. 
278. W. W. M. Rl-957 Newcastle to Rockingham 27 Ja I nuary 1768. 
279. B. M. Add. Mss-32990 f39 Newcastle to Rockingham 5 May 1768. 
Newcastle seems to have been particularlyýlmpressed by 
Savile's promotion of the Nullum Terapus Bill. 
280. Ibid. f75 Newcastle to Bessborough. 16 May: 1768- 
281. Ibid-flO3 West to Newcastle 19 May'1768, ibid. f107 Matthew 
548 
282 
important in politics and he was kept well informed of the 
283 
activities of other mercantile associates such as Rose Fuller. 
Newcastle remained in close contact with Rockingham at this 
time. When Rockingham was away from home this contact was 
maintained by Lady Rockingham., and the surmer of 1768 seems 
to have been +eriod when Rockingham and Burke felt they were 
particularly sure of the support of the mercantile class. 
Indeed on 18 July 1768 Burke wrote to Rockingham saying that 
the latter was in a very good position to conduct the govern- 
ment of the kingdom since he had "the confidence of the whole 
284 
mercantile interest". 
It is quite clear that*Rockingham was keeping his finger 
on the pulse of mercantile opinion for in a letter to Newcastle 
on 16 April 1768 Rockingham informed him that he intended 
dining with the Lord Mayor of London and the other City 
officials on 18 April so-that he-could find out their political 
285 
opinions. - 
In the last months'of Newcastle's life two political 
problems came to the forefront# John Wilkes and America. John 
Wilkes-had become important again during the Middlesex election 
of 1768 and in May 1768 the Massacre of St. George's Fields 
had occurred, andýhad"., served to ýkeep Wilkes in the centre of the 
281-keontd)Fetherstonhaugh to Newcastle 19 May 1768. Trecothick 
was-supporting aý. petition-of the-London Ilerchants on the 
ofict9, presented at this time. '. See copy, of the petition 
at; W. W. M. Rl-1054. 
282. B. M. Add. Mss,, 32990, f250 Newcastle to Rockingham 28 June 
1768;,. The. menýreferred to are Sir'Joshua Vannech's son 
and his son-in-law Thomas Walpole. 
283. Ibid-f309 Thomas Pelham to Newcastle 15 July 1768- Ibid 
f370 Thomas Pelham to'Newcastle. 2 August 1768- 
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political stage. Wilkes capitalised on the real economic 
distress of the lower classes and both government and oppositiorl 
recommended repression of the disorders that he was Causing- 
It is interesting to note that at no time during the 1768 
Wilkite disturbances did the Rockinghamites endeavour to win 
popular approval by supporting Wilkest and Wilkes does not seem 
to have been an issue on which the Rockingham Whigs could use 
286 
the alliance with the mercantile classes to advantage. During 
the London and Middlesex election the City and its financial 
community seem to have been predominately hostile to Wilkes 
although the aged and ailing Sir William Baker seems to have 
287 
made an effort to take up his cause during the London election. 
As far as America was concerned both government and 
opposition were involved in dealing-with the American re-action. 
to the Townshend Duties of 1767. The issues at stake at this 
time weres in particularl, the Boston non-importation agreement 
and the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768 and the riots 
1 288 that the Townshend Reverme Acts had occasioned. Newcastle 
was not unduly alarmed by, these events for on 23 July 1768 
he wrote to Rockingham 
284. Ibidf3O3 Newcastle to, -Lady, Rockingham 13 July 1768; ibldt--"ý, ý 
f3ll Rockingham'to Newcastle 17 July 1768. The Correspo ij 
dence of-Edmund Burke Vol-II., ed-T. -S-Butherland, Cambridge 
1960pp-30 Burke to Rockingham 18 July 1768. 
285. B. IA. AddoUss*32989 f342 Rockingham to Newcastle 16 April 17 sa IF, 
286. See Brooke op-cit-pp-354-360; Winstanley op. cit., pp-218-230. 
287. Christie 22.. 2itep-27; The'Middlesex Election of 1768-1769 
-- by George-Rudej, ýEnglish Historical Revie Vol. LXXXV# London 1960 PP. 609. 
288.. Brookeý2p. cit. pp-365-366; -Winstanley a-cit. pp-232. 
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"These New England people always were a refractory people; 
ever since and indeed even in King William's time-" 289 
As a result of the disturbances in Americap Grafton and 
Hillsborough replaced Sir Jeffrey Amherstp the non-resident 
governor of Virginia by Lord Botetourt who was e ected to 7W 
reside there and help soothe the refractory colonists. Botetourt 
01 
was a former adherent of Butes and the Rockingham Whigs saw in 
Amherst's replacement not only the removal of a capable and 
meritorious officer but also the sinister influence of the 
291 
favouriteb. 
Newcastle not only deplored the policy of the goverment 
but he considered it a useful topic for p, olitical opposition 
292 
by the Rockingham Whigs. His hopes were raised when it was 
reported that there was considerable disc6ntent in the City 
of London with this policy of the goverrment and it seems 
eXtremely like3. y that he may have had some idea of using 
mercantile discontent to gain popularity for the American 
293 
policy of the Rockinghams. In June 1768 the "Liberty Incident" 
took place and the chief victim 'of the Boston mob was Joseph 
Harrisonp who had been Burke's assistant during the Stamp Act 
Crisis and for whomp just before he resigned in 1766p Rockingham 
had secLered the, pbsition', bf Collector of Customs for Boston- 
When news of , the'incident'was received the Rockingham Whigs 
289 B-M-Add-Mss-32990 f340 Newcastle to Rockingham 23 July 1768* 
290. Brooke. '6p. 'cit. ýp- 666-368-- ' ý. I 
291-B-11-Add. -Us-s-72990 f389 Newcastle to Rockingham 6 August 1768; 
Ibid. ff4,05-, 407, 
_ 
Rocki#gham to Newcastle 11 August 1768. Cf - 
Brooke, Op. cit' . 368 i5t See also W. W. M. Rl-1080 Albe)ý=rle to 
" 
Rociýiý 
30 
Auýtý '=Ord8. 
292. B-IM. , Add* Mss- 32990 f374 Newcastle to Albetmarle 3 August 1768. 
293-lbid., f378 Alberliarle to Newcastle 4 August 1768; ibid 
T-30 Newcastle to Rockingham 6 August 1768.; 
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tended to take a much more serious view of evento in the 
colonies, particularly after the report that Harrison sent 
294 
Rockinghwn. By 24 August Newcastle was writing to PLIbemarle 
"I wish your Lordship would let me have what particulars 
You may have picked up relative to the behaviour of 
our Colonies in America. It is represented very bad* 
And I am afraid it is so. It is even called a revolt-" 
295 
On 31 July Sir George Savile had written to Rockingham 
viewing the events in America in the most serious light and 
on 14 August Dowdeswell did the same. Savile had heard the 
news about Harrison when he wrote and by 14 August Dowdeoviell 
296 
must certainly have done sop for Rockin&am had informed 
Dowdeswell when he wrote to him on 11 August discussing the 
297 
dismissal of Amherst and the confusion of American affairs. 
With regard to the new outburst of American resistance to the 
authority of the mother country Savile felt thatpto some extent, 
it was inevitable that colonies should rebel and become 
independent. He wrote: - 
"I am afraid these same colonists are above our heads 
and I am almost ready to think that G(eorge) G(renville)s 
Act only brought on a crisis 100 or possibly 50 years 
sooner than was necessary. This indeed is# regarding 
Colonies, almost all the ill that can be done# for in 
294- For Harrison and this affair see Trq Barlow Trecothick 
pp. 101-128 and my "Joseph Harrison and the Liberty Incident'# 
pp-585-593. For the Rockingh=3'reaotion to the Liberty 
Incident see especially Burlte Correspondence Vol-IIop-11 
Rockingham to Burke 11 August 1768.1 ( 295. B. M. Add. Mss. 32991A f27 Newcastle to Albemarle 24 August 1768, t 
296. W. W. M. Rl-1077 Sir George Savile to Rockingham 31 July 1768* 
Dowdeswell Papers,, William L. Clements Library# William 
Dowdeswell to Rockingham 14 August 1768. Cf. Brooke. 2p.. 
cit. pp-368-373. Harrison was a personal friend of 
Savile and he wrote to Savile personally about the "Liberty Incident" see imy Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 111-120. 
297. W. W. M. RI-1083 Rocking to William Dowdeswell 11 August 
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my opiniong(which may be in this a little singular) it 
is in the nature of things that some time or other 
Colonies so situated must assume to themselves the rights 
of nature and resist those of Law# which is Rebellion. 
By rights of nature I mean aduantages of situation or 
their natural powers, I am sorry I have confounded B&g&t 
and PoNver so much-" 298 
DowdeBwell felt that it was no longer possible to argue 
for the repeal of American taxation on the groundB of commer- 
cial expediency because it was the princip 
Ie of taxation that 
the Americans were obviously resisting and he wrote 
"It is the duty of the administration to support ; Yhe 
government of this countryq and obtain the execution of 
the laws. They are not to suppose resistance. Their 
case differs from ours in this. We had a real grievance 
a very heavy tax from which we meant to relieve the 
colonists. The tax now in question is no heavy burden 
up6n them: and the objections to it should rather come 
from this side of the water than from theirs. The 
Ministers have therefore a principle to meets but no 
grievance unless the principle of the colonists is 
right and ours is wrongs a thing not to be admitted by 
the Administration or by us-11 
Therefore Dowdeswell could not agree to a repeal of the 
Townshend Duties unless the Americans submitted to British 
authority. He continued 
"If they (the colonists) submit and make no resistance 
I should like very well the repeal of C(harles) T(owns- 
hendýS dutieB,, but tlxey are really too insignificant to 
be an object either to them or usp and to go further 
would be in favour of their principle and tend to revive 
their claim some other day. " 
He added ominously 
"I must however confess to you that I think we shall be 
soon trying who shall stand most forward in proposing 
terms of accomodation. to end a struggle by which this 
country.. possessed of everything has everything to lose 
29'r (contd) 1768. It is logical to asswne from this letter that 
the letter of Harrison's sent to Rockingham was the one 
reporting the "Liberty Incident". 
298. W. W. M. Rl-1077 Sir George Savile to Rockingham 31 Tu3, v 1768. 
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and nothing to get. For a contest with the colonists# 
supported as they will be by the enemies of this 
country, must be destructive to us in the first place. -*" 
He concluded 
"This leads me to my decision for ffach moderation. I 
could find much to say against any dissent that any man 
could offer: but upon the whole moderate measures are 
less dangerous, and if we come off at last. t. with a loss 
those must answer for it who have wantonly and unnec- 
essarity revived the questionp and I believe now profess 
that these duties were laid merely as a test to the 
Americans.... 0 29S) 
Both Savile, and Dowdeswell now admitted that the American 
since 
controversy had developed further aRd the Rockingham adMinist- 
ration had repealed the Stamp Act. This is significant I for 
important leaders of the Rockingham Whigs admitted that the 
situation was no longer static. Both Savile and Dowdeswell 
took a gloony view of the situationp both had little to offer 
Rockingham in the way of a policy and both admitted that the 
Americans now seemed to be challenging the right of the British 
Parliament to tax them. In 1768 commercial matters were no 
longer at the heart of things and Rockingham must have been 
painfully aware of this when he wrote to Dowdeswell on 11 
August and mentioned that the demand from America for Yorkshire 
300 
woollen goods was "the greatest ever known! '. In the circum- 
stances in the summer of 1768 the alliance of the Rockinghama 
with the mercantile classes was not likely to prove valuable. " 
As William Samuel Johnson reported to William Pitý: 4on 30 July 
; &VV* Dowdeswel-L papers WI. LllaM I& (aements Libraryl lVilliam 
Dowdesivell to Rockingham 14 August 17(38. Quoted Brooke 
. 
22* c it., pp. 370-3V24. 
300. W. W. M. Rl-1083 Rockingham to Dowdesivell 11 August 11168. 
from London 554 
"The intelligence relating to the commotions in Boston 
has been reveived here with equal concern and indig- 
natiom The impressions it at first made were surprising: 
the stocks fell greatly and there seemed to be a 
general consternation2 but indignation soon took place 
of every other sentiment, and all parties united in 
demand of vengeance (as they expressed it) against 
that insolent town-" 301 
and on 20 October 11168 he wrote 
"The merchants say they had no thanks for what they did 
on former occasions and do not yet seem to interest 
themselves much in our favour. Should they embark in 
the cause it would give great weight to our solicita- 
t ions. 11 302 
Rockingham tended to agree with Dowdeswell and Savile's 
assessment of the situation. It is not clear whether he 
admitted that the situation had changed but he still placed 
his reliance on the policy that the first Rockingham adminis- 
tration had enacted. On 2 October he wrote to Joseph 
Harrison, the victim of the Liberty riot : 
"I own I feel just as angry at the dangerous madness 
of some in America as at the passion and obstinacy 
of some at homej, and my only reliance is - that there 
are still at home those who will adhere to their 
maximsp justness and mildness towards the colonies 
and that in the colonies there are still as many who 
will co-operate with them by checking a conduct in the 
Colonies which has every now and then broke out in the 
most dangerous and offensive manner. 
The Declaratory Bill which we brought in to fix 
and ascertain the rights of this Z-ountry and its 
Colonies is what I must and sttIl ever adhere to. 
The exerting of this right is a matter which ought 
to be well considered and the ability of the colonies 
ought ever to be the first postulatum ground to go 
upon. There is no entering into the arguments pro 
and con in this subject without making my letter much 
too long and especially to you who already know my 
sentiments on the matter. 
;I 
301* "Trumbull Papers" loc-ci p-293. William Samuel Johnson 
to William Pitkin 50-jýu'ý 1,168. 
302. Ibid-P*298 William Samuel Johnson to William Pitkin 20 
October 111b8. 
LI 
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If the affairs in America go on with warmth# I have 
no doubt that the restrictions of the Acts of Navigation 
will be considered as a virtual taxation -I am sure so 
far I should agree with them# that they have the same Tan- 
dency as a Tax and allways were# it is an argument to 
those, who often assert that the colonies pay nothing to 
the support of the mother country. If I tie my tenants 
to grind at the manor mill# I certainly raise money upon 
them virtually for I let rny mill the better for their 
being tied to be its customers. " 303 
Pewcastle expressed his ideas on the American situation 
in a letter to Rockingham on 12 September. He had a different 
opinion about the situation and wrote 
"I hope our friends will adhere to the principles that 
they have acted uponj(when Parliament meets) when we 
repealed the Stamp Act. It is the same question and my 
Lord Hillsborough's view plainly to set up, and support 
the contrary doctrine there. I hope we shall disappoint 
hims for I think it comes to thatp the Parliament will 
never join in a measure that must totally destroy all 
connection with the Colonies and is directly contrary 
to their proceeding in the Repeal of the Stamp Act and 
the principles upon which that repeal was founded* 
I doubt by great mismanagement, the measure of 
conquering the Colonies# and obliging them to submit is 
become now more popular than it was. It is certainly 
the measure of the administration and I am afraid some 
of our Friends are a little tender on that point. But 
it must not be submitted to: and for nW own partp whoever 
is for it I must in consciencep enter cy protest against 
it. And I hope, our Friends will consider before they 
give into so destructive a measure. 
The Court have already laid their hands upon the 
East Indies .... Ands if they are sufferld to do what they 
please in America# this nation will find itself in time# 
deprived of its two greatest and its moot real and 
considerable strength and support. " 304 
305 
Newcastle also wrote a similar lettet to Dowdeswell. 
303. lbid-RI-1100 Rockingham to HarriBon 2 October 1768. 
304. B-M-Add-Mss-32991A ff94-96 Ilewcastle tp Rockingham 12 
r September 1768. Part printed Brooi; 'Lj5p. 373-374- 
305. lbid. fflll-12 Ilewcastle to Dowdesweii 17 September 1768. 
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Newcastle seems to have seen far less to the root of the 
American problem than Savile, Dowdeswell or Rockingham. His 
ideas had not developed with the changing situation and it 
would seem that he was unwilling to admit that the American 
situation was not static. This may have been partly due to 
senility and partly to his semi-retirement which left him 
short of accurate informationp but he had always reached his 
opinion on problems with reference to the needs of I)arty 
politics and he was doing the same here. It was important to 
Newcastle that there should be a clear division of opinion 
between government and opposition on the American issue. 
In the years after 1768 the solution to the American 
problem.. 'which the Rockingham Whigs offered., seems to have 
owed far more to Newcastle's, ideas than to Dowdeswell's. 
This was unfortunate. The "Newcastle -solutioel founded on 
British commercial interest offered little hope of solving 
the American problem. As this solution was based upon a mercan- 
tile support, which grew less 'strong as Merchants turned to other. 
306 
fields besides America, it grew less popular politically. 
Dowdeswell realised that the issues that divided England 
and her colonies were no longer of great commercial importance. 
His readiness to accept a-changing-situation and look for a 
solution based on compromise would seem to have been far more 
likely to attain success.,., Thus'to'some extent the commercial 
alliance of th6'Rockingham Whigs'may be blamed for their 
failure to evolve a satisfactory solution to the American 
problem. De s ir ing to protect the'tr'- e of Britai' ad n 
306- Cf-l'Trumbull Papers" 1OC4. c*t. . 298 William Samuel Johnson -d-Z 67 er 768 c to William Pitkin 20 Luoted above p. rrý 
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and maintain their alliance with the commercial classes they 
were handicapped in their attempt to find a real solution to 
the aspirations of the developing American Colonies of which 
they professed to be the champions. 
In September and October 1768 Newcastle seems to have 
gained some idea of Dowdeswell's notions on America. He 
became alarmed that members of the Rockinghhm Whigs should 
agree to Dowdeswell's ideas of supporting the ministry and 
making the Americans submit. He wrote to Dowdeswell about 
this endeavouring to make Dowdeswell conform to the "party 
line" and he also wrote to Rockingham and Albe/marle urging 
them to make the party show an united front. At the beginning 
of October 3368 Newcastle wrote to Rockingham urging him to 
make a plan with his friends for the coming session of 
Parliament. There is no mention of the mercantile interest 
in this letter and at this time there seems very little doubt 
that the mercantile interest was not in the inner councils 
30V 
of the Rockingham Whigs The statesman whose opinion and 
actions upon America Newcastle was most satisfied with at 
30? 
this time was the yoAng Duke of Richmond. 
Until his death on 17 November 1768 Newcastle was kept 
well informed of the development of events in America and he 
died in an atmosphere of deepening gloom for every report 
30Y. B. M-A-dd- 11sF. "32992A f3: 07 Newcastle to Albe"rle lb 
September 11168; ibid. flll Newcastle to Dowdeswell 17 
September 11168; ibid-f206 Newcastle to Rockingham 8 
October 1768. 
30g. Ibid-f220 Newcastle to the Marchioness of Rockingham 10 
Ocotber 1768; ibid-f224 Newcastle to Lord Frederick 
Cavendish 10 October 11168. 
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seemed to demonstrate how serious the situation in the colonies 
30q 
was becoming. Only one event lightened the gloom. On 3 
November W68 Rockingham wrote to Newcastle that the situation 
had not further deteriorated. He wrote 
"I have just received an account from the City that 
advice is received from Boston with the account of the 
arrival there of the first two regiments and that the 
select men have very quietly ordered quarters for them 
in Fort Williamp so that hitherto has no violence 
17 happened. " ,, Do 
Rockingham had been expecting violence but it did not occur. 
Most of his information at'this time seems to have come via 
310 
Barlow Trecothick. 
By a strange paradox right at the end of his life just 
when Newcastle was urging the staunchest opposition to the 
American policy of the government., Rockingham and the other 
Whig leaders tried to heed his former advice about co-operating 
with George Grenville. Thus in November 1768 in the reply to 
the address at the opening of Parliament., they would not raise 
the question of America for fear of dividing the opposition 
311 
and losing the support of George Grenville. 
Instead of America, Corsica was chosen by the Rockingham 
312 
Whigs as a subject for opposition in November 11168. The 
Corsicans under Pasquel Paoli had rebelled against Geonese 
307. 
3 f*6 
17 
311. 
312. 
lbid, qf2t3l Mansfield to Vewcastle 20 October VbS; ibid. 
fL%b Albetmarle to Newcastle 29 October 11168; ibid. f359 
Albe/marle to Newcastle 30 October Voa- For Newcastle's 
death see Winstanley . 
21?.. cit-p-239.2: 1ba. 
B. I. I. Add., Mss*32991A f3'16 Rockingham to Newcastle 3 vovember 
See W. W. M. Rl-1112 Barlow Trecothick to Rockingham 4 
November lYb8 (morning) ibid. Rl-1113(a) Barlow Trecothick 
to Rockingham 4 NovembeiT =-tt58 (1 pm) ibid. Rl-1113(b) Barlow 
Trecothick. to Rockingham 4 November I-rou k4 pm) ibid 
Rl-1114 Parry Wentworth to Rockingham 4 November=lfb;. 
B. m. Add-Mes-32991A f265 14ewcastle to Richmond V October 
1768. ibid-f403 AlbeZýmarle to Newcastle 7 November Vb8- 
Ibid. r4O; 5 Albeimarle to Newcastle It November 1,1bts.. 
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rule and during 1768 Corsica was coming under the power of 
France. Barlow Trecothick and another London merchant# 
Samuel Vaughan# in 1768 and 1769 were active in collecting 
subscriptions for Pasquel Paoli. Paoli wrote a letter of 
thanks to them for their efforts. This letter was published 
in the London Chronicle in translationo but the original of 
the letter is among the Burke Papers at Lamport Hallrp. North- 
amptonshire. It thus seems likely that the Rockingham Whigs 
were, active in urging Trecothick on in the matter of the 
subscription. Some of the funds for the subscription were 
public but there wm also substantial private donations and 
probably much came fw= the Rockingham Whigs. Soon after 
this event Sir William Meredith wrote to Burke refusing to 
participate in another subscription because he had not been 
consulted over that which had been raised for Paoli. As the 
letter from Paoli to Trecothick and Vaughan is among the 
Burke Papers it seems logical to conclude that it was the 
Rockingham Whigs who gave the driving force to the subscrip- 
tiom The Rockingham Whigs were still finding those merchants 
with whom they had worked at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis 
valuable-# and they probably worked through Trecothick as 
he was a very convenient City patriot and was in a good 
313 
position to organise a subscription of this nature* 
ivor znis see my 13arlow Trecothick etc pp. 66-67. See also "I'asquel Paolip an Inspirat-ion to the Sons of Liberty" 
by G. P. Anderson.. Colonial Society of Massachusetts 
Publications Proceedings 1924-1926 Boston 1927, p-180 et 
sect. See also Burke Letters. 9 Northamptonshire Record Officep Lamport HallsA/XIV/33 Paoli to Trecothick and Vaughan 20 March 1769; London Chronicle 22-25 June 1769; 
W. W. M. Burke Letterst Bkl-1,31 Sir William Meredith to 
Burke 28 August 1769,, 
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Newcastle died in a changiog world. Chatham had resigned 
in the middle of October 1768 and his restraining influence 
on American policy and on men like Grafton was now finally 
314 
removed. Newcastle's party seemed to be becoming more and 
more a party of opposition when he died and to be losing that 
sense of urgency in the search for political power which he 
always gave it. Iff in the endq Newcastle's ideas on American 
affairs set the pattern for the policy of the Rockingham Whigs 
rather than Dowdeswell's perhaps it was because these conformed 
more with the ideas of Rockingham personally. There is no 
evidence that Rockingham's belief that the solution to the 
American problem was the Repeal of the Stamp Act and the 
Declaratory Act and the non-implementation of a stated right# 
315 
had been modified by November 1768- 
But if Newcastle's influence on the Rockingham Whige at 
the time of his death was small his contribution to the partyl 
whether they cared to acknowledge it or noty had been great. 
Newcastle had built up the connection of the Old Whigs with 
the "City Interest". He had maintained this connection after 
his fall in 1762 and had secured the support of this interest 
for opposition in 1763 and 1764. He had done much to reconcile 
the City Interest with the somewhat antipathetic force of 
mercantile interest during the first Rockingham Administration 
1765-1766. He had accepted the mercantile interest and 
314. Cf. Brooke 22-cit*Pp-381-384. 
315. For Rockingham's ideas on America at this time see VI*W-M- 
R1=1100 Rockingham to nCL-rfts-oe-. Z bZ: tbbdrA74'0`boted above 
1: P- 554-5. 
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realised its growing value and the leader of this interest# 
Barlow Trecothickv Newcastle regarded until his retirement in 
316 
1768 as his adherentt rather than Rockingham's. It was 
Newcastle more than anybody else who had chosen Rockingham as 
his successor as the leader of the Old Whigs and it was 
Newcastle who helped and aided Rockingham to establish his 
position. After Newcastle's deathp because the Rockingham 
Whigs were continually in opposition# mercantile support was j 
more valuable to them than the support of the financiers- 
After 1768 the City interest ceased to be so important but 
from Newcastle the Rockingham Whigs learned how to handle the 
merchants who became a similar type of pressure group. 
Old as he was Newcastle had been at the centre of politics 
at the time of the Stamp Act Crisist and his assiduity and 
skilful handling of the merchants at that time was of great 
assistance to Rockingham. From him Rockingham seems to have 
inherited an appreciation of the value of information from 
the commercial classes. 
In the last two years of his life when he was again in 
opposition Newcastle tried to guide his supporters in what 
W! he thought was the best policy and tried to show them that it 
was in the best interest of England and themselves to gain 
office if they possibly could. These principles were often 
forgotten in the years immediately after Newcastle's death*, 
Above all Newcastle seems to have prized the alliance 
with the financial and mercantile classes which Rockingham 
never appears to have forgotten,, 
316. See above P*ý549, 
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CONCLUSION. 
A) ROCKINGHAMp-NEWCASTLE AND THE MERCHAMS. 
The scene which emerges in this theiis is painted against 
4 
a backeloth of growing mercantile representation in the House 
1 
of Commonsp slight perhaps$ but none the less significant# 
particularly in an age which was the prelude to one of great 
indilstrial growth and rapid trade expanston, and which itself 
was a climax of a great mercantile empire. During this period 
the two leaders of the Newcastle and Rockingham Whigsp the party 
which Burke claimed represented the mercantile classes# were in 
ýý 
t.. I ýi 
ý:: 
contact with an appreciable-number of merchant members of Parli- 
aments indeed with a much higher proportion than the size of the 
2 
party warranted. As is to be expected, Newcastlep because of 
his long tenure of office and his particular connection with 
goverment finances was particularly associated with financier$# 
bankers# and more wealthy merchants. On the other hand Rocking- 
ham., who was by 1768 emerging as an opposition leaders, was 
connected with less prominent and less wealthyi-OLerchants and 
manufacturers who allied with him to put pressure on Parliaments 
both when he was in and out of office.. to secure the enactment 
3 
of legisl-ation which was favourable to their commerce. 
The relations between the politicians and merchants 
considered in this theiis show an increasing preoccupation 
with American affairs. This is. scarcely surprising as the 
years 1761-68 saw some of the most important preliminaries 
in the-'events which led up to the struggle between Great 
1. See above pp. 6-8.2- See above pp. 
3. See above pp. 15-17. 
1 
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Britain and her American colonieE;. Moreover for the American 
merchant this was a period of change and readjustment: America 
as a market was becoming much more important and was changing 
4 
its role f4m a source of supply to a market. The Stamp Act 
Crisis occurred at a time when the American market was generally 
expanding and'it made the effect of the general post-war slump 
much harder. It cannot be doubted that the use of mercantile 
discontent by the first Rockingham administration was not 
merely a piece of political management. It was a true relection 
of the severity of the crisis in the American trade occasioned 
5 
by the Stamp Actp for the emergence of an organised group of 
American merchants at this time and the evidence given before 
the Stamp Act Committee points to the fact that by 1765 there 
was considerable specialisation in that trade. The effect of 
British legislation after 1766 was never so severe or immodiate 
as at the time of the Stamp Act Crisis, nor were these effects 
felt at a time of widespread slump. Moreover after 1766 the 
merchants began to weigh their personal economic interests 
against the political and constitutional issues of the rights 
of the British Parliament and realising increasingly that the 
struggle with the colonies had not ended in 1766 they began 
to insure-themselves against, economic loss by turning to 
other markets. Concern for the welfare of their American 
customers thus gradually changed to bitterness at the. loss 
6 
of their trade- Thus the nature of the trade and the magnitude 
ý ", 1 1" 
d 
lih fill' 
4. See above pp. 20-21.5. See above pp. 25-27s, 
6. See above'pp. 29-34. 
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of the crisis at the time of the Stamp Act does much to explain 
why the Rockingham Whigs suddenly emerged in 1765 as the great 
champions of the trading interest. For the first time for many 
years trade had come to the forefront of the political stage. 
The informal viliance to which Newca6tle had only paid lip- 
service may have existed for some time but it was only with 
the Stamp Act Crisis that it became obvious to all and it must 
be admitted that it was not conscious choice but political 
7 
necessity which made Rockingham use the alliance. The success 
of the Rockingham Whigs in repealing the Stamp Act# their 
difficulty afterwards in holding their mercantile supporters 
together and pursuing an effective opposition to measures 
which they realised were detrimental to commerce can also be 
related to the economic pattern of trade with the American 
colonies. 
The connection between the Newcastle and Rockingham vjh198 
and the merchants seems to have originally derived from the 
traditional Association of the Whigs with religious dissent 
and from Newcastle's continued attention to trade and finance 
as a result of his preoccupation with goverment finance. In 
his respect for dissenting opinion Newcastle continued a tradi- 
tion which had been established by Walpole. He, far more than 
Rockingham his successory considered the dissenters as a 
separate entity, as an interest whose support it was worthwhile 
8 
to cAltivate- Rockingham's different attitude can be related 
7. See above pp. 1-367. 
8. See above pp. 
r3-72. 
., S ., 
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to the change that was occurring in dissent. The dissenters 
were becoming less powerful as a unif ied interest. They had 
loot much of the religious fervour which distinguished them in 
9 
the early eighteenth centuryp and with increased economic 
growth trade and industry often became more inportant to 
members of this class than religion. Rockingham codld often 
win the same support as Newcastle among the dissenters by 
interest in economic affairs but in Newcastle's early years 
in office at least# the interest of the dissenters in general 
had to be considered as something separate from trade and 
commerce. Other features contributed to this diffgreiire 
attitude betbfen the two ", Vhig leaders. As the eighteenth 
century progressed the dissenters beca, -,. e more radical. When 
they became the-champions of American liberty and political 
reformthey had become too extreme to earn the sympathy of 
10 
the Rockingham Whigst who were thus forced to redefine their 
attitude towards religious dissent and-they revived the old 
Whig principle of religious toleration on which the alliance 
with the dissenters had originally been built. The Rockingham 
Whigs continued to represent the dissenters ih so far as they 
supported religious toleration but the orIer of priorities 
had been reversed. Thus under Rockingham the party became 
one which stood'ehiefly for the trading interest and supported 
religious toleration partly because many traders were dissenters. 1, 
Under Newcastle the party had been the champion of dissent and I 
because many dissenters were merchants and traders of some 
sort, had paid particular attention to trade. 
10. - Sue, nuvu PP. 67--d9. 
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This change in attitude can also be related to the change 
in nature of the party from the time of Newcastle to the time 
of Rockingham. Under Newcastle the Party was usually in power 
and it was important to maintain the allegiance of identifiable 
interests which could be turned into blocks of votes at 
election times and loyal supporters of goverment when 
controversial legislation was to be enacted. Under Rockingham 
the party beca: me one of opposition. It was intent on defend- 
ing the principles on which it believed it had based its actionn 
when in power, not with marshalling ij; s supporters: for eight- 
eenth century oppositions did not necessarily secure the over- 
throw of administration because their supporters were more 
numerous and more cohesive. Abstract principles such as 
religious toleration were more important to Rockingham and his 
11 
colleagues than the support of the dissenting interest. 
Moreover this phenomenwcan be related to the differences in 
character between the two leaders of the party. Newcastle 
was a practical politician# used to power and accustomed to 
manipulating votes. Rockingham was an opposition leader. An 
idealist concerned with the vague principles of Whiggisms he 
was not really interested in the' realities of running a party 
or an administrations or a goverment =chine. Indifferent 
to whether he was'in power or not Rockingham was content as 
long as his own character and'that of his' fellow Whig aristO- 
crats remained untarnished. Thus the party under Rockingham 
11. See Tbove pp. 71-72. 
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became dominated by ideals and condemned to opposition. 
Newcastle would have willingly sacrif iced any or all of his 
principles to secure office. 
In her article "Edmund Burke and the First Rockingham 12 
Ministry" Dr. Sutherland stated that the attitude of the 
mercantile classes when they supported Pitt from 1757-1761 
shows that the alliance of the merchants with the high Whigs 
of which Burke boastedp as distinct from the alliance-of 
Newcastle at the Treasury with the financial interests generally 
known as the Imonied interest' cannot have begun before the 
period of oppo-, 'ýion beginning in 1762. It is thus in the 
period between 1762 and 1765 that we must look for the real 
beginnings of the association between the Newcastle and 
Rockingham Whigs and the mercantile classes, for in 1765 when 
the first Rockingham administration took office the first 
results of this alliance were to be seen in the co-operation 
between Rockingham and the merchants at the time of the Stamp 
Act Crisis. 
I 1- 1, When Pitt resigned in 1761 he possessed the loyalty of 
the less wealthy merchants inside Parliament and the merchants 13 
outside Parliament,, while Newcastle possessed the loyalty of 
the government financiers and those merchants who aimed at 
gover=nent contracts or high political office. This situation IP! 
governed the development of. eeR**ae-4 the relations of the New- 
castle and Rockingham Whigs and the merchants and was of 
profound influence-in the development of Rockingham as a party 
leader. On-Pitt's resignation Newcastle and his colleagues 
3M. 1,36.61 -pp-48-49 13. See above pp. 
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who remained in office carried out a series of manoeuvres 
designed to secure the support of the whole mercantile class 
14 
for the administration. After an initial success the attempt 
failed. Pitt's mercantile following returned to him and 
1, Tewcastle and the'administration viere left with only the 
15 
traditional alliance between government and the Imonied interest' 
Rockingham played little part in thece activities. He was 
not yet a national politician# merely a local magnatep but 
his association in local politics during his early years with 
independent country gentlyrand trade were to be influential 
when he took his place as a national politician as he was to 
16 
do within four years. 
It must be admitted that Newcastle was not really per- 
turbed at the failure of the administration to retain the 
17 
United support of all the mercantile classes. He had maintained 
the support of the governrient financiers who to him were the 
most important members of the mercantile claBses and with 
whom he was most concerned and to whom he was most sympathetic. 
Newcastle's concern vrith the state of the stock market and 
mercantile banl=upt'cy can be understood if it is considered froni 
the pointr , Y-iewof t1j, . of, c, e man who was responsible for raising goverment 
loans. It was fron, this group of merchants that Newcastle 
sought advice' and information on financial affairs and it 
was their attitude which influenced his attitude to the new 
war with Spain when it broke outp although it must be admitted 
14. See above Pp-83-90 15. See above pp. 90-98. 
16. See above-pp-90-9l-, F, 1 17. Cf. pp-99-116. 
18. See for example pp. 91-112.19. See above pp. 102-117- 
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that Newcastle's idea on the conduct of the vrar in general 
differed. at this time from that of a number of his mercantile 
20 
supporters in this class. Perhaps it is a mark of his success 
in his dealings with the goverment financiers that ITewcastle 
a 
could afford to differ with them on/major issue of goverment 
policy and yet ntillatatain their loyalty. 
It cannot be contended that the differences betreen 
Newcastle and the rest of the Cabinet which led to Newcastle's 
resignation in 3362 were caused because Newcastle stood for 
the mercantile point of view. His general desire for peace 
and the continued support which he wished to be given to 
Frederick the Great werephoweverv policies likely to render 
him popular and earn the support of the government financiers. 
Having resigned Newcastle attempted to embarrass the government 
by maintaining the loyalty of the goverment financiers to 
himself. This tactic was doomed to failure because it was not 
to a person or party that the financiers oradttboir allegiance 
but to administration from which they gained their economic 
22 
livelihood. Moreover Hevicastle was not a good opposition 
leader. He was too used to power to be able to effectively 
organise an opposition and too afraid of charges of disloyalty 
and faction' to be willing to declare himself an out and out 
opponent of the- governmeýt. Indeed- he vias more concerned with 
embarraBSing'th6 gover=nent: s'o that he could force himself 
23 
back into-p6wer rather than with'actual opposition. It is 
true that NeWcastle's tactics'only failed whon-Bute was able 
20. ý,, see above, -, 
PP- 104-105.21- See above 108-109. 
229 See above' fký. 138.23. See above PP- 
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to negotiate a peace and so reduce public expenditure bVrt even 
before this it was quite obvious that the loyalty of the govorn- 
ment financiers to Newcastle was wavering., and that they were in 
. 24 
fact. willing to deal with the Bute administration. 
Newcastle now began a vain search for an effective oppositiorXII 
policy. He turned first to the peace Bettlement which was not 
good choice. At first Newcastle himself did not know the 
terms that he wasýoing to oppose and any opposition to the peace 
terms was likely to meet with a very mixed reception from those 
mercantile followers whomýhe had left. Most of them would be 
glad for peace to be restored for the sake of their trade. OnlY 
a few proved able and willing'to challenge the government on 
the issue that the terms were not the beat that could be made 
25 
considering the success Britain had achieved during the war. 
The failure of Newcastle- to rally his supporters on the 
peace preliminaries and on the dismissal of the Duke of Devon- 
shire was significant. For in the discontent which this caused 
lay the origin of Wildman's club which was closely linked with 
the rise in importance of Rockingham as a political leader and 
the mercantile section of the. partyý The reil beginning of 
this group which was discofit&nted With Newcastle's policy cat 
26 
be dated from the meeting of, 30 November 1762. The party 
now began to break down into two groups$ young and old. The 
group which was in general younger more radical and anxious 
for opposition. --, 
The older group was more conservative 
and having been used, to power -was less willing 
24. See 
, 
above pp- 129-130.25. See above ppe 145_160#171-179-ý' 
26. See' above pp*'160-161. 
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to enter opposition. It was the former group which was able to*, ý 
capitalise on the marked increase of outside influence on 
Parliamentp which Dr. Sutherland has notedy and on mercantile 
influence in particular. This movement as Doctor Sutherland 
has observed was closely associated with the growth of popular 
radicalism and was able to support the first Rockingham admin- 27 
istration, during one stage in its development. It was signif- 
icant that the opposition at Wildman's club fastened on the 
Wilkes-issue as a key plank in their opposition policy for this 
enabled them to harmonise more condordantly with the radical 
28 
pressure groups developing. The position that Rockingham 
occupied in the development of Ylildman's club was also important. 
He was clever$ or fortunate# enough to maintain sympathy and 
popularity with the new and developing young element of the 
party without antagonising Newcastle and the older members of 
the party less anxious for opposition. Rockingham thus became 
29 
marked out for the leadership of the party. 
UtLtil the formation of lVildman's club in January 1764 
ued to work Newcastle and his followers contin without a real 
policy. Fle still hankered after the support of the goverment 
financiers and opposition to the peace terms, an issue which 
a more skilled leader would have abandoned as soon. - as he 
realised that he could not gain the unanimous support of his 
30 
followers and an alliance with Pitt- The N6rth Briton case 
31 
again demonstrated the lack of unanimity among the ; 7hig leaders 
IF 
27. Sutherland loc. cit. P. 4,9.28. See above pp-216-35. 
29. See abov 
,e -PP-228-233.30. 
See above PP-166-193 
31. See above pp. 214-218. 
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and opportunities to rally the opposition., such jgsuý* 66 Ed-ý-, -'Vwe Cider'ýjý 
Tax and the rivalry between Clive and Sullivan in the East 
32 
India Company were r1issed. The more the opposition failed the 
more Newcastle looked to an alliance with Pitt instead of 
trying to rally his supporters. 
Indeed it was not until the party began to utilise the 
new forces that were represented at Wildman's club that a 
policy was found or any success in opposition was achieved. 
The period of over a year when Newcastle searched for a policy 
before the rise of Wildman's club is essentially a transitional 
period. Both the goverr=ent financiers and merchants of other 
types seem to recede into the background of the story. The 
old alliance of Newcastle with the government financierss with 
the notable exception of one or two followers who recognised 
him as their political leaders had broken down and the alliance 
with the new mercantile element had not yet been 'built up. 
The r=mber of financiers whom Newcastle could rely upon by 
the end of 1763 was only one or two. It is significant that 
the only merchant that has any prominence in association with 
Newcastle during this period was Sir William Baker. He was 
not really a gover=ent financier but a merchant anxious to 
clinfb the social scale who successfully emerged as a country 
33 
gentlemam Baker was really a typical political adherent of 
'Newcastle. Yet Baker iva4of sitpreme importance. He became 
associated with the radical group at VJildman's, naintained 
his loyalty to Newcastle although heavily criticised by himp 
and formed the prototype of the merchant from Nyhom Rockingham 
32. See above pp. 1,18-183 
53. 'For Baker see MY Barlow Trecothick etc pp. 129-137. 
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was to gain. so much support. 
At first sight the merchants do not appear to be really 
important in the development of Wildman's club. But the 
realtively high proportion of merchants in the Club and the 34 
calibre of some of them meant that their views became of great 
significance. LIen like Sir William Baker were in the van of 
opposition and as American commercial issues came into the 
foreground of politics the importance of the merchants waa 35 
bound to increase. A rift developed between Newcastle and 
Baker over the'Dr-Hay affair' and Newcastle seemed to-move 
more and more out of sympathy with the Club and the radical 
36 
element of his party. He was not able to bridge the gap 
between the two sections of his party and the way vas opened 
for Rockinghean to be Newcastle's successor for he W antag- 
onised neither group. Moreover when the party had to form an 4 
administration in 1765 and it became an urgent necessity for 
the party to have an active leadert those older members of the 
37 
party who had a prior claim to its leadership had died. 
As Wildman's club becanie important the isnue of America 
became more prominent for the rise of Wildman's coincided Nvith 
Grenville's American legislation. Sir William Baker had* 
since the Seven Years 17ary acted as an American expert to the 
Newcastle Whigs but N7hen in 1764 the duty of leading the 
opposition to Grenvillets 'budget fell upon him the limitations 
34. See above P-212-213. 
36. See above P. '221-225. 
35. See above Pp. 245-247. 
37. See above PP-284-288. 
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of mercantile leadership became obvious. Even a merchant as 
a 
prominent as Baker had neither the polýqal ski]IW personal 
standing which allowed him to lead a real attack upon the 38 
government., In 1764 the greAt weal=ss of the mercantile 
section of the party also emerged for the first time. The 
mercantile interest was not one unified group: different 
groups of merchants desired different policies and the conflict 
between the interests and the West Indian and the North Americarx 
merchants which was only healed for the great crisis of the 
Stamp Act was always present in the background. Even the 
enthusiasm and impetus created by the highly successful 
organisation at Wildman's Club was not sufficient to make the 
mercantile interest put up a unified front against Grenville's 
measures of 1764. 
The first indication that antagonism between the West 
Indian and North Americans was , breaking down came in the 
opposition to the Stamp Act in 1765. In this case., howevers, 
the full force of unifded mercantile opinion could not be felt 
for the Newcastle and Rockingham Whigs viere divided among 
themselves; the opposition being restrained by the scruples of 
39 
Newcastle and his older colleagues. Moreover, as yet# the 
alliance between the merchants'and the Newcastle and Rockinghara 
Whigs was still-in its embryonic state. There was no traditioxi 
of co-operation and'the division among, the leaders of the party 
and the fact'that, the merchants were not so strongly opposed 
to the nzea"siire tha't"they were driven to. violent action 
meant 
1 1: 
10 38. See Exbove 'P- 247.39. See above PP- 255-273- 
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that this was not thd opportunity for the inauguration of 
co-operation. In the Stamp Act Crisis both parties were under 
extreme pressure to begin working together. It does seem cleart 
howevery that the passing of the Stamp Act, the 1765 budget add 
the Mutiny and Quartering Acts contributed in a limited way to 
the growing association between the merchants and the Rockingham 
and Newcastle Whigs and paved: the way for the co-operation at 
40 
the time of the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Newcastle's eej-i: 3ýjýt to secure office for some of his more 8 
prominent mercantile supporters when the first Rockingham 
adminietration was formed cannot really be regarded: as an 
gftolltt ýo secure representation for the mercantile interest 
41 
in the administration. It'must be regarded as an attempt to 
secure office for long-standing political adherents and the 
sympathy of the Imonied interest'* Moreover it is symptomatic 
of Newcastle's opinions in 1765 1 'that it was Rockingham who 
considered Sir William Baker for office and not Newcastle 
pressed him to do this, for Baker had been a prominent 
member of wildman' s Cliib' and became alienated from Newcastle 
over the 'Dr-Hay Affair'. ' It is not surprising that the 
merchants who Newcastle suggested for office had never really 
incurred his displeasure'becaiise of the violence of their T; 1i 
opposition. Nor considering Newcastle's ideas on Wildman's 
is it surprising that he did not press for stronger mercantile 
T1 
representation in the'neit*administration. It in also 
t demonstrative"of'Rockingham'B position as mediator between the 
40. See above'PP. 259-27.5.41. See above PP-295-299. 
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two sections of the party that it was he who tried to find a 
42 
position for Baker. 
Yet Newcastle did not entirely neglect mercantile support 
for in the summer of 1765 it was he who was nndeavouring to 
secure the allegiance of Barlow Trecothick, already prominent 
among the American merchantsp by obtaining a seat in Parliament 
43 
for him in the Newcastle interest. 
From the very beginning of the first Rockingham adminis- 
tration American affairs became very important and from August 
1765 events began to march in a direction which was to force 
Rockingham into alliance with the merchants. Contact with merchants 
petitions to the Treasuryp and letters of thanks to the petition- 
ing merchants over the Treasury Minute of 15 November 1765 was 
a full dress rehearsal for, the repeal of the Stamp Act. This 
earlier incident also had the difference of opinion with Charles 
Yorke which heppened again and was to be so important during 
44 
the Stamp Act Crisis. The only thing it really lacked was 
the examination of witnesses by Parliament and this was because 
it was-not necessary to deal with the matter in Parliament. It 
was the gravity of the Stamp Act Crisis and the necessity of 
a full-dress performance before Parliament that led to the full 
organisation of the merchantsland the cementing of the alliance 
with the Rockingham Whigs. 
The eviaence, presented in this thesis does not su#gest that 
Rockingham was pressurised into repealing the Stamp Act 
.. .-ýI 
through mercantile agitation. It cannot be contended that 
42. See above, pp-; &v4-zv. 5.43. See above p. 
44. Cf-pp-318-319 and PP-361-362. 
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Rockingham was not under pressure from the merchants but he 
did come to his decision to repeal the Stamp Act independent 
of this pressure although making fall use of the information 
on trade which the merchants gave. Only when Rockingham had 
4eached his decision could pressure be translated into co-oper- 
ation and a thorough-going alliance between administration and 
45 
merch*B be formed. The fact that Rockingham reached his 
decision at a late date and it was not apparent immediatelys 
made it seem that he was forced to give into mercantile pressure, 
whereas in fact the major reason for the delay was the search 
for information and a policy which would be acceptable to all 
of Rockingham's followers. 
It was the real economic hardship which the merchants 
were undergoing in late V65 which drove them into the arms of 
the administration but it must be admitted that Rockingham 
was forced to seek help from the merchants because of hits 
failure to enlist Pitt's support and because he found it 
difficult to formulAte a policy which was acceptable to the 
King and other political groups in a House of Commons where 
he was already weak. Once policy was aecideds co-operation 
with the merchants could be embarked upon and here it must be 
ad. mitted that Rockingham with supreme skill used his new-found 
46 
allies to execute his pol cy. 
The initiative for-alliance with the Rockingham 71higs 
did not lie entirely in the agitation of the merchants because 
of the slump in their trade. In the autumn of 1765 both 
45. Cf. above PP*365-, 366. See also PP*367-405. 
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Rockingham himself and other leading colleagues in the admin- 
istration were making deliberate effortt to gain information 
47 
and opinions from merchants. In view of the traditions of the 
party and developments in the years of opposition ir=ediately 
before the administration-came to power this is scarcely 
surprising. 
Barlow Trecothick was the key merchant in the campaign 
for the repeal of the Stamp Act. He cannot have been unknown 
to Rocking , ham when direct contact between the two was first 
established in Ibvember 1765p for only a few months before 
Newcastle had been trying to secure Trecothick's eleation at 
Shoreham. Co-operation between thetwo began at informal 
dinner parties but Trecothick's importance increased after 
the formal foundation of-the, London Yerchants Cornmittee on 
48 
December 11165 and his election as its chairman. 1§ the 
circular letter which this body'sent out was not drawn up in 
Rockingham's presence, 'Rockingham. had at least agreed to both 
the idea behind, the letter and its form. Much the same sort 
ot process seems. -to 
have been used when the London merchants' 
petition was drawn ýapat_the end of the year,,, and the organ- 
isation and presentation of, conccrteqýctitions seems to have 
had ministerial,, approval. as does the form, of petitions. The 
merchants showed respect-for their alýies by constructing the 
the petitions in, such general 
49 
was not them, 
terms that the administration 
4'1* See aboveý pp. 
, 
330: 3 0.48. See above P. 344. 
49. Sce. above,, pp., 353 
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Although the critical decision to rep, "'al the Stamp Act was 
taken solely by the party hierarchyp it was taken knowing 
mercantile opiniong feeling mercantile pressure and aware of 
the need for mercantile support. Thuss since it sought 
mercantile support the policy of the administration became 
essentially a compromise between what was cornercially popular 
and what was politically acceptable. 
i Parliament seems to have sensed that the parade of witnessen I 
before it was not an impartial attempt tojascertain the truth 
but an organised c=paign to Corce it into a spocific meaBure. 
This feeling led to the accusations against Rose Fuller, the 
I 
chairman of the co=ittee and the questions to Trecothick 
51 
about the organisation of mercantile, petitions. The task of 
the merchants was to convince uncommitted members that the 
repeal of the Stamp Act was necesaary. for economic reasons 
and to justify Rockingham's policyp when it was likely to be 
challenged by the Grenvilleitea as a submission to force. 
Thd administration had the difficult task of executing a 
p1licy vihioh seemed appropriate yet difficult to itaplement 
because its opponents could interpret it M-0901r--. " JarUkndihation 
of weakness. There is no evidence# however, that Rockingham 
and hie colleagues regarded the policy as the inevitable result 
of overwhelming circ=stances., 
The use of mercantile pressure continued to the very end 
of the repeal, campaignf, There were tentative effortB to 
organise a,, campaign-in the House of Lords similar to that 
BO. See above pp-409-, 4 13. 51. See above pp. 351-378. 
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52 
pursued in the House of Commons and 
tried to ensure that the policy was 
merchants to write to the colonists 
suitable reception for the measure i 
the administration final2y 
succesoful by using the 
in order to obtain a 
53 
vhen it arrived there. 
The credit and reputation gained by the merchants at the 
time of the Stamp Act Crisis enabled them to take the lead 
in planning the Free Ports Act and the other commercial 
legislation of the first Rockingham administration. Heres 
however, the weakness of the merchantsi, their division into 
American and West Indian factions became apparent. This 
legislation was pushed through Parliament in much the same way 
as the repeal of the Stamp Act. Petitions# witnessesp and 
55 
evidence was used but now the ministry had lost its driving 
force. Even though it was hoped to embark upon a comprehensive 
scheme to overhaul the laws of trade they viere growing weaker 
and the great crisis which had stung them into action had 
passed. Thus the Free Ports Act and other cornercial legis- 
lation after-die repeal of the Stamp Actwas very much of an 
anti-climax and the ministry found itself in some ways 
dominated by its commercial allies. Only cormercial Meacure(3 
56 
in i,, ihich they were really interested were becoming legislation 
Yet only in this sense were the merchants dominatitig the 
administration. Rockingham and his colleagues did believe 
in the legislation they enacted and were in no sense driven 
by the need for, mercantile' support along a path which they 
were reluctant to follow- it seems more the case that the 
52. See above PP- 401-403. 53. See above pp. 406:: 409. 
54. See above Pp: -WC 0 PA409U3POve 
432-435. PPO 
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administration was limited in what it achieved by the didisions 
and squabbling among the merchants. Yet as Dr Sutherland 
states the administration 
"Because it had followed without system in the ways of 
others and played for co=rercial support# it was put 
at the mercy pf a new comnercial strength and organ- 
isationp And the Rockingham Ministry saw within a few 
nonthsy what it had certainly never foreseen) the most 
fundamental changes of the century in British trading 
policy. It also saw the most definite otep in the 
growth of the cornmercial ments confidence in their own 
political powerl which among other things formed a basis 
for the widening claim for a greater share to it. But, 
since this was rather accidental to them because of the 
ministryts policy, their practical experience# so far 
from leading them away from the traditions of old Whig 
rule once again consolidated even the extremists among 
them in it. It - 57 
Two mercantile leaders important to the Rockingham Whigs 
ernerged during the first Rockingham administration. These 
were Barlow Trecothick and Abraham Rawlinson. Their careers 
illustrate the tendency of Rockingham to gather life-long 
supporters from allies in one. particular crisis. They did not 
cease to support Rockingham as soon as the administration fell 
from power. Trecothick became the City leader of the Rockingham 
Whigs and Rawlinson and his heirs# although less active politi- 
callyq remained associated with the Rockingham Whigs. Thin 
allegiance was not merely for personal gain for none is 
disceiLnable. It must have been from respect-for Rockingham 
and respect for his principles. It was the support, of men like 
Ravilinson and TrecotLck that pnabled the Rockingham whigs to 
57. lOc-cit-P-56-- 
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survive the long years of opposition and emerge a more broadly 
58 
based party. Yet it cannot be said that Rockinghan made a 
conscious choice of support outside Parliament rath-sr than 
alliance within. It was his strict adherence tp principle and 
his unwillingness to compromise with other political groups 
that forced him to look for support from men like Trecothick 
and Ravilinson. 
Dr. Sutherland writes with reference to the mercantile 
alliance of the Rockingham Whigs 
"A disunited opposition'it was'before 1765p an opposition 
of compromise it became afterwards. " 59 
This staterr,, ent is in many ways true. The mercantile alliance 
was partly responsible for the Rockingham Tihigs failure to 
enter opposition irm-aediately the Chatham administration vian 
formed.. for they realised that Chatham still possessed at leai3t 
,I (- 1-ý, 60 
some claim to be regarded as the champion of the merchantr,. 
It also made them hesitate to form a thorough-going alliance 
with the Grenvilleites for the policy that they had enacted 
when in power in co-operation with their mercantile allies 
61 
had been diametrically opposed to Grenville's policy. It is 
typical that when the party fell from power it was Vewcastle 
who attempted to cultivate the partySts new-found allies. 
Rockinghaii. retire 0 the north and seems to have resumed 
62 
something-of, his traditional UU: ffOr_qMCeto,,. 7ards politics. 
Oti. iror itawunson ana xrecoznicj-ý' see, n7 Barlow Trecothick etc 
PP-00-741,252-5, also-my"Barlow, Treec7thickilloc. clt. 
59. loc. cit. p. 56., 60. See above pp. 456-459. 
61-- See above, pp*'456-514,1 62. See above pp.. 460-462* 
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That the merchants were by no means central to party politico 
at this time is obvious. When the Policy of resignation was 
embarked upon in November 1766 no consideration seems to have 
been. given by the party leaders to the effect that this would 
have on their mercantile following and when hhe party moved 
into more formal opposition at the end of 1766 the real tent 
. 63 
of mercantile loyalty began. 
At first the Rockinghamites do not seem to have been 
aware that their political circumstances had been changed 
through their actions when'in power. They therefore failed 
to give their mercantile followers a lead on the question of 
the East India Company in 1767. and this was to be a question 
t-,, 
-at was to be influential in the, formation of yet another 64 
mercantile group in politicsp the East India group. Newcastle 
in particular was influenced by his former association with the 
65 
tmonied interest' at this time. Nor was mercantile opinion 
taken into account when the negotiations with the Bedford 
Whigs were entered upon and it was decided as an opposition 
66 
tactic to move for the reduction of the Land Tax. Neither of 
these measures were likely to win the favour of the Rocking- 
hamites former mercantile supporters and the links with the 
merchants at this time appear to have &cc7&Lgradually vicaker. 
There is in these eventsp however, very little of the oppoci- 
67 
tion of compromise of, which Doctor Sutherland speaks. Yet it 
was precisely because-_they were not considering the mercantile 
, 11 -, 
63. See above PP-456-469.64. See above pp-470-478- 
65. See above poll' 66. See above PP, 1483-487 67. SUthablandrVEdxundlurke and the First Rockingham Ministry" loc-cit*P. 57. 
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alliancethat the Rockingham Whigs had at this time ceased to 
be an opposition of compromisq. American affairs were coming 
into prominence againy the Rockingham Whigs from both choice 
and obligation began to pay more heed to their mercantile 
followers and their point of view and the opposition became 
again one of compromise. 
The attitude taken by the Rockinghamites to Grenville's 
motion that the colonists should pay for the trvops stationed 
in America and their attitude to the New York Merchants 
petition of 1767 seems to have been conditioned partly by 
their sympathy with mercantile opinion on America. Their 
policy may have been calculated to win mercantile approval 
but there is very little evidence of real consultation or 
68 
close co-operation., This is perhaps not surprising for the 
early period of opposition must again have been a period of 
adjustment both to opposition and to the new alliance of 
the partyp and it is too much to-expect the Rockinghamites 
to change the ways of nearly half a' century, immediately and 
respond at once to a new'pressure group especially when the 
party"was founded so strongly on Whig principles. It was 
, more Rockingham's, -desire for consistency and his attempt 
to 
support the measure's'that he had enacted that the alliance 
continued at-thi's-time than, -any 
consciousýeffort on the 
part of the Rockingham Whigs. ' Thus when the Townshend Duties 
came to be debated not, 'only did both the Rockingham Whigs 
and the-merchanýs miss,. the true significance of the measure 
68. See above. pp., 488-509. 
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but the Rockinghamites fought with their hands tied behind 
their backs because of American resistance to the Mutiny and 
69 
ý4uartering Acts. In the 1767 negotiations with the Bedford 
Vrnigs the Rockinghamites assumedwhat may be described as a 
pro-mercantile attitude because of Rockingham's desire for 
consistency, not through any deliberate consideration of 
70 
mercantile opinion. It was tie4 oný: y the young men of the party# 
men like the Duke of Richmond who saw the true value of the 
71 
mercantile alliance. It was the pressure of the mercantile 
alliance in the past which had helped to forge Rockinghwaite 
policy that prevented the alliance with the Bedford 17higs in 
17679 not pressure from the merchantsotx. Yet when the 
real rupture Nvith the Grenvilleites came over American policy 
in November 3367 it must have been patently obvious to 
Rockingham ancl his followers that 'the difference8iyere not 
purely those of principles"but that their association with 
the mercantile interest was also at stake. A Rockinghamite 
motion to increase the trade of America was the occasion of 
the rupture and the principle challenged the priority of 
72 
expediency over the exertion of a legislative right. Thus the 
final break between the Rockinghamites and the other major 
opplition group occ urred. The Rockinghams were left on their 
own in the opposit'ion - wilderness and unaided'they had to Nvork 
out the implications of the mercantile alliance. 
The general-, -election of-1768 marked-the, begirming ofAho 
69. See above PP'o499-: 500* 70. See a '130ve PPII 505-514* 
71, See above pp-5YI-518.. 72. See Cf. above PP*520-524. 
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consolidation of the co-operation of the merchants which had 
occurred during the first Rockingham administration. The 
importance and value placed on their mercantile followers by 
73 
Rockingham and Newcastle during this general election is obvious. 
Yet it cannot be claimed that they were pioneering a new rela- 
tionship and going out of their way to encourage new supporters. 
The developments which took place at this time were far m6re 
a consolidation of the past; it was the consolidation of the 
achievement during the Stamp Act Crisis. Yet this election 
mast have done much to re-inforce in Rockingham's mind an 
appreciation of the value and importance of his mercantile 
associates. Moreover with the retirement of Newcastle a few 
74 
months before he died the old emphatil of alliance with the 
tmonied interest' and alliance with another political group, 
in many ways opposed to the mercantile alliance#was removed. 
Rockingham was left free to find'his own path. It was not easy,, 
for the immediate American issues(resistance to the Townshend 
Duties and the Liberty Incident) which came to the forefront 
so soon after Rockingham had assumed sole control of the partyv 
s; ich a way 75 
were not structured sn3, Athat mercantile support could be utiliced. 
Thus the early years of opposition after 1766 were not 
**@jgj5r- productive of any real new development in the field of 
mercantile support. They saw the consolidation of the position 
that Rockingham had assumed when in*power and in alliance with 
the merchants. They saw a certain amount of mercantile 
Beg above pp.. 526-544.74. See above pp. 
b-bGO. 
75. See above pp.. 549-5b8. 
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influence and sympathy for the mercantile classes but it mast 
be admitted that the Rockinghamites did not capitalise fully 
on the value of their mercantile allies and when they consid- 
ered the viewpoint of the merchants their opposition became 
one of compromise. 
In the succeeding years the implications of the mercantile 
alliance at the time of the Stamp Act crisis were worked out 
as 
but/the attitude-of the Rockingham Whigs hardened on issues 
such as America and constitutional reform they alienated 
sections of mercantile opinion and they could only retain 
tmiddle-of-the-r. oad' support. Indeed it seems true to say 
that only at the time of thezStamp Act Crisis did the Rocking- 
ham Whigs have the practically unanimous support of the 
mercantile classes. Thus Burke's statement that the Rocking- 
76 
ham Whigs were the party of trade can only be accepted 
with strict limitations. The Rockingham Whigs represented 
the trading interest more than any other Political party 
during the yenrs'1761-68 but the policy was never an 
unqualified and committed support for the trading intereat. 
76. Cf. above 
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(B) ITENICASTIEpROCKINGRAIT AIM THE ROC"KINGRAY IMIGS. 
The picture of Newcastle that emerges during this thesis 
is far more the picture drawn by Winstanley and Professor 
Butterfield than that dravin by Horace Walpole, Namier and 
77 
Mr. John Brooke. It is impossible to deny Newcastle's chort- 
comings., his constant suspicionsf Jealousies and readiness to 
take affront. Yet he emerges in this work as a careful 
administrator of a party machine and often seems to see to the 
heart of a political matter in terms of political tactics 
far better than many of his colleagues. it is true that he 
had long experiance of poiitical affairs and this experience 
was paying dividends but the ability t6 
past experience is indicative of some political ability. 
it is true, that Newcastle seer-,. B. to have had very. little 
success as an opposition leader*after 1761 but he. had been 
in power for nearly all his life and it is perhaps too much 
to ask an old man to be sufficiently flexible-to change the 
habits of a lifetime and suddenly emerge as a capable active 
opposition leader, especially in the condition of the early 
yeýrs of the reign of Gebrge III.: Perhaps the characteristic 
of Newcastle which dominates the picture drawn of him in thit3 
thesis is that of industry. Thislytas fortum-te for Rocking- 
ham's strongest characteristic was indifference to the 
W. Cf. Winstanley Personal and Party Governme pp 10 12., 
Lord Chhtham axZ_theI7hirr Opposition pp-lb--15, George TIT 
and the Historians by Herbert Butterfield Londc7n l9b'Ij* 
pp-245-248 et passi ]2assi 9 Namierp England in the Age 
_etc 
P. 110 et, passi .9 
Brooke o1p. cit. 
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administrative and patronage affairs that Newcastle loved so 
much. As Rockingham rose to power Newcastle could thus be 
complementary to him.. and the value of his industry became 
obvious when the party took power againjoand when the Stamp Act 
Crisis occurred Newcastle was given ample opportunity to show 
his flair for mustering and organising support and counting 
votes. As Professor Butterfield says Newcastle practised 
Burke's idea of a party system 
"As a resultp Nevicastle had a contribution to make; and 
some part of his work was actually inherited by the 
Rockingham Whigs. He was the real founder of that 
connectiont though he did not in fact work out an 
adequate idea of party - dia'4615ealisej for examplep 
how his own f olloviing was doomed to be reduced an soon 
as he came into conflictwith George 111-" 78 
In much the same way this thesis points to the fact that 
the current fashion of writing off Rockingham as a mere 
nonentityi, a puppet whose strings were usually controlled by 
79 
Buricep needs careful re-examination. Rockinghamwao still a 
young man when the story narrated in this thesis ends in 1768,, 
but he had emerged into the front-rank of political leaders. 
Although it may be acknowledged-that his high birth and 
aristocratic background originally gave him political import- 
ance on the local scale it was his own personality that made 
him a national poliiical'leader. That he was interested in 
national political events can be seen from the year 1761-1762, 
but it was his supreme ability as a mediator between conflict- 
ing interests that eventually enabled him to come to the 
78. Butterfield 22-cit. p. 23,46. 
79. Cf. above p. 3j and pp. 34 - 409 2assim SO. See above 1? 1). 156. , 
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forefront of the political scene. Wildman's gave him his 
chance and this was taken. Perhaps Rockingham has been mis- 
judgedt because he more than any other eighteenth century 
political leader did not want political power and was extremely 
: Ljldif-f-erýtnt; ý; t4). I. i-t.. But when he was forced to take political 
responsibilityp as he was when he formed his first administra- 
tionp he proved himself industrioust capable and tactful. 
Which other political leader besides Rockingham could have 
solved the problems created by Grenville's American Stamp Act 
without creating any antagonism, except from the Grenvilleites 
who were bound to be antagonistic unless their policy was 
enforced ? Indeed if Rochingham is to be criticized at the 
time of the Stamp Act Crisis it must'be on the ground that he 
was too meticulous in seerUng a solution to the crisis that 
would accommodate all the interests involved. one must 
however, agree with Winstanley when he writes that Rockingham 
was not 
"adapted by nature to be a leader of men or a champion 
of a lost cause. " 81 
and that 
it shy and retiring by disposition# a poor speakers and 
rarely taking part in debates he was the pilot who 
shunned rather than weathered the storm. " 82 
Yet it shoula always be borne in nind, that Rockingham was 
Perpetually dogged by ill-health. Born with a congenital 
chest. complaint he contracted syphilis whilat on the grand 
tour and'theseý'tiio"conditions were to dog him for the rest 
81. winstanley, Personal and PartX Government P. M. 
82. lbid-P-243., 
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13. 
of his li e Against physidbal handicaps such as these it seems 
remarkable that he should have achieved what he did in leading 
a party and as the head of two administrations. 
Rockingham's rise as a party leader can be dated from the 
time when he began to mediate between the opposing factions 
of the Newcastle Whig hierarchy and gave in to the younger 
more violent members demand for a club on 21 December 1762. 
From this time onwards Rockingham became of increasing 
importance. as he vies the only person able to keep the syrTathy 
of both wings of the party. This vies particularly the case 
when open war was declared between Newcastle and the younger 
84 
zealots over the I'Dr-Hay Affair". Rockingham came through 
unscathed. Accusations of. violence were not hurled against 
him by Ndwcastle and the lloldýguard', I, and he remained popular 
with the Wildman's group.,.. Thus, Rockinghambecane marked out 
for leadership of the. party and his., rapid rise to power was 
hastened by the death within, eigh, teen months of most of the 
older members of the party who--could have challenged him for 
85 
power. The peculiar circumstances which surrounded the 
negotiations of V65 set_the, sealýon Rockingham's position. 
He was the onlyperson.., whom, leverybody 
might accept# that 
could form a ±nistry, atlthis time. In power he proved himaelf 
inclustrious in seeking, informationand. capable of taking 
decisions. Moreover his ability-to-keep his head in a tire of 
extreme strain must have emerged during the long months of 
83. See above p. 294 n. 17.84. See above pp- 221-225. 
85. See above I%p. 284-288.86. See above pp. 289-300 
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the Stamp Act Crisis and above all the quality which Burke 
was so ready to acknowledgep the ability to accommodate and 
87 
reconcile different interests. It must also be admitted that 
Rockingham had sufficient political acumen to turn quite 
readily to the allies.. the merchantsp who presented themselves 
at a time when he was so desperately in need of support. 
When the first Rockingham administration fell from power 
and Rockingham became for the first time a true opposition 
leader his limitations became apparent. Because he was in- 
dAff9rPrA- to political povier he was not suited to be an 
opposition leader if the duty of that leader was to get his 
party back into power as quickly-as possible. To Rockingham 
the return to power came low on a long list of priorities at 
the top of which were the maintenance of his Whig principles 
and the defence, of the policy which he had enactedwhen in 
power. Thus he became preoccupied with consistency and this 
principle often ran counter to any hopes of achieving officep 
and his capacity as an opposition leader was far more than his 
capacity as the leader of an administration. Little evidence 
has emerged during the course of this thesis to support 11r. 
Brooke's contention that Rockingham liked first place in 
general both as an administration and party leader. Nor is 
there evidencet"as, *. Brooke suggestsp that-Rockingham lacked 
87. See above p. 288, 
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application# was ambitiousq "shone in history with the reflected 
light of other men! ' or wasp as Walpole contends 
"a weak., childish and ignorant man# by no means fit for 
the head of Administration! '. 88 
Moreover this thesis supports Professor Butterfield's conten- 
tion that there is continuity in the Rockingham Whigs as a 
political party from the days of Newcastle to those of Rocking- 
89 
ham. It shows them as a group not created but inherited by 
Rockinghanj6d definitely, something more than an ordihary faction. I 
It also shows that they were always concerned with trade and 
mercantile opinion and they represented these factions probably 
more than any other party. Yet political principles were never 
sacrificed for mercantile support and mercantile connections,, 
although important to the party were never an overwhelming 
influence in the period under consideration. 
88. Brooke op-cit-p-25 quoting Walpole 22-cit-Vol-III. 9p. 222* 89. Butterfield 
. 
22. cit. pp. 221-1222.? 
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